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ABSTRACT
Foreign Policy Formation And The Interaction Between Domestic And 
International Environments: A Study of Change in Turkish Foreign Policy 
During 1980
Mustafa Aydin
PhD, Lancaster University, August 1994
M otivated by both increased international interest in Turkey and concerns over its 
future and the directions its foreign policy is taking in the face o f  the systemic changes 
that have swept through world politics since 1979 onwards, this thesis attempts to 
study contemporary Turkish foreign policy from a dynamic-analytical perspective by 
concentrating on the dynamics o f change, instead o f stability.
In this context, this study sets out to assess the argument that, although a high 
level o f  continuity in Turkish foreign policy had followed on both from the basic 
features o f the country's situation, and from the attitudes entrenched in the foreign 
policy making elite, shifts in emphasis - which had hitherto occurred within this pattern 
o f  continuity - came to a point during the 1980s when a different set o f  attitudes, 
patterns and directions became discernible, and as such demanded new explanations as 
to  what determines and affects the basic directions o f Turkish foreign policy.
In explaining this "change", the foundations o f Turkey's foreign policy-making 
in the 1980s are analyzed from both the theoretical and practical aspects, and two sets 
o f  variables are identified as being instrumental in stimulating change: domestic socio­
political and economic developments, and environmental circumstances. M oreover, it is 
shown that these variables, in the Turkish context, function in such a way as to  remain 
interactive and to  continually reinforce each other and also induce changes in foreign 
policy, which in turn excite reactions in the former. Therefore linkage patterns are used 
in this study both to show the interaction between different variables, and to emphasize 
connections between these variables and the changes that occurred in Turkey's foreign 
policy setting.
When applied to a case study o f the period 1980-1991, these variables 
corroborate the view that a certain set o f changes occurred in the fundamental 
principles and directions o f Turkish foreign policy, without upsetting its pro-western 
orientation as yet, because of:
-. changes in the nature o f the political regime and the reactions received from 
abroad, especially from Europe where Turkey's linkage patterns are most strong;
changes in the economic nature o f  the country and the necessities o f  the new 
development strategy;
-. changes within the policy-making system which came to operate in such a 
way as to incorporate and uphold those who favour change because o f their ideological 
inclinations or cultural values;
-. and changes in the international environment which affected the country's 
perceptions o f itself as well as others.
As a result, this study concludes that Turkey entered the decade o f  the 1990s 
with diversified external connections, more active and balanced pursuits in international 
relations, and a purposeful and multi-dimensional foreign policy with a certain emphasis 
on Turkey's immediate neighbourhood, that is the Middle East, the Balkans, and the 
Caucasus.
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C H A PT E R  ONE
IN TR O D U C TIO N
C ontext o f the  S tudy
Turkey is not one o f the great powers o f the Twentieth century. H er geopolitical 
location, however, has enabled her to play a potentially higher role in world politics 
than otherwise would have been possible. She holds the key not only to the Turkish 
Straits but lies along the roads from the Balkans to the Middle East and from the 
Caucasus to the Persian Gulf. She is a member o f the biggest surviving military bloc 
and most European organizations, as well as an associate member o f the European 
Community. Her political involvement and exposed position assign her an importance 
hardly matched by any other medium power. Accordingly, the correct evaluation o f 
this country's policies is o f crucial importance. Furthermore, as one o f the small 
number o f non-W estern societies successfully struggling to modernize both country 
and people, together with the aim o f evolving workable parliamentary democracy, she 
has long seemed to offer lessons and insights into an important political process.
Yet, the interest she is getting in the Western media and the amount o f the 
scholarly works on Turkey, produced especially from an international relations 
perspective, do not match the importance conferred upon her by other players in 
international politics. Given her frequently expressed strategic importance on the edge 
o f Europe, the Middle East, and the former Soviet Union, this may seem surprising. 
For to this very reason, however, it is difficult to place Turkey into any neat category 
that the area specialists and foreign policy analysts like to draw before starting their 
research. N ot only does Turkey not appear to fit any one geographical category, but it 
does not fit any one cultural, political or economic category either. About 97 % o f her 
landmass lies in Asia, and yet Turkey's progressive elites consider their country as part 
o f Europe. About 98 % of her population is Moslem, and yet Turkey is a secular 
country by choice and her religious development through the years has taken a 
different path from that o f other Islamic countries. Culturally, most o f the country
reflects the peculiarities o f wider Middle Eastern culture, and yet she, with an equal 
persistency, participates in European cultural events. She professes to have a liberal 
economic system, but the remnants o f the planned economy still hamper the country's 
development. In religious, historical and geographical senses she is a Middle Eastern 
country, yet any development impinging upon the status quo o f the Balkans and the 
Caucasus directly affects Turkey just as much. Thus these conflicting facts indicate 
wider uncertainties about the placing and the role o f the country.
A sense o f confusion about Turkey seems to reign not only in external 
appearances, but also in the deep-rooted convictions o f her people. Age-old 
discussions within the country between the "eastern ideaf'and the "western ideal" 
about the exact nature o f the country and her people appear to be as lively today as 
they have ever been. Hence, while on the one hand, the conviction that Turkey should 
be part o f  Europe was demonstrated by her application for membership o f the 
European Community in 1987, on the other, one could hear calls for the severing o f 
relations with the W est and the establishment o f an Islamic Common M arket instead.
This uncertain self-identity and sense o f confusion has likewise been reflected in 
Turkey's domestic political structure that has alternated between periods o f civilian 
governments and military rule, which has had important implications for her external 
relations. While the military has emerged since 1960 as the defender o f the Kemalist 
principles, especially the unitary and republican-secular character o f  the state, and the 
most pro-western segment o f the society, the periods o f civilian supremacy - though, 
strictly speaking, total civilian control over the military has always been questionable - 
has brought to power policy-makers o f various creeds with their varying emphasises pn 
different aspects o f Turkey's ambivalent identity. Consequently political struggle 
between grass-root politicians, with their less than "modem" appearances and 
attitudes, and the alliance o f "westernized" civil-military elites has been keynote to 
these periods. Moreover, during the period immediately before the 1980 military 
takeover, Turkey was riven by domestic conflicts which, in part, reflected this 
ambivalence and plunged Turkish foreign policy into depths o f uncertainty and
indecisiveness, due to the inability o f various opinion-holders to effectively take 
control o f the decision-making body. The takeover itself meant that foreign policy, as 
well as all other aspects o f Turkish socio-political life, was thereafter determined by the 
peculiar national mission o f the Turkish military, which by this time had differentiated 
itself even from those o f western-minded civilian elites and bureaucrats. Though their 
overall foreign policy stance seemed to conform with the long-standing guiding 
principles o f Turkish foreign policy, they, nevertheless, due to various unforeseen 
reasons, dealt with in chapter three, had to experiment with different variations; thus 
came Turkey's forced isolation from Europe and her opening towards the Middle East 
and former Communist Block. The civilian governments from 1983 onwards, however, 
unlike their military predecessor, were more open to popular pressures as well as more 
representative o f popular images. On the other hand, they too, being true to popular 
Turkish tradition, created a "father figure", Mr Ozal, whose distinctive sense o f 
Turkey's place in the world came to dominate the country's foreign policy in the second 
half o f 1980s as well as affecting some o f its fundamental principles.
As even the Turkish intelligentsia has demonstrated doubts from time to time 
about the way their country has been conducting her policies, both domestic and 
foreign, it is hardly surprising to see that a sense o f uncertainty also reigns among 
W estern statesmen, scholars, and journalists alike about Turkey's intentions and foreign 
policy priorities.
Particularly since the 1970s, Western political analysts, statesmen, and media 
spokesmen have seemed increasingly confused about Turkey's intensified 
rapprochement with Islam in both the domestic and international spheres. Although 
they seem to agree that the implications o f a reversal in Turkey's Western-oriented, 
secular foreign policy could be serious for Western security interests, since had Turkey 
been "a less stable country - or a less pro-Western one - the last four decades o f 
European and Middle Eastern history would have turned out very differently", * they 
do not appear yet to comprehend the extend o f changes both in Turkey and her foreign 
policy.
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There was a time - during the 1950s - when Turkey's resolute renunciation o f 
the idea o f an Islamic conference was unceasing, and it was then that Turkey was taken 
for granted and greeted as a reliable - that is, unquestioning - ally o f the West in the 
international arena. This was, however, a long time ago, and one thing appears to be 
certain today: that through the 1970s, while Turkish trust in West was corroding, 
general confidence in Turkey as a faithful ally o f the Western world, too, has been 
shaken considerably. There were increasing concerns, specially after Turkish-US 
relations had received heavy blows from the continuing Cyprus crises, about Turkey's 
perceived shift from the West and questions were raised about whether the tensions 
would cause Turkey to leave the alliance.
Certainly, the Cyprus crisis o f  1974 led to consequences far beyond Turkey's 
boundaries and affected some o f the fundamentals o f Turkish foreign policy. The 
disappointment Turkey felt with its Western allies during and after the crises, the 
immediate embargo imposed upon her, and the loneliness in international forums, 
forced Turkey to search for additional and "reliable" friends. Obvious targets for this 
search were culturally and religiously close Islamic countries, and geographically near 
but, due to ideological reasons, hitherto neglected Communist countries. As a result, 
Turkey's relations with the Islamic countries and the Communist bloc afterwards 
increased. However, this forced-enlargement in Turkey's international environment did 
not bring with it an immediate change either in her orientations or to her pace o f 
foreign policy. Thus the much sought after dynamism and activity in Turkish foreign 
policy was yet to come and international interest in Turkey dissolved as quickly as it 
had amassed.
From 1979 onwards, however, there was a new focus on Turkey because o f 
what was perceived as a sudden threat against Western interests in the Middle East. 
The occupation o f  Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, the Iranian revolution and the 
closure o f US military bases almost immediately, and above all the strength o f the 
Islamic revival in the region, meant that the "loss" o f Turkey, the only remaining
4
Western ally in the region with the exception o f the US's bilateral relations with Israel, 
would have dealt a major blow to Western interests in the region.
After the 1980 military takeover in Turkey, concern about its future in the 
W estern alliance further increased as contacts between Turkey and the Islamic states 
intensified, parallelling the increased activity o f the Muslim groups in Turkey. In the 
mean time, the fact that Turkey's relations with the West, especially with Europe, were 
passing through a bad patch generated further worries and questions about the 
country's future. Was Turkey's "strengthening o f her ties with the Arab world to the 
detriment o f relations with Western Europe"? Wouldn't there seem to be "political 
risks to increasing trade with the Soviets and with those Middle Eastern countries". 
Could Turkey "take a radically different line from its present political course and go 
Islamic or Communist"?^ The fact that these and similar questions have been given 
negative answers numerous times by Turkish statesmen did not seem to matter much; 
why, then, it was asked, "Turkey's markedly closer relations with the Islamic world 
which have been visible" during the 1980s?^ The questions kept coming at a changing 
rate and regularity depending on the situation in the region. The Iran-Iraq war, for 
example, again intensified the questions about Turkey's interests and policies. As the 
issues o f water, the Kurds, and the spread o f Islamism have all served to drag Turkey 
more firmly into Middle Eastern affairs during the 1980s, both the interest in and 
questions about Turkey intensified. At the same time, the almost simultaneous break­
up o f  the former Soviet Union, while further generating international interest in the 
region, brought about yet more unanswered questions. Would Turkey have any grand 
designs towards the Turkic states o f the former Soviet Union?
If  one looks through recent literature and polemics about Turkey, it appears 
that almost everyone seems to agree that something is happening in Turkish foreign 
policy that has not been satisfactorily explained by either Turkish statesmen or Turkey 
specialists. But there seems to be no agreement as to what is happening and where it 
leads the country. While some argue that Kemalism is "in the process o f being buried 
with Ozal",^ and Turkey "...is facing the most serious threat from Islamic forces since
the inception o f the modern republic sixty-three years ago",^ others do not seem so 
sure as to whether "Turkish secularism is likely to be compromised" in the international
Q
and domestic spheres. They all maintain, however, that "...if pressures from 
international politics become too strong, it is not inconceivable that they will 
strengthen those who would like to see greater emphasis on Islam as a guide in the 
conduct o f  internal affairs".^ Such a development could, naturally, have serious foreign 
policy implications for Turkey. Others disagree. They argue that a "newly diversified 
Turkish foreign policy is bound to weaken even further the demagogic appeal on the 
Turkish domestic scene o f such themes as Islamic fundamentalism and neutralism. 
Thus it will contribute indirectly but materially to the country's political stability". ^  
Moreover, they maintain that "the tendency to move away from Western culture", 
which has been enjoyed only by the elite, was natural in a "democratic age o f 
consumerism". * *
Some warn that even if the changes taking place in eastern Europe and in the 
former Soviet Union, and growing economic relations with the Middle East do not
cause Turkey to  turn more firmly towards the Eastern option, then "the rejection o f
19 • •Turkey from Europe certainly will". Others urge that the improved political relations
between Turkey and the Arab world need "to be watched carefully for indications o f
13changes in Turkey's foreign and domestic politics alike".
One may ask, then, why there are so many and often such conflicting 
arguments about Turkey and her intentions, and what has happened to Western trust in 
Turkey? Why did confidence in Turkey's future with the Western alliance disappear in 
the late 70s and early 80s?
The obvious answer to the first question is that, in the absence o f in-depth 
studies covering exclusively different aspects o f Turkish foreign policy and its 
fundamentals, it would be too optimistic to expect any analysis to be accepted without 
further critical inspection. The truth is that studies o f Turkey in general, and Turkish 
foreign policy in particular, have not yet progressed to the point where a "standard" 
view o f the country and its prospects has emerged. Isolated by the Ottoman history,
language and culture from the West, and by the Republican history and political choice 
from the East, Turkey thus stands as an unique case, one which has not often been 
considered to be o f great interest to scholars o f international relations in general. 
Hence, Turkish foreign policy appears to be o f interest only to Turks and a narrow 
circle o f Turkish-speaking scholars, who, under the various constraints, seem to 
concentrate their studies on the relatively narrow paths o f practical descriptions o f 
Turkey's relations with number o f countries such as Greece, the US and more recently 
the EG. As a result the very small number o f general ideological and foundational 
analysis o f  Turkish foreign policy and various attempts to present Turkish reality as a 
coherent whole have long been outdated by the rapidly changing character o f  the 
country. As for the polemical coverage o f  the country by the Western media, one 
bound to say that it is restricted in scope and often confusing, if not misleading. 
Therefore there seems to be an urgent need for a comprehensive in-depth study o f 
contemporary Turkish foreign policy since the most recent work in this regard appears 
dating from early 1970s and is now, o f course, out o f date. ^
Finding answers to the latter questions is not easy, and appears to generate 
more questions to be answered. It is true that, as we mentioned earlier, Turkey's 
relations with the Islamic countries and the Communist bloc increased after the 1960s. 
But can this justify the conclusion that there has been a "shift" from the West? Do we 
need more evidence to show that a shift has, in fact, taken place? Why do official 
Turkish statements that Turkey remains tied to the West not carry the same weight as 
they did in the 1960s? Are Turkish leaders, who do not seem as concerned as some in 
the W est, mistaken? Or are they deliberately misleading world opinion? I f  so, why, and 
what has happened to traditional Turkish contempt for the Arabs and fear o f 
Communism and the Russians? And are there obstacles to Turkey's further 
rapprochement with the Muslim and Communist countries? Where did the partial 
rejection o f the EC leave Turkey?
To find answers to the above questions is the main motivation behind this 
study. It is not the aim o f this study, however, to answer the question about whether
there has been a deviation from the Western-oriented and secular Kemalist line in 
Turkish foreign policy during the 70s and 80s. Since this dissertation presupposes that 
there has been a change in Turkish foreign policy, it is aimed at studying this change 
and its results. Therefore, the main focus o f this study will be to identify the changing 
patterns o f Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s; to find the reasons behind them; 
and to show linkages between both external and internal environmental 
conditionalities, and changing patterns and the actual foreign policy actions o f Turkey. 
M oreover, an attempt will be made to answer the question o f whether the increasing 
orientation o f  Turkish foreign policy toward new centres reflects a definite 
transformation or is merely a passing phase. In other words, are the changes Turkey 
experienced throughout 1980s, and continues to experience today, here to stay or 
likely to revert back in the foreseeable future?
(Non)Theoretical Framework for Analysis
It should be mentioned right from the beginning that this study will not make an 
attempt at theorising about either international relations or foreign policy based on 
assumptions from this dissertation. Rather, this study wishes to emphasize that "the 
foreign policy o f every single state is an integral part o f  its peculiar system o f 
government" and reflects its special circum stances.^ As such it does not allow 
generalizations embracing all states, since this may cause us to lose sight o f the 
political realities that we are studying.
Clearly, there is a temptation among scholars, not only o f foreign policy, but 
also o f other areas o f  learning, to generalise when evidence o f  apparently similar 
experiences and development processes is readily to hand. It is generally assumed that 
there are patterns in the foreign policy o f nations and not just single acts. A knowledge 
o f the pattern - the "policy" - o f an actor is expected to be useful for explaining and 
predicting actions. I f  it can be shown that an action fits into a pattern - that is, the actor 
behaves as he usually does, or says that it is his policy to do - it means in one sense
that his action is explained. Similarly, if a pattern is known, it could be anticipated what 
the actor will be likely to do in the future. In other words, a regular feature o f  
international politics would be brought into the open - a feature that may, however, be 
more or less amenable to c h an g e .^  But there is also danger that such generalisations 
may prevent us from recognizing the diversity o f forms which foreign policy, or any 
other development for that matter, can actually take. Therefore, our understanding not 
only o f  Turkish experience but also foreign policies elsewhere, is likely to be much 
more productive if we avoid starting from the assumption that there are general forms 
o f behaviour in international relations which could explain all the relationships between 
states. Instead each case needs to be located in its specific conditionalities within the 
uneven international system. Rather than imposing general labels on states, we should 
aim to understand the development o f the international system by trying to  explain the 
varying forms which foreign policies could take in different situations and at different 
times. In this context, Turkey is one part o f the international system, and needs to be 
understood as a unique part o f that system, yet as a part which is in a complex set o f 
interrelations with other parts. Although one part or another o f her interrelations could 
be fitted into, or explained by, one o f the various different international relations and 
foreign policy analysis approaches, almost all o f them, however, fail after a certain 
point to  explain Turkish foreign policy as a coherent whole.
Much writing on foreign policy suggests that we can compare countries with
similar characteristics and that particular types o f countries have matching particular
types o f foreign p o lic ies .^  Leaving aside the contentious question o f  whether we can
justifiably define types o f society, the literature on foreign policy seems to focus on five
components that are eventually used in labelling the various countries: (1) Size, status
and international involvement; (2) Economic, social and political development; (3)
Internal political order; (4) Ideological orientations; and (5) Organizational 
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One o f  the favourite categories o f foreign policy analysts that comes 
immediately into mind, especially when thinking in terms o f development, is the group
of states loosely termed as the "Third World". Turkey, undoubtedly, shares important 
features with many other "developing" or "newly industrialising" countries o f  the 
world, a possible sub-group o f more general classification: Third World. It is clear that 
they are experiencing similar economic, political and social upheavals. Yet, differences 
arising from distinctive historical experiences and geographical setting compel Turkey 
to  react differently to  international developments.
M ost o f these countries have been hounded by their colonial past which has 
affected their position in the world and responses to events. In contrast, Turkey was 
never colonized, and was thus spared the after-effects o f colonialism. Consequently 
while the great majority o f the "Third World" states chose non-alignment after the 
Second World War, when most o f them achieved their independence, Turkey 
consistently remained within the Western alliance system. This, being the only "Third 
World" country in constant alignment with the West to the point o f  belonging to 
NATO, set her apart right from the beginning and, especially in the foreign policy 
arena, demanded a different set o f actions, aims o f which have been in contradiction 
with the wishes o f other "Third World" countries.
Even if we were to ignore the significant historical and geopolitical differences, 
Turkey still does not appear to fit into any one clear category even in terms o f strict 
economic indicators. Although the World Bank classifies Turkey as a middle-income 
country, a category that she shares with many other "Third World" countries, she is 
also a member o f the OECD, known as the "rich man's club" which essentially 
comprises the developed industrial nations that operate market economies, and which 
with the exceptions o f  Greece, Portugal, and Turkey are all in the World Bank's "high- 
income" group.
In theoretical terms, the schools o f thought which have dominated development 
studies since the early 1970s, the various dependency and underdevelopment 
approaches, see the world as divided into "developed" and "underdeveloped" areas. In 
many respects, Turkey may appear to be typically underdeveloped, but this appearance 
o f  underdevelopment is misleading and cannot taken for granted. While Turkey is
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rapidly industrialising country, and thus "her incorporation into the world capitalist 
system, and her disadvantaged place in the international division o f  labour, has created 
economic, political and social problems which are common in other parts o f  the 
w o r ld " ,^  a systemic analysis o f  the development o f her economic and political 
structures, makes it clear that while there are many similarities with other "typically 
underdeveloped" nations, there are also significant dissimilarities. This makes the use 
o f  the label "underdeveloped" problematic, since in many respects Turkey has not been 
subject to  what are widely thought o f as typical processes o f "underdevelopment".
There has been a tendency in development studies for the dominant theories to 
be general theories and to emphasise the common characteristics o f typical
development process. However, the case o f Turkey has already been used to show the
70inadequacies o f  world-wide generalisations o f this sort.
While still within the general framework o f the "Third World", another
approach, that is modernization theories, comes to mind which was especially used
during the 1950s and 1960s to explain the process o f massive socio-economic and
political change that began in Europe towards the end o f the Middle Ages and has
become a world-wide phenomenon in the Twentieth Century. Broadly speaking,
modernization theory suggests that societies move through a developmental process
from a relatively simple and primitive state to one o f increasing complexity. Although
each society may have its unique traditions, the process o f modernization involves
elements that are characteristics o f all modernizing societies. If  we assume that each
society starts from a traditional pattern, we can describe a general set o f structures,
71values, and interactions that all modernizing societies will manifest.
Sure enough, contemporary Turkey has participated in this revolutionary 
development that has swept across the world. Consequently, there have been studies to 
explain Turkish modernization and also attempts to use Turkey as an example for other 
modernizing countries.22 However, the problem with this approach, apart from the 
fact that it has been widely criticized for being Euro-centric and partially discredited by 
later theories o f dependency, is that the Turks, in many respects, experienced
modernization a generation earlier than other modernizing Twentieth century 
countries, in the wake o f the collapse o f the Ottoman Empire at the end o f World War 
One. In a sense, in fact, "she blazed the trail that other Third World countries were to 
follow a quarter o f a century later".22 In particular, they successfully defended their 
claim to political independence and statehood and to the development o f their 
autonomous industry and economy. Consequently, these historical differences in 
experiences make it difficult to study Turkey comparatively. M oreover, though Turkey
is still a modernizing country, especially with regard to concepts o f authority,
94democracy and economic development, Turkish foreign policy o f today is a result
o f a much more complex interplay o f factors - to be studied by this dissertation - than
9Scan be explained simply by modernization theories.
Another category o f states which comes to mind immediately when talking 
about Turkey is that o f  the Middle Eastern/Islamic countries, because o f similarities in 
culture and religion. However, this category, too, is not as strong as it implies in the 
first instance when it comes to explaining Turkey. Above all, Turkey does not share 
two dominant characteristics o f  the region. Firstly, with the exception o f Iran and 
Israel, all other countries in the region share a common ethnicity, that is they are all 
Arab countries. Obviously Turkey cannot be part o f any groupings in the Middle East 
based on ethnicity. The other common factor uniting the Middle Eastern countries, 
with the exception o f Israel, is their adherence to Islam. This, too, is problematic for 
Turkey since her religious evolution took a different path in the Twentieth century 
from the rest o f the Islamic world and she consciously chose to be a secular state, 
despite the fact that the overwhelming majority o f her population is Muslim. Indeed 
since the "Kemalist revolution" o f 1923, Islam in Turkey has been redefined. 
Secularism emerged as one o f the key principles o f the new state, and religious 
expression came under strict government supervision and control. Thus through the 
years "Turkish Islam in effect became more standardized, circumscribed and 
compartmentalized, while republican ideology and associated institutions came to 
dominate much o f everyday life"26 As a result, it was argued that "there is... a specific
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Turkish national, political, cultural and religious tradition coming together to form a 
Turkish national identity quite separate from that o f  the Arabs to the South and the 
Persians to  the E a s t" .^  Consequently, these differences led to the claim that Turkey is 
different from other Muslim societies, "the exception that proves the ru le " .^
The one category o f states that Turkish elite consider their country to  be part 
of, i.e. Europe, is also problematic as Europeans do not appear to  share the same 
conviction, and, in addition to geographical distinctiveness, her cultural, religious and 
historical development set her apart from Europe, if not against it.
Turkey has also been categorized in the past as a "small state" and depicted as
sharing the same conditionalities as other small states vis-a-vis her relations towards 
9Qthe "big powers". This approach again proved unreliable as Turkey, because o f  her 
exceptional strategic location, has been able to act in international politics in a 
considerably more independent and influential way than other small states. Moreover, 
Turkey o f 1980s could hardly be considered a small state, especially compared with 
her neighbours.
In terms o f country size, Turkey is thrice the size o f United Kingdom, and sits 
comfortably with her neighbours when her 769,630 sqkm compared with Bulgaria's 
110,550; Greece's 130,850; Cyprus's 9,240; Iraq's 437,370; and Syria's 184,060. In 
term s o f population, her 57.08 million in 1988 stands impressively against Greece's 
10.01; Bulgaria's 8.99; Syria's 11.34; Iraq's 17.25; and Cyprus's 0.55 million.30 The 
only other countries in the region which could be compared with Turkey are Iran and 
Egypt, both in terms o f population, 52.52m. and 51.90m. respectively, and in terms o f 
area, 1,636,000 sqkm and 995,450 sqkm respectively. However, Iran's "Islamic 
Republic" and Egypt's low-level income and development, put them apart from 
Turkey.3 1
Consequently, Turkey's categorisation as a small state in international relations 
seems to be restricted to the early republican period and the only later application o f 
this approach appears to be during such an extreme international situation as the
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s e c o n d  W o r l d  W a r ,  w hic h  is hardly re levant  to o u r  u n d e r s t a n d in g  o f  Turk ish  fore ign 
policy o f  the I980s.3^
Therefore, both because the foreign policy analyst needs to  examine 
combinations o f factors which are often unique to each country, and because Turkey 
stands aside remarkably distinctive from her surroundings both historically and 
geographically, and does not appear to fit any one regional or sub-regional system, this 
study puts emphasis on a historical and country-specific rather than a theoretical and 
comparative approach. Consequently, ii concerns itself only with the foreign policy o f 
Turkey during the period o f 1980-1991, and attempts to find out why Turkey acted as 
she did during this period.
Nonetheless, although various methods o f comparative foreign policy analysis 
do not appear to  fit Turkey, in order to study anything we must be equipped with some 
notions o f what it is important to look for. Let us therefore now review some o f  the 
relevant literature on foreign policy analysis.
Foreign policy analysis starts from the supposition that, despite the significant 
differences, "there are enough similar and, therefore, comparable patterns of 
behaviour" between the foreign policies o f states "to enable the observer to make 
certain generalized statements".3'1 The assumption appears as that foreign policies of 
various states could be explained by devising appropriate analytical techniques. 
However, right from the beginning, foreign policy analysis poses a number o f 
conceptual and empirical problems which start with defining the basic terms o f 
"foreign" and "policy". Wallace once separated foreign and domestic policies in terms 
o f territorial boundaries and defined foreign policy as a "area o f politics which bridges 
the all-important boundary between fne nation-state and its environm ent"34 It follows 
from the fact that foreign policy, like domestic policy, is formulated within the state, 
but, unlike domestic policy, is directed at and must be implemented in the environment 
external to that state.35 Another way o f identifying an area o f governmental activity 
which is concerned with "foreign" would be to base our separation on a particular type 
o f  policy which is concerned with the "raison d'etat" o f the state. O f course, the
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problem appears with both o f these distinctions as the changing patterns o f 
international relations since Second World War made the rigid differentiation between 
the state and the international environment difficult to sustain and thus the separation 
o f "foreign" and "domestic" politics look rather arbitrary.3** It is obvious today that an 
increasing number o f governmental activities are not self-evidently foreign or domestic. 
Typically, most o f the issues that the governments have to deal with, have foreign and 
domestic dimensions and there is often an overlap between the two. Hence, in today's 
complex society, foreign policy analysis requires the analyst to be competent not only 
in understanding the international environment and interactions between states, but 
also the domestic political dimensions o f foreign policy-making. This creates what 
Wallace calls "boundary" problems, by which he means the study o f foreign policy 
crosses the boundary between two academic disciplines, international relations and
' j j
political science. It follows than if the analyst views foreign policy behaviour from 
the perspective o f international relations, he will be predisposed to see elements o f the 
international environment as the major determinant o f foreign policy. A political 
science perspective, on the other hand, predisposes the analyst to highlight domestic
TO
determinants like governmental politics, pressure group activity and public opinion. ° 
In this context, although an approach which touches both sides o f the "boundary" is 
employed here, this study, as will gradually become clearer, is more partial to the 
political science perspective.
It has been suggested that analysis cannot begin until certain choices are 
made.39 Indeed, the analyst must specifically decide, either explicitly or implicitly,  ^
what foundation to base the analysis upon and at what level to set it up. Basically three 
levels o f  analysis are recognized in foreign policy: the influences on foreign policy: the 
making o f foreign policy; and the implementation o f foreign policy.40 These basic 
choices are important because they help the analyst to select significant facts and 
figures from the trivial attention; but more importantly they determine the nature o f the 
ensuing analysis and the sort o f explanations produced.4 ^
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Traditional foreign policy analysis approaches, despite the differences in stress
AT)
on different variables, generally assume that foreign policy is the product o f  rational 
behaviour4^ and the state, rather than any other international actor, is the foreign 
policy-making unit. M ore importantly, the state, or rather the government acting on 
behalf o f the state, is treated for analytical purposes as a unitary monolithic actor. 
These two assumptions, as Nye suggested, are indicative o f a realist analysis which 
explains state behaviour in terms o f an inter-state struggle for power.44 Since the 
Realist approach characterizes the international environment as hostile and dangerous, 
it follows that state behaviour is analysed from the perspective o f that environment; 
forces external rather than internal to the state are regarded as the major determinants 
o f foreign policy4-*
While we know today that the state, especially in the Third World, is not 
generally an "all-powerful monolith",4 *^ the most important challenge to traditional 
assumptions and sort o f  analysis derived from them has come from the application o f a 
decision-making approach to the study of foreign policy.4^ There are three central 
concepts related to  this approach: decision, decison-maker, and the decision-making 
process, and the major assumption employed is that foreign policy is, in essence, a 
series o f decisions made by a group o f people who can be labelled as decision-makers. 
It follows that foreign policy decisions do not simply emerge in response to external 
stimuli, rather they are processed through an identifiable machinery within the state. 
Adopting this approach inevitably directs foreign policy analysis to the task of 
explaining the behaviour o f an individual or, more typically, a group o f people 
operating within a structured environment who decide or choose to pursue one course 
o f action rather than another.48 Thus the object o f the study is no longer the state, 
which is both abstract and ascribed with human qualities by traditional analysts, but the 
behaviour o f  those who make decisions on behalf o f the state, and who, by definition, 
become "the state". As a result, instead o f trying to explain state behaviour in terms of 
its international environment, Snyder et.all. suggests that the "key to the explanation o f
16
why the state behaves the way it does lies in the way its decision-makers define their 
.. 4Qsituation 7
Naturally, the emphasis on the domestic or internal sources o f foreign policy 
represents a significant departure from traditional analysis which, as indicated earlier, 
tends to focus on the impact o f external factors on policy. There are o f course 
problems with the assumption that all foreign policy behaviour is a product o f specific 
identifiable decisions. But the clear implication is that anyone who wants to understand 
foreign policy must be as concerned with the making o f policy as they are with the 
substance o f  that policy. Obviously if foreign policy-making is part o f  a broader 
domestic political process it will also involve a range o f actors, many more than merely 
those who hold the official positions. Therefore, our analysis has also to focus on the 
governmental machine - the organizations and the political actors involved in the policy 
process.
Clearly, foreign policies are not made in a vacuum. Foreign policy making 
bodies o f  any state receive inputs (demands for action, values, threats, feedback) from 
outside world and respond to them. If  we wish to make sense o f  the foreign policy 
process we need to look at these inputs and their interrelationship. However, what 
makes it difficult to use these factors (inputs and outputs) as a useful tool o f analysis is 
their elastic character which need to be adjusted and changed to fit a given historical 
and concrete situation. Therefore, it is hardly possible to specify a precise number o f 
factors that affects foreign policy making o f all countries in the same way all the time. 
Nevertheless, Morgenthau suggested nine factors ("elements o f national power"): 
Geography, National resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, 
national character, national morale, the quality o f diplomacy, and the quality o f 
government.
O f course, analysis o f a specific policy, or a specific situation may require a
CO
different emphasis on various factors; also new factors may emerge. Therefore, 
especially when studying the foreign policy formulation o f a specific country in a 
specific time period, some thought should be diverted beforehand to the question of
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which factors contribute to the foreign policy making o f that country. As suggested 
earlier, in today's complex society foreign policy formulation is by no means a simple 
process. The factors that can determine and condition the plans and choices made by 
foreign policy officials are too many and too varied to be enum erated .^  Every aspect 
o f a society becomes relevant when one starts to explain the orientations and actions o f 
a state. As improved technology, increasing communications, growing military 
capabilities, and expanded trade increase the interdependence o f the states o f the 
world, the variables that can underlie the foreign policy choices o f  any state become 
more and more complex. And the fact that foreign policy formulation is more often a 
response to immediate pressures from other states and the flow o f events rather than a 
result o f  long-range p l a n n i n g , m a k e s  it all the more difficult to get at the root o f a 
matter.
Nevertheless, experience and tradition over time - in combination with basic 
values and norms - create a set o f relatively inflexible principles. W hat affects the 
process o f formation o f these principles varies from state to state. Yet, while looking at 
the elements that shape the foreign policy o f any country, one can see, with some 
degree o f  over-simplification, the interplay o f two kinds o f  variables.
One kind, which may be called "structural variables", are continuous, and rather 
static. The other, which may be termed "conjunctural variables", are dynamic and
r / r
subject to change under the influence o f domestic and foreign developments. °
The structural factors are not directly related to the international political 
medium and the daily happenings o f foreign politics. They can exert a long term 
influence over the determination o f foreign policy goals. Geographical position, 
historical experiences, cultural background together with national stereotypes and 
images o f other nations, and long term economic necessities would fall into the 
category o f "structural variables". "Conjunctural variables", on the other hand, are 
made up o f a web o f interrelated developments in domestic politics and international 
relations. Although not displaying any long term continuity like the structural static 
factors, these conjunctural dynamic factors do exert temporary influence on a country's
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foreign policy and especially on its daily implementation. Conjunctural changes in the 
international system, such as the end o f the cold war, shifts in the world's present 
balance o f power, domestic political changes, daily scarcities o f economic factors, and 
the personalities o f  specific decision-makers, would fall into this category.
With these general observations in mind we may suggest a working proposition 
o f  the following factors as contributing to Turkish foreign policy formulation during 
the period under consideration (1980-1991): (1) the nature o f the domestic political 
regime, including balance o f power within, and composition of, the policy-making 
system; (2) Socio-Economic dynamics; (3) military attitudes and the national security; 
and (4) External environmental circumstances.
The Nature o f the Political Regime
In any political system domestic issues have an important bearing on the formulation
and substance o f foreign policy, though the extent and nature o f  this influence varies
with a nation's political system. There are differences between parliamentary
democracies; guided democracies - o f which Turkey was an example during the second
half o f 1980s; authoritarian governments - as the military regime o f  1980-1983 could
be categorized; and totalitarian regimes. In democracies, the government has to
contend with political parties, the interests these parties represent, the desire to further
improve standard o f living, traditions, ethics, religion, and a multitude o f pressure
groups. M ost important o f all is the role o f the electorate which in the last analysis
determines what kind o f government is to reflect the objectives o f the winning party.
This is a truly enormous accumulation o f factors, all o f which influence the
*
international position o f a nation. Moreover, in democracies, the very nature o f 
democratic multiplicity o f interests rarely, if ever, permits unanimous approval o f a 
policy. Thus to maintain political equilibrium, democratic governments must rule by 
compromise. They have to trade one principle against other. Consequently, democratic 
administrations may make internal concessions to gain endorsement for foreign policies 
or, vice-versa, sacrifice foreign policies in order to carry out domestic measures.
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The political system o f a country is also significant in terms o f the decision­
making process and responsibilities, and it determines powers and focus and the 
mechanisms o f decisions in foreign policy.6^ The mechanisms o f decision making in a 
democracy are different from those in a dictatorship. Those differences are o f major 
significance. The democracies have their constitutional provisions for the organization 
o f international affairs. Though there may be some manoeuvrability within the 
framework o f this law, fundamentally whoever is in power must conform to the 
constitution. These provisions sometimes render policy formulation and 
implementation awkward except in emergency when the nation closes ranks behind its 
leaders. ^  Nonetheless, parliamentary supervision remains: active, and not even in 
wartime can the leader o f a parliamentary democracy assume that he is above 
accounting to the legislative body which holds the power to question. Yet, the 
parliaments are rarely agree on vital issues, thus it may take too long to get a 
concession on any given subject that the policy-makers might be tempted to by-pass 
the parliament.
Dictatorships, on the other hand, permit decision-making without the 
supervision o f parliamentary bodies. The fact that in a dictatorship a foreign policy 
decision is made secretly, without controls and restrained, contributes to the speed o f 
decisions and swift action. In a democracy, on the other hand, foreign policy decisions 
are made as a part o f public, parliamentary debate; their enforcement is slower and 
subject to moral restraints. Moreover, any certain course o f action can easily be 
reversed in dictatorships, in contrast to the latter which "must be more concerned 
about the domestic costs o f altered policies than the form er"61
This brings us to the much debated question o f the role o f  public opinion in 
international affairs and foreign policy. The general assumption is that, in democracies, 
public opinion exerts considerable influence on policy-makers. But how articulate is it?
Can it be accurately measured? Moreover, it was said that public opinion offers
f \ 9
abundant criticism but rarely, if ever, has constructive advice
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On the other hand, the masses may be swayed by irrational ideologies and 
charismatic leaders. Therefore, not institutions alone, but institutional behaviour is also 
relevant as the democratic and non-democratic way o f life is mirrored in institutional 
behaviour, behaviour within the institutional framework, attitudes towards institutions, 
and techniques o f adjustments. Even between democratic countries there are significant 
differences in that respect.
The institutional structure in a country, at a minimum, "determines the amount 
o f  the total social effort which can be devoted to foreign po licy".^  Aside from the 
allocation o f resources, the domestic structure crucially affects the way the actions o f 
other states are interpreted. Without denying the importance o f other factors, the 
actual choice o f policies within states are determined to a considerable degree by the 
interpretation o f the environment by their leaders and their conception o f alternatives. 
Their understanding o f the nature o f their choice in turn depends on many factors, 
including their experience during the rise to eminence, the structure in which they must 
operate, and the values o f their society. ^  In this context, the personality o f leaders, 
who control the focus o f power, may have important influences on foreign policy. This 
is especially important in totalitarian countries, where power o f  dictators is not 
restrained by democratic bodies, and where they exercise decisive influence over the 
conduct o f foreign p o licy .^
Moreover, in the contemporary period, the very nature o f  the governmental 
structure introduces an element o f rigidity which operates more or less independently 
o f the convictions o f  statesmen or the ideology which they represent. Daily issues are 
usually too complex and relevant facts too manifold to be dealt with on the basis o f 
personal intuition. Therefore, vast bureaucratic mechanisms emerges within the states 
to  aid the leaders to chose between options. In today's society, there are few 
government offices which do not contribute to foreign policy-making in one form o f 
another. While doing this, however, in time, they, too, develop a momentum and a 
vested interest o f their own, and certain governmental influences may be brought to 
bear upon the administrators o f foreign affairs. When this happens, o f course,
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bureaucracy becomes an obstacle to policy-makers and thus they may try to overcome 
i t 66
Another efect o f institutional structures could be seen in the concentration o f 
authority: in the difference between centralized and decentralized government 
structures. "The greater the concentration o f authority in a single individual or small 
group, the greater the likelihood that subordinate policy-makers will withhold criticism 
and seek to provide the information and recommendation that they perceive their
f i lsuperiors to want".
Socio-Economic Dynamics
The socio-economic conditions o f a country, which are closely connected with its 
political evolvement, form an important factor o f foreign policy. The standard o f living, 
the distribution o f income, and the social structure related to the facts o f production 
and consumption are elements o f social strength or weakness, while political 
institutions, civil rights, political stability are measure o f political vigour, and both are 
closely interwoven.
The degree to which the economy o f a state has developed may have important
consequences for its foreign policy as different states at different levels o f
developments have different needs and therefore different links to their
environm ents.^  In addition, the level o f economic development greatly contributes to
the internal demands from governments to.formulate external policies that reflect and
serve the diversity o f interests that it produces.^9
M oreover, the level o f economic development may also be effective in
*
70determining a nation's capability to implement foreign policy plans. "The more a
country is develop, the larger is the proportion o f its GDP that is likely to be devoted
to external purposes, whether these be military ventures, economic aid programs, or
71extensive diplomatic commitments".
The cultural and socio-psychological factors, which also belong to this factor, 
are possibly the most difficult to analyze in precise terms However evasive this factor
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is, it still exists and perhaps even more enduring than +hose associated with economic 
development.. N o statesmen make decisions in foreign politics without evaluating a 
pattern o f  political behaviour o f a nation which is either his partner or his adversary.7^ 
Foreign policy, whether for cooperation or conflict, sooner or later becomes a social 
process. Patterns o f political behaviour, or o f general cultural patterns are thus 
paramount, and statesmen usually base their decisions on their own and historical 
experiences. M oreover, values and memories may be shared widely within the country, 
thus producing a bounding effect between people, or they can be divisive forces among 
different parts o f the society. Obviously, the societal unity may have important effects 
on the formulation o f the country's foreign policy and the conduct o f its external 
affairs.7**
Foreign policy formation, and its effectiveness once formulated, clearly 
depends on many factors, but the extent o f the support which officials would get from 
people is quite certainly one o f them. Furthermore, the importance o f social and 
cultural unity as foreign policy in put could be observed from the many nation-states 
which are affected by internal dissension among different groups. Though the 
implications o f this fragmentation for the conduct o f foreign policy are not easily 
discernible, its importance for Turkey, which was almost thorn apart by ideological 
strife during the 1970s and came to be affected by an ethnic separatism during the 
1980s, is quite clear.
Moreover, a nation's history produces stereotypes o f behaviour and attitudes 
which are the consequences o f the cultural and social environment and the political 
atmosphere that has historically prevailed.74 They are also the result o f the physical 
and political geography o f the country and its role in the concert o f neighbouring 
countries, thus they may bring forth not only national customs but also fairly consistent 
attitudes tow ard neighbouring countries in particular and the outside world in general. 
Consequently, historic prejudices may shape a people's national character and also 
colours the views o f the men in responsible policy-making positions.
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As mentioned above, the characteristics and personality o f decision-makers
may have affects on their decisions, and therefore on a country's foreign policy. The
office gives the decision-maker certain responsibility for making objective decisions
when confronted with objective situations, but whether he actually makes those
decisions may depend on his "decisiveness". Equally, the office gives him certain
powers, but whether he enlarges the power o f  the office may depend on his 
75"assertiveness". The objective situation would obviously influence the decisions o f 
any man, but his personal views o f national interest and his own personal interests and 
his personal style would also shape the decision. Therefore, it should be remembered 
that personality o f official decision-makers is an important determinant o f their 
decision and, hence, o f the nation's foreign policy, and "the higher in the hierarchy o f 
the foreign policy organization an individuals role is, the more likely are his personal
1  fT
characteristics to affect foreign policy decisions".
It was argued that man's motivation is deeply rooted in his values, which are
77"both goals o f his actions and yardsticks to measure his behaviour". Apart from 
personal expediences, ideological inclinations and societal pressures, man's values are 
formed, in part, by his religious beliefs. Therefore, it is also relevant to our assessment 
that the role o f  religion, in this case Islam, in foreign policy-making should be 
considered, especially since Islam, unlike Christianity, does not prescribe the separation 
o f  religion from politics.7** Indeed, devout Muslims argue that Islam is a complete 
social, political, leal and cultural system, and has its law: the Sharia. Consequently, it is 
the only legitimate rule and there can be no separation between politics and religion. 
The importance o f Islam's influence on foreign policy o f Islamic countries, therefore, 
should to be considered. As an influence, "it can act...as an integrative force, creating 
consensus on foreign policy objectives...(providing) Vesprit de corps...to a population, 
and...mobilizing external sources in support o f state....In other cases, Islam can be 
constraint on policy".79 According to Dawisha, an important problem which foreign 
policy analysts face all too frequently when trying to uncover the effect o f Islam on 
specific foreign policy actions, is the question o f whether "a particular policy
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pronouncement or decision motivated by Islam, or was it motivated by some other 
value or consideration...whereby Islam would be used to simply to bestow credibility 
and legitimacy on the policy". This problem, as will be discussed in chapter six, also 
relates to the Turkish case, where even an attempt to put Islam's role in determining 
general Turkish foreign policy has so far been missing. The only foreign policy related 
question most often asked in veiy few studies, seeking to explain the apparent revival 
o f  Islam in modern - supposedly secular - Turkey, has been whether the "Islamic 
revival poses a political threat to the survival o f modem Turkish state...and the rarely 
articulated role o f (Western fear o f Islam) in determining Turkey's relation to
O 1
Europe". Thus, Chapter Six o f this study will attempt to fill the apparent gap in 
looking beyond the visible manifestations o f "Islamic revival", such as turban issue, 
events which attracted foreign media attention.
External Environment
Unlike in domestic politics, where the political leadership exercise relative control over 
their environment, in foreign policy political decisions are aimed at an environment 
over which political leaders have very little, if any, control. On the other hand, 
although, in practice, the conduct o f states in the international arena seems to be 
constrained only "by the decisions o f the states themselves, not by an authority external 
to them",82 thus the basic feature o f international society appears to be its "anarchical 
nature",83 foreign policies, as stated earlier, are not made in a vacuum but in relation 
to other bodies similarly acting in the global arena, which creates certain sets o f
04
restraints, "be it conventional, customary, ethical, legal or institutional". In this
*
context, as foreign policy consist o f "decisions and actions which involve to some
or
appreciable extent relations between one state and others", it can be defined as "the 
actions o f a state toward the external environment and the conditions under which 
these actions formulated".86 Therefore, while formulating foreign policies, policy­
makers have to take their international environment into account, since the success in 
achieving their goals may be affected by other states' responses and the level o f  their
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accurate reckoning o f others' policies. Moreover, the structure o f  the international 
political system and the geo-political position o f the state vis-a-vis the international 
system are also important determinants o f a country's foreign policy and its success. ^
O f course, the more an association is valued, the more it imposes constraints on 
its members, and the degree o f influence members o f an association can exert over 
each other depends upon the relative priorities they attach to maintenance o f the
O O
association and o f membership in it. This effect will be observed in the text on 
Turkey's relation with the Council o f Europe and The European Community during the 
period under consideration.
Obviously, a major part o f the external environment o f  decision-makers is 
formed by the actions o f  the other governments in the international arena. Since all the 
governments act in order to further their own interests, a competition and/or conflict 
between states is the natural outcome. However, the nature o f the relationship, that is 
dependent, inter-dependent, oppositional, etc., will also be affected in the first place 
"by the extent to which the two governments fell they need to the support o f the other
on
in question".
In this context, an important part o f the effects from the international 
environment is brought upon states by their linkage and influence relationships with 
other states and state groupings.99 The essential variables which affect the exercise o f 
influence have been identified as: (1) "the amount o f influence a state wields over 
others can be related to the capabilities mobilized in support o f  specific foreign policy 
objectives";91 (2) the "extend to which there are needs between the two countries";92 
(3) "the ephemeral quality o f responsiveness", (4) the maximum utility o f  fjie
resources available;94 and (5)the probability o f reactions.95
However, this approach should be treated carefully when studying Turkey 
during the 1980s, since after the experience o f Cyprus intervention o f 1974 and 
attempts by the US to use its influence patterns extensively on Turkey to obtain a 
certain set o f outcomes which were not favoured by Turkey, she became much more 
restive in her relations with other states and much more sensitive towards any influence
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attempt or intervention. Moreover, the apparent failure o f US influence attempts 
during the second half o f the 1970s made her an unlikely target for new attempts 
during the 1980s, though there were limited European attempts to affect the outcome 
o f  Turkey's democratization process, they are treated in this study as a result o f 
Turkey's conscious linkages with Europe rather than influence relationship.
Military Attitudes and The National Security
In the modern world, the political leadership in most societies acts in order to maintain 
the security o f their national state: "  so much so that foreign and security policies have
merged to the point where statesmen and military strategists must collaborate
97closely. Therefore, it goes without saying that military leaders are needed for expert 
advice, and it is possible that their considered opinion can strongly influence policy 
decisions. However, it is the responsibility o f the decision-makers to determine, if he 
can, "how much influence the military may be permitted to exert on foreign policy 
decisions and whether military personnel should be permitted to state conflicting views 
in public"."
W hether the influence o f military leaders can be kept within bounds by a 
civilian government will always be crucial to a nation's position in international affairs 
and to its own internal politics. Since Turkey was under outright military dictatorship 
between 1980-1983 and even after 1983 the military was effective in determining 
policies in the country, the civil-military relationship and the foreign policy-making o f 
the military regimes are important aspects o f this study.
Though there is a lack o f scholarly study dealing with the foreign policy 
formulation o f  the military regime because foreign policy analysts have not regard 
military regimes as another variable in foreign policy studies, Parakala, in a recent 
work, attempted to provide a comparative framework for analysing the foreign policies 
o f  the military regimes, which he concluded there does not exist what can be termed as 
a typically military regime's' response to any particular foreign policy is s u e ."  Yet, 
there appear to  be some similarities between military regimes regarding their attitudes
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to  national security and foreign policy issues. Hence Parakala's two hypotheses also 
seem relevant to the Turkish case.
His first hypothesis, moving from the observation that the orientations and 
attitudes o f  the military personnel towards the political activity are clearly different 
from those o f  the civilian politicians, assumes that armed forces personnel, whose main 
preoccupation is to defend the country, "perceive national interest and the means to 
effectively serve it differently", and as such "it is reasonable...to expect that once they 
come to power...the country's foreign policy undergoes a change".
The second hypothesis is based on the observation that following the military 
coups, civilians' influences on key policy-making units are replaced by the military, and 
that the military regime usually restrict, if not totally prevent, "the participation o f 
hitherto influential groups in the decision-making process". Consequently, it is argued 
that this change in the decision-making process, also affects the regime's structure, and 
as the "regime structure is one o f the important determinants o f the country's foreign 
policy", it is "reasonable to  expect that the transformation o f a civilian regime into a 
military one affects a country's foreign policy"
Sure enough, "change" was one o f the consistencies o f  Turkish daily life during 
the 1980s. Starting with the military coup d'etat o f September 12, 1980, Turkey had 
experienced fundamental changes in every field. Her political structure, her economic 
system, social strata, cultural patterns, religious expressions, and o f course her foreign 
policy, all had their share from fast evolving developments. Turkey at the end o f the 
decade is a largely transformed country and the impetus for change is still visible. The 
transformation o f various aspects o f Turkish foreign policy may not be discernible all 
the time for outsiders and the changes may not always be as momentous as we have 
witness during the last part o f the 1980s and early 1990s across Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, but it has nevertheless been there.
According to Dina A. Zinnes change, another word for "transformation", 
implies that "something is happening through time" and that "what was true at one
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point is different at a subsequent time point".10^ In this sense, "change" has become
one o f  the watchwords o f Turkish foreign policy, certainly after 1983 when civilian
government took over power.
A change in any policy is usually based on a change in ideas, on rethinking or
reappraisal, and a variety o f factors may have impact on specific foreign policy
10^reappraisals or changes. When and what factors determine whether and to what 
extend pressure for change in policy will in fact produce a change in hitherto rigid 
policy patterns is an important issue in foreign policy theory.10^ If  we relate this 
problem, together with the above definition, to our study it is fairly obvious that a 
study o f change in Turkish foreign policy means an analysis o f how and why 
differences occurred through time, that is during the period under consideration.
In theory, a reappraisal o f ideas may occur because of:
-changes in the composition o f the policy-making system; that is shifts in 
domestic politics may place new people in positions o f power and these new policy­
makers may have "normative, descriptive or theoretical ideas that differ from those o f 
their predecessors", thus leadership change may also imply a policy change. 10  ^ In this 
context, Mr. Ozal's "different" ideas and "vision" about various aspects o f 
governmental policies, including foreign policy, made the country susceptible to 
change once he had taken over political power.
-changes in the balance o f power within the policy-making system; that is if the 
policy-making system contains advocates o f competing policies, the balance o f power 
between the camps may determine which policy will be pursued.106 The struggle 
within the executive over Turkey’s policy during the Gulf Crisis is a good example o f 
this and thus will be studied in detail.
-finally, changes in environmental circumstances may bring about foreign policy 
reappraisals. It should not be forgotten that the international system and the 
relationship between the state and conditions existent within that system determines 
how the state will behave.107 Also it has been emphasized that nations under pressure
1 OR
adapt to  changing conditions in their environment.iUO Thus, systemic changes, for
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example, may generate an important impetus for change by altering the conditions for 
foreign policy.100 In this context, the end o f the Cold W ar and the subsequent 
transformation o f world politics were the most important systemic changes that had 
taken place since the emergence o f the bipolar system after the Second World War, 
thus as such it provided tremendous momentum for national policy changes as well. 
System transformations may also involve the extension o f new - or abandonment o f 
previous - commitments and therefore signify a change in the goals and/or objectives 
o f participating actors.110 Turkey's new commitments during the 1980s towards the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region and transformation o f the Regional 
Cooperation for Development to the Economic Cooperation Organization and her 
relations with the European Community, may constitute ample examples to  this.
M oreover, as stated earlier, nations also take into account the way in which the 
international environment responds to their policies. Accordingly, the "spill-back 
process" or the negative feedback from the international environment may create 
pressures for change.111 As a result, the answers to the questions o f whether Western 
pressure had an impact on Turkey's democratization-human rights policies, and o f 
whether the negative feedback Turkey received from European countries and 
organizations after the 1980 coup d'etat forced her to look for new areas o f linkage, 
will be particularly interesting.
While the first two categories o f above-mentioned possible determinants o f 
change are related to the internal domain o f the country in question, the latter is to the 
international. Since the governments make foreign policy in the context o f domestic as 
well as international pressures, studying change in foreign policy should involve an 
understanding o f both the domestic and external environments and the interaction 
between the tw o .112 Therefore, we must also look at the institutional structure by 
which governments make and implement their foreign policies, and arguably at the
1 1 O
whole domestic process as it also affects their policy-making.i i J  In this context, the 
type o f political or economic regime in a state can be crucial in determining foreign 
policy actions.114 M oreover we also have to look at the linkages between the two as
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the national and international systems function in such a way as to continually reinforce
each other, ^  ^  and no matter what the state o f international politics, the impact o f an
action "on a polity will vary according to particular nations, structures and groups to
which the polity is linked and the nature o f that link. Nations do not react to the
international system as a whole, but to the way it is reflected in particular actors with
whom they have most contact". In connection with this, Turkey's vocational
linkages with the West in general and Europe in particular will be emphasized in this
study, with particular references to the effects o f European criticism on Turkish
decision-makers and their responses to them. However, while doing this, it should not
be forgotten that the linkage patterns, like foreign policy patterns, can be highly
117dynamic and susceptible to change.
Hence in the context o f changes and linkages, this study will examine the 
various factors which brought about changes in Turkish foreign policy, and which may 
be broadly categorised as domestic, regional and international ones. These factors 
include disillusionment with Turkey's Western allies after 1974 and a desire for new 
political friends; a desire for new economic opportunities because o f inadequate 
economic benefits from the West; the new attitudes from domestic factors shaping 
foreign policy, particularly the recent visibility o f Islam in popular attitudes and 
governmental circles; the end o f the Cold War and changes happening through Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union; and Mr. Ozal's own peculiar understanding o f 
foreign policy and what should be given priority in the Turkish foreign policy agenda, 
will be discussed through the text in detail.
Needless to say, one o f this study's principal contentions is that the type o f  
political and economic regime in a state can be crucial in determining its foreign policy. 
Further it is acknowledged that these two - domestic environment and foreign policy o f 
a country - are intimately related and that each serves better to explain and shed light 
upon the other. Thus it will also be shown that the peculiarities o f the Turkish 
governing system, her chosen economic strategy, and the "Turkish style o f democracy" 
have all had important effects on determining her foreign policy. Moreover, it will be
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illustrated that this was not only because any country's foreign policy is a by-product or 
reflection o f its domestic political system, but also because it is affected by other states' 
responses to a particular country's perceived political system, which also crucially 
affects the way the actions o f other states are interpreted.
Organization of the Study
This study is in three parts. Part one examines the traditional inputs o f  Turkish foreign 
policy and changes in their relative importance through the years up to 1980. It also 
explores the relevant literature through these years.
In this context, Chapter Two deals with the effects o f Turkey's highly strategic 
geographical setting, its imperial background, and the views and foreign policy 
implementations o f Ataturk, founder o f the Republic and the one who set forward an 
ideological quideline for Turkish foreign policy. The aim o f this chapter is to clarify the 
traditional-ideological foundations o f Turkish foreign policy and, as part o f it, the 
concept o f Kemalism which affected Turkish foreign policy through the years.
The third chapter will deal with the internal and external factors which forced
Turkey to reevaluate its foreign policy during the period up to 1980. Such factors as
the changing pattern o f the international environment from the cold war to  detente; the
Cyprus crisis; changes in Turkey's domestic political scene and problems relating to
them; the relations between Turkey's economic problems and its dependence on
Middle Eastern petrol and Western economic aid, and their complications on foreign
policy during the 70s, will be dealt with. Finally, the concluding remarks o f this chapter
will set Turkey's domestic and international scene as it was on the 12 September 1980.
*
Although the main part o f this study is concerned only with developments since 
1979, when the latest international and domestic challenges for Turkish foreign policy 
had come about and when most o f the basic changes manifested themselves, the 
inclusion o f  these two chapters was deemed necessary in the hope that an explanation 
o f  earlier periods from the perspective o f foreign policy fundamentals and changes 
would deepen the understanding o f contemporary Turkish foreign policy and show its
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historical linkages. Besides, the claim o f this study is to be o f  help with the general 
understanding o f Turkish foreign policy.
Part Two is the crux o f the study. It will deal with impetuses for change in 
Turkish foreign policy, during the period under consideration, with an added emphasis 
on Turkey's domestic environment as it relates to foreign policy. The highlights o f this 
part will be Mr. Ozal's particular understanding o f Turkey's place in the world and the 
foreign policy which Turkey should follow to reach this "respectable" place; the 
increasing Islamism in Turkey as it relates to foreign policy; alternatives o f 
economically dependent Turkey in the foreign policy arena; restructuring o f Turkish 
democracy and its effects on country's foreign policy; and the traditional importance 
and influence o f the Turkish military on foreign policy, and society in general.
Some interest will also be directed towards the decision- making process o f 
foreign policy. In this context, differences not only between reality and legality, but 
also within the executive will be shown. Furthermore, an evaluation o f the influence o f 
Turkey's external relations on the practice on her foreign policy during the period 
under consideration (1980-1991) will be incorporated into various chapters in this 
section. This will include analyses o f the economic and political relations between 
Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries in general, including Turkey's neutrality in the 
Iran-Iraq war, and her participation in the Islamic conference; relations between 
Turkey and the former Communist bloc in general and the Soviet Union in particular, 
with an emphasis on more recent developments; and relations between Turkey, the 
United States, the European Community, and the Council o f Europe.
Accordingly, the object o f Chapter Four is to explain the impact o f  the 
September 12, 1980 coup d'etat on both Turkey's domestic evolution and on her 
foreign policy orientations. In this context not only the priorities o f the military regime 
but also the responses o f the external environment to these priorities, and their 
combined effect on Turkish foreign policy will be o f interest to us.
Chapter Five will follow the trail o f the previous chapter in that it examines the 
democratic development o f Turkey, the reactions it generated outside the country, and
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the combined effect o f country's democratic maturity over her foreign policy. This will 
include not only the particulars o f Turkish democracy and decision-making process, 
but also the responses from abroad, especially from Europe, to them and the linkages 
between the two.
Similarly, Chapters Six and Seven will deal respectively with the effects o f the 
resurgence o f  Islam in Turkey, and her chosen economic development strategy over 
her foreign policy. In this context, the momentum given by the world-wide Islamic 
revivalism to Turkish Islamists and their effects, if any, over Turkish foreign policy will 
be discussed in Chapter Six. On the other hand, discussion o f  Turkey's economic 
relations with the EC, the Middle Eastern and the Black Sea countries will be o f 
interest to Chapter Seven. Further connections between Turkey's economic system and 
her foreign policy, and the effects o f the internationalization o f Turkish economy will 
also be shown in this chapter.
Part Three o f this study will analyze Turkish foreign policy in practice, and 
evaluate the influence o f various, domestic and external, factors. The chosen case- 
study, that is Turkey's response to the Gulf Crisis o f  1990-1991, also aims to show the 
extent o f  Mr. Ozal’s domination over, and personal touch on, Turkish foreign policy 
decision-making.
The last part o f this thesis offers, first, a number o f  conclusions, which will 
present a multi-faced picture o f Turkey's contemporary foreign policy, its changing 
ideological stance; and, secondly, speculations on how the economic and commercial 
rapprochement between Turkey and the Muslim world might affect Turkey's future 
attitudes toward NATO and Middle Eastern matters as well as its domestic political 
stability. Further speculations will be made as to how the break up o f the former Soviet 
Union and the creation o f the independent Turkic states might change Turkey's foreign 
and domestic policy priorities; and on whether the continuation o f being kept out o f 
Europe will affect Turkey's orientations. Hence, in short, the conclusion will assess the 
decade o f 1980s under the light o f the preceding analyses, leading up to investigating 
future prospects.
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It should be mentioned, however, that no attempt will be made in this study to 
detail and document the international developments o f foreign governments' action 
and/or reaction towards Turkey, except in so far as they help to explain shifts and 
trends in Turkish foreign policy. The emphasis, then, will be on Turkey's action 
patterns and the reasons behind them.
Finally, a few words about the way in which this research was carried out is 
needed before proceeding to main body o f the text. While the secondary sources, both 
in English and in Turkish, provided useful information particularly about aspects o f the 
operational environment o f Turkey's foreign policy, the main research effort o f  this 
study was directed to various official statements, speeches, interviews and memoirs of 
the major actors in Turkish politics during the period under consideration.
In this context, the collections o f the Directorate General o f  Press and 
Information, Prime Ministry, which, among others, included all the speeches, 
statements, messages and interviews o f the presidents, premiers and foreign ministers 
o f  the period, were extremely useful. In addition, their archives also included a review 
o f foreign press for the news related to or about Turkey. M oreover, reference series o f 
the same Directorate General and the Foreign Ministry Information Bureau were useful 
in presenting official views. Insight for the official attitudes towards various issues was 
also readily available from the English edition o f the weekly digest Newspflt and from 
press releases o f Turkish foreign ministry. Further, my access to the Library o f Turkish 
Grand National Assembly enabled me to look at the minutes o f the national parliament 
which provided invaluable understanding o f opposition parties' as well as government's 
attitudes towards the country's foreign connections. Although the minutes o f the 
discussions within the National Security Council for the period o f  1980-83 were not 
open to  the public at the time o f my research in Turkey during spring 1993, this was 
compensated partly by the detailed memoirs o f General Kenan Evren, leader o f the 
Junta that took power on September 12, 1980 and later president o f  the country 
between 1982-1989. Further gaps were filled by an interview with General Evren, 
conducted on March 2, 1993, in Marmaris, Turkey.
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Another valuable source o f information about Turkish views on specific 
subjects has been the Turkish press which, though restricted under the military regime, 
has acquired relative freedom and a lively form since 1983. Despite its disadvantages 
and highly emotional attitude in times o f crisis, the press coverages and especially 
comments were nevertheless useful in providing information about the thinking o f 
particular political movements with which they were associated. M oreover, the press 
was also worth looking at from the point o f  view that it reflected, and to  a certain 
extent shaped, public opinion. In addition to various Turkish dailies, some English 
language newspapers and news digests were also consulted for accuracy o f  information 
and western opinion on issues under consideration.
Although, because o f the contemporary nature o f the work, the official 
documents were only partially available, I believe this disadvantage was minimalized by 
the fact that this research is mainly interested in general directions and fundamentals o f 
Turkish foreign policy rather than the daily dealings o f the foreign ministry.
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PART ONE
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK: THE OPERATIONAL SYSTEM 
OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
CHAPTER TWO 
TRADITIONAL INPUTS OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
1. Introduction
It was suggested earlier that every "ounty's foreign policy reflects its special 
circumstances, though similarities between factors contributing to the foreign policies 
o f  different states could be found. Moreover, it was proposed that those variables, the 
interplay o f which may shape any country's foreign policy, could loosely be categorized 
as "structural and "conjunctural". Since, in this context, in order realistically to portray 
any country's foreign policy, one has to appraise carefully, first o f all, the elements and 
principles which shape it, let us now first look at the structural determinants o f Turkish 
foreign policy.^ In order to see "changes" after all, one needs first to see the 
foundations from which changes occurred.
During the early years o f the Ottoman Empire, its foreign policy was motivated 
by its military-offensive character. Subsequently, when the Empire first stagnated and 
then started to crumble, the main foreign policy objective was the preservation o f the 
status quo by military and diplomatic means, o f which the latter had had very little 
significance until that time.
When, finally, the Turkish nation-state came out o f the ashes o f the Empire, she 
was surrounded with a new international environment which was no longer identical to 
that which existed prior to World W ar I. First o f all the breakup o f the Ottoman, the 
Russian and the Austria-Hungarian Empires - empires that had played significant if not 
crucial roles in the international political and economic system - signaled change for 
the international system. The disintegration o f these three empires increased the 
number o f actors in the international system. M ost o f the new actors were politically 
unstable and economically weak compared to the victorious powers o f World War I.
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The political indicators o f this period in which the new Turkish state found itself were 
colonialism, industrial - capitalist growth and its counterpart, communism.
Furthermore, throughout the war the international system ceased to be a 
"European System" and became a global one in which Europe was no longer 
predominant. The whole world had become what only Europe had been before: an 
indivisible field o f  international action. Moreover, the new Turkey was no longer an 
empire, but a nation state. She had no desire for territorial conquest and had no power 
to do so even if she had desired it. She needed a new, realistically sound foreign policy 
which could respond to the challenges o f the new international system without 
endangering the existence o f the state. Ataturk's new directions for Turkish foreign 
policy were enormously important for this point and, therefore, will be discussed at 
some length. His foreign policy objectives reflected a departure from the militant 
expansionist ideology o f the Ottoman Empire. He was genuinely concerned with 
independence and sovereignty. With his motto o f "peace at home, peace in the world", 
he was essentially a realist in his foreign policy. He sought a deliberate break with the 
Ottoman past in virtually every aspect o f life.
Nonetheless, the new Turkey could not totally disassociate herself from her 
Ottoman heritage. Today, the Turkish nation carries the deep impressions o f the 
historical experiences o f being reduced from a vast empire to extinction, and then 
having to struggle back to save the national homeland and its independence. The 
struggle for survival and the play o f realpoiitik in the international arena, together with 
an imperial past and a huge cultural heritage left strong imprints on the national 
philosophy o f  Turkey and the character o f her people.
Furthermore, historical experiences cannot be separated from the present day 
life o f a nation. Like individuals, nations react to both internal and external forces 
within the international political arena, based on their historical impressions, prejudices 
and national image o f  themselves and other nations. Good or bad, right or wrong, 
historical experiences colour a nation's reaction to events and forces in the political 
system. As Legg & Morrison state, past relations between nations (the centuries o f
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enmity between Ottomans and Russians, for example) do have relevance for 
contemporary international politics. They limit the foreign policy options o f the 
political leadership and are filters for viewing international reality.^ Therefore, the 
historical foundations o f Turkish foreign policy will also be discussed.
Some other important foreign policy inputs o f Turkey grew out o f the country's 
geopolitical reality. As Rosenau puts it:^
The configuration o f the land, its fertility and climate, and its location relative 
to other land masses and to waterways...all contribute both to the psychological 
environment through which officials and publics define their links to the 
external world and the operational environment out o f which their dependence 
on other countries fashioned.
The Turkish Republic, which has inherited, from the Ottoman Empire, the 
historic role o f serving as both a land bridge and a fortress connecting Europe, Asia 
and the Middle East, constitutes a very good example o f how and to what degree 
geography determines a country's foreign policy. The foreign relations o f Turkey, and 
the Ottoman Empire before her, have been in large part, governed since the eighteenth 
century by the attempts o f the Russians to gain control o f the straits, and the efforts o f 
Britain and France (and lately the United States) to stop them.
Turkey has undergone profound changes since the 1920s. But one thing, that is 
her location and its strategic value, has not changed. Even if her relative importance to 
other states has changed, what the Turkish decision-makers perceive about their 
geographical importance and threats reasoned from this particular location have not yet 
radically changed. And as far as the foreign policy making o f a country is concerned, 
the perception o f  decision-makers about themselves, their country and other countries, 
is the most important factor to take into account.^
Therefore, in this chapter, I shall deal with three main traditional inputs o f 
Turkish foreign policy; namely the Ottoman experience and its long lasting legacy; the 
geopolitical realities o f Turkey; and the ideological foundations defined under the 
leadership o f Ataturk.
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2. T he Legacy of E m pire
Turkish imperial history ended with the collapse o f the Ottoman Empire at the end o f 
W orld W ar I. The Treaty o f Lausanne, signed after three years o f nationalist struggle 
on July 24, 1923, replaced the dictated Peace Treaty o f  Sevres and established the new 
Turkish nation-state with complete sovereignty in almost all the territory included in 
the present day Turkish Republic 6Although it contained restrictions on the Straits, the 
Treaty o f  Lausanne was essentially international recognition o f the demands expressed
n
in the Turkish National Pact.
The Sevres Treaty in contrast was detrimental to Turkish independence and
Q
destructive o f its homeland. It stipulated that Greece was to receive the remaining
portion o f the Empire's European territory as well as Izmir (Smyrna) and its hinterland
in western Anatolia. In addition to the abandonment by the Turks o f all Arab lands, a
sovereign Armenian state and an autonomous Kurdistan were to be formed in eastern
Anatolia. Furthermore, France, Italy and Britain were allowed to carve out "spheres o f
influence" from the remaining Anatolian heartland. Capitulations, abolished during the
war, were to be restored, and the Straits were to be governed by an international
regime. Thus the Turks were only allowed to keep a small part o f desolate central
Anatolia under various restrictions. However, the Treaty o f Serves remained still-born
as the Nationalists, organized around M. Kemal in Anatolia, refused to accept it and
o
successfully fought to overturn its terms.
Nonetheless, the fact that the sovereign rights and independence o f the Turkish 
people had been disregarded by the Entente powers, and that the Turks were forced to 
fight to regain their independence and the territory they considered as their "homeland" 
after rapidly losing an empire, was to have an important effect upon both subsequent 
Turkish attitudes vis-a-vis foreign powers and on their nation-building efforts. 
M oreover, it should be mentioned that, though displaced by a later treaty, the Treaty 
o f  Sevres, together with the arguments and counter-arguments about the killings o f 
Armenians during the first World War by the Ottomans, formed a basis for subsequent
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Armenian claims on Turkish territory. Furthermore, perhaps more relevant to the 
discussion o f Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s, the Treaty o f Sevres had given 
form and inspiration to Kurdish nationalism and today Kurdish nationalists still refer to 
it as an international recognition o f their aspirations for independent Kurdish 
ho m elan d .^  However, it should not be forgotten that at the time most o f the Kurdish 
tribes sided with the Turks against the "invading powers" as both nations' primary 
identification was based on religion rather than along ethnic or racial lines. It was only 
after the full-fledged development o f Turkish national consciousness and the 
dissolution o f the religious characteristics o f the new state from 1924 onwards that the 
Kurdish and Turkish interests seemed to diverge and various Kurdish uprisings, 
motivated by a mixture o f nationalist and religious feelings, took place against the 
Turkish state during the 1920s and 1930s.^
2.1. Constructive Legacies
The Turkish Republic was born out o f the Ottoman Empire, but bore little resemblance 
to  its forerunner. The new Turkey was not an empire, but a relatively small nation­
state; not autocracy or theocracy, but a parliamentary democracy; not a state founded 
on expansionist principles, but a nation dedicated to peaceful coexistence; not a 
multinational, multi-racial, and multi-religious state, but an almost homogeneous 
society.1^ Her aims were not to create and expand an empire, but to build and 
perpetuate a strong, stable nation within the boundaries o f her homeland. Those were 
not ephemeral happenings (at that critical time o f history) but the facts created by the 
deliberate choices o f the leaders o f the new Republic.
Though at one time the Turks formed an important part o f the ruling classes, 
they were actually one o f the smaller nations within the multi-ethnic empire. Moreover, 
the Ottoman sultans did not consider themselves as Turks as such, but as Ottomans. 
Therefore when the Turks fought for their independence after the First World War, 
they did not fight only against the Entente' invaders, but also against the Ottoman
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Sultan and the forces o f the old system: a point that is usually overlooked.1*1 Hence, it 
is not surprising to  see that the leaders o f the new Turkish state sought to  break with 
the Ottoman past which they identified with ignorance, corruption, backwardness and 
dogmas. To establish a truly new state, they had to clear away the ruins o f  the Empire, 
disown its legacy and discover new virtues based on the Turkish nation. The new 
Turkey had to have no relationship with the old.1^ Yet, this does not necessarily mean 
that the Turkish Republic did not inherit some o f the fundamental features o f the 
Ottoman Empire. A closer look at these features would help one to understand the 
background o f Turkish Foreign Policy.
The new Turkey was established not only in the very heart o f  the old Empire's 
geo-political setting, that o f Asia Minor and Thrace, therefore acquiring its 
complications, but it also retained many o f its ruling elites. Since the bureaucratic elite 
o f  the Empire in its last days was dominated by Turks, the new Turkish state had found 
an experienced bureaucracy, an important value o f which other post-empire states ran 
into scarcity. Fortunately 1 9 ^  century experiments with Western education had 
produced an educated official class. Later this elite group o f administrators, under 
Ataturk's guidance and within the one-party authoritarian regime, formed the nucleus 
o f Turkey's modernizing elites - the Republican People's Party, and imposed 
revolutionary changes from the top. Though these elites, on the one hand, secured a 
strong political power base for Ataturk and thus enabled him to carry out the most 
needed radical reforms to break down the traditional social and spiritual culture o f 
Turkey and transform it into a secular and Western culture, on the other, they 
somewhat contradictorily supplied a material connection between the Empire and the 
new Turkish Republic. This pattern o f elite, one-party politics with its dual character, 
was to set the trend in Turkish politics for many years to come.15
One o f the fundamental features o f Turkish foreign policy has been its Western 
orientation. Despite the fact that Turkey had fought against the Western powers during 
the First World War, after independence she opted for the Western World. This was 
expressed first in cultural and, after World War II, in political and military terms. This
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orientation has been so deliberate and continues to be a policy choice that can not be 
explained with the limited aim o f "countering an imminent threat" or such formulations 
as "the economic interests o f the ruling elite". These kinds o f explanations would not 
only be unsatisfactory, but also misleading. Instead, one should look into Turkish 
history which has helped to shape Turkish understanding o f its environment and its 
governmental philosophy.
Throughout history, the Turks have been connected to the West, first as a 
conquering superior and enemy, then as a component part, later as an admirer and 
unsuccessful imitator, and in the end as a follower and ally. Before anything else, the 
Ottoman Empire was a European state. After the Mongol invasion throughout 
Anatolia, a small tribe o f Turks which later became known as Ottomans settled in the 
Valley o f the Karasu, where they were in direct contact with the Greeks and Western 
influences. This was the beginning o f the influence which had such a profound effect 
on their subsequent history. They began, indeed, to face the West; before they had any 
status in Asia Minor, the Ottomans were already an empire based largely on South-east 
Europe.
It is an important historical fact which is not often appreciated that the 
Ottoman Turks started their career as a people in extreme north-west o f Asia 
Minor, facing Europe; that they founded their Empire not in Asia but across the 
Sea o f Marmara in Thrace and the Balkans, in other words in Europe, and that 
then expanded eastwards into Asia Minor a century after they had already 
become a European power. It was, in fact, only during the course o f the
fifteenth century that they became ah Oriental power as well as a European.16 
N ot only did Europe have an effect on the Ottoman Empire, but the Turks, from the 
time that they first entered the European continent, played a role in the destiny p f 
Europe. They were not only the enemy o f the European monarchs, but frequently allied 
themselves with one or more o f the European countries against the others, and 
operated within the European system. It is, however, one o f the ironies o f history that 
the Ottoman Empire, whilst it had progressively become more and more alienated from 
Europe through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was "officially" re-admitted to 
the European legal system at the Paris Congress o f 1856.
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It is only natural that the Ottoman rule over one-third o f Europe for four 
hundred years would have important effects on Empire's outlook.1^ Its adaptation o f a 
somewhat secular state system, especially in the conduct o f foreign affairs and in the 
administration o f the various millets, was part o f this influence. Although It must be 
admitted that serving the cause o f Islam was an important element behind most o f the 
Ottoman conquests, but it is also a fact that, so long as the state was strong, the 
Ottoman rulers did not use the title "caliph", the religious leader o f the Muslim 
community. It was only after the continuous dismemberment o f the Empire's non- 
moslem subjects in the 19th century that the sultans, notably Abdulhamit II, upheld the 
idea o f Pan-Islamism in order to prevent the disintegration o f the Empire's Moslem 
subjects. In fact, the Ottoman Empire, though essentially a theocratic state, had come 
to create its own peculiar understanding o f Islam, somewhat "secular" and different 
from that o f the Arabs. It is no wonder that the Arabs, orthodox Muslims, called 
Ottomans "Atrak Rum", meaning the Turks o f Rome or Byzantine. Moreover, it must 
be remembered that there was no institutionalized religious authority independent from 
the state. Therefore, it was easy for the Ottoman Sultan to make peace with the 
infidels, whenever he considered it necessary, and to look for Western help when 
modernization o f empire was needed.
Given this background, the introduction o f the western-oriented secular state in 
the 1920s was not totally contradictory to the overall experience o f the Turkish people. 
In fact, modernization in terms o f the West was started after a series o f  Ottoman 
defeats at the hands o f the Western powers.18 M ost Ottoman and Turkish modernizers 
did agree upon one basic assumption, as put by Abdullah Cevdet, that "there is no 
second civilization; civilization means European civilization, and it must be imported 
with both its roses and thorns".19 Turkey owed a great deal to the late Ottoman 
intellectuals, who advocated most o f the reforms, which were finally realized under the 
guidance o f  Ataturk in the 1920s and 30s. Ataturk's success derived from his belief in 
European civilization and his willingness to accept "both its roses and its thorns", 
whereas earlier reformers had only tried to imitate them with limited success.
51
Another point o f historical significance is the realistic outlook o f Ottoman 
diplomacy, which was shaped during the nineteenth century with extraordinary 
success. During the last hundred or so years o f its life, the Ottoman Empire was weak 
in comparison to the Western Powers and was forced to pursue its foreign policy 
among the tensions between its own interest and those o f other powers. Nonetheless, 
by playing one great power against another for survival, the Ottomans were able to 
maintain the territorial integrity o f much o f the Empire for a long time. Thanks to the 
contemporary international system o f the "balance o f  powers", and the Ottomans' 
understanding o f its main features, the Empire's decline took three hundred years and 
its collapse came only with a world war.
As a student o f this remarkable diplomacy, Ataturk would later use all the 
advantages o f the international system, such as the differences between England, 
France and Italy at the end o f the First World War, and the greater antagonism 
between the Western powers and the Soviet Union. One can also see that after the 
second World W ar Turkey's well-played role as a continuously threatened nation (by
the Soviet Union) gained resulting American aid which mounted to the point o f $738.9
70million to the year 1986, at its highest point, only third after Israel and Egypt
2.2. Problematic Legacies
Along with above-mentioned constructive elements, Turkey also inherited 
some complications from its Ottoman past which still show themselves today in 
Turkish foreign policy construction. The line o f foreign policy, which the Ottomans 
pursued through their last years, that is o f playing powers off against each other for 
survival, necessitated the Ottomans to  be extraordinarily wary about their environment 
and suspicious about other powers' intentions. They also learned, as a result o f 
centuries-long hostilities with their neighbours, not to trust any state, to rest on 
nothing but their power, and to be ready to fight at any given time, which is reflected 
in the common Turkish saying as "water sleeps, enemy never sleeps".
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Consequently, Turkish diplomats are famous today, among other things, for 
being sceptical and cautious. The Foreign Ministry always takes its time in answering 
any given foreign statement or memorandum as if they were searching for the real 
intentions behind the lines. There is also a sense o f insecurity in Turkey, a direct legacy 
o f  the Ottoman Empire, reflected even today in those kind o f  statements as "Turkey's 
historical position indicates that she is obliged to pursue a policy based on being strong 
and stable within her region...(since) she is surrounded by unfriendly neighbours".^
When discussing cautiousness and scepticism in Turkish foreign policy, one 
should bear in mind the fact that the Empire had been subjected repeatedly to 
propaganda attacks, exploitation and outright aggression by the self-appointed 
protectors o f her minorities. The Ottoman Empire restricted itself to minimum 
interference in the affairs o f the subject peoples. The authority granted to the head o f 
millets, or religious communities, included church administration, worship, education, 
tax collecting and supervision o f the civil status o f their co-religionists. Because the 
Turks did not seek to impose their language, and the traditional tolerance o f Islam for 
"peoples o f the book" reflected as the Ottoman rulers did not oblige conversion o f 
Christians and Jews but rather used the religious leadership o f these communities to 
administer their co-religionists, the persistence o f strong non-Muslim religious identity 
and linguistic differences served as a natural basis for the growth o f nationalism and 
eventual separatism by the subject peoples in the nineteenth century. These religious 
communities, by attracting European attention, therefore caused the continued 
involvement o f the West in Ottoman affairs. Thus, when the central authority 
weakened, the millet system, once an excellent instrument o f governing, precipitated 
the self-destruction o f the empire. In particular Greek Orthodox and Armenian 
communities had been used as a means o f interfering in Ottoman authority throughout 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Hence, Turkish sensitivity about Greece's 
efforts on internationalizing Orthodox patriarchy in Istanbul or any possibility o f 
accepting alleged Armenian genocide claims, has to be seen against this background.
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Naturally, Western Christian nations' interference in Ottoman authority, at one 
time, on behalf o f  her Christian minorities, caused a follow-up feeling among Turks 
that this difference in religion, though rarely articulated, is relevant to their 
international relations. This is especially true for the Islamists who usually refer to the 
European Community as a "Christian Club" and sarcastically mention their worries 
about whether these Christians would accept an Islamic country between them.
Another bitter legacy o f the late Ottoman Empire for the Turks is the memory 
o f  financial control exercised by European powers through Duyun-u Umumiye, Public 
Debt Service, on Turkish soil after the Ottoman Empire went bankrupt in 1881. Thus it 
was not surprising to  hear from Ataturk that "...by complete independence we mean of 
course complete economic, financial, juridical, military, cultural independence and 
freedom in all matters. Being deprived o f independence in any o f these is equivalent to 
the nation and country being deprived o f all its independence".^
Knowing that the Ottoman Empire, in its last years, , had lost its independence, 
to a large extent due to foreign interventions, privileges granted to foreigners, and the 
capitulations, the Ankara governments were thus veiy sensitive about infringements 
upon their sovereignty as well as about foreign economic entanglements. Hence, for 
example, Turkey had been very uneasy about even the suspicion that United States 
forces could use Turkey as a stepping stone for operations in the Middle East. In the 
economic sphere, this suspicion showed itself by very tight control over foreign 
companies operating in Turkey and strict rules governing financial problems.
Still another point o f historical significance is that there is a sense o f greatness, 
in the common Turkish mind, based on belonging to a nation which had established 
empires and been master o f a world empire, which was only brought down by a world 
war. Given that in the final years, the empire was nothing more than a name, devoid o f 
all real power, nonetheless it was a name, a symbol to which most o f the Turks 
responded and in which they took pride. Though the grandeur o f empire and its pride 
are matters o f  the past for contemporary Turks, it is still frustrating for them to be in 
the position of, and regarded as, a second-rate power. This frustration, perhaps in large
54
part, explains Turkish sensitivity to insult and criticism, related to her dependence upon 
the great powers, and to exclusion from important international conferences. On the 
other hand, centuries old Ottoman supremacy over the Arab states and the Balkans left 
the Turks with a conviction o f their superiority. The ordinary Turk is inclined to look 
down upon the Arab as a man who really cannot control his own affairs in a civilized 
fashion. The periodical reoccurrence o f conflicts in the Middle East tend to confirm, in 
the ordinary Turkish mind, this prejudice. A vicious circle is thus established as the 
Arabs react to  Turkish haughtiness.^
On the other side o f the fence, the long, and in its last days inefficient and 
presumably unpopular, Ottoman domination in these countries left ill will against the 
Turks, and modem Turkey had to face the legacy o f neighbours who have bitter 
memories o f Ottoman rule. Certainly, the Imperial past has something to say about the 
bitterness between Turkey and Greece. The late nineteenth century witnessed rising 
Greek nationalism and the modern Greek state was the first nation-state in the Balkans 
to  come out o f clashes between nationalism and the Ottoman Empire. In the early 
twentieth century the Turkish struggle for independence reached a climax when the 
Greek army landed in Izmir in 1915 to attain the Megali Idea (long-lived Greek dream 
o f reconstituting the Byzantine Empire), and at the end the Turks had to  fight against 
the Greeks to claim their independent nation-state. The frustrated hopes o f reaching 
the Megali Idea on the Greek part, and having been forced to fight against ex-subject 
people for its independence on the Turkish part, together with the stories about 
wartime atrocities on both sides, were enough reasons for the continued bitterness in 
the early 20s and 30s. Though some o f the potential for conflict was eliminated 
between Ataturk and Venizelos by the arrangement o f a compulsory population 
exchange in the 1920s, past bitterness provided a base for hostility when differences
erupted from 1950 onwards.
Another important historical fact is that one o f the main principles o f Turkish 
foreign policy ideology, namely, that o f the Soviet Union representing the primary 
threat to  Turkey's security, also had its roots deeply embedded in history. Since the
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seventeenth century, Russia's expansionist policies had helped it to become the "arch 
enemy" o f  the Ottomans. A succession o f major defeats at Russian hands had 
consistently confronted the Ottoman Government with the realities o f its declining 
power. M oreover, it was Tzar Nicholas I, who described the Ottoman Empire as the 
"sick man o f Europe" when he proposed to the British in 1853 that the Ottoman
O fEmpire be partitioned. The last o f the thirteen Russo-Turkish wars was, o f course, 
the First World War.
This course o f conflict over the past four centuries, had generated a full 
measure o f  hostility and distrust between Turks and Russians. Even during the period 
o f  the Treaty o f Friendship and Neutrality, when good neighbourly relations were 
enjoyed by both sides, the historical Turkish distrust o f the Soviets was well evident. In 
1934, during a conservation with General Douglas Mac Arthur, Ataturk predicted a 
major w ar in Europe around 1940 and also saw the real victors o f the war as the 
Soviet Union22;
W e Turks, as Russia's close neighbour, and the nation which has fought more 
wars against her than any other country, are following closely the courses o f 
events there, and see the danger stripped o f all camouflage...The Bolsheviks 
have now reached a point at which they constitute the greatest threat not only 
to Europe but to all Asia.
A history o f distrust, hostility and continued wars, made the Turks
extraordinarily wary. Hence they did not hesitate to accept American aid when the
Soviet Union placed great pressure on Turkey after the Second World War for
28territorial cessions and special privileges on the straits.
3. Geographical Realities
M odem  Turkey, thanks to her geo-strategic location with borders on Europe, the 
Middle East, and the Soviet Union, has been able to play a role in world politics far 
greater than her size, population, and economic strength would indicate. Historically, 
Turkey is located on one of, if not the most, strategic and traditionally most coveted 
pieces o f  territory.29 She controls not only the Turkish Straits, which link the Black
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Sea to the Mediterranean, but also the historic invasion t-outes from the Balkans and 
the Caucasus mountains onto the high Anatolian plateau, which in turn commands the 
entire Fertile Crescent down to the oil rich Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.
M oreover, Turkey is also at the crossroads o f major air, land, and the sea 
routes, o f modern times, joining the industrially advanced lands o f Europe with the 
petroleum-rich lands o f the Middle East. Furthermore, she possesses the sources for 
most o f  the water irrigating lands as far as the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, she 
was also on the line o f conflict between the zones o f two military superpowers and 
their respective alliances. And from the North to the South, she was in a rather 
sensitive part o f the Mediterranean, where both superpowers have tried to expand their 
spheres o f influences and counter-balance each other.
This particular geographical position makes Turkey a Balkan, Mediterranean, 
and Middle Eastern country all at the same time. It also makes Turkey doubly 
susceptible to international developments near and far and, therefore, greatly sensitive 
to the changes in the international political balance as well as the regional one. Thus 
the peculiarities o f the Anatolian peninsula are worth looking at, before anything else, 
since the various effects o f Turkey's geographical position, which influence Turkish 
foreign policy, are derived from these peculiarities.
The settlement in Anatolia dated back to as early as 7500 B.C.. Being at the 
crossroads o f land connections between Europe, Asia, and Africa, on the one hand, has 
increased the importance o f any state established in Anatolia. However, on the other 
hand, being also the main channel for migrations from the East, and invasions from 
both the East and the West, has encouraged a sense o f insecurity as well.
The Anatolian peninsula is highly mountainous in the East, permitting only 
small gateways between them. Each side o f Anatolia is surrounded by the sea, and 
against the coasts on the North and the South run parallel mountain ranges with forests 
and rivers, which make this area all but impermeable. As Toynbee describes "...only 
towards the West does the plateau sink in long fertile river valleys to a clement, and 
sheltered coastline".30 This geographical setting has forced all states located on the
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Anatolian peninsula, including the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, to look
to  the W est rather than to the East for trade and cultural exchange.
The physical features o f a land may make it easy to defend or penetrate from
outside. From the military point o f view, the Anatolian peninsula is a "strategical 
11region". The seas on both sides and the fortress-like mountainous terrain in the East 
are difficult to penetrate by using force, and make natural boundaries for Turkey. 
European Turkey, on the other hand, is difficult to defend and the Straits are also 
vulnerable to air attacks. It is true that possession o f the Straits conveys political and 
military advantages, and raises Turkey from the position o f a purely local power to one 
having crucial international influence. Simultaneously, however, the Straits pose one o f 
Turkey's major security concerns by attracting potential aggressors. The fact that 
Turkey deployed her most powerful First Army to protect the Straits and the area 
surrounding them, shows the full realisation o f this phenomenon by Turkey.
Another important factor in Turkish security thinking is that the Aegean 
Islands, if under the control o f an enemy power, would deny Turkey the use o f her two 
principal harbours, Istanbul and Izmir, and could prevent access to the Straits. In this 
case, navigation would be safe from the eastern Mediterranean so long as the island o f 
Cyprus, which could bloc the area, was controlled by a friendly government. Hence, 
the scenario that Enosis (union o f Cyprus with Greece) would cut Turkey off from the 
open sea, encouraged Turkey's resistance to such designs since the 1950s. It is the very 
same fear that is behind the Turkish declaration o f  casus belli against the Greek claims
about twelve-mile territorial waters in the Aegean, thus putting all open-sea exits from
12the Aegean within her territorial seas.
Another important reason for Turkey's geographical insecurity is the fact that 
she is surrounded by many neighbours with different characteristics, regimes, 
ideologies, and aims; and that the relations between them and Turkey would not 
always be peaceful, and especially in the Middle East, may occasionally take the form 
o f armed clashes.
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A country's borders may be a source o f strength or o f weakness depending on
their length, the number and intentions o f the neighbours, and the relative power
available to the affected parties. In the early days o f the Republic, Turkey had borders
with seven states, including four with major powers; Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet
Union, Iran, Great Britain (mandate in Iraq and possession o f Cyprus), France, and
Italy (possession o f the Dodecanese Islands). Although the Soviet Union and Iran
posed no threat at that moment, their predecessors, the Russian and Persian Empires
respectively, had deadly quarrels with the Ottoman Empire. Bulgaria, though an ally
during the First World War, had fought against Ottoman Empire for its independence
and the memories o f Balkan Wars, during which she had advanced as far as the
fortresses o f Istanbul, had not been forgotten by Turks.
In the interwar period, though she enjoyed good neighbourly relations in
general, Turkey had problems with Britain (concerning Mosul), with France
(concerning Hatay or Alexandretta), and with Italy because o f her open imperialistic
tendencies towards the eastern Mediterranean after the 1930s. After the Second World
War, Turkey's borders dropped to six, leaving Greece, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union,
Iran, Iraq and Syria as neighbours, and the Republic o f Cyprus joined them in 1960.
This composition o f neighbours left no need for further explanation and Turkey's sense
33o f  insecurity proved what M ost and Starr argue;
...a nation that borders on a large number o f other nations faces a particularly 
high risk that it may be threatened or attacked by at least some o f its 
neighbours...and confronts its neighbours with uncertainty because it must 
protect and defend itself against many potential opponents.
To counter-balance potential opponents and to reduce her sense o f insecurity,
Turkey sought alliances with regional states and outside powers. Between 1920 and
1955 Turkey entered a number o f pacts and alliances, as well as signing friendship
declarations with all her neighbours and bilateral security treaties with the United
States. This sense o f insecurity went too far as she entered the Balkan Pact (1953) and
Alliance (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), all o f which meant nothing any more, as
far as Turkey's security was concerned, after Turkey's adherence to NATO in 1952.
59
Another geographical influence on Turkish foreign policy derives from the facts 
that Turkey controls the only seaway linking the Black Sea with the Mediterranean; 
that the Soviet Union was the major Black Sea power as well as being a superpower; 
and that Turkey also shared a common border with the Soviet Union. As mentioned 
above, by possessing internationally important waterways Turkey had been able to 
exercise much more influence on world politics than would otherwise have been 
possible. As summed up by Vali "...an Anatolian state that did not control the bridge 
toward Europe would only be another country o f the Middle East; united with this 
historic region however, it is bound to play more eminent role either offensively or 
defensively".^
This intercontinental position has proved an element o f strength as well as o f 
weakness. For five centuries, Istanbul provided a homebase for the Ottomans "from 
which they were able to exercise control in all directions, in the Balkans and central 
Europe, the Black Sea region, the Aegean and Mediterranean, Mesopotamia and
o c
Arabia, Syria and North Africa". The Straits have also supplied a resource for the 
Ottoman Empire and its successor, the Turkish Republic, that could not be duplicated 
in manpower as a means to influence the actions o f the Russian Empire, and later the 
Soviet Union. ^
On the other hand, however, controlling these vital waterways brought the 
Ottoman Empire into perennial conflict with the Russians, beginning in the seventeenth 
century when Peter the Great began his drive to the south. It has always been vitally 
important for Russia to have its outlet to the Mediterranean unimpeded, independent 
o f  its neighbours' goodwill. Once Karl Marx said that "Constantinople [Istanbul] is the 
golden bridge between the East and the West, and Western civilization cannot, like the 
sun, go round the world without passing that bridge; and it cannot pass it without a
' i n
struggle with Russia".
But it has been equally important for Western powers not to  let Russia gain 
control over this important passage. So much so that Napoleon is said to have placed 
such importance on the Turkish Straits that he declared his willingness "to abandon
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mastery over half the world rather than yield Russia those narrow S tra its" .^  Indeed, 
during the nineteenth century, the struggle for control o f  the Ottoman Empire in 
general, and o f the Straits in particular, was the major part o f the assertions o f 
European diplomacy. And in the latter half o f the nineteenth century the "Eastern 
Question", in essence the fate o f the Ottoman Empire, became the major factor in the 
global balance o f power. Consequently, the Ottomans,"even though militarily weak, 
economically bankrupt and politically anomalous", were still able to subsist for another 
century "on the conflict o f interests between Russia, on the one hand, and Austro- 
Hungary, France, Britain, on the o th e r" .^  This went so far that, in 1854, Britain and 
France fought against Russia to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity o f the 
Ottoman Empire.
The struggle over the mastery o f the Straits between Russia and the West 
continued until the first World War with "the ancient rule o f  the Ottoman Empire", 
based on freedom o f navigation for merchant ships with a denial o f passage to men-of- 
war, in force. During this period no hostile navy ever managed to enter the Straits by 
force, neither from the Bosphorus, in the North, nor the Dardanelles, in the South.4^ 
During the first World War, control o f the Straits had a major impact on the military 
and political developments o f the war. The geopolitical significance o f the Straits have 
never been more clearly demonstrated than by the role they played between 1914 and 
1918. With Turkey as an enemy, Russia's most important route o f supply was cut off 
and the Western Entente powers were largely unable to send her badly needed 
weaponry and ammunition, a circumstance which greatly contributed to her eventual 
collapse.
The dismemberment o f the Ottoman Empire in the first World War gave the 
W est the opportunity to achieve the internationalisation o f the Straits. The Lausanne 
Conference, signed with the new Turkish Republic in 1923, established an international 
regime with the freedom o f navigation to be supervised by an international 
commission.41 Under the Convention, the Straits area was demilitarized and 
jurisdiction over all navigation passed into the hands o f international authority.
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Then in 1936, prior to the second World War, Turkey regained full sovereign 
rights and control o f the Straits area with the Montreux Convention. 4^The 
Convention, while authorising unrestricted freedom o f commercial navigation, 
established very strict regulations for warships, except Turkish ships, hence giving full 
consideration to Turkey's military security as well as to that o f Black Sea powers it 
conceded the "ancient rule o f the Empire". Practically it eliminated any possibility o f an 
offensive drive to the Black Sea, but did permit limited passage from the Black Sea 
into the Mediterranean. After the Second World War the Soviets raised some 
objections and sought changes in the status o f the Straits, but they were refused by 
Turkey, backed by the United States. Since then no challenge has been made to the 
status o f the Straits and the Montreux Convention remains in force today.
While the question o f the Turkish Straits and the historic hostility between the 
Russians and the Turks has been at the heart o f Turkish-Soviet relations for many 
years, having a superpower neighbour also had its effects o f Turkish foreign policy. 
The Turkish-Soviet border was not confined to land but was extended by a long sea 
border which merged with that o f Bulgaria, a close ally o f the Soviet Union.
During the first two decades o f the Republic, relations with the Soviet Union, 
which supplied political and material support to Turkey, were good and were 
strengthened by the Treaty o f Neutrality and Non-aggression o f 1925. This era o f 
mutual understanding came to end on March 15, 1945, with the Soviet's unilateral 
denunciation o f the 1925 Treaty and demands for a new treaty "in accord with the new 
situation".43 They further demanded territorial concessions from Turkey and bases on 
the Bosphorus. These Soviet demands strongly influenced Turkish foreign policy 
attitudes and reinforced its Western orientation. Since Turkey was only able to  refuse 
these demands with the United States' backing, the Turkish Government sought a 
formal alliance with her, and the link with the Western defence system was formalised 
with Turkey's accession to  NATO on February 18, 1952.
Though, after Stalin's death, the Soviet Government officially declared that its 
policy towards Turkey had been wrong and that the Soviet Union had not any kind o f
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territorial claims on T u r k e y , t h e  time had already been passed for the Soviet Union 
to revise its relations with Turkey since the historic Turkish distrust o f the Russians 
reappeared on the horizon. The belief that the Soviet Union posed a primary threat to 
Turkey's security dominated relations between the two countries during the cold war, 
and it was only after the blow o f Johnson's le tte r^  that Turkey showed interest in 
Soviet efforts to normalize relations. It took nearly a decade for her to accept the fact 
that detente between the Soviet and the Western Blocs had been started in the 1960s, 
and a further decade to improve its relations with the Soviet U n io n .^  Nevertheless, 
having a common border with the Soviet Union was still a cause o f  concern and 
remained one o f the factors contributing to Turkey's extremely cautious foreign policy 
and her continued membership o f N A T O .^
Another complication for Turkey's political and security thinking is the fact that
Turkey is a Middle Eastern country as well as a Balkan and Mediterranean one. The
strategic importance o f the region does not need further elaboration. The single fact
that the Middle East owned most o f the known oil resources made the region one o f
the most important in the strategic thinking o f all parties concerned. Turkey, like most
o f  the Western countries, is dependent on Middle Eastern oil. N ot only is the
functioning o f  the Turkish economy dependent on continuous flows o f Middle Eastern
petrol, but also mounting a viable conventional defense during international crises and
war, for military strategy has become increasingly reliant on massive wartime fuel
48needs, which are normally larger than under peacetime conditions. ° Therefore, 
Turkey's growing political and diplomatic concern in the region has been, in part, a 
result o f the intensifying economic ties which were forced upon her by her dependenge 
on Middle Eastern oil.
The significance o f geography on Turkey's destiny has never been more clearly 
demonstrated than by the fact that losing the oil-rich Arab lands, which the Ottoman 
Empire once controlled, after the first World W ar had left Turkey with a need to 
import oil that encouraged financial dependence on the West and contributed to 
periodic economic crises, which in turn caused social and political instabilities within
63
the country. Though the consecutive governments in Ankara continuously declared 
that Turkey had no territorial demands on any country, the memories o f losing these 
territories with their extensive resources is still fresh in the ordinary Turkish mind. This 
can explain, in part, Turkish sensitivity about developments concerning the Aegean 
seabed. N ot to give up possibly oil-rich areas once again is one o f the reasons behind 
Turkish arguments that the eastern portion o f the Aegean seabed is an extension o f the 
Anatolian continental shelf and, therefore, Turkey should have jurisdiction for 
purposes o f  exploration and exploitation o f seabed and subsoil resources. ^  The fear 
o f  losing another potentially oil-rich area (though any prospect o f finding substantial oil 
resources in the Aegean is fairly rem o te^ ) is so strong in Turkey that she will not, in 
the near future, waive her claims to the Aegean seabed, even at the risk o f a military 
conflagration with Greece while the dispute remains unresolved.
Apart from oil, there are other reasons why the Middle East possesses a great 
place in Turkish security thinking. The region has been continuously unstable since the 
First World W ar and the breakdown o f the Ottoman Empire. Turkish foreign policy in 
the Middle East, while depending on status quo, requires stability, and any destabilising 
development in the region would create security problems for her. Thus the general 
insecurity o f the region has attracted great deal o f concern from Turkey. It is sufficient 
to  point out that four Arab-Israeli wars, the unending Palestinian problem, the 
Lebanese civil war and foreign interventions, the Suez crises, the Iranian revolution, 
the Iran-Iraq war and the latest Gulf War, have all occurred within the immediate reach 
and security zone o f Turkey. Such developments, and the ever-increasing possibility o f 
superpower involvement, have inevitably created great concern in Turkey over her 
immediate security. Beside cultural aspirations and ideological, economic, and political 
factors, the stability o f Europe in comparison to the Middle East since the Second 
W orld W ar has also encouraged Turkey to remain in the Western camp. A secure place 
within the multinational fore, which have created stable political, social, and economic 
conditions in Europe, has always had a considerable attraction for Turkey, a country 
which is placed in one o f the most unstable and insecure regions o f the world.
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4. The Impact of Kemalism
Although experiences and memories o f the Ottoman past, together with its geo­
strategic location, served as a foundation for and influenced the subsequent foreign 
relations o f  Turkey, it was Ataturk's theory and practice o f  foreign policy which has 
been the most important factor in shaping Turkish foreign policy.
He not only completely controlled Turkish foreign policy in his life time, but he 
also put forward an ideological framework by which the pursuit o f Turkish foreign 
policy could be achieved. Though the original Kemalist goals o f national foreign policy 
underwent various mutations, especially under the relatively free democratic system of 
the 1961 Constitution, practically all Turkish governments, regardless o f their 
standpoints, put his "indisputable dogma" into their programmes and have not (or 
alternatively could not) implemented policies that ran counter to Kemalist principles. 
And even the "conflicting interpretations were often attributed to th e m " .^  His 
influence over the Turkish people, in general, and Turkish foreign policy in particular, 
has been so deep and so fundamental that there are at times intimations, and often open 
warnings, that anything other than his principles would be disloyal to him and to the 
country in general.
In particular, Turkey's foreign policy has been influenced by the following goals 
and principles laid down by Ataturk: establishment and preservation o f  a national state 
with complete independence conditioned by modem Turkish Nationalism; promotion 
o f Turkey to the level o f contemporary civilization by means o f Kemalist principles; 
and attachment to realist and peaceful ways in foreign policy actions.
Ataturk's foreign policy views, like his political views in general, represented a 
break with the past. He aimed at a renunciation o f three strains which had been 
important during Ottoman times: the imperial-Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan- 
Turanism. Incidentally, policies which could break these strains coincided with the
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three o f his political principles; Republicanism, Secularism and Nationalism 
respectively.
Ataturk's foreign policy was clearly an extension o f his domestic policies. He 
recognized the vital relationship between the internal organization o f the new Republic 
and its foreign policy. He also realized that a peaceful foreign policy was needed in 
order to achieve his far-reaching reforms inside Turkey. Once he said, "What 
particularly interests foreign policy and upon which it is founded is the internal 
organization o f the state. It is necessary that foreign policy should agree with the 
internal organization". Therefore it is not surprising to see that in his famous motto - 
"peace at home, peace in the world" - while he was connecting internal stability with 
international peace and order, he put the home front first.
Ataturk did not want to see the Turkish nation as a foreign or hostile 
community set apart from the nations o f the world and did not want the nation to 
belong to a group holding such views. He wanted Turkey as a part o f civilized world. 
However, in order to achieve this, a change was necessary, apart from in the system o f 
government, "in the mental disposition o f the Turkish p eo p le" .^  His political reforms 
were directed to this aim, namely, to change the centuries long backwardness and 
ignorance o f Turkish people, and to accustom them to the modern way o f life. The 
ideological guidance, which was necessary to achieve this end, was to be derived from 
his political principles, which were formalised at the 1931 Congress o f the Republican 
People's Party and written into constitution on 1937.-^ They were symbolised by the 
emblem o f the RPP: " six arrows". Each o f them actually represents one o f the key 
words o f Kemalist ideology: Nationalism, Secularism, Republicanism, Populism, 
Etatism, and Revolutionism. These six key words did not encompass all aspects o f the 
Kemalist ideology but they did, in a concise manner, represent its pillars and many o f 
them had foreign policy implications.
As the foundation o f Kemalist ideology, Republicanism comprises the notions 
o f popular sovereignty, freedom and equality before the law. It was against the 
totalitarian tendencies and the notion o f the Empire, which was revisionist and
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imperialist. While accepting the existing status quo as a main foundation o f the new 
state, A taturk said that "...the state should pursue an exclusively national policy...! 
mean... to work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare o f the 
nation and the c o u n t r y . . . R e p u b l i c a n i s m  was not only a change in the governmental 
system, but also a turning point in the political philosophy o f the new Turks. The new 
Turkish Republic was a nation-state founded by the Turkish nation, by its own accord. 
Throughout history all Turkish states had been dynastic. Therefore, the extra stress on 
republicanism was necessary to help accustom the Turkish people to the idea that the 
change in regime after the War o f Independence was non-reversible. From this point o f 
view, republicanism constituted a doctrinal barrier against those who still hoped for a 
return to the Sultanate and the Caliphate.
Secularism was a necessary component o f modernisation, covering not only the
cn
political and governmental but the whole social and cultural life. From the foreign 
policy point o f view, it has a much more general meaning than one which refers more
C O
narrowly to a specific process o f separating religion from the state. Indeed, the main 
struggle o f  Kemalist secularists was not over the question o f separating the spiritual 
and temporal, but over the difference between democracy and theocracy. A theocratic 
Islamic state, as a way o f government, was obliged to see Christian powers as infidels 
and according to Islamic belief the state o f warfare never ended between believers and 
infidels. By choosing a democratic system o f government and dismissing the idea o f 
Islam-protector nation, the new Turkish state ended centuries o f hostility and 
established the basis for peaceful relations with Western Christian countries.
Another reflection o f Secularism in terms o f Turkish foreign policy can be seen 
in its rejection o f the idea o f Pan-Islamism. To unite different Muslim nations, under 
one common name, to give these different elements equal rights, and found a mighty 
state, was seen as a brilliant and attractive political solution for the Empire's problems 
in its last years. But it was a misleading one. The new state would not be world- 
conquering or Islam-protecting any more. Such claims could endanger the existence o f 
the state.
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There is nothing in history to show how policy o f  Pan-Islamism could have 
succeeded or how it could have found a basis for its realisation on this earth. 
History does not afford examples as regards the result o f the ambition to 
organise a state which should be governed by the idea o f  world supremacy and 
include the whole humanity without distinction o f race. For us there can be no
question o f  the lust o f conquest...
Since the Islamic Ottoman Empire could not try its Christian subjects with 
Sharia (Islamic law), it allowed them to be tried before Christian courts, which in turn 
resulted in foreign interventions and caused the Ottoman Empire to become involved in 
conflicts against the Western powers over the supremacy o f the Millets. Hence, it 
seemed that the Islamic religious establishment o f the Empire had played a major role 
in accelerating and enhancing the Empire's decline and decay. Consequently, M. Kemal 
was determined not to allow the same thing happen to the new Turkish state. 66 In 
other words he could not give a reason to the Western powers to intervene in Turkish 
affairs.
Nationalism, as a source o f Turkish existence, stood for a Turkish-nation state 
in place o f Ottomanist or Pan-Turanist ambitions, and was bound up with the national 
borders, which were first laid down by the National Pact o f 1920 and later legalized by 
the Lausanne Treaty o f 1923. Nationalism, a movement which was re-discovered by 
the Empire's Christian subjects in the early 19th century, and was therefore partly 
responsible for its disintegration, had come in touch with the Turkish population only 
in the early 2 0 ^  century. When the Entente powers started to partition the Empire's 
heartland, it became clear that they were taking advantage o f the lack o f a unified 
nationalist movement. It was obvious to M. Kemal, that the main requirement for the 
independence o f a nation was the effort towards a common goal and public awareness 
o f  the nation's historical consciousness. The creation o f nationalism on the European 
model was essential for a successful independence struggle against the supremacy o f 
the Imperialist European powers.61 Therefore, the idea o f a Turkish nation in Turkey 
was the basic innovation in the early days o f the Kemalist revolution.
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M. Kemal's declaration in the Amasya circular o f June 21-22, 1919 that "only 
the will and the determination o f the nation can save the independence o f the nation", 
became the main principle o f the National Independence Struggle.6^ This principle 
invited every individual o f the nation to share a common obligation and responsibility. 
A taturk had realized the necessity o f basing his movement on the reality o f 
"nationhood". But it was no easy task to accustom a people who had been attached to 
a religion and a dynasty, to the new meaning o f Turkey. Even the expression "Turkey" 
was neither used nor known by the people. The concept o f nationalism, and the 
establishment o f  a national state, which had begun in the West centuries before and had 
slowly spread and become the very property o f the people, was unfamiliar to the 
Turks. Therefore, with the war o f Independence and realization o f the reforms 
following it, non-national political and social values had to be replaced by the values o f 
the Turkish people.
Yet, he also realized that any nationalist claims must be supported by a very 
strict definition o f National identity. He was opposed to the expending o f the country's 
energy on a quest for virtually unobtainable goals. "We know our limitations. We are 
not worldly-minded".6-* Directing the country in the path o f adventurism could very 
well result in the loss o f what had already been achieved. Therefore, he rejected the 
utopian ideas o f Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism and did not build Turkish nationalism 
on religion or race.64 He defined nation as "a political and social body formed by 
citizens bound together by the unity o f language, culture and ideas" 65 Hence, Turkish 
nationalism, like that o f Europe, was based on common citizenship66 and did not 
extend its aims beyond the national borders. It was not imperialistic but rather realistic.
Basing Turkish nationalism on a common citizenship instead o f "ethnicity" was 
a realistic option for the population o f Turkey consisted, and still does, o f "individuals 
from many different ethnic backgrounds but, according to the Turkish Constitution, all 
citizens o f  Turkey are Turks".67This official, legalistic, approach to Turkish "national 
homogeneity" allowed the early Turkish leaders, in accordance with the principle o f 
populism, to be representative o f all the peoples o f Turkey irrespective o f their class,
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religion, or ethnic origin. People was officially defined as "all individuals who, without 
demanding any privileges, accept absolute equality before the law" 68 In this context, 
the nation was regarded as resulting from "historical and sociological conditions",^  
different from race which "is a biological occurrence", and from am met "which is a 
group o f  people believing in universal religion" 70 The role o f nationalism then, was to 
"form a bond between the people's collective memories o f the past and adherence to 
the goals o f  the future".7 ^
From this point o f  view, various ethnic groups within the Turkish state were 
accepted as "building blocks o f the nation" which "joined together to create the 
national culture". In connection with this, the demands o f ethnic groups for national 
status, "regardless o f the social anxiety causing the demand", were considered 
contradictory to "the spirit and law o f history" and thus "unrealistic and wrong".77 As 
a result, when faced with different ethnic claims emerging within the "unified Turkish 
nation", the Kemalist regime chose to dismiss them as plots o f "enemy agents", an 
attitude continued until 1990s:
In today's Turkish national, political and social community we have patriots and 
citizens who have been subjected to propaganda about the Kurdish, Caucasian, 
and even Laz and Bosnian nations. But these misnomers, which are a result o f 
despotic ages long past, had no influence on the individuals o f this nation, 
except for a few enemy agents and brainless reactionaries, and have left our 
people in grief and sorrow. Because the individuals o f this nation, as members 
o f the integrated, unified Turkish Community, have a common past, history, 
73morality and law.
In the process, however, what started as an attempt to create a homogeneous Turkish 
nation through constitutionalism using public consensus, turned to an attempt to force 
various elements within the Turkish state into a homogenous society through 
demographic homogenization.74 This, on the one hand, contradicted with the original 
claims o f  the Kemalist ideology, and on the other hand, alienated the masses who felt 
ethnically distinct from the Sunni-Turkish speaking majority. When coupled with the 
persistent denial o f the Turkish ruling elite o f the latter's existence, especially since 
mid-1970s onwards when the latter groups started to express and demand their
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cultural distinctiveness through organizational structures, "ethnicity" issue came to 
determine the ideological boundaries o f Turkish national identity, and also constrained 
its constitutional evolvement. This aspect o f Turkish nation-building is especially 
relevant to our discussion o f Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s as it essentially 
interacts with the Kurdish issue which became an element o f both Turkey's domestic 
and external policies during this p e r i o d . I n  this context, while the Kemalist 
emphasise on the Turkish Language as "the heart and mind o f  the Turkish N a tio n "^  
still prevents the ruling Turkish elite from iecognizing the Kurdish Language as equal 
to  that o f  Turkish, the adherence o f the latest Constitution to the above-mentioned 
Kemalist principles continues to conflict with the social reality o f Turkey.
Turkish national liberation should also be distinguished from the anti-imperialist 
movements o f  the post-1945 period during which the African and Asian peoples who 
struggled for their independence came into conflict with the colonial powers in so far 
as political, economic and social ideas were concerned. Nationalism in Turkey, 
however, was an anti-imperialistic program for independence, on the one hand, but it 
was also, paradoxically, a program for cultural and political Westernization. Ataturk 
himself often reiterated that his struggle was directed against Western imperialism 
rather than against the West itself. Turkey fought the West, but by fighting with the 
West, entered into the Western sphere and Western system o f society.
Other Kemalist principles, each o f which were interlocked with the others, also 
had somewhat indirect effects on the foreign policy o f the new state. Populism, by 
referring to the equality o f citizens and by denying existence o f  classes in Turkish 
society, would expect to avoid creating class conflicts and, therefore, would maintain 
internal peace and stability, a concept, according to Kemalist ideology, that 
international peace and order should be based on.
Statism was a program of economic development and a way "to attain a rank 
worthy of...new Turkey". Since "...we live in an economic era...the new Turkish state 
will not be a world conquering state. The new Turkish state will be an economic 
state"
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All these principles were protected by nationalism against foreign aggression, 
and kept alive by the revolutionary dynamic process o f the transformation o f the 
Turkish state and society toward the modern Western id e a l.^  To modernize the 
country and to assimilate the Turkish people into the nations o f the modern West were 
the underlying motivation for Kemalist principles and reforms. For a Kemalist, to be a 
revolutionary means to devote oneself to the cause o f modernisation and to struggle to 
transform Turkey into a rapidly advancing country capable o f playing an important role 
among the developed nations o f Europe. The revolution meant a transformation in 
outlook, the adoption o f a Western way o f life, a fight against ignorance and 
superstition, the import o f new techniques, economic development, and, in particular, a 
constant change in people's minds.
In this sense, Kemalist revolutionism was different from other new 
revolutionary states' intentions. Due to its very nature, Kemalist revolutionism had no 
intention o f  exporting its revolutionary ideas. Its main aim was to protect the results o f 
the Turkish reforms from counter-revolutions, not to export its ideas and influences 
outside the boundaries o f Turkey as many contemporary revolutionary movements did. 
Like Turkish nationalism, the revolution was an internal not an external phenomenon.
Such ideas as these Kemalist principles led Turkey to develop good 
neighbourly relations and join in with international collaborations for collective security 
and peace. Moreover, Turkey's Western orientation in foreign policy was a natural 
adjunct to Ataturk's overall embracing o f the West and rejection o f the East. At the
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end o f the W ar o f Independence in 1923, Ataturk spoke in the following w ay77:
There are many nations, but there is only one civilization. For the advancemeftt 
o f  a nation, it must be a part o f this one civilization... We wish to  modernize our 
country. All o f our efforts are directed toward the establishment o f a modem, 
therefore Western, government.
As can be seen, Ataturk identified "modernization" with "Westernization" and used
them synonymously.
In the Ataturk period Turkey's Western-directed foreign policy was carried out 
in conjunction with the establishment o f cultural ties with the West. The victories won
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against the Western states during the National Struggle gave a psychological boost to
the Turkish nationalist movement and thus, as stated above, enabled swift
W esternization to take place. Turkey's peculiarity o f  never having been a colonised
country and consequent lack o f post-colonial resentments, unlike other Third World
countries which gained independence after World War II, was also an important factor
affecting Turkey's attitude towards the West. But above all, the influence o f M. Kemal,
who even during the period o f National Struggle favoured a Western style o f thinking,
was o f  great importance in this orientation.
At the beginning o f the National Struggle, M. Kemal's major goal was the
liberation o f the country from foreign occupation and the establishment, within national
boundaries, o f a Turkish national state which would be master o f its own fate. In its
foreign policy actions, the government o f the Grand National Assembly favoured the
application o f  the basic principles arrived at during the peace deliberations following
the First World War. Since every nation was to be permitted to form a state o f its own,
it was felt that Turkey also should be allowed to enjoy this right o f establishing an
independent country. In fact, the Grand National Assembly was the result o f  one o f  the
newest national movements in 1920; which was very similar to the European national
independence movements that took place in the course o f the last century. This
Turkish belief, too, attracted Turkey to the West's democratic ideals.
After the W ar o f Independence, the main concern o f Ataturk's foreign policy
was complete independence. Because o f foreign interventions, privileges granted to
foreigners, and the capitulations, the Ottoman Empire in its last years had to a large
extent lost its independence. Following its defeat in the First World War, the last
Turkish state was in the position o f being completely erased from the map. This was
the reason for M. Kemal's initiation o f the War o f Independence and it was stated in
80the following terms in the 6th Article o f the National Pact :
In order to render possible our national and economic development and to 
succeed in achieving orderly administration, like all states we must possess 
absolute independence and freedom in the achievement o f our development. 
For this reason we are opposed to all limitations on our political, juridical or
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financial development. In the settling of our assessed debts there shall no 
change in this matter...
M ustafa Kemal made it clear that, even at the beginning o f  the W ar o f  Independence,
one o f  his major goals was the establishment o f a completely independent Turkey, free
o f  all foreign interference and privileges. "By complete independence" he said to H.
Franklin-Bouillon, representative o f France, on June 9, 192T "we mean o f course,
complete economic, financial, juridical, military, cultural independence and freedom in
all matters. Being deprived o f independence in any o f these is equivalent to the nation
and country being deprived o f all its independence",8 ^
Nothing could have been more natural than for M. Kemal to insist upon
"complete independence", since he intended to liberate the country from the limitations
imposed by foreign hegemony which had been forced upon the notion o f the
sovereignty o f the state. Furthermore, he in no way accepted the idea o f a "mandate"
or a "protectorate". But this principle was not against the alliances or the political and
military agreements made with other countries. Article 7 o f the Sivas Congress
Resolution reads that "...we shall gladly accept technical, industrial and economic aid
from any state which will show respect for the ideals o f nationalism and will not pursue
the aim o f seizing our country...".82 Therefore, "complete independence" does not
mean that a state cannot enter into military and political cooperation with other states
for the purpose o f balancing its own power with that o f potential aggressors, as long as
these allies are respectful o f the country's right to existence. Ataturk himself, played
the leading role in the establishment o f the Balkan Pact in 1934 and the Sadabad Pact
in 1937, and accepted economic aid from the Soviet Union.
One o f  the key elements o f Ataturk's foreign policy was that the new Republic
would seek to  preserve the national territory encompassed by the armistice line o f
1918, and would renounce any other territorial claims. In the Treaty o f Lausanne, the
borders determined by the National Pact were, for the most part, realised. With
Turkey's territorial situation settled by the Treaty o f Lausanne, Ataturk embarked upon
a foreign policy based on his motto, "Peace at home and peace in the world". Satisfied
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with its new borders, there was no reason for military adventurism on Turkey's part. 
This was one o f the overall principles o f M. Kemal's foreign policy. He was opposed to 
the use o f  force as a policy instrument. Both in the War o f Independence and in the 
subsequent period, Ataturk always first attempted to secure and preserve Turkey's 
independence by peaceful means. Only when peaceful means failed to secure the 
legitimate rights and interests o f his country did he then resort to force.
As a state which was defeated in the First World War, the position o f  Turkey 
with regard to the situation existing in Europe after the war is noteworthy. I f  Turkey 
had acted emotionally it would have been natural for her to join the bloc o f nations 
opposed to the status quo. But Ataturk, who had taken the responsibility o f 
determining the direction o f Turkish foreign policy, avoided leading the country down 
the general path o f  adventurism. Thus, although Turkey attempted to maintain good 
relations with all states, she nonetheless established closer ties with non-belligerent 
states in their opposition to those states which were attempting to destroy the
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international peace.
In contrast to a good number o f other contemporary states, Turkey showed 
great willingness to solve its major problems by legal means. During the interwar 
period, it could have been possible to resolve some o f Turkey's problems left behind by 
Lausanne (such as those o f Straits and the Sanjack o f Alexandretta) by force or fait 
accompli without patiently waiting for an opportunity to solve them peacefully, but 
Ataturk, who was always against the policy o f fait accompli, rejected such 
adventures.84 One can point to many examples o f the allegiance to legality in Ataturk's 
foreign policy. Only five years after signing the Treaty o f Lausanne, at a time when 
there still remained problems unsolved by this treaty, Turkey clearly demonstrated its 
allegiance to the rule o f law and to world peace by signing the Kellog-Briand Pact on 
August 27, 1928, thereby renouncing "the use o f war as an instrument o f foreign 
policy".8^
Later, Turkey signed the Geneva General Act for the Pacific Settlement o f 
Disputes. Although Turkey was still not yet a member o f the League o f Nations, by
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signing this agreement for the use o f legal means in the solution o f international 
disputes - an agreement signed by only twenty Western states - she occupied an unique 
place among the nations defeated in the First World War.
Yet another example o f this allegiance during the Ataturk era could be seen in 
the course followed by Turkey in the signing o f the M ontreux Conference o f 1936 and 
in the solving o f the Mosul dispute. At Lausanne, Turkey accepted that the Mosul 
question could be taken to the League, which she was not a member of, if no solution 
could be reached by bilateral negotiations with Britain. Eventually the problem was 
solved by the League o f Nations and Turkey renounce her claims over Mosul in favour 
o f  a British mandate, though the area had been designated as a part o f  the Turkish
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homeland in the earlier Turkish National Pact. Similarly, in the M ontreux case,
Turkey based her claims on the international law principle rebus sic stantibus, and
called for an international conference to change the Treaty o f Lausanne, in a way to
allow Turkey resume full control over Straits and re-militarize the area around them,
87instead o f  acting militarily by herself, like many o f her contemporaries had done. It 
would be possible to multiply these examples. The common point o f all o f these is that 
the Turkey o f Ataturk, as he himself, was a firm believer in the necessity o f the 
allegiance to legality in Turkish foreign policy actions.
Further, he regarded humanity as one body, and each nation as a part o f this. 
Accordingly, the prosperity and happiness o f the nations o f the world could not be 
divided.
Pain in the finger-tip o f the body causes all the other members to suffer...If 
there is an illness in some part o f the world or other...it must concern us exactjy 
as if  it were among us. It is this idea that saves nations from selfishness. 
Whether selfishness is personal or national, it must always be regarded as
bad.88
After stressing the definite need o f peace for all the civilised world, he indicated also 
the measures which he thought necessary for the continuation o f world peace:
I f  a lasting peace is desired, international measures must be taken to better the 
conditions o f  communities. The prosperity...of mankind must replace hunger
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and oppression. The world must educate its citizens in a way that will remove 
them far away from envy, greed and vindictiveness...^9
As a military man, he knew the horror o f war very well and promised in 1920 " to
refuse absolutely to  waste the nation's time and resources in the pursuit o f dreams o f
domination".9^ It has been observed by M ost and Singer that "success may embolden
a nation's leaders' notion o f confidence and optimism and thereby stimulate their entry
into subsequent conflicts".9  ^ The Turkish case, however, has proved otherwise; the
victory over the Entente powers decreased the likelihood o f subsequent conflicts. As
Edward Weisband concluded, o f all the "great socio-political revolutions in the history
o f  the modem  state...the Kemalist Revolution in Turkey represents the only one that
9?has produced an ideology o f peace".
This line o f  foreign policy also shows, on the part o f Turkish leaders, the full 
realisation o f the country's limitations. As Lenczowski puts it, "...perhaps the greatest 
merit o f  Kemal [Ataturk] and, his followers was their sober realization o f  limitation 
and their moderate, realistic foreign policy. There was nothing romantic or 
adventurous in Kemal's foreign policy".93 In fact, his foreign policy had to be free 
from adventurism in order to give him time to initiate the socio-economic reforms 
necessary for the modernization and reconstruction o f the Republic. Once he said:
The government o f the Turkish Grand National Assembly is national and 
material in its labours. It is realist...We are not swindlers who, in pursuit o f 
great dreams, seem to do what we can not do...This is the whole trouble. 
Instead o f pursuing ideas which we can not accomplish and increasing enemy 
pressure against ourselves, let us return our natural, our legal limits. Let us
. 94know our limits...
Bearing in mind these principles, Turkey, during the interwar period, was able 
to  establish a long-enduring peace with the Western powers by renouncing her claims 
on M osul and Western Thrace, which would cause problems. Ataturk's realism further 
showed itself in Turkish-Soviet relations. Although he was a life-long enemy o f 
communism, he agreed to sign the Turco-Soviet Friendship Pact o f 1921. This 
cooperation was the natural outcome o f the conditions prevailing at the time, and the 
product o f  Ataturk's realistic foreign policy.95 According to him states had no eternal
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enemies, and no eternal allies. They do have national goals. A state which recognizes 
these goals and can help to achieve them could be a friend. At any particular time, it 
was not ideology, but national and international realities which determined his foreign 
policy towards any particular state.
5.Concluding Remarks on Governmental Foreign Policy
For a correct evaluation o f Turkish foreign policy, it is important to distinguish 
between the fundamental goals o f  Turkish national foreign policy and its long or short 
term objectives. Although the short-term policies for the realization o f  the national 
goals have undergone considerable changes through the years, the fundamental goals 
o f national policy, as determined under Ataturk, have not radically altered until 
recently.
Ataturk attempted to replace the traditional beliefs o f the Turkish people with 
"national" values in order to transform the old imperial society into the modem nation- 
state.^^ Since then her foreign policy, too, has been appraised in terms o f national 
interest. Because the evaluation o f the national interest is more often than not a 
controversial issue, Turkish decision-makers have based their individual decisions on 
Ataturk's "dogma" and terminology thereby guaranteeing, at least, the support o f the 
ordinary Turk and often the Ataturkist military and civilian elites. As long as Ataturk's 
"dogma" remained unquestioned foreign policy could be based on his ideological 
framework. The national goals, put forward by Ataturk, together with the effects o f 
Imperial history and the geostrategic location, are the traditional inputs which have 
long governed Turkish foreign policy.
Since the traditional inputs are not only confined to the past, historical legacies 
that continue to contribute to Turkish foreign policy may thus be summarized:
-Turkey's important and sensitive geo-strategic position has meant that national 
security concerns have always been paramount in foreign policy considerations. A 
critical element in these concerns has been Turkey's proximity to and traditional
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distrust o f  the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the fact that Turkey has borders with 
the Balkans and the Middle East, areas o f traditional conflict, makes Turkey very 
sensitive to  changes in both the international and regional political balance.
-Turkey's security thinking is also coloured by the historical experiences o f 
foreign intervention and economic dependency. As a result, the foreign relations o f 
Turkey, since Ataturk's times, have been dominated by concerns for genuine 
independence and sovereignty. Though the Soviet threat after the Second World War 
persuaded Turkey to move away from Ataturk's uncommitted posture to seek politico- 
military alliances, she is still sensitive to any real or implied infringements on her 
sovereignty.
-Turkey's location at the intersection o f the "West" and the "East" (the USSR 
and the Arab and Islamic World) also resulted in an identity crisis, both national and 
international. The tendency o f the Kemalist ruling class to look towards the West for 
inspiration has not alienated the cultural and religious affiliation to the Arab-Islamic 
world by the general public.
As Turkey moves into the 1990s, the question o f religion and secularism on the 
one hand, and the related issues o f ethnicity, nationhood and the territorial state on the 
other, are coming to the fore. Although the old certainties o f the ruling class' self- 
image as belonging to a modem, European-oriented, secular Turkey, which has been 
based almost exclusively on the territory o f Anatolia, is coming under increasing 
challenges both from the left and the religious right, the legacy o f the Turkish state and 
nationalism, embodied in a ruling class or elite with a strong commitment to Kemalist 
principles, still greatly affects Turkey's internal and external policies. In this context, 
despite the emergence o f a seemingly homogeneous Turkish-speaking, traditionally 
Sunni-Moslem, society within Turkey's borders, the obvious failure o f the Kemalist 
attempt at homogenizing Turkey, based on a majority language and Western ideals, 
continues to  haunt both the Turkish identity and the Turkish state, as the ruling elite 
still refuses to acknowledge the ethnic and structural pluralism o f Turkish society
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'vvriion should bo undei stood as essential cc me formation cf a modern :nuit>eifimc 
democracy". ^
-Turkey's self-desire to  become an economically developed country has not 
changed since the early days ot the Republic. Apparently, her economic development is 
not only a social need but also a source to strengthen the power o f the nation. 
M oreover, economic development, in the eyes o f  the Kemalist elites, is one o f the 
prerequisites o f a European identity. Turkish ambition for development and 
modernization is not confined to technological equality with the industrially advanced 
W estern countries. They wish to be recognized as Europeans and to be assimilated into 
European civilization, which had been acknowledged as superior by Ataturk,
-Another important factor which Turkey's foreign policy should be seen 
through is the legality o f her actions in international arena. It has been seen in Turkey
g o
as honourable to comply with international commitments. Any intimation to the 
contrary, such as the US intimation about her NATO commitments during the Cyprus 
crisis o f  1964, usually causes widespread surprise and astonishment as well as 
disappointment in Turkey. Although her inflexible policies, which have often resulted 
from an all too legalistic approach toward international questions, would delay and 
sometimes prevent possible solutions, Turkey still insists on abiding by rigid legality. 
This could be as Vali a rg u e s ,^  a direct result o f the memories o f  the last years o f the 
Ottoman Empire when the only way to preserve its existence and independence was 
the reliance on international agreements. Or it is still possible to argue that this attitude 
could be simply a continuation o f a tradition established and carefully followed by 
Ataturk in the early days o f the Turkish republic.
-Another factor which should be kept in mind when evaluating Turkish foreign 
policy is Turkey's desire to improve her image among international community. 
Though the Turkish politicians and diplomats usually argue otherwise, contemporary 
Turkey cares for "international public opinion" and responds to  pressures from the 
international arena. Given the fact that one o f the most insistent national foreign policy 
goals o f Turkey is to  become a member o f  the European community o f nations, it is
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not surprising to  see that even the military junta o f September 12, 1980, both before
and after the intervention, had been sensitive to perceptions abroad. ^
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that structural factors, as discussed
above, have played a stabilizing role in, and ensured the continuation of, Turkish
foreign policy. Therefore the characterization o f Turkish foreign policy as having a
high degree o f  rationality and s o b r i e t y , h a s  much to do with the heritage o f the
Ottoman Empire, which was forced to pursue its foreign policy amid tensions between
1 09its own interest and those o f other powers. At the same time, it is also in 
accordance with the demands placed upon Turkey by her geopolitical situation: the 
fact that Turkey lies on the boundaries o f Europe, the Middle East and the Soviet 
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CH A PTER TH REE 
CHANGING PATTERNS: TU R K ISH  FOREIGN PO L IC Y  UP TO  19SO 
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter we looked at the structural determinants o f Turkish foreign 
policy. We examined the factors that have traditionally influenced and shaped the
foreign policy o f  Turkey from imperial times, through the interwar years with Aruturk, 
to the present day third Republic. Thanks to these structural determinants and their 
strong influence upon Turkey, she has been able to display a remarkable degree o f 
continuity in her foreign policy, in contrast to frequent internal changes. It is, to  i 11 -a 
extent, due to these factors that Turkish foreign policy has been praised for its high 
degree o f rationality, sense o f  responsibility, long term perspective, and '"'realism found 
in few developing nations and far from universal even among the democracies o f the 
W est”. 1
Yet, there are other factors that have affected Turkish foreign policy and its
daily happenings. These conjunctural factors, the result o f international and domestic
changes over the years, have also helped to shape Turkey's contemporary foreign
policy. Due to their dynamic and changeable character, however, they exert a
temporary influence on the country's foreign policy, especially on its implementation.
But due to these factors, Turkey's foreign policy has undergone some rapid changes in
its implementation, even if no major deviations have occurred in the ultimate national
goals. These factors have modified the foreign policy o f Turkey through the years to
establish a better defined and more relevant foreign policy to  meet the requirements o f
*
the contemporary world.
Though there are several o f  them, we shall deal, in this chapter, with only a few 
major conjunctural factors that have affected Turkey's foreign policy and its 
international environment. Bearing in mind that almost every happening in domestic or 
international politics could affect and change a country's foreign policy in one way or 
another, it is imperative to be selective. One should not forget that a change o f
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government, even a minister, can affect attitudes and policy implementation. Besides, a 
selective approach is certainly appropriate from an analytical perspective when 
researching a country like Turkey where eight presidents, three military coups d'etat, 
four different constitutions, and forty eight prime ministers with an average tenure o f 
seventeen months, have been squeezed into sixty seven years. ^
The selection o f  factors has been determined by the im portance o f  the changes 
that they caused. In this respect, the most decisive reason for choosing certain 
conjunctural factors was the sudden shift they had caused in either the implementation 
or more importantly the foundation o f the foreign policy o f Turkey.
An overview o f Turkey's foreign relations shows that the single most im portant 
development has been the transition from the cold war, which dominated relations 
between the East and the W est in the 1950s, to the process o f detente.
A nother im portant factor in the making o f Turkey's foreign policy has been the 
Cyprus issue, which became a permanent problematic o f Turkey's foreign relations 
since its inception. In the mid-to-late 1960s, it was the continual Cyprus crisis which 
gave impetus to  a process o f  reconsideration o f the basic orientation o f  Turkish foreign 
policy. And in the 1970s it was another Cyprus crisis which led to  fundamental changes 
in foreign policy, though not as dramatic as pulling the country out o f  the W estern 
states system.
O ther im portant factors which caused some considerable changes in Turkey's 
attitudes to  certain groups o f  states, have been the constitutional and political 
developm ent o f  the country, together with its economic ambitions and problems; the 
different views o f  political parties and groups which came into existence after the I9 6 0  
military intervention; the 1961 Constitution, together with social and political 
evaluation it embodied; and the changes in attitudes o f certain states tow ards Turkey..
Some o f  the conjunctural factors that had affected Turkish foreign policy w ere 
ephemeral in character. O thers continued to affect its patterns for some tim e and w ere 
usually interrelated with each other. Since it is virtually impossible to  identify the exact 
result o f  each factor separately and any foreign policy action is influenced by a
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combination o f factors, this chapter follows a slightly different line o f arguing from that 
o f  the first chapter. Instead o f looking at certain factors and their effects through the 
years, I have chosen to deal with Turkish foreign policy in different periods, 
distinguishable by their distinctive patterns in foreign policy. The above-mentioned 
conjunctural factors, then, are discussed in-depth in their relevant periods, under the 
overall "guidance" o f the traditional inputs.
During the first and second Republics o f Turkey (between 1923-1980), one can 
distinguish at least three different periods which could be identified with their distinct 
patterns in the country's foreign policy attitudes.
The interwar period under the leadership o f Ataturk and Inonu had seen Turkey 
W estern in its inclination but jealously guarding against any intimation that her 
independence, either economically or militarily, might be jeopardized. The foreign 
policy o f  this period was essentially shaped by the factors that we have labelled 
traditional or structural. Particularly M. Kemal's understanding and practice o f foreign 
policy was important. As these factors were discussed in the previous chapter, there is 
no need to engage in further discussion about this period.
The second period, 1945-1960, during which Turkey's foreign policy was 
dominated by total Western dependence, was followed by a period o f disillusionment 
with the West, late detente with Eastern Block and rapprochement efforts with the 
Third World (1960-1970).
The 1970s, in addition, saw a pattern o f alienation from the West encouraged 
by the Cyprus crisis o f 1974, which in turn showed Turkey the cumulative result o f the 
foreign policy she had been following since the end o f World W ar II: loneliness in the 
international arena. Hence, the 1970s witnessed Turkey's efforts to  come back to the 
international arena as a reliable and friendly nation, just as she was during the interwar 
period.
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2. Determinants of Turkey's Cold W ar Policies, 1945 - 1960
M odem  Turkey's Western orientation and rapidly modernizing features were, as 
mentioned above, firmly consolidated under the leadership o f Ataturk. His foreign 
policy was dominated by the priority o f peace, sovereignty and national development 
over expansionist-revisionism.
After Ataturk's death, one o f his close associates, Ismet Inonu, took over the 
Presidency o f  Turkey and the Republican People's Party (RPP) in a one-party political 
system. He was so committed to the Kemalist ideology in general, and foreign policy 
principles o f peace and sovereignty in particular, that Turkey under his leadership 
"faithfully followed the Kemalist regime in every domain and the foreign policy 
remained unchanged". Although "the gathering storm" over Europe in 193S forced 
Turkey to enter into an alliance with France and Great Britain,^ she was able to stay 
out o f the war until the last minute."*
Despite surviving the Second World War virtually unscathed, by showing one 
o f history's best examples o f small state diplomacy in great powers politics,^ Turkey 
however, was soon to see that the situation after the war w as . demanding careful 
diplomacy as much as it had done previously. Throughout the war, Inonu came to the 
conclusion that Turkey's biggest problem after the war would be the prospect o f facing 
all alone the more powerful Soviet Union. In fact, he was convinced that if Turkey 
entered the war, the Soviets would occupy Turkey either as a member o f the Axis or as 
a "liberator".^ He also foresaw the Soviet post-war domination o f Eastern Europe.** 
Hence, he was determined not to give the Soviets an excuse to set foot on Turkish soil. 
However, Turkey was soon to learn that all her careful manoeuvring to avoid alienating 
the Soviet Union had been to no avail.
The Second World War marked an important watershed in Turkey's foreign 
policy as well as in her domestic developments. Although Turkey's political and 
economic alignment with the Western countries after the Second World War may be 
treated as a natural outcome o f her desire to become a fully modernized (=westemized)
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country, her dependence on the Western powers went too far to represent a reversal in 
her earlier policies. It is true that the prewar Republic under Ataturk's leadership 
attempted to adopt the institutions and the values o f the West in order to accelerate the 
process o f modernization and economic development. This inclination to the W est did 
not, however, imply a dependency on the Western powers, either militarily or 
economically. Moreover, she was reluctant to form any economic bonds which might 
lead to any real or imaginary dependency, as a result o f the foreign domination o f the 
Ottoman economy in the 19th century. On the contrary, Turkish foreign policy before 
the second World War was independent in nature, despite a series o f regional pacts, 
and based primarily on conciliation with all big and regional powers. During this period, 
Turkey maintained friendly relations with all the major states o f the time but avoided 
any formal attachment with any o f them until 1939. Even during the Second World 
War, her main foreign policy aim was to find a way to stay out o f  the war and not to 
endanger the delicate balance o f her relations with all the parties.0 Why then did 
Turkish foreign policy reverse itself following the Second World War?
A number o f domestic and systemic factors had pushed Turkey towards 
Western tutelage in general, and Western-dependent foreign policy in particular. It was 
no accident that significant changes occurred simultaneously in both foreign and 
domestic policies, for as we shall see there was a linkage between the two.
2.1. External Factors: Meeting the Soviet Threat
In the international arena there were basically two more important and interrelated 
developments that were instrumental in Turkey's decision to establish closer ties with 
the Western countries. First o f all, there was a change in the nature o f the international 
system which rapidly evolved from a "balance o f power" structure to a "bipolar" 
structure. In such a structure, as Aron's paradigm states, a policy o f neutrality was not 
very realistic or possible at all for a country like Turkey, a middle-range power situated 
in such a geopolitically important area.10 Other important developments in the
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international arena were the emergence o f the Soviet Union as a superpower, and, more
delicately for Turkey, her subsequent demands upon Turkey. As most observers noted,
the impetus for Turkey's shift to Western alignment did not come from the West, but
rather resulted from her reaction to Soviet pressures.
Already during the war, it became obvious to Turkey that the Soviets were
pursuing a policy designed to gain territorial concessions from Turkey. During the
secret German-Soviet negotiations in November 1940, Turkey was one o f the
bargaining pieces, and was a price asked by the Soviets to enter the Berlin Pact.11
Subsequently, allied with the West, the Soviets brought their demands to Yalta and
19Postdam Conferences in 1945. Having received Churchill's acquiescence at the
M oscow Conference (October 1944), Stalin presented Soviet position at Yalta
(February 1945) vis.a.vis the Turkish Straits. "It is impossible" remarked Stalin at Yalta
11"to accept a situation in which Turkey has a hand on Russia's throat".
Having already received these hints about Soviet intentions on her territorial 
integrity, and alarmed by the Soviet note o f March 19, 1945, denouncing the 1925 
Treaty o f  Friendship and Non-aggression, Turkey was terrified by another Soviet note 
on June 7, 1945, demanding Soviet bases on the Straits in addition to the territorial 
adjustments in the Soviet-Turkish border as the price for renewing the Treaty o f 
Friendship and Non-aggression.1^ President Inonu's response was sharp and emotional, 
telling the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) that they were "under no 
obligation to give up Turkish soil or Turkish rights to anyone...We shall live with 
honour and die with honour". The Assembly speaker further warned Soviets in a firm 
and equally emotional manner that "if the Russians insist on their demand, we shall fight 
to the last Turk".15
When Turkey refused these initial demands, from mid-1945 onwards, the 
Soviets started to exert heavy political pressures on Turkey. In this situation, Turkey 
unsuccessfully tried "to involve the United States in defending Turkey against the 
Soviet Union", and "bring the United States position on the Straits into harmony with 
the minimum Turkish view".16 However, the United States and Great Britain, under
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the mistaken belief that meaningful cooperation with the Soviet Union after the war 
would be possible, stood aside. What they did not know at the time was that the Soviet 
demands on Turkey were a part o f Stalin's efforts to take advantage o f the power-gap 
o f  the wartime and immediate post-war international situation by provisional demands 
just beyond Soviet borders. ^2 Furthermore, Turkey's neutrality during the war had left 
her future status in ambiguity in contrast to most European countries where the post­
war spheres were clearly defined .^  While this ambiguity made Turkey a tempting 
target for Stalin's post-war expansionism, the Western (US and UK) attitudes at the 
end o f  the war, which were slow to adopt a firm position against Soviet demands, must 
have encouraged Stalin about his proposals upon Turkey.
Meanwhile, at the Postdam Conference (17 July-2 August), the Soviets sought 
to obtain an Allied consensus that the problem o f the Straits was a matter between 
Turkey and the Soviet Union. Though the Conference broke up without resolving the
I Q
matter, it was agreed in principle upon a revision o f the M ontreux agreement. In the
meantime, the Western attitude towards Turkey, and the Soviet demands in general,
began to change gradually. Taken in conjunction with Soviet actions elsewhere, and in
the light o f the unsuccessful conference of foreign ministers in December 1945, the
Soviet demands started to appear to President Truman to demonstrate an intention to
70invade Turkey and control the Straits.
With the declaration in March 1946 by the Great Britain that the 1939 Treaty o f
Alliance was still in force and obliged the UK to help her in the event o f aggression,
71Turkey realised that her post-war isolation had now ended. Turkey was further 
relieved by another sign reflecting the changed American stance: the battleship Missouri 
anchored at Istanbul on April 15, 1946, carrying the remains o f Turkish Ambassador 
M. Ertegun, who had died in Washington during the war. This was seen by many Turks 
as a sign o f American readiness to protect Turkey. Nevertheless, the dispute over the 
Straits continued until the end o f 1946.
On August 7, 1946, Soviets presented their proposal over the Straits as 
authorized at Postdam 22 The proposal called for control o f the Straits to be in the
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hands o f  Turkey and "other Black Sea Powers", with Turkey and The Soviet Union
sharing joint defence o f the waterways. They also sent strong notes to Turkey to
complain about the administration o f the Straits during the war. This time the
Americans and the British backed Turkey in her rejection o f Soviet demands, and in
September 1946, shortly after proposed regulations presented by the Soviets, the
United States announced its intention to maintain a permanent naval presence in the
Mediterranean. Although later in September the Soviets repeated their earlier
demands, they dropped the issue toward the end o f October 1946 after another refusal
from Turkey, backed by the United States and Great Britain.2^
The answer to the question as to what actually persuaded the Soviets to back
out o f their demands on Turkey is difficult to give, and has been controversial. Many,
9 5especially foreign observers, tend to emphasize Western support. And the Turkish 
officials, who tried to persuade the US to continue her aid to Turkey, tend to reinforce 
this connection. On the other hand, many Turkish scholars, specially since the mid- 
1960s, have argued that the years o f maximum threat were 1945 and 1946 and Turkey, 
without any formal connection with the US, had to stand all alone against Soviet 
demands. They further argue that when finally the US agreed to give aid to Turkey 
through the Truman Doctrine (12 March 1947), the Soviet Union had already backed 
down in her claims.2^ It seems fair to state that it was the combination o f determined 
Turkish resistance, opposition o f the Western powers, and the loss o f will on the 
Soviets' part, as Yapp argues,27 that caused the Soviets to back down.
Whatever the reasons for the USSR's failure to follow up her claims, Turkey, 
thoroughly alarmed by the Soviet actions, reverted to its historic animosity for its 
Russian neighbour and continued to seek protection from the West, mainly from the 
United States. To this end, she attempted to dramatize the Soviet threat, and continued 
to  argue that Turkey's geographical position made her the key to the Middle East, 
supposedly final target o f the alleged Soviet aggression.
Although by the end o f 1946 the Allied position had hardened in opposition to 
Soviet demands on Turkey, it was not until 1947, in reaction to Communist activities in
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Greece and the British announcement o f their intention to withdraw from her 
responsibilities in the area, that the United States became actively involved. The result 
was the Truman Doctrine which forged the initial bonds between Turkey and the 
United States, despite the fact that United States personnel, who began to be stationed 
in Turkey, quickly aroused memories o f the Capitulations 28
One o f the main Ottoman foreign policy aims for a lengthy period was to ally 
herself with a powerful state, against her traditional antagonist Russia. Now, in the 
bipolar international system, modern Turkey, facing with renewed Russian threat, was 
forced to find an ally to  protect her interests against the Soviet Union. There were a 
number o f reasons why the United States was the natural candidate for the post. Apart 
from the fact that the United States was now assuming the leadership and protectorship 
o f the W estern democracies, and she was the only country capable o f lending money 
which Turkey's economy badly needed at the time, it was also significant to the Turks 
that the United States had no history o f colonial domination and was geographically 
located a considerable distance from Turkey.
2.2. Domestic Factors: The Interaction Between Multi-Party Democracy, 
Economic Development and Foreign Policy
Though the Soviet threat in the late 1940s stands out as the most instrumental factor in 
pushing Turkey into Western camp, there were other reasons for Turkey to choose the 
W estern course. Firstly, as war ended with a victory for the Western democracies, the 
future seemed to be on their side and with their political system. This belief in the 
Western democratic system must have contributed to Turkey's willingness to alter her 
position o f  non-alignment and seek closer links with the West. Moreover, apart from 
international and systemic factors, internal political and economic pressures also played 
an important role in Turkey's new orientation in foreign policy. M ost importantly, a 
dramatic change in the Turkish political system, that is the transition to a multi-party 
system was occurring concurrent with above mentioned international developments.
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Turkey's post-war foreign policy goals, at least in part, affected this change in her
domestic politics which in turn had an effect on Turkish foreign policy.
Although there can be little doubt that the real impetus behind change was
President Inonu's accurate assessment o f Turkey's domestic scene,2^ it would also be
fair to  argue that desire for Western support against Soviet demands strongly
influenced his decision to promote truly democratic, multi-party elections.3^ Internally,
there was mounting criticism about RPP's one-party regime, which failed to produce
viable economic policies and generated strong opposition with its capital levy during
the war. At the same time, similar criticisms by the United States Congress must have
had considerable impact upon Inonu, who was now seeking closer relations with the
31United States and wishing to join the Western community.
The social changes and specific events which were instrumental in the formation 
o f a multi-party system in Turkey are too numerous and beyond the scope o f this study. 
W hatever the reason for its introduction, however, this political experiment challenged 
RPP's almost exclusive privilege o f  governmental policy-making and offered the rural 
groups an opportunity to gain political influence alongside an urban elite composed o f 
former high ranking military officers and bureaucrats. This in turn had inescapable 
effects on the implementation o f Turkish foreign policy.
Beyond the political factors, economic needs necessitated a Western leaning in 
foreign policy. Although Turkey, by the end o f 1946, had gold and foreign exchange 
reserves around $262 million,32 this was mainly due to favourable prices that the 
fighting powers offered Turkey's agricultural products and raw materials such as 
chromium. Moreover, at the end o f the war Turkish officials, who were now 
considering the possibility o f war with the Soviet Union, did not want to use these
reserves and, therefore, tried to utilize international loans in order to enable Turkey to
33maintain a large army with its economic consequences.
Under the RPP government, Turkey had already started to receive American aid 
through the Truman Doctrine (1947), and later Marshall Plan (1948), although both 
schemes were not primarily arranged for Turkey, and there were restrictions on the use
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o f American a id .^  Further, Turkey had also established additional formal links with the 
W estern Community. In 1948 Turkey became a member o f  the newly established 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which in turn enabled 
Turkey to be automatically included in the Marshall Plan, and in 1950 she joined the 
Council o f  Europe. Turkey's participation in these purely European organizations was 
o f primary importance for her future economic and political relations and policies.
This pattern o f economic dependency continued under the Democrat Party 
(DP), which won a decisive victory over the RPP in 1950. Democrats were at least as 
anxious as the Republicans to tie Turkey politically and economically to the West, and 
particularly to the United States. Although they encouraged free enterprise in their 
campaigns, they soon found it convenient to continue to build up the state enterprises 
after gaining power, thus came to rely heavily on foreign, mainly American, economic 
and military assistance. As a result, Turkey's need for foreign aid became an integral 
part o f her foreign as well as domestic policy.
Turkey's economic system under the DP was modelled along Western lines and
relied heavily on private initiative and foreign investment, and during the period 1947-
1961 Turkey received $1,862 million in military assistance and $1,394 million in
3 seconomic assistance from the United States. As a result o f this extensive assistance, 
Turkish leaders apparently became insulated from economic reality, and consequently 
established Turkey's long standing dependency on foreign assistance.
After an impressive economic start which lasted through 1953, the economic 
situation in Turkey deteriorated rapidly. Its initial success was due mainly to the 
expansion o f  private investment, the boom in agricultural production as a result ,of 
government subvention in prices and opening o f new farming areas, the mechanization 
o f farming, and favourable weather and high world prices for agricultural products
because o f the Korean war.
Despite early indications and Western warnings o f serious economic problems, 
the Menderes government, encouraged by early successes, continued to pursue
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ambitious but uncoordinated development policies. After 1953, however, Turkey's 
economy began to deteriorate and her foreign trade deficit grew.3^
Even though the Turkish government refused to follow its economic advice, the 
United States continued to provide essential assistance under the, sometimes 
exaggerated, view o f Turkey's geographical importance. Finally, when faced with 
bankruptcy in 1958, Menderes accepted the stabilization programme imposed by an 
international consortium composed o f the United States, Germany, Great Britain, the 
European Payments Union, and the Internationa! Monetary Fund. In return the 
consortium rescheduled Turkey's debts and provided an aid package o f $359 million.-^ 
In addition to establishing Turkey's dependency on foreign assistance and 
creating a less than favourable image o f the Turks' ability to manage their finances, the 
fiscal policies o f the DP government led to significant social changes in Turkey. The 
increased correlation o f status with power and the rise o f the new middle class, based 
on economic activity, resulted in a concomitant decline in the status o f the salaried 
bureaucrats, intellectuals and military officers. And the danger was the Democrat Party 
government did not understand the new forces o f instability developing in the society. 
Thus the stage was set for domestic conflict.
Meanwhile, Turkey's main foreign policy objective was to be a full member o f 
NATO. This desire for membership was based on political and economic factors rather 
than strategic and military concerns, since, by 1950, the main Soviet threat was already 
averted. Although Turkey's wish to enter NATO should be seen as a natural outcome 
o f the foreign policies that Turkey had been following since World War II, the 
economic concerns must also have played a considerable part, and the idea that her 
exclusion might lead to a decrease o f US interest and subsequent reduction in American 
aid must have had its weight in the government's decision. Furthermore, domestic 
political considerations o f the DP also played a significant role in this decision. First o f 
all the DP, which was advocating liberal economy in Turkey, might have seen that it 
was difficult to establish such a system without attaching Turkey to the West. 
Secondly, the leaders o f the DP genuinely believed that Turkey's entrance to NATO
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was necessary for the future o f the democratic system in Turkey and their own 
existence. In fact, it was quite clear from their statements during the election campaign 
o f  1950 that the DP leaders, under the earlier experiences o f multi-party system in 
Turkey, were afraid o f the possibility that the RPP would not deliver the government 
even if they lost the election. They thought that joining NATO would prevent the RPP 
from playing such g a m e s . F i n a l l y  in 1952, after the Korean War, and Turkish 
participation in the conflict, Turkey and Greece joined into NATO, which marked the 
Turkey's military commitment to the West as well as her economic dependence.
2.3. Reflections on Turkey’s Western Dependency in Foreign Policy
As a result o f her economic and military dependency on the West, Turkey's foreign 
policy also started to tilt toward the West. Turkey's active role in the creation o f such 
alliances as the Baghdad Pact and the Balkan Treaty which gained her no additional 
security and the awkward role she played at the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference in 
championing the cause o f Western powers may all be interpreted as a part o f Democrat 
Party's efforts to appear as an indispensable ally in order to secure greater aid from the 
West. Likewise, her support o f  the Western powers at the Suez crisis o f 1956; her 
fierce opposition to the 1958 Iraqi coup; her threats to Syria in 1957, in the heat o f the 
US-Syrian crisis, to invade should the Communists, or the Soviet Union, gain control 
over the Syrian government, were all the parts o f Turkey's efforts to exacerbate the 
Communist threat in her immediate borders in order to get more economic and military 
aid as well as the result o f the Democrat Party's foreign policy thinking which was 
essentially anti-Soviet.
As one could expect, relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Block 
countries were far from friendly during the period under consideration. After Soviet 
territorial demands on Turkey, relations further deteriorated proportionate to Turkey's 
alignment with the West through the Truman Doctrine (1947), and her membership in 
NATO (1952), the Balkan Pact (1954), and the Baghdad Pact (1955). Turkey's
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political preference o f multi-party system based on free elections, and economic choice 
centred on free enterprise were also reflections o f her commitment to Western style 
democratic system. Soviet harsh and often threatening responses only helped Turkey to 
move closer to her Western allies. ^  Turkey's suppression o f the leftist parties and their 
organs during the 1940s and 1950s was also caused, in part, by Soviet hostility.
On the other hand, the Soviet fear that Turkey might be used as a base for a 
W estern attack against the Soviet Union dictated Soviet policies toward Turkey for a 
long time, which remained openly hostile and intimidating until 1953 when a 
culmination o f several factors resulted in change. In May 1953, barely three months 
after Stalin's death, the Soviet government renounced its territorial claims for Turkey's 
eastern provinces and its desire for control o f the Straits.
Since the Turkish government regarded these peace moves as a new Soviet 
tactic designed to separate her from the West, there were no immediate positive results 
in Turkish-Soviet re la tions.^  Consequently, Soviet efforts to establish intimate 
relations with Egypt in 1955 and the Syrian and Iraqi crises o f 1957 and 1958 invoked 
further fears in Turkey about being surrounded by hostile pro-Soviet states and the 
crushing o f the Hungarian revolt in 1956 by the Red Army only helped to confirm 
Turkish suspicions about Soviet m o v e s . A s  a result, when the Cold War entered a 
period o f limited detente in 1954, Turkey was left behind in the process o f 
normalization o f East-W est relations.
Finally, when Turkish premier Menderes agreed on exchanging visits with 
Krushchev in April 1960 as a result o f mainly Turkey's need for economic assistance, 
and the basic changes in Soviet policy, which was no longer insistent on radical change 
in Turkish Foreign Policy as the price for improved relations, it was too late, because 
Menderes was to be ousted by the military coup o f May 27, 1960, which caused a 
Turkish-Soviet standstill for another four years.
During this period, Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern Arab countries, 
and Third World states in general, were literally an extension o f her Western-dependent 
foreign policy, as well. Even before Turkey's accession to a Western defense system,
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there were enough factors leading to a deterioration o f Turkish-Arab relations. First o f 
all, historical experiences, i.e., the relationship between the rulers (Ottoman Turks) and 
the ruled (Arabs), surely coloured the relations. Secondly, Ataturk's reforms created a 
difference between two Islamic peoples, and the general secularisation o f  Turkey in the 
name o f  modernization (Westernization) created profound resentment and mistrust 
among Arabs. Moreover, the question o f Alexandretta, which resulted from the 
attachment o f the region to Turkey in 1939, was still a matter o f tension between 
Turkey and Syria.
Furthermore, Turkey's Western orientation, which led Turkey to adopt political, 
social, cultural and economic ideas from the West and eventually to join NATO, had 
significant impacts on Turco-Arab relations. In her Middle Eastern relations Turkey 
was looked upon by the Arabs as a pawn o f the West. This perception was not 
altogether untrue, but it would be unfair to assume that Turkey was acting only as a 
Western proxy. Indeed, Turkey had a real desire to secure her southern borders. 
Beyond, the emergence o f Israel had an immediate and long lasting effect on Turkish- 
Arab relations. Originally Turkey opposed the partition o f Palestine, but, after 
establishment o f Israel, changed her stance to be the first Islamic nation to recognize 
her and exchange ambassadors.4**
Further, Turkey's efforts in 1951 to help establish a Middle East Defense 
Organization (MEDO) and the Arab states' resentment against this as another form o f 
Western and Turkish imperialism in the region worsened the relations. Though MEDO 
had failed, Turkey later joined the Baghdad Pact o f 1955, which was also opposed by 
many Arab countries, especially E gyp t44 Though the effectiveness or utility o f the 
Baghdad Pact had certainly been questionable, the role it played in the alienation o f 
Egypt and her allies from the West in general and Turkey in particular are obvious. It 
most assuredly cast Turkey in the image o f a tool o f the Western powers.
During the period Turkey's foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, as 
mentioned above, mirrored her pro-Western alignment and reflected Turkey's fears that 
the Soviet Union was enlarging its influence over Middle Eastern countries, and Turkey
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could be soon contained by pro-Soviet and hostile Arab states.45 Therefore, it could be 
said that, by contributing to Turkey's rapprochement with the West, and placing great 
pressure upon her, the Soviet threat indirectly influenced Turkey's further alienation 
from the Middle East.
Turkey in the 1950s certainly failed, as Karpat assesses, to understand the trend 
o f  development, the political objectives and resentments o f her Arab neighbours.4^ On 
the other hand, the Arabs, too, failed to understand Turkey's security needs and fears 
from the Soviet Union. They were geographically removed from the Soviet Union by 
the buffer that Turkey and Iran had created between the two areas. For the Turks, the 
Russians were not merely a dangerous historical enemy but, because o f their proximity, 
a credible threat to the existence o f themselves, as well. As Aykan assesses, "no matter 
how the Arabs could have felt about the Soviet danger, their feelings could not have 
been so deep-seated as Turkey's feeling".42
Meanwhile, Turkey's defence o f the West at the Bandung Conference in 1955
4 0
further strained her relations with the Third World Countries. Originally Turkey did 
not even want to join this conference. But later, under the pressures from the West, she 
changed her mind and went to the conference in order to warn these states against the 
threats caused by "middle o f the road measures" 49 At this conference o f Afro-Asian 
nations Turkey strongly defended her Western alliance (NATO) with harsh attacks on 
non-alignment, socialism and communism.59 As a result, Turkey became isolated from 
the Third World, an isolation which would later be felt in the United Nations.
Throughout the 1950s Turkish foreign policy was clearly a product o f her 
W estern alignment and an extension o f Western policies toward both the Soviet Union 
and the non-aligned countries. The leaders o f Turkey, during this period, did not agree 
that a "detente" would be possible between two blocs, and did not believe in the 
sincerity o f "peaceful coexistence" policy which they regarded as another tactic by the 
Soviet Union to deceive the free world.51 They did not accept non-alignment as a 
viable solution and further believed that it would help the Soviet Union to dominate the 
world in the long run.52 However, in the 1960s, due to systemic and internal changes
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as well as American policy toward Cyprus, Turkey began to reevaluate her strict 
W estern orientation.
3. Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Inter-Coup Period (1960-1980): 
The W estern Tie Weakened
It would have been hard to imagine in the late 1950s that the Turks would ever be 
disappointed with the West and would join in the world-wide anti-American sentiment 
with shouts o f the familiar "Yankee Go Home". Yet, the Turkish-American friendship, 
which began with the Truman Doctrine and flourished in the 1950s, began to cool 
during the 1960s and deteriorated in the 1970s. What happened to the Turkish- 
American "honeymoon" in such a short time? What had changed in Turkey and in the 
international arena that affected Turkey's relations with the United States in particular 
and generally with the Western alignment?
In fact, it was not only Turkish-American amity that was altered throughout the 
inter-coup period. The whole o f Turkish foreign policy thinking, actually, was 
experiencing a reevaluation and reorientation process along with the rise o f anti- 
American sentiments in Turkey.
Although the 1964 Cyprus crisis is commonly regarded as the turning point in 
Turkish-American relations and Western alignment in general, in reality the process o f 
reorientation in the mind o f intellectuals and some politicians started well before that 
year. Admittedly, the Cyprus question stands out as being the most significant factor in 
bringing about the reappraisal and diversification efforts o f  Turkish foreign policy 
during the inter-coup period. In point o f fact however, there were other factors both 
domestic and international involved in Turkey's policy shift.
3.1. Detente in East-West Relations and Turkish Foreign Policy, 1960-1970
The detente process and the consequent loosening o f the bipolar balance, which had 
initiated important changes in world politics, also greatly affected Turkey's international 
position. The cold war had earlier necessitated, on the one hand, Turkey's dependency
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on the West, but on the other, also sustained unquestioning Western support either 
militarily or politically including economic aid. During the 1950s the Soviet threat was 
felt by Turkey so much that there was no reason on the Turkish part to question her 
total dependence to the West, as long as the West (mainly the United States) 
committed itself to protect Turkey from Soviet aggression.
But, the 1960s saw a softening o f inter-bloc tensions. Furthermore, the rise o f 
China and France as rebellious countries against bipolar arrangement o f the postwar 
years signalled a change in the power balance o f the world which has eventually turned 
to be a multipolar one. Although, international relations continued to be overshadowed 
by the two strong poles, the growing interdependence among nations, and increasing 
roles o f the secondary states in world politics have caused a loosening o f the bipolar 
balance and the emergence o f a more complex and multidimensional configuration.
This multidimensional interplay can also be observed in economic 
developments. While seeking a fulcrum between East, West, and the other focuses o f 
power, the world, at the same time, had to sustain the discrimination o f the North 
towards the developing countries o f the South. On the other hand, the rising economic 
consciousness o f the South has brought along a set o f political consequences and has 
introduced new actors to the world political stage. O f these actors, the "Group o f 77" 
on the economic stage, and the "Group o f Non-aligned Countries" on the political stage 
became the representatives o f rising consciousness o f the so-called "Third World" 
countries. These events have introduced the concept o f economic development to 
world politics and have also resulted in considerable cross-alliance relations.
While the world became more inter-dependent, both economically and 
politically, the period o f detente, which slowed down inter-superpower rivalry, also 
made it possible for small members o f alliance systems to have broader economic and 
political relations with the other states disregarding military blocks. In such a 
fragmented world Turkey had to expand its relations to these new centres o f economic, 
political and military power in order to take full advantage o f her economic and 
political potential.
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M oreover, an official NATO report, the Harmel Report, issued in December 
1967, gave way to inter-alliance relations and must have dispelled possible Turkish 
apprehensions that her changing relations with the Eastern bloc could jeopardize her 
position in NATO. The report stated that since all NATO members are "sovereign 
states, the allies are not obliged to subordinate their policies to collective 
decision...each ally can decide its policy", and called the Allies to seek improved 
relations with the USSR and the countries o f Eastern Europe. 55
The expansion in Turkish foreign policy, however, would have required more 
developments both domestic and international level other than detente itself, though 
they were not far away in the early 1960s.
3.2. The Effects of Pluralist Democracy: The 1960s
During the inter-coup period, Turkey went through important socio-political changes, a
combination o f which affected the thinking o f Turkish people in general and their
approach to the matters o f foreign policy in particular. The internal evolution o f Turkey
after the 1960 coup, therefore, deserves further attention.
Since the 1960 coup was a result o f various social, economic and internal
political factors rather than based on any foreign policy consideration,54 its immediate
affect on foreign relations was minimal.5*5 The only visible foreign policy modification
o f the military junta was an attempt to improve relations with the Arab countries, and a
desire to  establish closer contacts with the newly emerging nations.56 The military
government also attempted to regularize the various bilateral agreements with the US
57and emphasized Turkish national interests in this connection.
Although the 1960 coup and the military government afterwards did not 
produce any immediate real foreign policy changes, the relatively free political 
atmosphere after the coup and the "liberal" constitution o f 1961 had a significant 
impact on Turkish domestic politics, and subsequently affected Turkish foreign policy. 
Up to  the early 1960s, Turkish foreign policy-making remained in the almost exclusive
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privilege o f  a small elitist group. Public criticism o f government foreign policy was 
generally considered unpatriotic. Under the presidencies o f Ataturk and Inonu, the very 
nature o f the authoritarian single-party politics precluded any real opposition in the 
foreign policy area as well as in domestic policies. Under the DP governments, too, 
public discussion o f foreign policy, and indeed all other issues, were tightly controlled 
chiefly in parallel with Menderes' efforts to suppress opposition in the country.
Besides suppression, it is evident that the opposition RPP's views on foreign 
policy were very similar to those implemented by the DP governments. Although 
M enderes did not consult with the opposition party on matters o f foreign policy, he was 
usually criticised only on matters o f implementation rather than decision itself. For 
example, the opposition criticized his decision to send Turkish troops to Korea, one of 
if  not the most important Turkish foreign policy decision o f the 1950s, more on the way
C O
it was made than for its content.
Apart from this, one o f the foreign policy acts o f the Menderes government did 
in fact create great unrest among Turkey's intellectual community and the RPP, shortly 
before the 1960 military coup. This was the 1959 bilateral agreement between Turkey 
and the United States, which stated that the United States would come to Turkey's aid 
in the event o f "direct or indirect" aggression.59 Soon, the term "indirect aggression" 
created great concern among intelligentsia and the opposition who saw an American 
commitment in the agreement to intervene on behalf o f the Menderes government in the 
event o f a coup or even an electoral defeat.60 The criticism directed against the 
government was so strong that the submission o f the agreement to the Grand National 
Assembly for ratification was postponed for a year.6 1
But still discussion o f foreign policy matters was limited, and in any case, 
confined to the intelligentsia. However, after the 1960 coup and the reconstruction o f 
the constitutional government, Turkey's foreign relations entered inter-party 
discussions, together with relatively pluralist political life, and attracted people's 
attention.
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M oreover, the constitutional and electoral changes introduced by the National 
Union Committee (NUC, the military junta) have influenced Turkish politics, both 
foreign and domestic, for a long time.6^ The new electoral law introduced a system o f 
proportional representation which allowed small parties to enter parliament and 
therefore created multiplicity in foreign as well as domestic policies. The new 
constitution, moreover, put a series o f checks and balances to prevent democratic 
system to turn, in effect, into one-party totalitarianism as happened during the 1950s.
On the negative side, however, the new electoral system made it increasingly 
difficult for a single party to obtain a majority. What followed was a series o f weak and 
generally ineffective coalition governments. Due to the major ideological differences 
between Turkey's various political parties, the long periods o f coalition rule created an 
atmosphere within which a general consensus on policy, either foreign or domestic, was 
rarely reached. This, o f course, created ineffectiveness and inactivity in Turkish foreign 
policy during the 1970s.
The new system also created a plural society alongside the pluralist parliament, 
by spelling out in the 1961 Constitution the "fundamental rights" - freedom o f thought 
and belief, freedom of press, o f publication, o f association, and many others.6^ Under 
this air o f  freedom, foreign policy, like domestic policies, became a topic o f open public 
discussion. This was contrary to the previous practice o f the Republic, in which the 
public, as mentioned above, was generally silent on matters o f foreign policy.
Another factor which was to contribute indirectly to the reorientation o f 
Turkey's foreign policy was the emergence for the first time in Turkey's history o f a 
genuine socialist movement. The emergence o f the new Turkish left was signalled by 
the publication o f the weekly Yon (1961) and the establishment in 1962 o f the Turkish 
W orker's Party (TIP), which was later outlawed after the 1971 military intervention. 
They advocated the demolition o f Turkey's ties with the West and the normalization o f 
relations with the neutral and communist countries. As a natural extension o f their 
socialist ideology, they were against the strong American presence on Turkish soil and 
ran an anti-American campaign throughout the country.65
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Although these callings o f the new Left attracted many followers from the 
intelligentsia, its anti-Western campaign did not attract widespread support from the 
masses until the Cyprus crisis o f 1964. It was, however, at least in part responsible for a 
basic policy shift within the RPP, which adopted a "left o f centre" stance on the eve o f 
the 1965 general election in an apparent attempt to win back the intellectuals from TIP 
and to  gain support from the working class.66
Concomitant with the Worker's Party, other splinter parties advocating 
nationalistic and religious ideas also emerged. Parties, and indeed any other 
organization, acting on these grounds were not allowed before the 1960s. With the free 
atmosphere the new constitution created, however, these parties found a chance to 
come out and be represented in the parliament. The fragmentation o f the Turkish 
political system after the 1960 coup also played a part in this result.
Another significant feature o f the inter-coup period was the extraordinary 
degree o f radicalism espoused by the Turkish youth. Though in the late sixties it was 
undoubtedly affected by the world-wide trend, especially by student insurrection in 
France in 1968, the relatively free atmosphere and extreme fragmentation in Turkish 
political system created after the 1960 intervention were, at least, partly responsible for 
the result. What began in the late 1960s as peaceful student demonstrations against 
poor social and educational conditions, soon assumed political significance, grew 
radical, and became polarized between the Right and the Left and turned into bloody
f i larmed clashes in the 1970s.
Anti-imperialism was a common platform for both sides. But, while the Leftists 
attacked Turkey's alliance with the West, which they believed restricted Turkey's 
freedom o f action, the Rightists were strongly anti-communist and opposed Soviet 
imperialism, which at the time was no longer an obvious threat to Turkey.
The clashes between extreme Left and Right grew in the 1970s and spread 
outside the political arena. More importantly, in the 1970s another wave o f  violence
/ T O
surrounded Turkey with its roots in cultural and religious grounds as well as politics.
As far as foreign relations were concerned, increasing political and social instability
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generated by political violence and terrorism seriously damaged Turkey's world image 
at a time when Turkey was in great need o f economic and political support.
M oreover, it was quite certain that during the late 1970s any foreign policy, like 
any domestic policy, o f the government would generate a strong challenge from at least 
one o f  the extreme groups. Under these circumstances, governments had to restrain 
themselves to the daily happenings o f the foreign relations instead o f trying to map out 
general guide-lines for Turkey's foreign policy problems. This strategy in turn 
contributed to Turkey's inactivity and isolation on the international front.
3.3. Cyprus as a Foreign Policy Determinant and Turkey’s New Multi-Faceted  
Foreign Policy
3.3.1.The Impact of the Cyprus Question: The 1960s
In terms o f fostering a new direction in Turkish foreign policy, the factors 
outlined above involved only a limited circle o f politicians and intellectuals until the 
Cyprus crisis o f 1963-1964. The democratization o f Turkish politics, with the growth 
o f  a vocal and fragmented opposition and the emergence o f foreign policy as a political 
issue, created an atmosphere in which a shift to a more independent foreign policy was 
not only likely, but also considering Turkey's need for foreign capital, very probable. 
However, not until the Cyprus crisis o f 1963-1964 did the emerging independent policy 
trend at the top find wide support. Wide-spread anti-American sentiments emerged. 
But more importantly, events surrounding the Cyprus crisis forced Turkey's leaders to 
recognize that their strict adherence to a pro-Western alignment in a period o f ,a 
changing international system had left Turkey virtually isolated in the World 
Community. Cyprus then was the catalyst which forced Turkey to re-examine her 
foreign policy in the light o f a rapidly changing world system.
While the history o f Cyprus and developments o f crises over Cyprus between 
Greece and Turkey are not o f prime importance to this research,69 it is sufficient to
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know that various forces made the Cyprus issue one o f vital importance, for both the 
Turkish government and the Turkish people.70
First o f  all, the geographical position o f the Island o f  Cyprus in the Eastern 
Mediterranean made it strategically important for Turkish security thinking. The 
scenario that Greek-held Cyprus would cut Turkey off from the open sea encouraged 
Turkey's resistance to Greek designs on the island since the 1950s. Secondly, the large 
Turkish community on the island which the Turks felt compelled to defend against the 
Greek majority made the issue highly emotional. Furthermore, Enosis (union with 
Greece), then the Greek position on the island, was seen by many Turks as a first step 
for achieving the Megali Idea (re-estab!ishment o f the old 3yzantine Empire), and 
therefore the Cyprus issue became a matter concerning national pride.
This highly emotional and therefore political appeal o f the Cyprus issue can 
clearly be seen in the statement issued by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, in late 1963, in 
reply to President Makarios' proposed constitutional changes, which would have 
reduced the status o f the Turkish community in the island from a community with equal 
rights to  a minority. The statement ended; "A government that can abandon some 
100,000  dear members o f our race to the arbitrary administration o f foreigners will 
never come to power in Turkey".71 It is obvious that the fragile Turkish coalition 
governments o f the 1960s could not dare to negotiate a compromise when Turkey was 
drawn into the crisis by the violent clashes between the two communities on Cyprus at 
the end o f the year 1963.
Initially, Turkey sought support for her position in NATO where the United 
States had the dominant voice. Although NATO seemed to be a natural forum fpr 
Turkey and Greece to seek a solution, it was soon evident that the other NATO states,
especially the United States, were reluctant to enter into what was seen as a local
79discord between two members o f the same alliance. Moreover, the Umted States was
restraining itself from imposing any solution on the Cyprus dispute for fear o f  alienating
73either Greece or Turkey.
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Turkey, on the other hand, was fully expecting American support under the,
what is now apparent us faulty, appraisal o f the extent o f support the United States
could or would extend. It is evident that Turkey, at the time, had failed to take into
account the changed circumstances in which international relations were operating
during the 1 9 6 0 s .^  It was easy for the United States to use leverage on Turkey and
Greece to reach compromise on Cyprus in the 1950s when the effects o f Cold War still
felt and both countries were in need o f American aid. By the 1964, however, both
Greece and Turkey were feeling less strained by the Cold War. Furthermore Greece,
due to her association with the EEC, became much less dependent on American
economic aid, and therefore American economic leverage on Greece had greatly 
• • 75diminished. Moreover, Cyprus had became an independent state in 1960 and 
M akarios was now taking an independent stand from Greece.
Another faulty assumption, on which Turkey based her expectations, was that 
the relative importance o f Turkey to the United States was more than that o f Greece 
because o f her more strategic location. But what Turkey could not see at the time was 
that the thaw in the Cold War and the advent o f intercontinental ballistic missiles 
diminished the American need for Turkish bases to maintain the nuclear balance o f 
power. Ulman also points out the effect o f the large and well organized Greek-
American community and the scope o f world Christian protest against the restrictions
H f\Turkey placed on the activities o f the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate o f Istanbul. 70
When all these factors were considered, it is not surprising that the American
and NATO position on Cyprus was one o f neutrality between Greece and Turkey.
Thoroughly frustrated by America's and NATO's neutrality on Cyprus; faced
with public outcry at home; and fuelled with the Cypriot parliament decision o f June
1964 to establish general conscription for the Greek Cypriot defence forces, Inonu's
77government informed its allies that Turkey decided upon unilateral intervention. The
American response was the now infamous Johnson letter o f 1964, which was described
78by Inonu in his reply as "disappointing" both "in wording and content".
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The contents o f  the letter, which was not made public until 1966 but 
nevertheless partially leaked to the press, was shocking for many Turks who now came 
to  the conclusion that Turkey could not rely on its allies unconditionally. In the letter, 
Johnson warned Turkey that her "NATO allies have not had a chance to consider 
w hether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if  Turkey 
takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and 
understanding o f its NATO Allies". He further reminded that "the United States can not 
agree to the use o f any US supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in 
Cyprus under present circumstances".
The second part o f the letter, which was to play a most important role nearly 
ten years later, passed more or less unno ticed .^  The questioning o f NATO support, 
however, as Inonu's reply reflected, created great concern among Turks and forced 
them to rethink the reliability and trustworthiness o f the alliance with the West. They 
realized, as Inonu put in his reply to Johnson, that "there are...wide divergence of 
views" between Turkey and the United States "as to the nature and basic principles of 
the North Atlantic Alliance". In Turkish understanding, the NATO Treaty "imposes 
upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance o f any 
member victim o f  an aggression" unconditionally, and to debate the issue o f "whether 
aggression was provoked" and "whether they have an obligation to assist" would 
jeopardize "the very foundation o f the Alliance...and it would lose its meaning". They 
further realized that the national interests o f Turkey were no longer identical with those 
o f the United States or the Western alliances. From then on, the question o f re­
examining and redirecting Turkey's foreign relations, a notion that the progressive 
intelligentsia had been advancing for a long time, spread out to cover the hitherto silent 
mass; and put all Turkish governments, as Harris notes, "on the defensive in regard to
the American connection, and memories o f the Johnson letter would colour popular
80impressions o f the United States for many years to come".
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3.3.2. The Deterioration of US-Turkish Relations
Beyond the deteriorating effects o f the Cyprus crisis and the Johnson letter, there were 
other problems concerning Turkish-US relations. As noted above, in the 1960s, 
because o f  domestic developments there was growing anti-American sentiment in 
Turkey even before the 1964 Cyprus crisis. The general areas o f  friction, such issues as 
American sovereignty over military bases on Turkish soil; misuse o f US installations in 
Turkey;** * alleged covert activities o f the CIA;**^ what the Turks considered to be 
American abuse o f the "status o f forces agreements";**'* alleged US involvement in 
domestic policies; and the lack o f sufficient American military aid, were already 
pressurising the Turkish government to re-examine the relations with the United States.
In addition to these, two specific events which were to have an impact on 
Turkish-American relations took place during the 1960s - the Cuban missile "deal" and 
NATO's adoption o f the "flexible response" strategy. Although the two events probably 
did not arouse the general Turkish public, as much the Cyprus crisis did, they surely 
created concern among Turkey's political and military leaders.
At the risk o f further alienating the Soviets and making Turkey a prime target,
the Menderes government had agreed in 1958 to the deployment o f medium range
atomic warhead Jupiter missiles in Turkey. In point o f fact, the Missiles had been
rendered obsolete even before they became operational in July 1962. And in 1961 the
US had begun negotiations with Turkey for closure o f missile sites. Under pressure
from the military, however, the Turkish government opposed the idea and the United
States dropped the matter.84 As a result, the missiles were still in Turkey when the
*
Cuban missile crisis broke out and became a bargaining point when the Soviets 
proposed that the Jupiters be withdrawn in exchange for their withdrawing the missiles 
from Cuba. Although the State Department denied any kind o f "deal" over the missiles, 
they were in fact removed from Turkey in 1963, apparently without consultation with 
the Turkish government, which actually owned the missiles but not their warheads.
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The removal o f the Jupiters gave rise to several issues which would make a 
deep impression on Turkish-American relations. First o f all, the suddenness with which 
the Cuban crisis occurred and the limelight which Turkey shared because o f missiles on 
her soil brought about a basic change in Turkish attitudes. The experience had 
demonstrated that a war could occur almost without warning and the possession o f 
strategic offensive weapons makes any country a primary target. The realization that 
Turkey might became a target for a Soviet nuclear attack because o f the US bases, and 
that having bases that would attract such an attack might not be in the security interests 
o f  Turkey, gave rise to the sentiment in Turkey, as Harris states, "in favour o f removing 
weapons systems which the Soviets considered especially dangerous, in order to 
decrease the likelihood that the country could be dragged into a conflict against her
Q z T
will." Equally important, was the impression given by Kennedy's unilateral action that 
during a crisis the United States could and would act in her own best interest without 
consideration of, or consultation with her allies. The Turkish public was also offended
0 7
by the idea that the US treated Turkey as a client whose interests were negotiable. 
This, coupled with the strategy o f "flexible response" and the doubt cast upon United 
States commitment to Turkey by the Johnson letter, created great concern in Turkey.
Soviet development o f thermo-nuclear weapons in the 1960s necessitated a 
rethinking o f the concept o f "massive retaliation", whereby an attack on an American 
ally would elicit an automatic nuclear strike against the aggressor. The United States 
opted for a strategy o f "flexible response" which did not entail an automatic nuclear 
response .88 In light o f previous American actions surrounding Cuba and Cyprus, this 
new strategy doubtfully created great concern in Turkey. The outcome o f this concern 
was reappraisal by Turkey o f her role in NATO.
3.3.3. Multi-Faceted Foreign Policy Concept
In the late 1960s, all these frictions and problems abroad and the basic changes in 
Turkey's socio-political life outlined above were showing only one direction - the need
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for a new and fresh foreign policy. But, as Ahmad pointed out, "throughout the 
sixties...the intelligentsia was able to inhibit the activities o f the government by constant 
criticism but...never able to force the government to reformulate the p o licy" .^  
Although , after the Cyprus crises o f 1963-1964 and 1967, the signs o f reevaluation of 
basic fundamentals o f  Turkish foreign policy were evident even in the governmental 
circles,9^ soon the outcry that Cyprus and other problems created died out, or at least 
shadowed, due to mounting pressure o f the domestic politics as a result o f growing 
violence and economic problems.
Nevertheless, there were basic changes in Turkey's attitudes, if not in main
directions, towards certain countries in an apparent attempt to break her loneliness in
the international forums and find support to her position on Cyprus. One o f the major
changes in Turkish foreign policy in the late 1960's was the rapprochement with the
Soviet Union. Although there had been a movement towards rapprochement with the
Soviets as early as 1959 because o f economic needs, the real thaw in Turkish-Soviet
relations started after 1964 and was undoubtedly influenced by American actions during
the Cyprus crisis. But attempts by Turkey to better her relations with the Communist
Bloc were motivated by other factors as well. The Turkish desire for Soviet economic
91assistance in view o f declining American economic and military aid; 1 the development 
o f a highly vocal political opposition; and growing anti-American sentiment in Turkey 
all contributed to Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union.
In his memoirs, Turkish Foreign Minister F. C. Erkin, claims that Turkey moved 
to normalize relations with the Soviet Union because the Soviet threat to Turkey had 
decreased due to the NATO alliance, the rise o f China as a balancing force, her 
economic difficulties on the domestic front, and demands for autonomy by the Soviet 
Union's allies in Eastern Europe 92 Just as important were the signals from Moscow 
that the Soviets had abandoned their harsh policy toward Turkey and that better 
relations between the two countries would not be contingent on Turkey loosening her 
NATO bonds. Clearly, there were a variety o f factors dictating the desirability for
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better relations, but just as clear is the fact that Cyprus was the catalyst for 
rapprochement.
Ulman/Dekmejian acknowledge three factors, related to Cyprus, that forced 
Turkey to  consider rapprochement with the Soviet Union.9^ First o f  all, the Turks 
probably felt that signs o f a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement would pressure the United 
States and NATO into inducing the Greeks and Greek Cypriots to accept a solution 
favourable to Turkey. Secondly, Turkey hoped to win positive Soviet support for her 
position on Cyprus, and therefore, secure the support o f the Communist Bloc in the 
United Nations. Finally, the least they could expect was a neutral Soviet position, 
thereby denying support for the Greek position. Taken into consideration with Turkey's 
isolation in the international arena, the lack o f Western support, and the Soviet warning 
to Turkey during the 1964 Cyprus crisis about the integrity o f the island, this attempt to 
secure Soviet support on Cyprus issue seemed all the more appropriate.
What began as a tactic to secure support for her position on Cyprus soon 
became a firm conviction o f Turkish foreign policy. Talks and visits between Turkey 
and the Soviet Union increased after 1965 and the dialogue was extended to other 
matters o f mutual interest to the two countries. Perhaps most significant was the 
increase in trade and the beginning o f a Soviet aid program for Turkey. As a result, 
Turkish exports to and imports from the Soviet bloc rose rapidly and the share o f the 
Soviet bloc in Turkey's total trade increased from 7% in 1964 to 13% in 1967.9^
A basic tenet o f Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union was the belief 
that the Soviets had abandoned their harsh, militarist policy and would accept, however 
unwillingly, Turkey's membership in NATO. Therefore, the Soviet's armed repression 
o f the liberalization movement in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Brezhnev doctrine 
claiming the right o f intervention for the Soviets to uphold the socialist regime in any 
country must have had more than a sobering effect in Turkey. It was, according to 
Harris, "a blunt reminder that Moscow had not renounced force where its interests 
were concerned".95 The most immediate reaction to the Czech crisis was the decision
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o f the Demirel regime, in a reversal o f its previous position, to cooperate in a 
multilateral force to be created in the Mediterranean under NATO auspices 96
Although Turkish- Soviet dialogue continued after a short break, two ominous 
developments outside the realm o f diplomatic relations caused growing apprehension in 
Turkey. The first o f these was the increased Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean 
and the other was the growing ideological impact o f socialist doctrines within Turkey. 
These two developments were to impact on Turkey's foreign and domestic policies o f 
the 1970s in that the former again highlighted Turkey's strategic location, and the latter 
created instability in both the political and social life o f Turkey.
Concomitant with her rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Turkey also 
attempted to improve and expand her relations with the non-aligned countries, 
especially those in the Middle East. Although many factors, such as obvious cultural, 
geographic and religious affinities; the idea that Turkey, for strategic political reasons, 
must become a bridge between East and West; and the commercial opportunities in the 
new markets in the Arab countries undoubtedly influenced this shift in Turkish foreign 
policy, Turkish-Third World relations in the 1960s, however, were conditioned above 
all by the Cyprus dispute.
The almost total lack o f Third World support in the UN for the Turkish position 
on Cyprus forced Turkey to realize that her policy toward the nonaligned nations in 
general and the Middle East in particular had isolated her from the rest o f the world. As 
could be expected Turkey moved to break away from this isolation. Therefore, behind 
Turkey's new Arab policy was the desire to marshal support in the UN for her Cyprus 
stand, as well as to indicate to the United States that Turkish support on various issues 
could no longer be taken for granted.
Despite the fact that Turkey's rapprochement policy with the Third World 
initially ended with failure, as the 1965 UN vote showed,97 Turkey nevertheless went 
ahead with her multi-faceted foreign policy initiatives. Illustrative o f Turkey's new 
policy in the Middle East was the diplomatic position taken by Turkey in the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. During the period following the 1964 Cyprus crisis up until the 1967
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Arab-Israeli war, Ankara's position on the Middle East dispute was one o f guarded 
neutrality. It was characterized by extreme caution designed to avoid antagonizing the 
United States, the Soviet Union and the Arab nations. In the aftermath o f the war, the 
new direction o f Turkey's foreign policy became evident in the UN. Mindful o f the 
importance o f  the thirteen potential Arab votes in the UN, as well as o f future 
Communist Bloc support for her position on Cyprus, Turkey voted for the Yugoslav 
resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from captured Arab territories. Yet at the same 
time, in an apparent attempt to balance her interests with the West, Turkey abstained 
on the Soviet resolution that labelled Israel an aggresso r.^
Another event manifesting the diversification o f Turkey's foreign policy was the 
creation by Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, o f the Regional Cooperation for Development 
(RCD). It was an economic and cultural agreement parallel to but separate from the 
W estern dominated Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and as Harris states, 
reduced the importance o f i t . ^  Although Turkey's leaders initially were not 
enthusiastic about turning back towards the East, on cultural and especially Islamic 
grounds, Pakistan's proposal for RCD was timely and caught the Turks in the moment 
o f their political isolation.
Thus Turkey, whose credit with the nonaligned bloc had been bankrupt in 1964, 
began to pursue a more independent foreign policy in the Third World designed to 
alleviate the impression created at Bandung that she was running errands for the West. 
However, at the end, there were few Third World countries who actually accepted 
Turkey's eagerness to improve relations with them. And despite the adoption o f the 
"multi-faceted" foreign policy, most o f the Third World states continued to act *in 
favour o f Makarios' position over the Cyprus issue in international forums.
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3.4. Turkish Foreign Policy During The 1970s
3.4.1. The Domestic Environment and External Problems
As stated earlier, towards the end o f the 1960s Turkey became preoccupied with her 
internal economic and political problems, and therefore ignored the international 
situation. Although Turkey continued to follow a multi-faceted foreign policy, and her 
restrained position in the 1967 Cyprus crisis paid o ff as some Arab states started to 
take a more favourable stand with regard to Turkey in the international forums, soon 
Turkey was dragged into domestic conflicts and consequently inactivity in the foreign 
policy area.
The period o f  caretaker governments o f 1971-73 after the 1971 intervention 
can be identified with the lack o f  foreign policy initiative. The bureaucrats who 
occupied government posts without much authority and with limited popular bases o f 
support were in no position to undertake courageous steps in foreign policy. Before 
another Cyprus crisis dominated Turkey's foreign policy, there were two 
developments, one internal and one foreign, that would affect Turkey's and the United 
States' policies during and after 1974 Cyprus crisis, which in turn positively determined 
Turkey's foreign policy for the rest o f the 1970s.
Turkey's biggest problem with the United States between 1966 and 1974, was 
the cultivation o f opium poppies in Turkey and the US reaction to  it. As early as 1968 
the United States started to  pressure Turkey to adopt strictest control to prevent the 
illegal trafficking o f opium in Turkey, which they believed constituted 80 % o f  the 
heroin illegally consumed in the United States. 100 By 1970, the US Congress started 
to  take an interest in the issue, and in 1971 required the President "to suspend all 
military sales and aid (and) economic assistance" to governments that failed to prevent 
narcotics produced in their countries from reaching the United States.101 In 1971 
criticism o f Turkey grew and even went so far as to question Turkey's utility to the 
United States.10^
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Finally, US pressures had an effect on Turkey's caretaker government after the 
1971 military intervention, and the Prime Minister announced on June 30, 1971 that he 
banned poppy cultivation because o f Turkey's "humanitarian obligations".^^ However, 
this American pressure, which finally caused the Turkish Administration to ban poppy 
cultivation, contributed to anti-Americanism and to a decrease in American prestige in 
Turkey. Further, Turks were outraged in August 1972 when they learned that the 
United States had decided to ask India to increase its opium production to meet the 
world-wide shortage estimated by the International Narcotics Board . 104
Although very unpopular, the ban remained active until the RPP-NSP (National 
Salvation Party) coalition government revoked it on 1 July 1974. The United States 
immediately signaled its displeasure by recalling its Ambassador to Washington for 
consultations. And he was still in Washington when the Cyprus crisis broke out.
Congress reacted more harshly to the poppy crisis than did the Executive. 
Members o f  the House and Senate proposed a number o f draft resolutions asking for 
the imposition o f  embargoes. Finally when Resolution 507, which provided authority to 
President "to terminate all assistance to the Government o f Turkey", was approved by 
the Congress on 5 August 1974, the Cyprus crisis had already been bn the way .105 As 
a result, Congress did not pressure the President to implement the resolution because 
after the second Turkish intervention in Cyprus on 14 August 1974, congressional 
opponents o f  the poppy cultivation chose to support the arms embargo favoured by the 
Greek Lobby and "the rule o f law" opponents.
The Turkish government and the Turkish public were outraged at Congress's 
eagerness to adopt coercive measures against a loyal ally. The Ecevit government 
further judged Congress's action as an indication of, at the least, insensitivity toward 
Turkish national interests. The fact that when the coup took place in Cyprus, the United 
States ambassador to Turkey had already been recalled to Washington and Congress 
was discussing ways to penalize Turkey symbolically illustrates the lack o f trust 
between two countries.
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Meanwhile, an important development took place in Turkey, specifically inside
the RPP, which would later have effects on subsequent Turkish foreign policy in
general, and Turkey's Cyprus policy in particular. B. Ecevit, who had been advocating a
"left-of-centre" stand for the RPP, replaced Inonu as RPP chairman in May 1972. M ost
importantly for Turkish foreign policy, Ecevit believed that Turkey could afford to
adopt an assertive, in contrast to Inonu's cautious, foreign policy vis-a-vis the
superpowers. His argument that smaller allies did not need to correlate all o f their
foreign policy actions with those o f the Superpowers did in fact reflect the widely
shared belief within the RPP and Turkey. He suggested that Turkey should disassociate
herself from the cold war rhetoric o f NATO. ^
There was no question o f Turkey abandoning her alliances, such as NATO and
CENTO, but within the alliances Turkey would pursue a policy designed to serve her
national interests and not those o f others. That, according to Ecevit, was to be the
difference between his foreign policy and that o f his predecessors. He also criticized
Turkey's assumption o f the role in the Middle East on behalf o f the US. He consistently
maintained that Turkey's participation in the 1950s in schemes like the Baghdad Pact
109was harmful to Turkey's national security interests.
Though his insistence on more independence within NATO distinguished him
from his predecessors, the major characteristic o f his administration was his
assertiveness in Turkish-Greek relations. As his foreign minister told the National
Assembly in 1974 that Turkey wanted to live in peace with Greece, but that "just
because this is so, Greece will certainly not be allowed to gnaw away at Turkish
interests in any manner whatsoever or to upset the balance between the two
countries" .110 Ecevit was a risk taker when he felt the stakes were high enough, unlike
his predecessor's cautiousness, as his behaviour concerning the Aegean dispute had 
111shown.
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3.4.2. The Cyprus Intervention of 1974 and Its Aftereffects on the Turkish 
Foreign Policy
With the above-mentioned developments inside and outside Turkey, the stage was set 
for another Cyprus crisis which would be the catalyst for change in Turkish foreign 
policy during the 1970s. The 1974 Cyprus crisis served to intensify animosity between 
Greece and Turkey. It not only precipitated a sharp deterioration in relations between 
these countries, but also stretched Turkish-American relations to  near breaking point. 
The background to the crisis and specific events that participated the Turkish 
intervention in July 1974 and subsequent invasion o f Cyprus in August 1974 are too 
involved and varied to permit adequate description here. However, a brief 
examination o f some o f the perceptions and motives o f the various actors is necessary 
within the context o f this study.
The coup against Makarios in 1974 was apparently inspired by the Greek junta's 
need to find a foreign policy success abroad to offset their domestic weakness, and was 
based on a total misreading of United States policy and the international situation, just 
as Turkey had done in the 1964 crisis. The colonels apparently felt that the United 
States, based on her tacit approval o f their regime, would condone, o r at least tolerate, 
the coup and restrain Turkey as she had in 1964 and 1967. But the circumstances in 
1974 were different from those that had existed in those earlier years; Turkish- 
American relations had undergone a transition, and the United States no longer had the 
leverage on Turkey that she had in 1964 and 1967. And the impression given before the 
Turkish intervention in 1974 was that the US would not use her leverage even if she 
had any.
Furthermore, detente and Turkey’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union had 
decreased the threat o f Soviet intervention. In 1964, the Cold War tension was still felt 
between two countries and the Soviets had publicly announced that they would 
"defend" Cyprus' "freedom and independence from a foreign invasion", and warned 
Turkey that the USSR could "not remain indifferent to the threat o f  an armed conflict" 
near the Soviet Unions southern frontier. 114 In 1974 however, Turkish-Soviet relations
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were much improved and the Soviets, furthermore, no longer opposed Turkey's Cyprus 
thesis. In addition, they chose to remain silent about Turkey's intervention preparations, 
indicating that they did not oppose it.115
M oreover, Turkey's isolation in the UN had diminished since 1965. Relations 
with the Soviet Bloc and Third World countries became "friendly" and therefore the 
fear o f  anti-Turkish resolutions had been reduced. And the fact that the Colonels Junta 
in Greece had erased her favourable image in world public opinion, hence meant that 
they faced world-wide disapproval when they arranged the Coup in Cyprus in 1974.
Within Turkey the situation was also quite different from that o f the earlier 
Cyprus crisis. The earlier crisis had boosted rising anti-Americanism and contributed to 
a polarization o f  domestic policies in Turkey. In turn, these forces contributed to 
increased political instability. Given the fact that it was not possible to argue that the 
Greek supported coup was an internal affair in which the quarantor powers - Great 
Britain, Turkey and Greece - had no legal right to intervene, Ecevit's weak coalition 
government had no viable option other than intervention.1 ^
The aftermath o f Turkey's intervention and subsequent invasion o f part o f 
Cyprus is well-known. By the end o f the summer o f 1974, the Turkish army had 
occupied about forty percent o f Cyprus. In February 1975, the United States Congress, 
under pressure from the Greek-American community, imposed an arms embargo on 
Turkey .117 Turkish-American relations reached a "low", when later in 1975 the 
Turkish government suspended the activities at all American bases in Turkey except 
those related to NATO. It is important to note that the arms embargo was imposed by 
Congress but opposed by the President, the State Department and the American 
Military. This difference o f opinion allowed the Turks to maintain their relations with 
the United States, such as they were, and still save face. The embargo, which was 
partially lifted in the late 1975, was fully lifted in the summer o f 1978. .
Aside from its impact on Turkish-Greek and Turkish-American relations, 
foreign reaction to the 1974 Cyprus invasion once again created a sense o f diplomatic 
isolation in Turkey. The failure o f her (fiplomatic efforts, begun in the 1960s, to gain
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support among Arab and non-aligned countries for her policies in Cyprus was strikingly 
displayed at the 1976 Colombo Conference o f non-aligned nations (as it had been at 
Lima in the previous year), while a UN General Assembly vote on a draft resolution on 
Cyprus in November 1976 showed 94-1 against Turkey, with 27 absten tions.^^  
Consequently, Turkey redoubled her efforts to expand friendly relations with not only 
the Eastern Bloc countries, but also the Arab and non-aligned countries.
After 1974, Cyprus became both a main problematic for, and a determinant of, 
Turkish foreign policy. Moreover, because o f its emotional and political character, the 
Cyprus problem has affected Turkey's domestic politics, which in turn determined 
foreign policy o f Turkey with feedbacks. This new direction in foreign policy must 
however, be viewed against the background o f Turkey's internal political, social and 
economic problems, as described earlier.
3.4.3. Economic Factors
Apart from a political and social evolution o f Turkey and international developments, 
economic considerations also played an important role in influencing the course o f 
Turkish foreign policy in the inter-coup period, specially in the 1970s. As mentioned in 
the preceding section, as far back as the late 1950s economic necessities had led the 
M enderes government to consider rapprochement with the Soviets in order to obtain 
economic aid. Among many other considerations, the mismanagement o f the economy 
by Menderes was at least in part responsible for the military takeover in 1960. Seeing 
the damage done by the short-sighted and uncoordinated economic policies o f the 
previous government, the NUC established a State Planning Organization (DPT) and 
initiated the First Five Year Development Plan in 1963, which emphasized the 
importance o f speeding up the rate o f economic development.
Economic planning placed a new emphasis on Turkey's requirements for 
external capital. And when the NATO countries refused to sponsor an aid consortium, 
Turkey turned to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
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(OECD) in order to assure a steady flow o f external financing for her development 
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plans. Although the OECD consortium for Turkey was established in July 1962 
after strong American behind-the-scenes pressures, it never came up to Turkish 
expectations. Also a sharp cut in American aid, under the supposition that European 
allies would come forward to fill the gap, only helped to offend the Turkish 
au tho rities.^^
Under the Menderes government, Turkey had further tried to link her economic 
policies to the W est through the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1959 she 
applied for an associate status in the EEC. Her application was probably motivated 
more by political considerations than economic realities. Undoubtedly, Turkey's desire 
to  be considered "European" influenced her decision to seek closer ties with the EEC, 
but the fact that it followed so closely a similar request by Greece indicates that the 
Greek application prompted the Turkish action; for as Birand points out, "traditions of 
Turkish foreign policy required that Greece be watched very closely so that it would 
not use the political and economic weight resulting from a new relationship with 
Europe against T u rk e y " .^  Finally, in 1962 Turkey negotiated an agreement of 
association with the EEC.
In the 1970s, economic factors continued to play an important, if not crucial, 
role in influencing the course o f Turkish foreign policy. In a series o f Five Year Plans, 
Turkey committed herself to a massive economic modernization effort during the 
period. Beside, at the same time, for reasons related to her NATO commitments and 
her rivalry with Greece, she had been compelled to maintain a high degree o f military 
preparedness. The economic trends o f 1970s both within Turkey and in the 
international arena, however, made balancing o f these objectives increasingly more 
difficult. Although Turkey's economic growth rate in the 1970s was relatively high, 
averaging between 7 and 8 percent annually, it was not due to healthy growth o f the 
economy. This high rate o f growth was achieved at the expense o f  massive imports 
without any significant increase in exports, and was financed by heavy foreign loans. At 
the same time high unemployment and inflation became endemic in Turkey.
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Turkey's economic difficulties had been exacerbated and complicated in the 70s 
by her own policies as well as world events. Though Turkey's economic policies are to 
blame to some extent, it would still be unfair to argue that Turkey's economic woes 
were solely a result o f her domestic policies. Certain international events such as the 
economic recession in Europe, the world-wide energy crisis and the 1974 Cyprus crisis, 
along with its repercussions, all adversely affected Turkey's economy and forced her to 
diversify her foreign policy.
Turkey's balance o f trade and foreign currency reserves were affected by the 
recession in Europe. While her trade deficit with the EEC, her main trading partner, 
was rising, at the same time remittances from Turks working in Europe, Turkey's only 
self generated source o f income other than exports, dropped off significantly.^^ These 
set-backs were further exacerbated by the world-wide energy crisis which was set-off 
by the 1973 Arab oil embargo. According to 1978 figures, the cost o f oil imports 
equalled Turkey's entire export earnings.
A dramatic rise in military defence expenditures following the 1974 Cyprus 
crisis also strained severely Turkey's economy. The American arms embargo, the 
intervention in Cyprus and the following arms race with Greece, together with aimed 
self-sufficiency, required high defence spending, which competed for scarce domestic 
resources.
With the factors outlined above, Turkey's need to obtain outside credits and 
loans became all the more pressing. Hence, it is not surprising that Turkey, faced with a 
long list o f austerity measures as requirements for future loans from the IMF, wanted to 
expand her foreign relations to include the Soviet Union and oil rich Arabs.
Meanwhile, Turkish-EEC relations continued to be strained. The preferences 
given by the EEC to the former colonies and to several Mediterranean countries, and 
the failure o f the EEC to extend what Turkey considered sufficient credits led to 
charges o f discrimination in Turkey. Her failure to gain new agricultural concessions 
and the restrictions imposed on her textile exports disappointed Turkey and created 
dark suspicions about the Community's attitude and motives. Additionally, the
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probability o f Greek accession to the EEC led to worries in Turkey that the unanimous 
voting rule in the EEC Council might be used by the Greeks to block pro-Turkish EEC 
initiatives. M oreover, relating the close link between economic concerns and foreign 
policy objectives, Turkey's association with the EEC further polarized Turkey's political 
parties, which in turn had adverse effects on Turkish-EEC relations.
4. Concluding Remarks and The Setting for Foreign Policy at September 12, 1980
In the intercoup period, Turkish foreign policy changed its structure but not its 
foundations. While still resting upon the principles o f identification and alliance with the 
W est, it was now marked by a trend which stressed the pursuit o f Turkey's national 
interests in her foreign relations and greater independence in decision making.
This new orientation was influenced by psychological factors introduced in the 
1960s, such as the reversal o f the intimidating Soviet attitude towards Turkey; the 
Cuban crisis and subsequent removal o f the Jupiter missiles from Turkey; the American 
attitudes towards the continuous Cyprus crises; the formation o f the EEC; NATO's 
adoption o f  the "flexible response" strategy; and the lack o f support in the UN for her 
Cyprus policy.
These psychological factors were exacerbated in the 1970s by such events as 
the 1973 Middle East War and the ensuing oil crisis; a sharp deterioration in relations 
between Turkey and the United States, first on the poppy question and then on Cyprus; 
tension between Turkey and Greece on the Cyprus and Aegean problems; Turkey's 
differences with the EEC; and, again, lack o f support in the UN for Turkey's Cyprus 
policy.
These significant international events parallelled domestic developments in 
Turkey. Increases in communication, education and social as well as physical mobility 
led to  higher expectations and a greater politicalization o f the Turkish people. In turn 
these factors, together with the factors discussed earlier, resulted in ideological 
polarization and party fragmentation. The net result was weak coalition governments,
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which proved to be ineffective in the field o f foreign relations. Thus, at the time when 
international political and economic imperatives called for solutions to Turkey's 
outstanding foreign policy problems, such as Cyprus, the Aegean, her relations with the 
EEC and the US, Turkey did not have a government with enough political prestige to 
make compromises necessary for a lasting settlement to those problems.
On the other hand, the insistence on a more autonomous Turkish foreign policy 
from both the Right and the Left was strengthened by international events, outlined 
above, particularly the energy crisis which had a devastating effect on Turkey; and the 
American arms embargo which brought into question Turkey's Western defence 
alliance. Therefore, while little or no progress was made on the Cyprus and Aegean 
issues, Turkey exhibited strong moves in this period toward developing good pohtica- 
and economic relations with the nonaligned countries, particularly those in the Middle 
East and the Balkans, and the Soviet Bloc countries.
The emergence o f diversification in Turkey's foreign relations also coincided
with Ecevit's rise to power in the RPP. His political philosophy, which was quite similar
to that o f the European "social democrats", was most closely associated with pursuit o f
1 94national interests and independence in foreign policy m a k i n g . T h e r e f o r e ,  it was clear 
when B. Ecevit won the 1973 election that his government would attempt to exercise 
more independence in its foreign policy, Hence, on the eve o f the world-wide energy 
crisis and the Cyprus intervention, with all its ramifications, the stage had already been 
set for a search to find new orientations for Turkish foreign policy. Where this search 
led Turkey is a question that the following chapters seek to answer.
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PART TWO
DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AND FOREIGN POLICY FORMATION 
Social, Political And Economic Challenges
CHAPTER FOUR
THE SEPTEMBER 12 1980 COUP D'ETAT AND TURKISH FOREIGN
POLICY
1. Introduction: Early Indications And Immediate Reactions To The Coup
When the third "successful" military coup within two decades took place in Turkey on 
September 12, 1980,^ some people would have expected that the new leaders o f the 
country would introduce changes in foreign policy just as they were expected to do in 
all other walks o f life. There was, however, no indication to show that the NSC - five 
man junta - had any intention o f doing anything to change the country's foreign policy 
course. N or was there any reason, at the time, to expect that anything decisive or 
effective in the long run would happen in Turkish foreign policy just because the policy­
makers at the top o f the state had changed.
To begin with, Turkey was known for her stable, pro-WestCm and above-party 
foreign policy, which had been generally treated as national rather than party-political 
and therefore supported by the main parties, in government or otherwise. Beside, the 
basic principles and directions, which had been set up by Kemal Ataturk and which 
were influenced and guarantied by the military after his death, have not been changed or 
challenged enough to degrade their values. In view o f the military's well known role in 
Turkish politics in general and, to a certain extent, its influence in designing Turlqsh 
foreign policy beyond the country's security interests, it was not unrealistic to expect 
that, once they were in power, they would continue to pursue the general direction o f 
the previous civilian governments in foreign policy matters, though some nuances 
would have been expected in handling daily proceedings.2
Moreover, the coup o f September 12 was prompted by the obvious inability o f 
the civilian bureaucratic and political elites to come to terms with each other in order to
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contain growing civil-war-like terrorism and the deteriorating economy o f the country.^ 
External threats to the territorial integrity o f the country or foreign influences as well as 
intervention had played, if any, only a trivial role in triggering the military coup. It was 
essentially an internally arranged and conducted coup against internal threats to the 
country's integrity and independence, as the military leaders conceived them.^
At the root o f the matter lay the conflicting aims and desires o f the state elites, 
who posed as guardians o f Kemalism and were increasingly represented only by the 
military, and their continuous clashes with political elites whose indifference towards 
what state elites considered as fundamental led to the crises o f integration and 
legitimacy, which in turn resulted in military intervention on three occasions.'*
In explaining why the military had felt it necessary to intervene, Kenan Evren, 
the head o f the Junta, declared in the Military Communique No. 1, broadcast at about 6
tYio'clock in the morning o f September 12 , that;
...the Turkish Republic... has been facing... physical and ideological 
aggressions...[from] its...enemies, against its regime and its independence. The 
state...has been rendered unable to function, the Constitutional institutions have 
assumed a contradictory and muted silence and the political parties have failed 
to bring about the unity and togetherness and to take the necessary measures...
After enumerating endlessly what the enemies o f the Turkish Republic had done to the
country, state, educational institutions, administration, labour organizations, judiciary
organs, and so on, he flatly declared that "in short, the state has been incapacitated".6
It is obvious that the generals' main concern before the coup was centred
around internal disorder and chaos which continued to attract their immediate attention
after the coup, too. The purposes o f the coup were summarized, then, as "to preserve
♦
the integrity o f the country, to restore national unity, to avert a possible civil war, to re­
establish the authority and existence o f the state and to eliminate all the factors that 
prevent the normal functioning o f the democratic o rder"7 Further, in his first press 
conference on September 16, 1980, General Evren, as Head o f State, Chief o f General 
Staff and Chairman o f the five-man National Security Council, elaborated the targets o f 
the coup by mentioning: "to establish security o f life and property by curbing anarchy
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and terror, to establish social peace, national understanding and unity, to secure the 
functioning o f  the republican regime based on social justice, individual rights and 
freedoms and human rights, and to re-establish civil administration after completing the 
legal arrangements in a reasonable time".8
As people were wondering how these admirable aspirations and ideas would be 
translated into action, and cynics were starting to ask what outstanding good new 
leaders could do about the country's long standing problems, and what the long term 
affects o f  the measures they would obliged to take to attain these forcible sentiments 
would be, one thing was beginning to emerge quite certainly from the very first day o f 
the coup: that the new regime did not intend to make changes in the directions o f the 
country's foreign policy, and was going to follow a pro-Western line in its foreign 
policy just as the previous government did.^ After all, they, during their stay in power, 
were to be too preoccupied with remaking the domestic political scene to be able to 
devote sustained attention to devising major foreign policy initiatives.
One other striking point in the early days o f the coup was that, despite their 
obvious readiness to tackle any problem in Turkey, the military, it appears, had not 
thought much about the foreign policy during their long preparations. Alternatively, it 
could be argued, o f course, that they did think about it but found nothing to change, or 
that the intensity o f domestic problems forced the generals to turn their attention first 
and foremost into internal affairs and try to avoid external problems, if possible. Yet, 
the fact that the first volume o f General Evren's memoirs, which covers the pre-coup 
preparations and plannings, contain no reference about what they intended to do with 
foreign policy shows otherwise. A most probable explanation for this is that, since they 
agreed with Turkey's long term foreign policy goals and principles, they simply chose to 
let the experts run this much specialized business - a typical characteristic o f many 
newly formed military regimes. Accordingly, throughout his memoirs, General Evren 
talks about foreign policy only in a very casual and most general terms. Indeed, it seems 
that neither he nor the members o f the NSC had much to say about Turkey's foreign
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policy, save the national security aspects o f it and General Evren's frequent complaints 
about European misunderstanding o f his regime and their unwarranted criticisms.
Nevertheless, General Evren's early clarification o f his coup's position vis-a-vis 
foreign affairs was satisfactory. In his first televised speech at noon, September 12th, he 
took care to emphasize that the new regime would remain a staunch ally o f NATO, 
would honour all international agreements, and would continue to have good relations 
with its neighbours on a basis o f "mutual respect for independence and non-interference 
in domestic affairs".1^ Assurances were also given by him that the NATO military 
exercises planned to take place in Turkey would continue to do so as arranged.11
Further signs o f continuity were given by liter Turkmen, then Secretary General
o f  Foreign Ministry, when he organized a briefing for the NATO ambassadors at 3
o'clock on the same day. He heavily stressed the theme o f returning to democracy as
soon as possible, reaffirmed Turkey's commitment to the West, and assured the allies
17that Turkey would continue to adhere to the NATO.
Apart from these pronouncements on the day o f the coup, there were other
indications o f the military junta's pro-Western stance vis-a-vis foreign policy. One o f
the early hints was their initial selection o f Professor Turhan Feyzioglu, leader o f the
small right-wing Republican Alliance Party, as prime minister. He was the most pro-
Western o f  the country's party leaders and had been known for his rigorous Kemalist
views. Although in the event he was passed over, partly because professional politicians
were then in disgrace, and partly because an alliance o f mainly JP and RPP MP's under
his premiership, as envisaged by the generals, was not conceivable, the junta's respect
• • 13for him, nevertheless, says much about its politics.
It was no surprise, o f course, for the observers o f Turkish politics that the 
military regime o f Kenan Evren, along with its Ataturk laws, would reaffirm its 
attachment to NATO and its alliance with the West as one o f the cornerstones o f  its 
foreign policy.14 After all, it was one o f Kemal Ataturk's basic principles, o f which the 
military was supposed to be the guardian and ardent supporter, that Turkey should 
disconnect from its quasi-oriental past and associate itself fully with the West.
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The line which the military regime was going to pursue became clearer when the 
new government, under retired-Admiral Bulent Ulusu, established and presented its 
programme on 27 September to the NSC and subsequent to the public.1"* Although the 
new government programme added nothing to but only confirmed what General Evren 
said in his first speech, it was now quite obvious that the new regime had fully 
approved the previous government's pro-Western foreign policy and sought to build on 
it. The programme dealt with foreign policy only briefly, and said nothing to indicate 
that there would be radical departures from the policies o f the past. In fact, what the 
new programme expressed was essentially the JP views on foreign policy. Though the 
ideas were presented in the broadest and most general terms, the basic themes were 
that Turkey would be committed to the West while seeking to maintain sensible 
relations with her Muslim neighbours; that she would act in accordance with her 
agreements with the IMF and honour all existing treaty obligations; and that she would 
aim at eventual membership o f the EEC.
There was further promise o f continuity when liter Turkmen, a professional 
diplomat who had interpreted Turkey's foreign policy at the UN and the NATO, was 
appointed Minister o f  Foreign Affairs in the new government. *6 And he confirmed this 
during his speech at the opening session o f the 3 5 ^  General Assembly o f the U N .17
After stating that the "move" made by the Turkish Armed Forces was a 
response to the "total paralysis" o f the political system and "increasing violence, 
terrorism and anarchy" as well as to the "imminence o f civil war ", he declared that until 
civilian rule returned under a democratic system, the foreign policy o f Turkey would 
remain unchanged, and "Turkey will continue its attachment to the principles embodied 
in the Charter o f the UN and uphold all its Treaty commitments".18 Further, during the 
speech, the continuity and many dimensions of Turkish foreign policy were most 
evidently present:
She (Turkey) will seek to develop her relations with the EEC within the 
framework o f an Association Agreement aiming at eventual full membership. 
H er relations with the Council o f Europe will be guided by her dedication to 
democratic principles and her resolve to return to Parliamentary rule. Her ties
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with the member countries o f the Islamic Community will be enhanced and she 
will endeavour to achieve further ^oopcrauun among them. She will strive for 
better relations with all neighbouring countries and pursue vigorously her
efforts to settle existing outstanding issues with them peacefully.1^
It seemed that the military regime consolidated the continuity and multilateral foreign
policy, initiated during the mid-1970s.
O f course, the assurances , given by the new regime immediately after it took
power, and their timings were well received by the Turkey's Western allies who had
became increasingly worried about the chaotic political situation in an exposed but vital
area on NATO's southeastern flank. Also, they had considered the obvious
collaboration o f normally opposing groups o f Turkish politics on the ground o f their
general opposition to NATO and dominant position o f the Western states in Turkey's
foreign relations, as, at the least, dangerous and destabilizing. Therefore, they were
alarmed when strongly pro-Western foreign minister, Mr. Hayrettin Erkmen, was
forced to resign just a week before the coup by an alliance o f opposition parties -left o f
centre RPP and religious NSP- who argued energetically that Mr. Erkmen had involved
Turkey too closely with Israel and with the Western economies, to the neglect o f the
20Arab countries o f the Middle East.
Given the military's moderate, pro-Western and modernist views and their anti­
extremist conservative stance in Turkish politics, it was safely concluded in Western 
states that the coup would help to stabilize the situation in Turkey and counter the 
growth o f anti-NATO and anti-Western forces. The view in Whitehall, for example, 
was that there was "no reason to fear that Turkey's commitment to the West and the 
Atlantic Alliance" would be weakened.21 And the generals , who adopted so openly a
pro-W estern position in foreign policy as no civilian government could have done
99against the leftist and pro-Islamic forces, were evidently ready to reverse the trend. ^
Therefore, a certain relief was evident in the initial reactions o f the Western 
states to the coup. Though they usually acknowledged worries about the future o f 
democracy and human rights in Turkey, their responses were generally cordial and 
mild. While the W. German Chancellor Schmidt announced immediately that "Turkey
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will remain an ally o f W. Germany" and continue to receive military and economic 
23aid, the British foreign office announcement saw no reason not to recognize the new 
24
regime. Although both governments also expressed their hopes that "Turkey's
difficulties will be sufficiently overcome to allow an early return to a parliamentary
democracy", they did not seem particularly troubled with the overthrown o f the civilian
government which "was not altogether unexpected" by their respective governments.2^
Even the Scandinavian countries and the French government, which later became
Turkey's foremost critics at the governmental level, seemed restrained for the moment,
and chose not to condemn the military regime openly.2^
It appeared that the generally accepted view in Western capitals during the early
days was that the military would "clean up the mess", would put the country back on to
the right track, and would soon go back to their barracks as they did previously. To this
end, they were quite content, in the early days o f the coup, with General Evren's
promise to return the country to democracy as soon as possible, even if the road to
democracy would pass through a certain amount o f restrictions, repressions, and
imprisonments. After all, the war-like situation previous to the coup necessitated some
extraordinary measures.22 As one Western diplomat advised his government that there
was nothing they could do, at the moment, for "a prompt and effective return to
representative government" and their goal "should be not to do anything that might
affect them negatively"28 In the end the Western governments did not see any reason
not to give the new regime the "benefit o f the doubt", and therefore restrained their
29complaints and tried to avoid any accusations, at least for the time being.
«
2. Factors Influencing Actual Foreign Policy:
The military regime in Turkey after 1980 thus never intended to damage its relations 
with their Western allies, on whom they also depended economically as well as 
militarily. On the contrary, they were, with their dedicated Westernism, anxious to get 
closer to the West, or at the least, preserve the existing ties. The Western states - both
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the US and Europe - were, as indicated above, also helpful in their attitude toward the 
Turkish generals and gave some time to the new regime to prove itself. O f course, it 
was difficult to tell how long the West was prepared to condone the military regime in 
Turkey, though obviously not as long as the generals would have wanted. In fact, there 
was a feeling from the very beginning that the military coup, in spite o f its promise o f 
continuity, would add new complexities to Turkey's relations, especially with the 
W estern states, whose ideas about military regimes were quite different from those o f 
the Turkish people. It seems that, the military regime o f 1980 was destined to have a 
far more important affect on Turkey's foreign relations than any previous junta, either 
by attracting foreign reactions to their domestic security measures much more than 
before, or by their frustrated responses to developments usually beyond their control or 
above their imagination.
However, there are questions that need to be addressed before claiming the 
correctness o f this anticipation. What were the differences o f this military regime that 
escaped unnoticed from Western eyes at the time o f the coup, and that were going to 
be decisive in their future relations with Turkey? What happened in a matter o f months 
that affected Turkey's relations with European states and led to their deterioration , 
despite the obvious willingness on both sides to continue friendly relations? What 
happened to the cordial welcome the generals had got from the West? And why was 
even the breaking o f their relationship seen as imminent at one point or another?
Since the new regime's intention in foreign policy was continuity, unlike its 
domestic politics, and it never desired that its relationship with the West should 
deteriorate, we should look for other inputs, "external imperatives" not originating from 
within the NSC, in order to be able to explain complications o f Turkish foreign policy 
under the military regime, and in the transitional period followed it.
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2.1. The Nature Of The Regime
Clearly, during the period under consideration (1980-83) the single most effective 
factor over Turkey's foreign policy in general, and over its relations with Western 
Europe in particular, was the n a tu re  of the political regim e in Turkey.
It is argued that this factor, in a broader sense, operates at two levels. ^  At one 
level, the regime, with its powers to define broad framework o f the country's overall 
political philosophy, determines the general guidelines for country's foreign policy and 
limits its options in external relations. At another level, the nature o f the political 
regime in a given country generates perceptions and assumptions - some correct, while 
others are imagined - in the world outside about the country's political value system and 
identity. Responses o f foreign powers to these perceptions in turn generates counter­
reactions from the subject state according to its political values and how it sees the 
outside world. Moreover, negative external responses to the changes in country's 
political system may create pressures in the subject country to either change its policies 
or to distance itself from the centres o f pressure. In this context, the subject country 
may look for alternative supports against these pressures.
2.1.1. T he Effects of G overnm ental Philosophy
As far as the military regime o f 1980 in Turkey and its foreign policy objectives are 
concerned, one would expect to conclude that this should have had little effect since, as 
explained above, the new regime's foreign policy, unlike its domestic policies which 
were marked by change, emphasized continuity in general directions and thus adherence 
to the Western alliance accordingly. However, in determining the overall effect o f tfie 
military's political philosophy over Turkish foreign policy after 1980, one must not 
forget that the 1980 intervention differed greatly from previous military incursions into 
the political life in that it had by far the most important revolutionary effects across the 
entire social, economic and political fabric o f Turkish life. There should be no doubt 
that the generals o f  the 1980 intervention set their mark firmly on every aspect o f
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Turkish society, a phenomenon which is sometimes compared with changes the country 
had experienced under the revolutionary governments o f Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.3  ^
M oreover, believing that they were now the sole representatives o f the Kemalist 
tradition, the military leaders o f the 1980 coup d'etat, unlike their predecessors in 1960 
or 1971, gradually chose to govern the country themselves instead o f  allying themselves 
with, or trusting it to, the civilians. Therefore their value system, way o f thinking and 
working style effectively replaced their civilian counterparts more than ever.
Furthermore, apart from laying down ground rules for the state apparatus and 
the government machinery at the most structural level, they, in fact, by appointing 
liaison officers during the initial phases o f the coup to every and each o f the 
bureaucratic units, attempted to scrutinize and openly effect day to day policies. 
Although the bureaucrats at the foreign office had probably more influence upon 
matters than their counterparts in other ministries, this by no means represented an 
immunity from direct interventions of the military leaders. Hence the new regime's 
militarist philosophy o f governing and directing affairs had more effect on Turkish 
foreign policy than otherwise possible. In fact, in many cases, strategic thinking and 
primitive military reasoning replaced political and ideological thinking and the realities 
o f international politics. For example, despite its obvious political and arguable 
weakness and disadvantages for Turkey in the long run, the military leaders actively 
promoted the idea, against its international and domestic critics, which argued that 
Turkey, being economically, socially and politically underdeveloped to implement full 
democracy, should have its own brand o f democracy, in fact one which would suit 
more to Turkish needs.33 They also argued that the West should drop its criticisms and 
condone the shortcomings o f the Turkish style o f democracy on human and political 
rights because o f Turkey's strategic importance to the West. The same idea was also 
picked up by many sympathizers o f the new regime, both internationally and 
domestically. They argued in different ways that a new set o f criteria, different from the 
ones used in judging European democracies, should be used for Turkey, mainly because 
o f her geo-political situation and different historical development.35 O f course, what
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they did not realize was that this line o f reasoning, if accepted by the West Europeans, 
would put Turkey into the second league o f the European democracies and therefore 
would seriously hinder Turkey's bid to become a truly European country and full 
member o f the EC. Without realising its political or long term effects, the military 
leaders with their short-sighted logic, tried to promote Turkey's own brand o f  "geo­
political democracy" with the hope that it would contain international criticism in the 
short term.
The governmental philosophy was also important from the point o f view that 
most o f  the reasons for aggravated relations between Turkey and the West European 
states, after the takeover, would be found in the divergent world views on such matters 
as democracy, the position o f political, social and human rights against concepts o f 
internal security, method o f governing, etc. - which were largely ignored, or the 
importance o f  which could not be appreciated at the early stages o f  the military regime. 
As mentioned above, the Western states, like the broad segments o f Turkish opinion, 
were inclined, at the time, to take the generals at their word that this was a coup to 
restore democracy, not to destroy it. Therefore they thought that they could remain 
content with the military regime for some time, even if it was at cross purposes with the 
W estern democratic ideal. After all, the military rule would be transitional, and once 
civilian rule was restored, they would be able to redress the damages inflicted.
Popular expectation that the military would do all the necessary "dirty business" 
and retire to their barracks was to be proved wrong, however, on this occasion. 
Thoroughly disappointed with the politicians, the military was determined to "finish the 
business" this time. "Never again" was the popular saying among the generals, andrit 
became clear within months o f the intervention that the military intended to stay until 
they saw the results o f the changes they were going to make37; changes which would 
include restructuring whole political and social structures along Kemalist lines. 
Therefore, different understanding on such subjects as democracy, national security, 
state, people, etc., affected Turkey's relations with Western Europe, which in turn had 
implications for the whole o f Turkish foreign policy. It seems now that most o f the
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complications after 1980 between Turkey and Europe originated from this basic matter; 
what is and what should be the position o f the Turkish military vis-a-vis civil society, 
the political structure and democracy in Turkey? The different answers given by the 
W est Europeans and the military leaders in Turkey originated from their different 
political philosophies and were the main causes o f most o f the problems in Turkish 
foreign policy during the period under consideration.
The overall governmental philosophy is also important because it determines 
how the regime sees itself and other countries. The military regime o f 1980 saw itself as 
a reincarnation o f the Kemalist regime, protector o f the state and its people. It gave 
more importance to national integrity over individuality, state security over human 
rights. Its main aim was to re-establish respectability o f the state, by force if necessary. 
Individual and political rights were o f secondary importance. The consequences o f this 
vision are obvious.
2.1.2. The Effects of External Perceptions and Responses
The above-mentioned second level o f analysis, namely the effects o f external
perceptions and responses to the country's political regime, proved quite important in
terms o f  Turkey's relations, particularly with Western Europe.
In principle, similar regimes are assumed to be responsive to each other
although one can cite several important exceptions. The frequency o f abundant military
takeovers in Turkey indicates the important role the army plays in Turkish political life.
For all that, however, Turkey has been considered in the same league with military
dictatorships, at worst, or with guided democracies, at best. In particular during the
period under consideration (1980-83), Turkey was under a full military regime, though
38one can differentiate it from other military regimes in various points. Its officially 
proclaimed aim was to guide the country into full democracy as is understood in the 
West. However, in practice, democratic identity was denied to Turkey, both under the 
military regime and during the period immediately following it (1983-1987), by a
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combination o f factors, ranging from continued restrictions on fundamental rights and 
freedoms to explicit (implicit for the 1983-1987 period) usage o f  military's control and 
authority on various aspects o f daily life.
N ot surprisingly then, being less than a full democracy created tensions for 
Turkey during this period, not only in domestic politics but in foreign policy, as well. 
Since the military regime, or the quasi-democracy for the 1983-87 period, clearly 
contradicted with the fundamental values o f Western Europe, with which Turkey 
endeavours to identify itself, it created tensions for Turkish foreign policy where it 
seemed to matter most. As a result, Turkish foreign policy had to operate under strain 
during this period as the military regime in Turkey attempted to "reconcile the 
divergent objectives o f moving towards integration with Western Europe while 
defending the rationale o f being less than a full democratic regime". ^
France and the Northern Europeans, in particular, while ignoring the dynamics 
o f  social changes the country had experienced during the late 1970s, professed 
themselves unable to understand why the generals had stepped in; they especially 
seemed to view the restrictions on Bulent Ecevit, the leader o f the centre-left 
Republican People's Party then, as an indication o f deep military disdain for democracy, 
and they doubted that General Evren would keep to the timetable he had announced for 
returning to civilian rule. Rejecting the rationale for the military in Turkey, European 
opinion led a number o f Turkey's allies to join in pressures in the Council o f  Europe to 
penalize "the Turks" until they had satisfied the "Europeans" that their regime was truly 
democratic. As a result, the Council o f Europe was so critical o f Turkey's regime that 
the Turkish delegation withdrew in May 1981.40 Economic aid from Europe slowpd 
and the fourth financial protocol o f the 1963 Ankara Association Agreement between 
Turkey and the EEC was suspended for the time being. The Europeans initially seemed 
dissatisfied with the new Turkish constitution, which instituted a form o f state 
corporatism against individual pluralism, and with the start-up o f political party activity 
preceding the 1983 elections, as well. Critical comments in Europe continued to focus 
on the number o f parties prevented from participating in the elections and on the
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number o f candidates vetoed by the generals shortly before election day. Eventually, the 
Council o f Europe refused to seat the members o f the new parliament representing 
Turkey in September 1983.4  ^ Europe's own history o f democratic struggle meant that 
it was unable to accept the representatives o f what it saw as a repressive and 
undemocratic constitution.
In a more general sense, the frequency o f military regimes in recent Turkish 
political history, together with a general tendency toward the suppression o f certain 
ideas and freedoms even under civilian governments, have become impediments for 
Turkish foreign policy in her overall relations with the West. Such practices, especially 
the Turkish human rights record, have been instrumental in creating a general lack o f 
sympathy for Turkey in Western public opinion.4^ Therefore, it was hardly surprising 
to see that most European organizations and public opinions concentrated their 
criticisms towards Turkey and its military leaders when they faced a huge number o f 
allegations about human rights abuses, repression, mass trials and sometimes seemingly 
unlawful detentions o f political prisoners. In this context, there were strong correlations 
between the nature o f the government in Turkey during the period and the 
unprecedented dimension o f torture allegations and their "popularity" in the 
international public opinion after the 1980 intervention.
As General Evren once mentioned, the torture and human rights abuse 
allegations had been continuously raised against Turkey from mid-1970s onwards, but 
the military government was the first one "to take action" against it and actually punish 
persons who were found guilty o f torture.43 Why, then, were these allegations 
increased by number and also reached a stage that some states felt necessary to take her 
to the European Commission o f Human Rights? The answer is threefold, all o f which 
related, directly or indirectly, to the 1980 intervention.
First o f all being under military rule, away from public scrutiny, would have 
encouraged some self-appointed personnel to take responsibility into their own hands. 
The harsh measures prompted by the concern to contain violence in the shortest 
possible time, also would have exaggerated the process.
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Another reason for increased publicity was the self or enforced banishment o f 
some intellectuals and/or some members o f pre-1980 (il)legal organizations to the 
W estern Europe.
When the intervention took place, many former terrorists left the country at 
once. And after the intervention many intellectuals and political activists, who were not 
happy with the regime or whose activities were restricted by the military, continued to 
head to Western Europe. These "political refugees" together with "economic-minded 
refugees" constituted quite a big Turkish (including Turkish Kurds) community in 
Europe which was politically enlightened. In fact, it was these political refugees who 
continued to keep in touch with what was going on in Turkey. By means o f their 
personal relations with people who were detained or arrested by the security forces in 
Turkey, they were able to relate human rights abuses and torture cases, both actual and 
sometimes invented, instantly to the Western media. They also kept pressure going on 
the W estern governments by means o f open letters in the press, publishing books, 
pamphlets and newsletters, demonstrations and hunger strikes, therefore arousing 
interest within public opinion in what was happening in Turkey.
The last, but not the least important, aspect o f the popularity o f these 
allegations was the psychological factor that originated from directly being a military 
regime in Turkey. As mentioned above, there had been torture allegations before the 
intervention, but these had only appeared in the reports o f some human rights 
organizations such as Amnesty International or Helsinki Watch, and had never found a 
way to  generate public reactions, in general, on this scale. Not only the Western 
governments, but even the organizations such as the Council o f Europe had not 
attached too much attention and preferred to ignore them. After the intervention, 
however, these allegations not only appeared in the public but also found sympathetic 
ears, ready to listen and act, even in the government circles. Although the insistence o f 
the socialist members in the European Council and the continual efforts o f Greece in all 
the European forums affected these sympathies, it was the image o f  being a military 
regime that determined the ultimate Western interest on the subject.
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O f course, the nature of the political regime in Turkey and its professed goal o f 
fuller democracy gains meaning as a foreign policy determinant primarily in the context 
Turkey's Western orientation. Since one o f the 12 September regime's expressed 
aims in foreign policy area, apart from driving towards more integration with Europe, 
was to  apply for full membership o f European Community, the importance o f the type 
o f  regime became more apparent. By postponing the application until such a time that 
Turkey returns to democracy, the military regime, in fact, recognized the importance, 
and preconditioned position, o f this factor. On the other hand, however, by expressing 
their intention for closer integration with Europe, the generals, in a sense, invited more 
scrutiny and consequently more criticism from European organizations, the media, and 
public opinion in general. It is quite obvious that the announcement o f Turkish intention 
in Spring 1981 to apply for full membership o f the EC as soon as the civilian regime 
was restored, created a feeling in the European public opinion to look into, and talk 
about, what the Turkish public opinion, in general, considered as internal affairs o f their 
country. It further seems that, after the Turkish intent was publicized, the European 
states, organizations and public, in general, who had come to see themselves more and 
more as a club o f political democracies, saw it as their right to judge the country's 
credentials on such issues as human rights and democracy.4^ O f course, this 
unprecedented international attention in what the generals considered the domestic 
affairs o f the country, annoyed the military regime, who continued to consider these 
interests and criticisms o f the Europeans as direct interference in the internal affairs of 
Turkey.4^ The foreign interference with Turkish affairs had always been a most 
delicate subject in Turkey because o f historical experiences. This was, however, 
particularly important for the military regime who tried to put on a bold face publicly 
and act in defiance o f Western criticisms.
In the mean time, General Evren and other leaders o f the military government 
continued to complain about unwarranted European criticisms. Yet, whatever the 
military tried to do, the interests o f European public opinion in Turkish affairs resulted 
in internationalization o f Turkey's domestic problems. And from then on Turkeys
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internal political developments, as well as measures taken by the military regime to curb 
the anarchy, to reorganize society, to prepare a constitution or even to change a law, 
became matters o f international discussion and were subjected to close scrutiny. This, 
obviously, created tensions for Turkish foreign policy at a time when international 
support was most needed.
The military regime's decision to apply for membership o f the EC had important 
long term affects, as well. They, by taking such a decision which would necessitate the 
long term commitment o f Turkey, actually limited the country's options without 
considering future popular will on the subject. Moreover, even if the prospective 
civilian government wanted to go ahead with the application, it would mean that the 
will o f  the military would still be observed in the country. In other words, this decision 
put the future democratic government in a dilemma either to defy or carry out the 
military regime's "order". The complications o f either option are obvious.
We mentioned above that the nature o f government gained meaning as a foreign 
policy determinant in the context o f Turkey's European connection and also that similar 
types o f regimes are assumed to be responsive to each other. In this context, the 
militarist nature o f its government did not affect Turkey's relations with the East 
European or Middle Eastern countries, which did not raise objections about democracy, 
or indeed about torture allegations or human rights abuses in the country. In fact, Saudi 
Arabia was the first state to congratulate the Turkish military administration, and others 
followed suit. Unlike the Europeans, the Islamic Conference did not send human rights 
delegations to Turkey to tour prisons and talk to dissidents.
For that matter, the change o f the regime did not affect Turkey's relations with 
the US either, whose considerations for human rights and democracy were 
overwhelmed by its global strategic interests in the Middle Eastern region after the
developments o f 1979 and 1980.
Therefore, while Turkey's relations with Western Europe, which felt unable to 
understand the rationale behind the continued level o f military intervention, were 
souring, its relations with the Middle Eastern countries and with the US, who gave a
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supportive shoulder, were improved. Turkey's search for alternative courses o f action 
was also reflected by Presidential visits during 1982 to Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, 
Hungary, and even China, while no invitations were extended by Western governments. 
It was obvious that while the military government needed the West for political, 
military and economic support, it could not bear to be forced into a position o f 
isolation, as had occurred over the Cyprus issue and, as a consequence, was concerned 
to increase Turkey's links with the Islamic World.
During the period, the growing political importance of, and Turkey's increasing 
reliance on, the Middle Eastern states and desire to use them as a balance against West 
European criticisms was increasingly evident in the official speeches. The declaration 
from General Evren in April 1982 foreshadowed a new direction for Turkey. He 
affirmed that Turkey was a European country and, at the same time, a Middle Eastern 
c o u n try .^  The cool relations with Western Europe constituted, together with 
economic necessities, the principal reason for Turkey's new drive toward the Middle 
East. At a political level, Ankara had been striving to break out o f its isolated position 
among the countries o f the Third World by intensifying its relations with the Islamic 
world. At this juncture, the sympathetic attitudes o f the Islamic states towards the 
military regime helped Turkey to turn more eagerly towards the East. Together with 
sharp upsurge in economic relations, Turkey saw the need to assume a more active role 
in the Middle Eastern region. As a result, Kenan Evren became the first Turkish 
President to attend an Islamic Conference in January 1984. Turkey also shared the 
Conference's efforts to mediate in the Iran-Iraq war, and since 1984 has hosted the 
Economic Development and Cooperation Committee o f the Islamic conference.
The result o f the growing political importance o f the Arab world in Turkey's 
foreign policy was to be seen in Turkish-Israeli relations, which were continuously 
downplayed by Turkey during the period. Also "because o f Israel's disagreeable politics 
in the Middle East problem" Turkey reduced its diplomatic relations with Israel to the 
48second-secretary level.
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2.2. C hanges In The In ternational System And T urkey 's Security Perceptions
Another set o f factors that affected Turkey's foreign relations during the 1980s in 
general and 1980-1983 period in particular, originated from the state of East-West 
relations and developments taking place in the chain o f the states along the southern 
border o f the Soviet Union, which enhanced the importance of strategic 
considerations in world politics.
2.2.1. The Effects of the Second Cold War and Tensions in the Middle Eastern 
Sub-system
As political instability in the region heightened into tension and raised the possibility o f 
direct foreign intervention from early 1979 onwards, Turkey's strategic location, 
alongside its domestic crisis, captured new attention in the Western capitals. This was 
particularly true for the US whose President was going to declare the region, in coming 
months, one o f vital importance to American interests. Ramifications o f this were 
expressly evident in the US response to the "12 September Takeover", and continued 
to affect Turkish-American relations during the tricky period o f diplomacy under the 
military reg im e .^
The fall o f the Shah in Iran on 16 January 1979 was the first o f the continuous 
problems in the region from the Western perspective. The closing down o f all US 
military bases and monitoring installations on Iranian soil by the new regime meant the 
end o f  vital electronic surveillance which penetrated into the Soviet heartland and areas 
o f the Soviet Union bordering Afghanistan, thus increased the value o f already 
important intelligence sites in Turkey. ^
Another important factor influencing the American approach to the junta after 
the 1980 intervention was the strength of the Islamic revival in the region, which had 
already thrown aside one o f the most powerful armies in the Middle East. Thus, the 
US's evaluation o f Turkey had to take this Islamic revival into account. The prospect of 
an Islamic revival in Turkey was totally unacceptable to US interests. It would have
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delivered a blow worse than the "loss" of Iran for the West. The Iranian role in 
monitoring the Soviet Union could be replaced somehow by Turkey, but Turkey's vital 
position as the most important buffer zone in the defence of the Middle East was 
irreplaceable. It was as if the collapse o f the Shah's regime not only removed the key 
W estern outpost in the region, but also created a gap through which Turkey suddenly 
became visible as the only barrier in the Middle East which, if stable and powerful, 
could prevent a possible Soviet push into Iran or to the Persian Gulf.5  ^ Moreover, it 
was the only Middle Eastern state which could supply, if necessary, a stepping stone for 
the W estern forces into the region. Therefore, any form o f internal turmoil resulting in a 
weakening and wavering Turkey could have dealt a major blow to the Western, 
especially American strategic, interests in the region.
Against this background, the most single dramatic development before the 
Turkish coup occurred, was when the Soviet Union moved into Afghanistan on 26 
December 1979 - a date which marked the end o f detente and the beginning o f the 
second cold war. The occupation not only showed the Soviet willingness to use its 
military power, and therefore intensified Turkish military's apprehensions about the 
country's security, but also, by leading to speculations that Turkey might be the next 
country to  sink into chaos and instability, transformed, if not revolutionized, Turkey's 
geo-political importance to the Western alliance.52 At the same time, the occupation of 
the US embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979 and the failed rescue operation o f the 
on-going Carter administration, widespread discontent in Pakistan, disturbances in 
Egypt, and the friction between Iran and Iraq only helped to exacerbate the situation in 
the region.
Under these circumstances, and given the fact that in Greece the anti NATO 
pan-Hellenic Party was considered to be the most likely winner in upcoming 
parliamentary elections, the Western governments, especially the US, became 
increasingly concerned at the threatened loss o f Turkey s capability as an effective 
partner with its 500.000 man army and over 16 NATO bases. The so-called Carter 
Doctrine (January 1980), which introduced new dimensions both to Middle Eastern
159
affairs and equally to East-West relations, was formulated at this juncture. Under the 
auspices o f  the doctrine Turkey was expected to host the RDF (Rapid Deployment 
Forces) and allow the full participation o f Greece in NATO.53
Given the above-mentioned circumstances, when Turkish armed forces 
intervened and seized power on 12 September 1980, there was a sense o f relief among 
the American officials.5^ Even President Carter admitted later on in an interview that 
"the situation in Turkey before the '12 September Movement' was posing a threat for 
security reasons, and after the Iranian revolution and the occupation o f Afghanistan, 
this move towards stability relieved" them.55
Although there were strong allegations and circumstantial evidence to the 
contrary, the US government has denied knowing anything about the coup until 
"minutes" before it occurred5^. Nonetheless, the American administration, under 
strategic considerations, welcomed the coup led by the Turkish Chief o f Staff General 
Evren, a veteran o f the Turkish contingent in the Korean war, who was known for his
anti-communist, secularist and pro-Western ideas, and announced that it would
57continue to support Turkey's aid request before the IMF.
M oreover, the ideological inclinations of, and common threat perceived by,
both the conservative military government in Turkey and the Reagan administration in
the US, which took over the presidency in January 1981, led naturally to an expanded
58and more harmonious bilateral relationship between Turkey and the US. As a result, 
while the military coup in September 1980 led several Western European countries to 
make an issue over human rights, the US, under strategic considerations, remained 
unconcerned and gave priority to establishing a stronger and more long-term 
relationship with Turkey. They signed a defence co-operation agreement with Turkey 
covering the future o f more than two dozen military bases and in return provided over 
$2,5 billion for military and economic aid in four years 1980-1983 - a greater rate of 
increase than to any other country in the world.59 Consequently, political and 
diplomatic relations between the two countries were particularly accommodating during 
the military regime and appeared to be better than they had been for a generation.
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It appears that Washington's sympathetic understanding o f the reasons for the 
military takeover paved the way for greater intimacy and the frictions, accumulated 
under the arms embargo, were dispersed during the military regime in Turkey. While 
the signing o f the new Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) in 
1980 put mutual relations back on course, the US was also in the forefront o f the IMF's 
program to provide relief to Turkey's hard-pressed economy. And, perhaps, because the 
Europeans were so unsympathetic to Turkey's plight, Turkey's discussions with the US 
over such sensitive topics as economy and military aid levels were not marked by the 
bitterness these matters had generated only a few years earlier. And the American 
media's interpretation o f circumstances that brought the military to power in Turkey 
also helped erase lingering ill-feeling over the embargo years. Clearly, Turkey's military 
establishment valued the strategic relationship with the US. And the willingness of 
successive American administrations to give priority to aid to Turkey and the relatively 
high level o f this aid provided a solid base for cooperation. Exchanges o f visits by 
senior officials emphasized the relative closeness o f the relationship.
The geographical and strategic position o f Turkey meant that not only the US 
but also the Soviet Union was ever ready to exploit Turkey's foreign relations to its 
own advantage. In this context, although the Soviets saw in the generals regime a 
willing collaborator with Washington and doubted that the generals could, or indeed 
would, resist pressures to cooperate in military preparations for action in the Gulf area, 
they, nevertheless, were very sensitive to the extremely mixed and conflicting relations 
that Turkey was experiencing with the West in particular.
It was obvious that the Soviet Union had its own share o f anxiety about the 
possibility o f  nuclear weapons modernization and the upgrading o f the American 
military capability and influence in Turkey in the 1980s.61 Even though, it was clearly 
the American military presence in Turkey that instilled a sense o f vulnerability in the 
Soviet south facing Turkey, and in this context, the conclusion o f a defence agreement 
with the US in 1980 led to massive attacks on Turkey by Moscow, the Soviets were
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equally careful not to upset Turkey, officially, and they, too, tried to improve their 
relations with Turkey during the military regime.
On the other hand, relations with Moscow cooled considerably at the beginning 
o f the military regime, because not only were the Soviets annoyed with the new regime 
in Turkey, but also the generals were anxious about Soviet intentions. Particularly, the 
invasion o f Afghanistan had reasserted their belief that the old realities o f the Cold War 
were not dead yet. The generals also believed that Turkey's main antagonist was the 
Soviet Union, rather than any other country. Moreover, the NATO estimates which 
showed greater vulnerability o f the southern flank exacerbated the generals' 
apprehensions about the Soviet intentions. However, the disparity in size between 
Turkey and the Soviet Union also meant that responses to the Soviet threat should be 
diplomatic as well as military. Therefore, "good neighbourliness" and the avoidance of
fcf)provocation were constantly emphasized by the Turkish government. Consequently, 
they refused to join the Western allies in introducing sanctions against Aeroflot in 
September 1983 as a retaliation for the shooting down o f a South Korean airliner by a 
Soviet jet.
The official Soviet reaction to the coup, which refrained from criticism, also 
helped to improve relations between two countries. Even though the Soviet media 
made much o f alleged persecution o f "progressive politicians and trade union activities, 
who are being tortured and killed" in Turkey, but who had not committed any crime,63 
and the Soviet sponsored "Bizim Radyo", operated from Berlin by the illegal Turkish 
Communist Party, appealed to the Turkish people during the military regime to 
overthrow the "fascist junta"j6^ the official pronouncements were, on the other hand, 
as pointed out by Foreign Minister Mr. liter Turkmen, "in contrast" with these public 
attacks and even encouraged the resumption o f technical talks on economic 
cooperation between two countries.6  ^ As a result, trade relations with the Soviet 
Union increased and Turkey became the largest recipient o f Soviet economic aid in the 
non-communist Third World. Also, a new trade agreement, despite US efforts to limit
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W estern economic ties with the Soviet Union because o f the Polish question, was 
signed in 1982 and aimed to stipulate a 33 per cent increase in com m erce.^
Thus, despite serious misgivings and suspicions on both sides, reinforced by the 
emergence o f second Cold War, Turkish-Soviet relations continued to be cordial, if not 
friendly. That much tested Turkish practice o f keeping a constant balance between her 
suspicions about her superpower neighbour and need to accommodate it, was again 
being applied. Moreover, fine balance between complying with the requirements o f the 
Western alliance and, at the same time, not antagonising the USSR was observed by the 
military regime even after the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan. In this context, while 
Turkey strongly condemned the Soviet invasion and supported all UN actions, she 
nevertheless refrained from joining in active measures against the USSR as proposed by 
the US. Thus, at the October 1980 military parade in Moscow, Turkish diplomats, 
alongside Norwegians, were the only Western diplomats not to boycott the 
ceremony. ^  Consequently, though the Afghan events did facilitate the conclusion on 
January 10, 1980, o f the DECA agreement between Turkey and the US, Turkey's 
approach towards the USSR was not materially changed.
On the other hand, the tense international environment was Useful to Turkey as 
her declining strategic importance for the Western alliance was re-emphasised once 
again by the reviving Cold War. Hence, while the reinforced suspicions o f Soviet 
intentions kept the military regime on guard and prevented further political 
rapprochement, they did not appear as obstacles to improved trade relations, as well as 
helping to  improve Turkey's standing in the West, especially in the US.
2.2.2. Turkey's Evolving Security Perceptions
A factor related to the renewed importance o f Turkey's strategic situation, or otherwise 
deriving from it, was how the new leaders of Turkey actually interpreted the country's 
national security doctrine in the face o f a revived cold-war and how they responded to
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what they saw as security needs of the country, which they interpreted in its most 
general sense.
In the broader meaning o f the concept, there has always been a dominant 
preoccupation with security matters in Turkey - a continuation o f Ottoman tradition 
and a result o f continuing influence o f the military in Turkish political life 68 Though 
there is not an integrated consensus in Turkey as to the definition o f the threat, the 
location and the type o f threat to Turkish security, the military, by imposing its 
ideology and security concepts as state ideology and security doctrine, have been able 
to  determine, at least, the official definition o f the threat to the Turkish state.
Another continuing pattern in Turkey is its strict definition o f the concept o f 
national sovereignty and preoccupation with its maintenance. Though Turkey is not a 
creation o f  colonial aftermath, her policies indicate a strong nationalistic fervour. 
Special characteristics o f her history and geographical situation, together with her 
traditional confrontation with the Soviet Union and the realization o f the proximity to 
an unstable and violent area, provided Turkey with a unique sense o f national 
sovereignty. This overriding objective o f the Turkish foreign policy as to the 
maintenance o f the state and its independence was very much evident when President 
Evren said on several occasions, while discussing strains with Western Europe, that the 
"Turkish state will continue to exist, no matter w h a t" .^
2.2.2.1. Factors Related To External Security
In an extra-territorial sense, a feeling o f encirclement with unfriendly neighbours had 
always prevailed in Turkey's security thinking. During 1979 and 1980 this sense X)f 
insecurity enriched by the developments taking place in the region where Turkey 
situated. As mentioned above, the invasion o f Afghanistan, by showing the willingness 
o f the Soviet Union to use its army, terrified Turkish military elites who had always 
believed in the indivisibility o f detente. They further shared Demirel's views, rather than 
Ecevit's, on the issue o f East-West relations, who had said a year ago that there could
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be no meaningful detente in one region of the world while aggression was taking place 
in another (an obvious allusion to Afghanistan).70
Similarly, the generals believed that the country's security could only be assured
through NATO and the US, on any permanent basis. It was obvious that, despite
Turkey's complaints about her allies and desires for a more detached relationship from
both, Turkey continued to derive significant military benefits from them.7 ^  Detente and
the Cyprus issue might have made possible and desirable Turkey's more independent
position within the alliance and from the US. But for political, economic and security
reasons, the generals were not going to push too far. Further, despite the
rapprochement o f the mid-1960s, they remained suspicious o f Soviet motivations and
objectives and the Afghan invasion reassured them on the fact that severance o f
W estern security and political ties could only have helped to open the way to new
Soviet pressures. Such a severance would have also eliminated Turkey's influence and
participation in allied and security policy planning and even would tip the regional
balance in favour o f Greece, whose policies in the Aegean were increasingly becoming
nationalistic under the premiership of A. Papandreou. Moreover, Turkey's military
leaders, like its political and bureaucratic elites, were "Western" and "European" in
their values and orientation. They wanted the country to be considered a member o f the
W estern family o f nations. For all these reasons, despite their occasional threats to opt
out from the Council o f Europe or sever relations with Western Europe on the face of
their criticisms and the threatened expulsion o f Turkey from the Council, the military
leaders o f Turkey were fully aware that only through Western association could Turkey
achieve her economic and social objectives and establish herself as a major military and
political force in the region, a goal sought since the end o f the Second World War.
Therefore they were actually determined to hang on to Europe until the last minute, no 
72matter what.
The military leaders further believed that, on the political level, as well as 
military and economic levels, neither Islam nor the non-aligned countries offered 
realistic alternatives to continued close Cooperation with the Western nations. In view
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o f Turkey's proximity and strategic importance to the Soviet Union, they did not trust
that "Finlandization" was a credible option, and further a Finish solution, according to
them, would have meant the end o f the proud record o f Turkish independence.
Therefore, they had regarded Mr. Ecevit's "sedulous cultivation o f the non-aligned
world and the Soviet bloc as either foolish or dangerous".^  They had neither liked nor
officially accepted Mr. Ecevit's "New Defence Concept" Further, they had not
understood what was wrong with the old one, and therefore once in power, they
committed Turkey openly to NATO and the West generally, reversing Ecevit's 
7S"leftward aberrations".
Thus, it was not surprising to see Mr. liter Turkmen, as foreign minister o f the 
new regime, reaffirm the regime's conviction in the Madrid Review Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, that "detente is indivisible" and it could not be
confined to  Europe. The consolidation o f detente would require "mutual restraint and
7 f \maximum degree o f responsibility in other parts o f the world", too.
Another important development for Turkish security, apart from the Soviet 
invasion o f Afghanistan and attempts to influence the new regime in Tehran, was the 
deployment, from early 1980 onwards, o f the new Soviet army divisions into the 
Caucasus. In the face o f the estimations that the Turkish forces defending the Straits 
and the northeastern border were outnumbered by the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, 
and continuing animosities with Greece which frustrated cooperation in order to reduce 
these disparities, Turkey became increasingly worried about its security and had to turn 
to NATO and the US more eagerly
Moreover, the acquisition o f Scud missiles by Syria, which was becoming 
increasingly hostile in the region and which had lodged several complaints about 
Turkey's Ataturk Dam project, from the Soviet Union only helped to add new 
dimensions to Turkey's security concerns.
On the other hand, the Iran-Iraq War, which found the new military regime in 
Turkey barely ten days old, was harbouring more important security apprehensions for 
Turkey. Apart from the dangers o f the deliberate or inadvertent incursions from both
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sides into Turkish territory, the war on its borders offered opportunities to Turkey's 
foreign and internal antagonists, both real and imaginary, to exploit Turkey's 
psychological and real sense o f  vulnerability.
Any rational antagonist could have calculated that at a time when an important 
portion o f Turkey's strategic thinking and energies must be kept on a high state of 
readiness for any contingency emanating from the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey would be in a 
relatively weaker position vis-a-vis himself. Therefore, for example, the task that the 
Greek PM  Papandreou had set for himself from 1981 onwards to pursue a crisis 
diplomacy with Turkey had been made immeasurably easier by the exposure created in 
the East.
Another source o f strain was Turkey's interest in the Iraqi oil pipeline from
Mosul to Iskenderun, which generated revenues for Turkey. She was prepared to
protect this and the corresponding road links by military force if necessary and said so 
78to the Iranian officials. Further, Turkey's interest in containing the Kurdish dimension
o f the ground war was also posing threats o f conflict, particularly with Iran whose aim
to use Iraq's dissident Kurds in its war with Baghdad stirred up Turkey's concerns
79about its own "mountain Turks" (i.e. indigenous Kurds) and security o f its frontier.
Moreover, the threat o f escalation o f war to involve direct military engagement
by third parties, raising the spectre o f a general war just on the borders o f Turkey, was
highly salient and worrying for Turkey. Also the dangers o f superpower involvement,
and the possibility that the US might eventually find it imperative to use the Incirlik Air
Base and other airfield and facilities in Turkey for expanded air operations in the Gulf
80region worried Turkey's leaders.
On the other hand, Turkey's wishes to end the war which was causing security 
threats to  her, were clashing with the economic gains she was deriving from it. 
Moreover, because o f the possible Soviet push through it, Turkey wished to see a 
strong Iran capable o f holding its own. Yet, that wish was at cross purposes with her 
fears o f  a hegemonic Iran in the region, after an unconditional victory over Iraq, which 
would have an important impact on domestic developments in Turkey by enhancing the
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influence and power, on the one hand, o f the pro-Sheria forces, and, on the other, of 
the Kurdish separatists.
Furthermore, the possibility o f a peace settlement based on scenarios entailing 
major changes in the region was injecting new inputs into Turkish assessments o f its 
interests in the region, i.e. adventurist nostalgia for the return o f Kirkuk and Mosul to
O  1
Turkey. Therefore, to forestall such misguided emotions from turning into powerful 
pressures on Turkish foreign policy, the best possible post-war peace settlement from 
the Turkish perspective was seen to be the one that would replicate the pre-war status 
quo as closely as possible. Hence, after taking in view the economic gains and security 
dangers o f the situation, the generals choose to remain neutral towards the war and
on
sought an earlier and just end for it.
As if all these were not enough, the election o f A. Papandreou in Greece on a 
nationalistic platform, as mentioned earlier, aroused suspicions that at some stage he 
would start up a war with Turkey. However, under; the strategic reasons, during the 
military regime , relations with Greece suffered less than those with other European 
states.
The Turkish military had been the element o f Turkish society most interested in
compromise with Greece. The generals were convinced that the outstanding problems
between Turkey and Greece had reached a point which required swift solutions. They
were further agreed that Turkey should engage in confidence building measures
designed to mend fences with the Greeks. Therefore, even before the coup they had
abolished the so called "purple line" in the Aegean on 23 February 1980, without
actually asking the foreign ministry.83 In addition, they were ready to move Turkey's so
called Aegean Army to Konya, in mid-eastern Turkey, if  the Greeks were to respond to
84this with good faith by demilitarising the Aegean islands.
Consequently, after the intervention, civil air traffic between Greece and Turkey 
was allowed to resume with the military leaders taking the initiative to back away from 
the demand that Turkey be notified o f flights in the eastern Aegean. Similarly, late in 
1980, they dropped Turkish objections to returning Greece to the military wing of
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85NATO. Several reasons would help to explain Turkey's change in policy. The new 
military government undoubtedly sought to concentrate on domestic problems, the 
reason for its takeover. Turkey also shared with other NATO states considerable 
concern over above mentioned developments in Iran, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan and the on-going instability in the Middle East. The generals believed that, 
regardless o f  their country's clashes with Greece in the Aegean, Turkey's security 
interests were better served by Greece remaining within NATO than by leaving the 
alliance. Therefore, despite popular opposition to it, the generals allowed Greece to 
return to  the military wing o f NATO, under the so called "Rogers Plan", by not using 
Turkey's veto right. Though many officials, since then, have regretted that Turkey did 
not use its veto power to obtain fairer Aegean command and control arrangements, the 
decision provides an insight into the strategic thinking o f the senior military leaders in 
Turkey.86
In the end, however, the worst happened and the hopes o f further progress were 
cut by the election o f A. Papandreou in Athens on a platform calling for a tougher line 
toward Turkey. He did not comply with the arrangements and refused to talk with the 
Turks. Turkey, in fact, was puzzled by Athens' actions throughout Papandreou's 
premiership. The leaders were actually convinced that Greece under Papandreou was 
seeking to undercut Turkey's position in NATO and to delay the normalization of 
Turkey's relations with the EEC.
2.2.2.2. Factors Related To Internal Security
Turkey's internal security concerns also affected Turkish foreign policy during die 
military regime. The sense of domestic vulnerability or insecurity was high in the 
security thinking o f the Generals, and, in the broader sense, it affected their perceptions 
and therefore actions against certain states.
In addition to the activity o f rightist, leftist and separatist groups, the 
government also considered sympathizers, supporters, overseas activists, and "those
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who have not been identified by the security forces" as posing a threat. ^  The military 
government believed security threats were located in the prison population (which 
protested conditions and undertook hunger strikes), in smuggling activities (especially 
in the arms-drugs trade) with or without terrorist connections, and in "propaganda 
terrorism", which was thought to have destabilizing links to subversion and terrorism. 
These activities, by hampering security operations and impeding efforts to gain foreign 
sympathy and material assistance, were considered anti-state activities. ^
Consequently, the military regime, in addition to the rounding up and trials o f 
members o f armed illegal organizations, also arrested and tried thousands o f persons 
accused o f political offences but affiliated to legal associations in order to suppress 
"potential threats" -meaning opposition to the military reg im e .^  Although General 
Evren justified this repression in terms o f security threat to the state and continued to 
call them "traitors", the explanation did not satisfy the Western Europeans who 
increased their criticisms after every trial.
O f course, the fears o f the regime about its security were not altogether 
groundless. The Turkish government after 1980 seized some 800,000 firearms, 
including 1,371 Soviet made Kalishnikov rifles, plus some 500 anti-tank rockets and 
more than five million rounds o f ammunition. Total value o f this weaponry has been put 
at $250 million which was 50 times the take from all o f the bank robberies and all o f the 
successful extortion attempts in Turkey during the late 1970s. In view o f government 
estimates that, apart from the money spent for arms purchases, financing o f terrorist 
activities in Turkey during the period o f 1977-80 would need another $750 million, the 
suspicions o f foreign involvement in Turkish terrorism became probable, if not 
proved.
These suspicions inevitably led to conflicts with those states which the Turkish 
leaders associated with anti-Turkish activities. In this context, Turkey's relations, at one 
time or another, were strained with Syria and Lebanon over their role in providing 
training centres for Turkish, Kurdish and Armenian terrorist groups; with Bulgaria over 
its involvement in arms shipment to, and drug smuggling from, Turkey; with Iran
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because o f its encouragements to pro-Sheria groups; with Greece because o f its 
sympathetic attitudes towards any opposition to the military regime; with West 
European states because o f their leniency towards the members o f what Turkey 
considered as illegal terrorist groups, for granting them political asylum, and for their 
(particularly France's) failure to protect Turkish diplomats from Armenian terrorists.
Another internal security concern o f the military government which turned out 
to be more important in the longer term than all the others, was the threat posed by 
Kurdish separatist groups. Although main thrust o f Kurdish separatism came after 
1984, the Kurdish question was perceived by the military as a threat for country's 
unitary status long before that.9  ^ Thus after the coup, alongside the members of 
Turkish armed groups hundreds o f members o f Kurdish separatist groups were tried
GO
and sentenced for separatist activities and terrorism. During this period, since even
the existence o f Kurds in Turkey was denied by categorising them as "Mountain
Turks", the term "separatist terrorists" was used as a substitute for Kurdish 
oqorganizations.
As mentioned above, the Iran-Iraq war by weakening authority in the northwest
Iraq, further heightened Turkey's concerns over political fugitives, mainly Kurds, who
took refuge beyond the border and used this area to regroup and sometimes attack
Turkish transit routes. Moreover, the safety o f the Turkish-Iraqi oil pipeline was a
major concern to Turkey, as well as Iraq, since it provided lucrative returns. Thus in
May 1983, with Iraq's consent, the Turkish army carried out a limited military operation
inside the Iraqi border as a warning to such groups.94 After the operation, Kenan
Evren warned during a rally in Hakkari, eastern Turkey, that, "everybody should knQw
that our target is peace at home and abroad, but this does not mean that we will accept
peace in the worst o f all conditions...If terrorists insist on their...attacks, the response
will be much harsher"95 In the same year, Second Army's headquarters moved from
Konya, central Anatolia, to Malatya, eastern Turkey, thus increasing military's
supervision in the area.9^ The fact that two o f Turkey's four armies then were based in
97the eastern Turkey showed the military's uneasiness, in contrast to their denial.
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Although the strong-arm tactics of the military were able to suppress Kurdish 
separatist groups for the time being, it seemed that they failed to eradicate them as from 
1984 onwards the re-grouped PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) started its guerrilla 
warfare against Turkish state. In the mean time, the military regime also introduced 
further political and cultural restrictions on ordinary Kurdish people, including a ban on 
the Kurdish language, which in the long run proved to be counter-productive as the 
repressed Kurdish masses gradually drifted towards PKK as the representative of 
Kurdish rights in T u rk ey .^
2.2.2.3. National Defence Industry
Another subject related to Turkey's geopolitical position, and to security needs 
originating from it, was the generals' desire to build Turkey's own national defence 
industry, including an ambitious war plane production plant. These plans could be seen 
as a natural result o f being under a military regime but, apart from security needs o f 
Turkey which absolutely required some dramatic efforts and long term commitment for 
the foreseeable f u t u r e , t h e y  were also prompted by the belief that these investments 
would eventually bring high technology and industrial base to Turkey, and therefore 
would help Turkey's economic development in the long run even though in the short 
and medium periods it would run the danger o f draining the Turkish economy. 
However, one must not forget that Turkey’s requests for partnership in co-production 
shames o f  NATO and joint ventures with the US, in spite o f their merits, have the 
characteristic o f creating a greater dependence o f  the national economy upon size o f 
military forces and security oriented policies.
2.3. Economic Policy
A third set o f factors that affected Turkey's relations with foreign countries during the 
period was the results of Turkey's chosen economic policy. It was essentially
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important for Turkey's new drives towards the Middle East and Soviet block as well as 
for its renewed commitment to the West.
In the most general sense, the economic needs and priorities o f a country are 
known for their role in determining a government's stay in power. Though the military 
regime in Turkey had no such direct fears, nevertheless, it was responsive to the 
masses' economic needs in general.
Similarly, they enjoy a very great influence on foreign policy. Any given 
country's foreign policy is responsive to the interests and needs o f economic 
development strategies pursued by the governments, economic priorities and targets 
defined by them, and economic issues and pressures that emerged with respect to 
and/or independently o f the basic strategies and priorities. O f course, the other side of 
the coin is also true. In other words, any chosen economic policy is part of, and also 
reflects, the more general world outlook, including domestic political arrangements and 
foreign policy attitudes.
Broadly speaking, the structural changes introduced into the Turkish economy 
in the 1980s reflected a basic political-ideological choice anyway. A full-fledged 
commitment to a liberal economic system had been undertaken not only with economic 
imperatives and priorities in mind but also as a clear political signal, particularly to the 
US and Western Europe, o f the government's resolve to turn Turkey into a free market 
society integrated with world economy. A subtle political bond was hoped to be created 
with the free market economies o f the West even if the political dimension o f liberalism 
was yet to be expanded. The free market economy was thus counted upon to bind 
Turkey more intimately to the world economic system while hopefully creating 
opportunities for extensive economic and business relations with the West in general 
and with Western Europe in particular. Since the ultimate goal was to pave the way for 
integration with Western Europe, it was thought that the initial attempts to restructure 
the economy could lend credibility to Turkey's professed resolve to seriously tackle the 
inherent contradictions and wide disparities between the Turkish and the EEC 
economic systems.
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The military leaders' decision to continue with the economic liberalization 
programme, which was initiated by the Demirel government, showed that a profound 
change in the mind o f Kemalist-military elites had taken place since the last military 
coup. Unlike their predecessors, the post-1980 military elites did not consider 
Kemalism - and etatism as far as economic policy was concerned - as a political 
manifesto. Realizing the changes that the country had experienced, they adopted the 
monetarist economic policy, and let the economy be run by those whose economic 
knowledge was much wider than that o f the military men, but also "whose philosophy 
they did not necessarily e n d o rs e " .^  Their surprising action in the early days o f the 
military regime to let Turgut Ozal remain in charge o f the economy should be seen in 
this context.
Keeping Ozal in charge o f the economy was, then, partly designed to reassure 
Turkey's financiers that the new regime would continue implementing the IMF 
agreements, which had been negotiated by Turgut Ozal few months earlier. The 
decision showed quite clearly that the generals were no longer insistent on long-gone 
etatist developmentalism. His removal might have sent the wrong signals to the IMF,
1 A T
which in turn might have resulted in cutting Turkey's most needed economic aid. J
The economic strategy o f the so called "January 24l Decisions" (austerity 
measures introduced by the Demirel government with Turgut Ozal as economic 
supremo behind them) had called for, in addition to domestic measures, greater reliance 
on foreign trade, international borrowing and direct foreign investment in order to 
achieve its domestic targets. The implications o f this strategy, in turn, affected Turkish 
foreign policy in general, and reflected heavily in Turkey's relations with the EC and the 
Middle Eastern states.
During the process, Turkey's domestic economic targets became heavily 
connected with international economic developments and with other states' willingness 
to buy Turkish products, to lend money to Turkey or to invest in Turkey. In other 
words, Turkey's economic policies after, or concurrent with, its domestic policies 
became internationalized and international public opinion and foreign governments'
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actions became an important determinant for Turkey's political and economic policies, 
thus also for its foreign policy.
M oreover, these economic policies, recommended by the IMF and the World 
Bank, were undertaken under the supervision o f these organizations. Since international 
borrowings were usually connected with the IMF's positive signal which in term 
depended on Turkey's compliance with their advice or requirements, Turkey and its 
foreign policy had to take into account opinions and requests o f  these organizations, as 
well.
One o f the tools o f the new economic strategy was to depend on more 
international borrowing. A need to borrow large sums, however, is more often than not 
a potential source o f constraint on any country's foreign policy. There were precedents 
in the use o f economic pressures as instruments o f policy against Turkey in the 
aftermath o f the Cyprus crisis in the 1970s. Indebtedness o f this size also has the 
potential to put in jeopardy the autonomy and the negotiating power o f the 
governments with the creditor countries.
Complications arising from this factor were seen in the period o f 1980-83, 
during which the EC and West European states, despite strong responses from Turkey, 
attempted to use economic pressures (i.e. holding o f the fourth protocol o f the 1963 
Association Agreement) on her as a political leverage to get a speedy return to 
democracy. ^
On the other hand, the US readiness to support Turkey's borrowing needs when 
the European organizations and states were refusing to lend money on political grounds 
gave more credibility to the US as a reliable ally and significantly helped Turkish-US 
relations to  move away from the strains o f the 1970s.
Another external pillar o f this economic strategy was to expand exports which, 
because o f international economic conditions, was not at all easy. One must also 
consider the need for export markets as a new source o f political tension. The shift to 
an outward-oriented economic development strategy, with its emphasis on expanded 
exports, was imbued with potential tensions particularly because the Turkish drive had
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to transpire against the backdrop o f rising protectionism in world trade and intimations 
o f  international trade wars in the horizon. For example, during the period, the row 
between Turkey and the EC over Turkey's textile quotas had its part in worsening o f 
Turkey's relations with Western Europe. In both 1982 and 1983, with the European 
textile industry in a very depressed state, the Community took the unusual decision to 
restrict imports o f Turkish cotton goods which led Turkey to retaliate and impose an 
import duty on community steel in April 1 9 8 2 .^^  They also criticized the Community, 
in vain, because o f  the fact that Europe, whenever it suited it, did not want to practise 
the free-trade policies it preached.
Turkey's relations with individual Western European states also deteriorated
over trade rights during the military regime. French exporters, for example, claimed
that during 1983, when relations between France and Turkey were at an all time low
because o f human rights and Armenian terrorist issues, the Turkish authorities were
107discriminating against their products. There was also an "unofficial" trade boycott 
on French products by the Turkish people because o f what was conceived as France's 
supportive attitude towards Armenian terrorists.
Moreover, the world recession had also affected relations between West 
Germany and Turkey. The 1,6 million Turks living in W. Germany, at a time when 
unemployment was extremely high, had led to the growth o f resentment and outbreaks 
o f violence against this very visible ethnic minority, which in turn prompted strong 
Turkish condemnation and strained the relationship.
Against this background, the ready and vast market o f the Middle East was a 
welcoming option for Turkey's new export drive. Apart from the economic factors, that 
is opening up markets for Turkish exports; getting hold o f oil at as favourable a price as 
possible; and obtaining loans from the oil rich Middle Eastern states, the cool relations 
which Turkey was experiencing with Western Europe also had their share behind this 
new drive. In particular, opening up new markets for Turkish exports, was o f vital 
importance in the long term. In view o f the slow growth o f Turkey's industrial 
production, the difficulties encountered in selling agricultural and industrial products to
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the W estern industrial nations and the growing rate o f unemployment, the Middle East 
as a region was likely to become increasingly important as a market for Turkish goods.
As a result, from 1980 to 1982, while Turkey's exports to the EC dropped from 
%42.7 to %30.5 o f total exports, the percentage that went to the Middle East and 
N orth Africa doubled - %22.3 to % 45.10^ Turkish construction firms found support 
from government in their efforts to get contracts from Middle Eastern countries. By the 
end o f 1982, there were also approximately 250,000 Turkish workers in the region100 
- one should bear in mind that this time coincided with the return o f large number o f 
Turkish workers from Western Europe.
The outbreak o f the war between Iran and Iraq, and Turkey's neutrality, also 
helped greatly to increase her commercial links with the both countries. Bilateral trade 
with Iran, for example, rose to the level o f $2,3 billion in 1983-84 and continued to 
increase, reflecting an interdependence which was not easily reversed and which caused 
occasional strains for the Turkish foreign ministry's attempts to balance country's 
security concerns with its economic gains. As a result, Turkey had to tolerate the 
growth o f a large Iranian exile community, numbering upwards o f half-a-million. 
Turkey was similarly tolerant o f occasional lapses in good neighbourliness, showing 
restraint when Iranian officials sought to promote Islamic fundamentalism in its secular 
system.110 Meanwhile, the volume o f Turkey's trade with Iraq in 1983 was second 
only to that with West Germany.111
2.4. Domestic Political Stability
Another factor that helped Turkey during the 1980s to expand and diversify its foreign 
relations and stabilize its foreign policy, was the new stability achieved in domestic 
politics under the military regime. The instabilities noted earlier (section 2.2.2.2) 
regarding domestic security, were largely resolved, or, at least, subdued for the time 
being, by the military government towards the end o f its first full year in the power. 
M oreover, the lack o f political opposition, and thus squabbling between political
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parties, enabled the government to take and apply decisions pretty quickly while the 
concentration o f powers in the hands o f the NSC meant the end o f political strife in the 
country which prevented pre-1980 governments from being effective. Consequently, 
especially in the Middle Eastern context, aided by the new dialogue with the 
conservative Arab states and with the opportunities created by the Iran-Iraq War, the 
new stability provided Turkey with a sense o f confidence in itself as a credible regional 
power.
During the second half o f the 1970s, the perceived serious internal threat to the 
territorial integrity o f Turkey had forced an important portion o f Turkey's internal 
energy and resources to be diverted to the management and the resolution o f the issue. 
Such diversion automatically undermined and restricted the ability o f  Turkey to 
confront important foreign policy issues and choose alternative policies. In other words, 
as long as Turkey was not in full control o f the domestic situation, her freedom of 
movement in foreign and defence policies was necessarily subjected to and limited by 
the requirements o f  her struggle with domestic violence. Hence, the success Turkey 
achieved under the military regime in containing political violence and terrorism helped 
Turkey in the middle-to-long term to diversify its energies other than internal security 
problems and enabled Turkey to look for alternatives in foreign policy.
On the other hand, in the short term, however, the military dimension o f the 
official approach to the problem o f containing terrorism confounded the military 
regime's willingness and movements towards greater democratic freedoms, which in 
turn threatened to jeopardize relations with Western Europe.
From the Turkish perspective, the frustration worked both ways, for the 
generals knew that as long as restrictions on democratic freedoms and human rights 
continued to exist, their relations with Western Europe could not be normalized. On the 
other hand, they were determined to see the end o f their struggle with terrorism before 
finally retiring to their barracks. The process, however, they believed, was hampered 
and prolonged by the Western states which allowed "suspected terrorists" to go freely 
under the false pretensions o f "political refugee" status.112 Further, they believed that
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the terrorists derived a considerable amount o f support for their actions in Turkey from 
their activities in the West and from the sanctuary they found in those states.
Hence, Kenan Evren complained several times bitterly about European public 
opinion which protected and nurtured terrorists and criticized Turkey for punishing 
them. He was particularly forthright in his criticism when, after a Turkish terrorist, 
Mehmet Ali Agca, shot the Pope, he said that he hoped the attempted assassination 
would encourage foreign critics o f his regime to "come to their senses".1 ^
In the pre-1980 period, not only acute internal security problems, but also 
instability o f the political system had caused problems for Turkish foreign policy. 
Against the backdrop o f fiercely competitive party politics, the major parties, before 
1980, had tended to refrain from taking any politically risky, though innovative, foreign 
policy initiatives. Also, to all intents and purposes, the pattern o f coalition, or weak 
minority, governments as functioned in Turkey had seriously limited Turkey's flexibility 
in the foreign policy arena, as seen on the case o f Mr. Hayrettin Erkmen's forced 
resignation on the ground that the government had neglected the Arab world in favour 
o f the W est and Israel. In the same pattern, Demirel government in 1980 was unable to 
push Turkey's application for full membership to the EEC because o f well-known 
opposition o f NSP to it and the JP minority government's need o f its support in the 
parliament. Likewise, the DECA agreement, negotiated between Turkey and the US 
during the 1979 and 1980, could not been brought before the TGNA for ratification 
due to possibility o f defeat. Hence, the instability o f domestic political situation had 
limited and dictated Turkey's foreign policy choices, particularly during the months 
immediately prior to the coup.
In this respect, the military government, and to some extent the following Ozal 
governments, had little restraint on themselves. The military government, in particular, 
because o f its peculiarity as being not answerable to anybody, including the judiciary, 
and to  the public in general, was at ease in foreign policy and able to take initiatives 
which civilian governments would not dare. As a result, after the military regime, 
Turkish foreign policy became increasingly more assertive as evidenced by frequent
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official emphasis on the need for a Turkey-centred approach, which can be seen in the 
continuing efforts to broaden external contacts, notably with the Soviet Union and the 
Arab World.
2.5. Military Attitudes
A last, but not least important, factor that had influence over Turkish foreign policy 
during the 1980-83 period was the military leader's understanding of, and attitudes 
against, the foreign perceptions of their regimes. In other words, how the military 
regime responded to its critics from abroad.
First o f all, the long term linkage with Western Europe and the US had affected 
closely the vision o f both the Turkish people and their governments have about what 
type o f  society and what type o f a future they would like to have. This vision includes a 
modem political democracy characterized by high levels o f economic prosperity. 
Therefore, the difference between the NSC and its Western European critics was not 
actually on the principle but in the substance. In other words, the friction was not over 
the question o f whether Turkey would return to democracy again, because the military 
leaders, as a result o f their Kemalist training, were sincere in their conviction that 
democracy is the best form o f government for the country. ^  Therefore, General 
Evren for example was sincere in his claim that they "have not eliminated democracy" 
but they "were forced to launch this operation in order to restore democracy with all its 
principles, to replace a malfunctioning democracy".116
From the moment it took over the government on September 12, 1980, the 
NSC regime made it clear that it intended to eventually return power to democratically 
elected civilian authorities.117 It made equally clear, however, that it did not intend a 
return to the pre-1980 situation.118 Rather, the Council aimed at a major restructuring 
o f Turkish democracy to prevent a recurrence o f political polarization, violence and 
crisis that had afflicted the country in the late 1970s.119 Hence, the conflict was rather 
over the question o f when and what kind o f democracy it would return the country to.
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Obviously the generals' conception o f democracy did not correspond to that 
prevailing in W estern Europe. N or was it at peace with the democratic ideal o f Turkish 
intelligentsia. The democracy, so often talked about by the generals, was the kind o f 
democracy valued in their own world, which is, as Birand rightly notes, totally different 
from that o f  the civilians, and deeply rooted in their training and education, their 
martial lifestyle, and their way o f thinking.120 In this model, the ideal democratic order 
was one where "national unity" is not affected by any disharmony, and where everyone 
shares a common opinion about the common good, which so convincingly corresponds 
with the ideas o f the man at the top. Indeed, General Evren considered European 
democracies weak from this point o f view, and did not hesitate to criticize them. ^2 ^
The military wished to see a political regime in Turkey that was a pluralist 
system o f government but, at the same time, one in which such Republican norms as 
secularism, territorial-integrative nationalism, and populism would not be overlooked 
and the necessary measures for further modernizing Turkey would be taken.
Their democratic model combined discipline, proper organization, disregard for 
self-interest in favour o f the nation and the homeland, cooperation, unity and 
constructiveness. In this model, a powerful state, not the individual freedoms, was 
respected as the most effective means o f achieving democracy, that is Kemalist 
democracy. *22 The contradictions o f this model with European style democracy are so 
obvious that no further discussion is needed here, but the results o f  European 
criticisms o f  it and the military regime's responses to them are both worth looking at.
Much o f  the governmental sensitivity towards Western Europe tended to  be 
along the lines that Europe should "drop its criticisms" on such matters as human 
rights, because they believed that the harsh measures the military exercised in 
combating problems that led Turkey to brink o f civil war, were justified by 
circumstances and supported by a national referendum in 1982. They frequently 
argued that there was no democracy before the coup, only governmental paralysis, 
economic chaos and political terrorism. Hence, the 12 September operation had to 
be initiated "in conformity with the wishes o f the Turkish nation", and therefore, as
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our friends no doubt will understand", the final word on the process o f 
democratization "rests with the Turkish nation".124 They further argued that every 
country must find its very own democratic system, suitable to its needs and conditions 
rather than some pre-set principles; and that Turkey, as I already mentioned (pp. 149- 
150), should be treated differently from the rest o f the Europe on the ground that her 
conditions, both socio-economic and strategic, were different.
The generals were also sensitive about comparisons between their regime and 
that o f the Communists in Poland. They asserted several times that they had saved 
democracy in Turkey, while Polish generals aimed to destroy any move towards 
establishing democracy in their country.12^
Beside, they believed that the European criticisms o f their regime were unjust 
and originated from the leftist propaganda o f the terrorists, who had escaped from 
Turkey, and supported by the Communists, Socialists, and Greeks in the European 
forums. They were also very sensitive about the poor information the European 
governments seemed to be getting from the "unreliable sources", meaning any 
opposition o f  the military regime. As a result, General Evren was very critical about 
what he termed "Byzantine intrigues" to expel Turkey from the Council o f  Europe, to 
restrict Turkish exports, and to criticize its human rights records. Turkey could do 
without the West, he said, if the West continued to make things difficult.126
O f course, European criticisms o f the military regime in Turkey gained meaning 
in terms o f  the NSC's Western orientation in its outlook. Like other parts o f  the 
Turkish governing elite, the military leadership, as a result o f historical experiences^ 
economic relationships, defence needs and the vision o f the future, has looked to the 
W est as being the most advanced representative o f contemporary civilization, and in 
time has come to view itself as a part o f Europe. Since then it has persistently followed 
policies to  achieve higher levels o f integration with Western European countries and 
organizations. Therefore any kind o f criticism which would result in a severance o f 
Turkey's relations with Europe, was unwelcome for the military regime. In this sense, 
they regarded being a member of the otherwise politically unimportant Council o f
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Europe as a symbol o f Europeanness. Thus, the question of acceptability in the Council
became a matter o f domestic as well as international prestige for them .122
While discussing European criticism, one also has to keep psychological factors
in mind. As a result o f Turkish pride and sensitivity towards criticism, for example, the
generals, when they faced unfavourable judgements from Europe, usually felt that their
pride and face had been wounded and complained about being rejected by the W est.-2 ^
M oreover, because o f the above-mentioned peculiar Turkish sense o f "complete
sovereignty", the government regarded any criticism o f its internal affairs as 
19Qinterference. In this context, raising Turkey's human rights record in the European 
Commission o f  Human Rights in July 1982 by the five states was regarded by the 
military government as an intolerable infringement o f Turkey's internal affairs. The 
criticisms became more unacceptable to Turkey, when particularly they were 
accompanied by pressures from European states that were regarded as hostile to 
Turkey.130
In turn, General Evren likened European allegations o f human and political
rights violations in Turkey to a European intervention into internal affairs o f  the
Ottoman Empire during the period of its decline, which aimed mainly to disintegrate it.
M oreover in 1982 he attacked Council o f Europe critics from countries which
condoned often brutal racism against Turkish workers and which harboured the
131Armenian terrorists who were murdering Turkish diplomats.
The Turkish reaction to European criticism was also, undoubtedly, related to a 
sense that the international community was neither fully aware o f Turkey's recent 
difficulties nor appreciated the constructive role the military traditionally played in
Turkish politics.1^2
The disturbance from the Western criticism was, however, so intense at one 
time or another that some people even started to argue about political will o f self- 
isolation from Europe in order to create a critic-free environment. Indeed, the idea 
was sometimes advanced that defiant attitudes and actions o f the military regime - such 
as the imprisonment o f Mr. Ecevit two days before a visit by the West German foreign
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minister Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who was coming to convey European displeasure 
at the military regime, and who had asked in advance to meet Mr. Ecevit; the closure of 
some newspapers on the eve o f a meeting o f the Council o f Europe where the issue o f 
Turkish expulsion was on agenda; or the trials o f the members o f  the Turkish Peace 
Association, Jehovah's Witness, and Writers Union - may even be intended to be 
deliberate gestures o f self-isolation.13^ Although, in view o f the military regime's 
W estern orientation, one can argue that the weight o f this kind o f considerations could 
not be so high in the NSC, it should also be borne in mind that these events all 
undoubtedly followed high-level political choices in Turkey.
One last matter we should discuss in the context o f international criticism o f the 
military regime in Turkey is whether the critics o f the regime were successful in their 
attempts and whether, and how, they affected the regimes' attitude towards its internal 
commitments, i.e. early return to democracy and full human rights.
O f course, to assess the degree o f influence these criticisms had on the military 
regime is a very difficult matter but one can, at least argue that, by keeping alive 
international attention on Turkey, these critics continuously pressurized and reminded 
the generals o f the existence o f international public opinion. Also, it is fairly clear that 
the military regime, despite the contrary official rhetoric, was sensitive to European 
criticisms, and cared about the perceptions o f the international opinion, both before and 
after the intervention.135 And, keeping in mind the importance the military leaders 
attached to Turkey's relations with the West, we can argue that the European factor 
certainly counted, though its effect as to speed up the democratic process was not so 
clear. In other words, although the military leaders had to take European opinion into 
account, and therefore, probably, were not comfortable with what they were doing, 
they, nevertheless continued to do what they set out to do. Beside, even if they could 
not do everything they would have done otherwise, they stayed long enough to see the 
end o f political terrorism, economic chaos and political instability, reasons for their 
intervention in the first place.
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2.6. The Ozal Factor
To all these factors which had affected the conduct o f Turkish foreign policy under the 
military regime, or originated from it and affected Turkish foreign policy afterwards, we 
can also add another indirect result o f the military regime, that proved to have 
important imprints on Turkish foreign policy during the second half o f the 1980s and 
early 1990s; that is, creating a peculiar political environm ent from  w hich M r. 
T u rg u t Ozal em erged as prim e m inister of the country.
W ithout denying the existence, or underestimating the importance, o f other 
factors in his success, it is certainly arguable that the newly restructured political 
system, which did not allow former politicians to participate, provided Mr. Turgut 
Ozal, whose influence on Turkish foreign policy will be discussed in next chapter, with 
an opportunity to run for the office and to emerge in 1983, among restricted 
candidates, as prime minister.
3. C oncluding Rem arks
As has been shown here, after the September 12, 1980 intervention, a high level o f 
continuity in Turkish foreign policy followed both from the basic features o f the 
country's situation, and from the attitudes entrenched in the policy-making elite which 
were particularly marked in the officer corps.
Within this pattern o f continuity, however, shifts o f emphasis could be expected 
as a result of:
- the nature o f the regime and the attitudes o f its leaders towards both external 
developments and foreign, especially Western European, perceptions o f their reg im e;'
- changes in the external environment, taking into consideration Turkey's 
revived strategic importance together with her enhanced security concerns, both 
external and internal;
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- domestic political and economic developments, which aspired the ruling elite 
to look to Europe but, at the same time, forced them to turn to other parts o f the World 
for greater economic and political cooperation.
The cumulative effect o f these shifts on Turkish foreign policy was to  place 
increased emphasis on Turkey's relations with the USA and with neighbouring Islamic 
states, while leading to a cooling o f relations with Western Europe.
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CHAPTER FIVE
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE REVIVAL OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY
1983-1991 
Political Aspects of Change
1. Introduction
The previous chapter examined how the nature o f the political regime in Turkey after 
the 1980 intervention affected its image and identity vis-a-vis the outside world and 
how, in turn, this had impacts on Turkey's foreign relations. The conclusion was drawn 
that being less than a full democracy, as understood in the West, created constraints on 
Turkey's foreign relations and limited its courses o f action.
Broadly speaking, the military leaders o f Turkey, being true to  their promises 
and the military's long-lasting tradition, pulled the army out o f politics and gradually 
allowed democracy to take its path. On November 6, 1983, the Turkish people went to 
the polls to replace Turkey's military government with a civilian one. On November 14, 
the Higher Election Council announced official results which were hailed in and outside 
Turkey as a victory for democracy.1 The Motherland Party o f Turgut Ozal won the 
elections by obtaining 45.1% of the votes cast and nearly 53% of the seats in the 
assembly.2 On December 7, one day after the official dissolution o f the National 
Security Council, President Kenan Evren asked him to form the new government, 
which he duly did on December 14,4 thus becoming the 45th prime minister o f the 
country. When the government programme was approved in the parliament on 
December 25, the transfer o f power to the civilian government was completed.5 This, 
however, did not mean that Turkey reached, once again, a stage o f full democracy 
overnight. What followed was described variously as a "transitional period",6 "guided 
democracy",7 "democracy under military tutelage",8 "halfway-house democracy",9 or a
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two tiered regime . Whatever name was chosen to describe the state o f the political 
regime existing in Turkey after 1983, it was quite certain that the type o f regime, with 
its peculiar characteristics from both democratic and authoritarian regimes, was bound 
to affect the country's international standing. Turkey's relations with the Western 
Europe were likely to be especially vulnerable for some time to changes in the domestic 
political situation, since under the military regime these relations had been strongly 
influenced by European perceptions of Turkey's domestic politics. In this respect, it 
should be recalled that critics o f Turkey had been casting doubt on the democratic 
credentials o f the forthcoming Parliament even long before the elections.  ^  ^ Therefore it 
was obvious that the transitional period would not be smooth in respect to Turkish- 
European relations because o f its connections with the existence o f a democratic 
regime in Turkey.
Hence, a broad survey of the nature and the participants o f  the regime that 
followed military government after 1983 is justified here. Moreover, the political 
system that was created by the military regime, which involved preventing Turkey's top 
political echelons from participating in politics for five to ten years and establishing a 
system o f elimination for new political aspirants, was, in a sense, primarily responsible 
for the composition o f the country's political decision-makers for at least next few 
years. It is only a natural consequence that Turkish foreign policy was to be determined 
by those who were raised to power by circumstances beyond their control, namely the 
military regime's designs to re-shape Turkey's future and political system. One should 
keep in mind that without the political vacuum caused by the military junta, Mr. Turgut 
Ozal would not have been able to emerge in the 1980s as a strong political figure and 
certainly could never have come to power through the general elections o f 1983.
Therefore in this chapter, a sketch o f Turkey's democratic experience after 1983 
will be given, together with the consequences o f military intervention in Turkey's 
subsequent political structure, as a part o f the domestic inputs o f Turkeys foreign 
policy configuration during the second part o f the 1980s.
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2. T he Legacy of The M ilitary Regime: Political R econstruction and  Social 
Depoliticization
I f  the first and most immediate task o f the military regime o f September 12 1980 was 
the restoration o f order, it soon became clear that the long term aims were the re­
construction o f the political system and depoliticization o f social strata. However, the 
extent to which the Evren regime would exclude the old parties and politicians from 
Turkish politics only gradually became clear.
Upon the announcement o f the NSC on September 12, 1980, all political party 
activity throughout the country was banned and the leading political figures were taken 
into "protective custody". ^  Although the leaders o f the Nationalist Action Party 
(ultra-nationalist right), Nationalist Salvation Party (religious right) and Turkish Labour 
Party (Marxist left) were arrested and tried later on for their activities before the 
takeover, Demirel and Ecevit, the leaders of two major of-centre parties - JP and RPP 
respectively - were both released from custody on October 11, 1983, upon signing an 
undertaking that they would "refrain from making political statements or engaging in 
any kind o f political activity until such time as the military regime permitted the 
resumption o f party politics".13 Although they were allowed to return to their homes 
and no restrictions were put on their correspondence, their political rights were further 
restricted during the summer 1981 by the NSC decree, No. 52, which forbade them to 
make political comments and statements.1/1
It soon became clear that the military was actually trying to eliminate minor 
parties o f  the Second Republic by way of judicial process, and was not so keen either 
on seeing the leaders o f the two main parties take leadership o f their respective parties 
again, though they certainly did not intend to close political parties at this stage. 
Despite the contrary statements from General Evren during the first year o f the coup, 
however, the NSC decree o f October 16, 1981 ordered all political parties then in 




A third blow ^  for the political cadres o f the pre-1980 period came with the 
1982 Constitution, which, with a provisional article, banned all members o f the last 
parliament from politics for five years and all major political leaders for ten years. ^  
The ban was seen by many as one o f the last attempts by the military to eliminate old 
cadres and to build a "new democratic order" in which new leaders with new discourses 
would dominate the political scene and preserve the "12 September o rd e r" .^
The major cornerstones o f the restructured Turkish political system were laid, in 
addition to the new Constitution, by the /iew political Parties and Election laws, all o f 
which prepared by the Consultative Assembly and approved by the NSC. The former 
was also put to referendum on November 7, 1982 and received an overwhelming 
acceptance by more than 92% of the electorate who v o te d .^  Despite misgivings about
99the fairness o f the referendum, the size of the positive vote was interpreted by many,
among them General Evren, as popular respect for General Evren who became
automatically president with the endorsement of the referendum. The generals also
concluded that the result o f the referendum showed popular dislike and dismay o f pre-
1980 period and people's tacit approval o f and support for the military's policies o f past 
21two years.
The Presidential powers were the key for the new Constitution and it seems that 
they were prepared with General Evren in mind. Apart from the powers to dissolve 
parliament, to choose the prime minister, to appoint and dismiss cabinet members, and 
to declare emergency and rule by decree, the president could now lead the Council of 
Ministers whenever he wished and have rights to appoint the leading members o f the
high courts, the Chief o f General Staff, and the Council o f Higher Education together
24with all University Rectors (Article 104).
One o f the most effective but not openly declared aims o f the military regime,
25along with the restructuring o f political life, was the depoliticization o f society. To 
this end strict limits were put on the activities o f associations, the press, the universities, 
and on the rights and freedoms o f individuals. Article 14 o f the Constitution defines the 
limits o f permissible political ideologies and objectives, excluding ideas based on
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hegemony o f one social class over others" (Marxism) or on discrimination "of 
language, race, religion, or sect" (Kurdish separatism, religious fundamentalism and 
sectarianism respectively).
M oreover, the Constitution restricted politics to political parties. It prohibited 
political parties from establishing auxiliary branches for the youth and women (Article 
68). Similarly, cooperative political action among different associations and between 
political parties and associations were forbidden. Accordingly, the 1983 Law o f 
Associations further specified that teachers, high school students, civil servants, and 
soldiers were prohibited from forming or joining associations, including political
9 f \parties.
Further, the Constitution determined the limits o f the political activity in which 
political parties could engage themselves. Article 68 stated that no political party "shall 
be in conflict with the indivisible integrity o f the state with its territory and nation, 
human rights, national sovereignty, and the principles o f the democratic and secular 
Republic".
With the Electoral Law, the generals also attempted to increase political 
stability by preventing small parties from entering parliament. Article 33 stipulated that 
only those parties which had received 10% of the national vote would have
representation in the parliament. Article 34 of the same law introduced further cut-offs
27in the district level.
In order to  prevent the frequent party changing o f deputies, another source o f 
instability in the pre-1980 parliaments, Article 84 of the Constitution made it possible to 
terminate membership o f a deputy who did so. The Political Parties Law also regulated 
intra-party politics under judicial control.
Furthermore, the formation of new political parties was indeed complicated by 
bureaucratic red-tape28 and more importantly an elimination system introduced by the 
NSC. First o f all, the NSC prohibited the new parties and their founders from having 
ties to the pre-1980 political parties. To foresee this the NSC empowered itself with the 
veto power to prevent unfit individuals from forming a party. Moreover to qualify for
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the November elections, the parties had to have approved party list o f at least 30 
founding members by August 25, 1 9 8 3 .^  Further restraint was put on the prospective 
parties by insisting that they had established organizations in at least 34 provinces and 
at least half o f the towns connected with those provinces, and completed their general 
congresses by the above deadline.
In addition, the NSC had rights to veto any founding members and/or 
prospective deputies o f the parties even after the elections until the Higher Election 
Council officially announced the results (provincial Article 4 o f Political Parties Law).
With all the restrictions on individual and associational rights and limits over the 
role o f political parties, the 1982 Constitution, together with supplementary laws, was 
intended to create a strong state which could prevent challenges to national unity and 
security. Further, it demonstrated the military leaders' preference for unity over 
freedom.
3. Emergence of New Political Parties
Under the above mentioned environment, it goes without saying that to establish and 
maintain a political party which would represent and articulate interest groups in the 
country would require a high level of organizational capability. Nevertheless there was 
enthusiasm among prospective politicians to form political parties when the ban 
concerning political activities was lifted on April 24, 1983, and immediately after the 
NSC allowed political parties to be formed on May 16, 1983, several parties emerged 
hoping to fill the vacuum created by the disbanding o f former political parties.
It is significant that despite the NSC's attempts to put obstacles in the w a y o f  
new party formation in order to prevent the party inflation o f the 1970s, the new parties 
emerged "as mushrooms coming out of the g round" .^  In all, 15 political parties were 
formed prior to the November 1983 elections, but only three were allowed to 
participate in the elections by means of NSC veto and banishment o f 15 leading
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politicians, including Demirel, to Zincirbozan, a former radar base on the Dardanelles, 
where they remained until October l .3 1
The initial intention of the NSC seemed to be "to create a broad centrist, 
Kemalist movement along the lines of the French Gaullists".3^ But as popular support 
for such a movement was not forthcoming, the generals had to content themselves with 
centre-right Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP), under the leadership o f retired- 
general Turgut Sunalp instead of Premier Bulent Ulusu who did not want to form it as 
the generals hoped. Hence NDP became the first party to enter the political arena on 
M ay 16.33
It seemed that the generals' concept of multi-party democracy amounted only to 
a two-party system with one party on the left and the other on the right o f the political 
spectrum. This led to the relatively unproblematic emergence o f the Populist Party (PP) 
under N ecdet Calp on May 19 as the tolerated opposition party along side the NDP as 
the government party.
The only other party which was allowed to be formed in order to enrich the 
"party landscape"3^ was the Motherland Party (Mot.P) o f Turgut Ozal, former 
undersecretary o f PM Demirel, and deputy prime minister o f the Ulusu government 
until his resignation in June 1982. His party was looked upon at this date as an eventual 
coalition partner.
Although it has been much publicized that the NDP enjoyed the backing o f the 
military junta, it should be noted, however, that the other two parties which were 
eventually allowed to enter the elections, namely Mot.P and PP, were also had NSC's 
blessings from the very beginning.35 In effect, those parties which were established by 
three men who worked closely together with the military leaders after the intervention 
were allowed to participate in the Generals' "guided democracy .
However, this was not the end o f the military's intervention in the election 
process. Similar to their control o f party formation, the generals also set guide-lines for 
the prospective candidates for office in the November elections. According to the 
figures in table-I, about 20% of all party candidates were vetoed. By comparison, the
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NSC vetoed 89% o f the independents. Apparently, the members o f the NSC were 
determined to allow only candidates o f the three original parties to take up public 
office. Following these vetoes, all o f the powerful challengers o f the NSC-approved 
parties - individuals, as well as other parties - were temporarily eliminated from the 
political scene.
TABLE-I. Breakdown O f Candidate Vetoes
Parties' Candidate Number Candidates
Numbers Of Vetoes Vetoed %
NDP 400 74 19
PP 400 89 22
M ot.P 400 81 21
INDEPENDENT 482 427 89
TOTAL 1628 671 40
Source: Nokta Archives, reprinted in Yesilada, B., ’’Problems of Political 
Development In The Third Turkish Republic”, Polity. Vol. 21 (2), 1988, p. 362.
As if  these were not enough, President Evren went on television on November 4, to
give last minute support to the N D P .^  The same evening, PM Ulusu made a party
propaganda broadcast on behalf of the NDP, ending the fiction o f the government's
neutrality. He reminded the people o f the situation before September 12, 1980 and
38asked them to bear that in mind when they voted the next day.
Although the process o f returning to competitive politics in Turkey began with
the general elections o f November 6, 1983, as one observer put it, the "mockery o f an
election" was "merely a secondary election designed to elect 4 0 0  members o f
39parliament among 1230 candidates who have repeatedly been tested by the junta . ^
Contrary to expectations and calculations however, it was Ozal's Motherland 
Party which received the largest support, thus lending some credibility to the elections.
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TABLE-II. Results of General Elections 1983
Electoral Participation* 92.3%
M otherland Party 7,833,147 45.1% 211 seats
Populist Party 5,285,,804 30.5% 117 seats
Nationalist Democracy Party 4,036,970 23.3% 71 seats
Independent 195,588 1.1% None**
Art. 63 o f the Electoral Law imposes obligatory voting and provides for 
financial fines for voters’ abstinence.
** One seat remained empty in the parliament because of a veto on a MP-elected 
by the NSC.
Source: Resmi Gazete, November 14,1983, No. 18221, p. 13
Many reasons could be given for the defeat of NDP.4^ It was, nevertheless, indicative 
o f  the fact that the citizens did not want a continuation o f military regime under civilian 
disguise and voted for the party which was conceived as the most detached one from 
the military regime. Also it seemed that TV appeal o f President Evren gave a counter­
productive result. Though the Turkish people appreciated what the generals had done 
and were grateful for the end of terrorism - which they showed by endorsing the 
military's constitution with 92% of the vote - they expected the officers to withdraw to 
their barracks and certainly did not like to be dictated to from above. In fact, from the 
day the NDP was established and the NSC's preference was rumoured in the press, a 
resentment grew among the voters with regard to this party.4 * Significantly, this was 
not a new development in the Turkish politics. Twice before, in 1961 and 1973, the 
voters ignored the appeals o f the military in favour o f certain parties and acted on their 
own in voting for their favoured political parties.
Although there were rumours for some time after the elections as to whether 
the generals would except the result,4^ the worst did not happen and the generals duly 
handed over the government to the new cabinet established by Turgut Ozal. 
However, this did not mean that free democracy was established in Turkey with the 
1983 elections. The NSC was quite clear about this and said that the elections would 
only mark the beginning o f a "period of transition to democracy .
By extending martial law for another four months and by promulgating a 
harsher press law immediately after the election, allegedly because o f the continuing
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threat o f  terrorism, the generals showed that they intended to guide the return to 
democracy over the provisional period, that they reserved the right to intervene if they 
felt that the situation required it, and that despite the elections, they still remained the 
arbiters o f politics in Turkey, at least for the coming six-year period.
4. D evelopm ents Since the 1983 Elections
Political developments in Turkey since 1983 elections should be examined at different 
levels. In the strictest legal sense, the transition to democracy was concluded when the 
parliament was convened on 4-6 December for the first time since September 1980 and 
the NSC dissolved itself on December 6, 1983. Even on the broader legal sense, 
however, the remnants o f the military regime continued to haunt Turkish democracy. 
Legal restrictions on press, professional associations and individuals continued to exist 
and most o f the country remained under martial law for a long time as a reminder o f 
Turkey's restricted democracy.
On the political level, too, transition to full democracy was painful and took a 
considerable time. Abadan-Unat sketched out five stages, each marked by ballot boxes, 
for Turkey's political transition: the guided election o f November 1983; the provincial 
and communal elections o f 1984; the September 1986 by-elections with 12 parties; the 
referendum concerning the return o f former politicians o f September 1987; the 1987
early general elections.^
H er classification was done after the general elections o f November 1987 which 
had been "hailed unanimously in the Western world as the culminating point o f Turkeys 
return to 'genuine' democracy, the elimination o f military tutelage and the reaffirmation 
o f  legitimacy as expressed by popular w ill" .^  Yet, looking from the first part o f 1990s, 
it seems somewhat misleading to argue that the 1987 elections marked the end o f the 
road to  Turkish democracy, for the leader of the last junta was still president o f the 
Republic, with four other generals remaining as Presidential Advisory Council. 
M oreover fragmentation o f and anomalies within Turkey's party system, created by the
206
abnormal process of the post-1983 democratic transition imposed by military rule, were 
very much in evidence and continued to evolve. Hence, looking back from a greater 
distance and a broader context, we might argue that though the 1987 elections 
essentially marked a turning point in Turkey's democratic history, it was nevertheless 
one o f  the phases rather than the end of Turkish democratic evolution. In this context 
one might spell out four other equally important developments:
1 - The election o f Turgut Ozal as president on October 1989, which apart from 
putting a civilian into the post for only the 2nc  ^ time in the Republic's history, also 
meant an end to constant reminders of the 1980 coup; the presidency o f Kenan Evren 
and the existence o f the Presidential Advisory Council.
2 - The election o f Mesut Yilmaz on June 1990 as Chairman o f  Motherland 
Party which forced President Turgut Ozal to sever his relations with that party, thus 
ending another legacy o f military regime: unwarranted presidential tutelage over 
governments.
3 & 4 - The municipal elections of 1989 and the early general elections o f 
O ctober 1991 which replaced the Motherland Party, representing the last remnants o f 
the 1983 elections, both in local and national levels respectively by a coalition o f TPP 
and SDPP, representing fresh hopes for democracy, "by which was meant full, 
participatory, liberal democracy protective of all rights and freedoms and hence loyal to 
the Charter o f Paris which... Turkey had signed earlier in the year".4^
Although looking through various elections as a growing indication o f Turkey's 
democratic tradition would be helpful, it could also be defective if we do not include 
the changes to the conceived order and the changes in the intra-party politics in Qur 
analysis. The challenges to the generals' intended political system emerged even before 
the 1983 elections in the form of unendorsed parties. Apart from the insistence of 
former politicians not to give in and continue to fight for their political rights, the 
establishment o f new parties under the apparent tutelage o f those leaders, especially 
Demirel and his relations with the GTP, were seen by the generals as a direct challenge 
to their intents and authority.48 Although these parties were prevented from
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participating in the election and the generals' conceived political order was thus secured 
for the time being, it became clear soon after the elections that the "September 12 
parties", as they became known, were not consolidatory but transitional movements and 
only the M ot.P would generate any following in the mid-to-long term. The two parties, 
which were dubbed by the military regime as government and loyal opposition before 
the 1983 elections, were not even able to reach to the next general elections. The 
Populist Party o f Calp merged with the Social Democracy Party o f Inonu in November 
1985 to form Social Democratic People's Party (SDPP),4^ while the National 
Democracy Party o f Sunalp was forced by circumstances to dissolve itself in May 5, 
1986.50
When the dust covering the 1983 general and 1984 local elections settled down, 
it became obvious that the parties outside the parliament - TPP on the right and SDP on 
the left - replaced those parties as the real centre o f opposition. In the 1984 local 
elections all the parties which met the requirements o f the Political Parties Law were 
admitted to run. Thus those parties prevented by the NSC from being established in 
time for the 1983 elections were able to test their strength this time. The results proved 
the Motherland Party, obtained 41.5% of votes, as the most credible political 
organization at the time.5 * But it also showed that the NDP and PP had already 
become anachronistic groupings,52 obtaining only 5.4% and 7.8% o f votes 
respectively, while the TPP and SDP received 11.8% and 24.8% respectively.52
The results also showed that more than 40% of electorate were not represented 
in the parliament, and thus helped to clarified the "paradoxical peculiarity o f the politics 
o f transition".54 The artificial composition o f the parliament after the 1984 local 
elections had dangers within for Turkey's peaceful transition to democracy. The 
Motherland Party's programme, which was virtually unchallenged in the parliament, 
was in danger o f encountering nasty resistance in the streets because o f the powerful
opposition forces outside the parliament.55
Another consequence o f powerful parties being left outside the parliament was 
the gradual reemergence, between the two parliamentary elections, o f the familiar
208
picture o f the pre-1980 period of changes in party allegiance by deputies, thus 
demolishing another intention o f the generals and making a mockery o f its safeguard, 
Article 84 o f  the Constitution.5^ To overcome the threat deputies found an ingenious 
way o f establishing "hulle partileri" (interim parties), which after 1983 meant in Turkish 
political usage that a number o f deputies, who resigned from their parties to become 
independent, came together to establish a new party within the parliament, only to 
merge after short existence with another party outside the parliament.
In the end some extra-parliamentary parties became parliamentary forces 
without actually having been voted into the parliament. Thus, in May 1987, the 
distribution o f seats in the parliament was as follows: M ot.P, 255 seats; SDPP, 63 
seats; TPP, 40 seats; DLP, 23 seats; Independents, 17; and two seats were vacant.52 
Finally, the November 1987 elections legalized this situation, which was caused by the 
out o f  touch and rigid approach o f the generals' intended political system to socio­
political realities, thus ending the anomaly o f the existence o f powerful extra- 
parliamentary parties. Along the way, an important milestone was the referendum of 
September 1987 held in regard to the removal o f the political prohibition o f  "old 
politicians". Though the outcome was a narrow escape (50.16% yes and 49.84% no 
with only 75.066 votes difference), it enabled the "old politicians" to return officially to
CO
politics and soon they all took up their respective parties' leadership. M oreover many 
other small parties representing some interest groups or cleavages emerged 
accordingly. In all, twenty-two parties were founded until 1987, out o f  which only nine 
were in existence after the general elections and only three were able to enter the 
parliament; Mot.P, TPP and SDPP, receiving 36.3%, 19.1%, and 24.8% o f votes 
respectively.5^
It seemed that after the 1987 general elections only Turgut Ozal was able to 
remain as a major political figure out of the new names to whom the military leaders o f 
1980 tied their hopes for the future o f their restructured Turkey. While the 1987 
elections, as indicated earlier, were taken in the Western world as a fresh start for 
democracy in Turkey, the election process, thus the results, raised some doubts in
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Turkey /   ^ Apart trom causing nearly one fifth of the electorate to be not represented in 
the parliament, the results carried within themselves the seeds o f political instability as 
well as questions ot governmental legitim acy.^ After the elections, Demirel, now back 
in parliament again, started to exploit popular dissatisfaction over increased inflation, 
and seemingly widespread suspicions o f corruption and nepotism in government circles. 
By 1989, the popularity o f Mot.P had definitely decreased. The apparent decline in 
Ozal's following was exposed by the March 1989 local elections in which M ot.P came 
third by obtaining only 22% o f the votes after the SDPP (28%) and more importantly 
its centre-right rival TPP (25%). Despite immediate calls for resignation Ozal stayed 
on, commenting "people gave us only a w a r n i n g " . But the support for Ozal 
continued to fall off and a poll in late May 1989 showed only 15% su p p o rt.^
The year 1989 represented another important watershed for Turkish 
democracy; the election o f new president, which had earlier brought the parliament into 
stalemate for more than six months prior to the military coup o f September 12. 
Consequently, the deadlock o f the Parliament over the issue o f chosing the President o f 
the Republic was among the reasons for the military's intervention. .Although there were 
some speculations earlier in 1989 that a way might be found to allow Evren stand 
again, it was Mot.P majority in the parliament that in the end determined the outcome. 
In spite o f  unpopularity o f Mot.P and fervent opposition o f other parties, on October 
31, 1989 Turgut Ozal was elected as 8 ^  President o f Turkey by a simple majority o f 
263 votes o f M o t.P .^  His election was an important mark for civilian supremacy in 
Turkey, by not only removing one o f the last bastions o f the military regime, Kenan 
Evren, but also securing a civilian only for the second time in republican history in his 
place. On the other hand, Mr. Ozal's low popularity cast inevitable shadows over his 
presidency.
Nevertheless, Turgut Ozal went ahead with his presidency and nominated the 
Speaker o f  the Assembly, Yildirim Akbulut, as prime minister. The Akbulut 
government proved no more than a puppet o f President Ozal, hence allowing him to 
govern the country effectively until the succession o f Mesut Yilmaz over Akbulut in
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June 1990 as Mot.P chairman and consequently prime minister. In the meantime, 
however, Turgut Ozal guided Turkey during one o f its most important foreign policy 
challenges: the Gulf War, which will be discussed later on. And the 1991 early general 
elections replaced Mot.P as government with a coalition o f TPP and SDPP, and thus 
started a period o f uneasy cohabitation between president and government in Turkey, 
which only came to an end with President Ozal's untimely death in April 1993.
5. Political Parties and the Parliamentary Supervision of Foreign Policy during 
the Third Republic
As shown in early chapters, Turkish foreign policy was traditionally considered as 
bipartisan and above party po litics.^  However, political upheavals o f  1970s had their 
effects on foreign policy, too. Especially during the last part o f  that decade foreign 
policy issues, like all other issues, became explosive tool and part o f political struggle in 
the parliament as well as the streets. Finally, parties came to regard foreign policy as 
just another tool to undermine the power o f the governmental party. In this context one 
remembers the bitter experience o f Hayrettin Erkmen, who, as discussed earlier in 
chapter two, was forced to resign by opposition parties not so much because o f the 
foreign policy he followed, which was the governmental one in any case, but in order to 
destabilize the government. As we previously stated, before 1980 governments were 
unable at times to go on implementing their foreign policy decisions or to secure 
ratification o f treaties they had signed because o f their weak positions in the parliament
which increased the power o f parliamentary supervision and influence o f opposition
66  *parties.
In the 1983 and 1987 Assemblies, however, a combination o f different factors 
resulted in a reversal and weak parliamentary supervision over foreign policy as well as 
other political issues. Although most o f the below mentioned legislative and socio­
political factors emerged within and were directed to domestic politics, their 
connections with foreign policy are evidence as far as parliamentary control over, and
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approval of, foreign policy is concerned. And particularly, if one remembers the Turkish 
political tradition o f putting the government's foreign policy in front o f parliament for 
general support, their importance become more obvious.
5.1. The Effects of Legal and Political Restructuring
Above all, the legal and political restructuring o f  the parliamentary democracy 
in Turkey by the military regime had immense effects on parliamentary control after 
1983.
In its effort to regulate democracy, the 1982 constitution attempted to reduce 
the importance and power o f parliament vis-a-vis the executive, compromising both 
president and the Council o f Ministers. Parliament was reduced to a single 400-member 
house elected every five years instead o f four yearly elections for bi-cameral house o f 
600-650 members. The system also forced the parliament to organize and support the 
government in order to avoid dissolution. In an answer to pre-1980 parliamentary 
deadlocks, which left country without government for long periods o f  time due to 
absence o f constitutional means to force dissolution, the generals inserted Article 116 
to  the new constitution. Accordingly the President was empowered to dissolve 
parliament and call for elections if the PM were to lose a no-confidence vote or was 
unable to  obtain a majority within 45 days. Also, if the Parliament was unable to choose 
a new president in four ballots it had to be terminated automatically. The president was 
additionally given powers to choose the prime minister from any member o f Parliament 
(Article 109). Together with Article 116 this could result in establishment o f a 
government which was not voted by the electorate for the office.
The President also now had power to return laws to the Parliament for 
reconsideration. Although the latter retained the right to readopt the returned laws 
without change, the President could appeal in that case to the Constitutional Court or 
submit them to referendum (Articles 89 and 104).
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The 1982 Constitution, in order to avoid deadlocks caused by the shaky 
equilibrium between government and opposition and to prevent minor parties having 
leverage over government, also strengthened the powers o f the political wing o f the 
executive vis-a-vis other parties and of the prime minister vis-a-vis the Council o f 
Ministers. The Article 84, which, as already mentioned above, aimed at preventing 
frequent party changing o f deputies in order to gain political advantages (i.e. ministerial 
post), favours the majority - ie. governmental party - since the absolute majority is 
necessary to  decide loss o f membership in respect o f any deputy who changed his party.
Furthermore, the President was given the power to declare economic or security 
emergencies in conjunction with the Council o f Ministers and then rule by decree, 
subject to parliamentary approval (Article 104). Also, according to Article 91, the 
Council o f  Ministers would be given power by the Parliament to issue decrees having 
the force o f law. In affect, this meant giving the Parliament's right to enact laws to the 
Council o f Ministers. Except during periods o f martial law and states o f emergency, 
however, the fundamental individual and political rights cannot be regulated by decrees.
M oreover, in order to ensure cabinet consistency, the President was given 
power to dismiss ministers on the proposal o f the prime minister (Article 104). This o f 
course, strengthened the prime minister's leverage over his cabinet. It is obvious that 
most o f these arrangements worked in favour o f government and prevented sufficient 
parliamentary supervision.
5.2. The Effects of Psychological Factors
Apart from legal arrangements, the Parliament's power to supervise the 
government was also affected by psychological factors and political developments, 
caused by the 1980 military coup and the subsequent treatment to which the political
elites were subjected.
First o f all, as a result o f being part of the pre-1980 disorder and also being
deliberately identified by the military as one of the main sources o f that disorder, feeling
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o f self-remorse and apologetic behaviour were high among the political elite. Thus, 
particularly in the first Assembly, the MPs were strikingly ready to compromise in their 
arguments or attitudes in favour o f the government. Also being publicly denounced as 
self-seeking, and by implication as unpatriotic, and being persecuted for a long time, the 
professional politician's self-esteem was running low. M oreover the psychology o f 
being subjected to vetos and eliminations again and again before the elections and 
therefore, in a sense, to be appointed as much as elected to the office must have had its 
impact on MPs at least for some time.
Furthermore, the actual inexperience o f the deputies also prevented the 
parliament from exercising its already limited powers. As mentioned earlier, as a result 
o f  legal prohibition o f most o f the pre-1980 politicians from politics for 5 to 10 years, 
and the threatened veto for any person affiliated with pre-1980 parties, the new party 
founders were forced to look for candidacy o f people who were previously
f i linexperienced and uninterested in or even unqualified for politics. As a result in the 
first parliament after the 1983 elections only 15% o f all deputies had previous 
parliamentary experience and only %9 o f them had been national deputies.
Furthermore, according to a survey conducted by Kalaycioglu in September- 
November 1984, nearly half o f the deputies had never been a member o f a socio­
political association or o f a political party and only about one third o f the deputies had 
previous party affiliation over lengthy periods, that is six years or more; and only about 
one fifth o f the deputies had held some administrative posts in the political party 
organization. Also it showed that about a quarter o f the deputies developed an interest 
in politics only after 1983. These findings point to the fact that the 1983 parliament in 
Turkey hosted an overwhelming proportion o f "non-professional"69 political actors,
hence most o f the deputies had to learn and practise the role o f being a legislator and
70supervisor at the same time.
Also, the establishment o f parties in 1983 by people who were previously not 
involved in any political establishment meant in effect that most o f the deputies were 
named for office as a result o f personal favour or relation with the leader. Therefore,
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personal affiliation and the gratefulness of MPs to their leaders:, particularly in the 
Motherland Party for it commanded majority in the Parliament,, ensured the prime 
minister's patronage over the parliament through his party.
Moreover, the realization o f  the artificial characters o f  their parties, especially 
after the 1984 local elections, and the fact that most o f  them would not be reelected in 
the face o f powerful extra-parliamentary parties, made M Ps more docile and 
compromising vis-a-vis government. It also increased the loyalty o f  M otP  deputies to 
Mr. Ozal, who had proved by this time to be an able politician and leader, and many o f
71them remained loyal to him to the end. Likewise, the high percentage o f turnover
among the MPs in the 1987 early general elections meant in effect that the same
patterns o f inexperience and loyalty would take form in the 1987 Assembly, too.7“
As a result o f the lack o f the institutionalization o f parliament, because o f
deputies' inexperience, together with the personal tutelage o f  premier Ozal over
Motherland Party deputies who commanded majority in the parliament, the M ot.P
governments were able (especially between 1983-1989 when Ozal was premier) to
avoid "every issue that the Mot.P leaders did not wish to tackle" in the parliament,
73including those o f foreign policy.
Looking through the records o f parliament for an indication o f  parliamentary 
control, particularly in the foreign policy arena, for it constitutes our main interest, one 
comes across frequent complains particularly from opposition MPs about the 
government's avoidance o f parliament in decison-making, its unwillingness to give 
information about developments in Turkey's international relations, MP's difficulty in 
getting answers to questions and their insufficiency when answered, lack o f debates and 
so forth. For example, only three out o f twenty-two requests for general debate or 
parliamentary inquiry about the government's foreign policy in both 1983 and 1987 
Assemblies were accepted and debated later on. N ot surprisingly two o f those accepted 
were tabled by either government ministers or Motherland Party MPs.74
The information about foreign policy given by the foreign ministers to the 
assemblies was also irregular. Although during the 1983 Assembly foreign minister Mr.
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Vahit Halefoglu gave information to the Parliament about every two weeks, the 
practice, it appeared, to be less frequent during the 1987 Assembly.
Furthermore, having squeezed the question time to only once a week, the 
foreign ministers, along with other ministers, tended to ignore the urgency o f  the 
questions asked by the MPs and the answers usually came after long delays and more 
often than not after the relevant development had passed. Examination o f the records 
shows that only once did the government o f Ozal agree to bring its comprehensive 
programme o f foreign policy in front o f the Parliament for general debate 
beforehand. ^
It appears that most o f the parliamentary effort to supervise the government's
conduct o f foreign policy during the period o f 1983-1991 consisted o f questions,
general debate and inquiry requests after the problems had occurred and actions had
been taken by the government. And also governments seemed to avoid giving detailed
information about the problems and the causes and the reasons o f the governmental
actions taken in the foreign policy arena as long as possible and frequently not until
they were pressed by the parliament and public opinion in general. Hence one o f the
most frequent complaints about the conduct o f government's foreign policy during the
77both 1983 and 1987 legislature sessions was "secrecy" in foreign relations. After
Ozal moved to the Presidency, complaints about his intervention into foreign policy and
suspicions over would-be deals made by the President without consultation with the
78foreign ministry, particularly over the Cyprus issue, became frequent. ° His personal
handling o f the Gulf War in particular generated great irritation among deputies, as well
as public opinion, culminating in a request for "general questioning" in parliament o f the
Council o f Ministers on the grounds that on the face o f important developments
regarding Turkey "they followed secret diplomacy, avoided the Parliament and brought
79Turkey into loneliness in foreign relations".
216
5.3. Political Parties and Turkey's External Relations
Another important factor for the relatively calm nature o f foreign policy debates 
in the Parliament after 1983 was the existence o f a broad agreement on overall foreign 
policy issues among major political parties. Hence, before proceeding further, it is 
w orth sketching out roughly the main notions o f the major political parties o f post- 
1983 Parliaments on foreign relations. ^
The Motherland Party advocated an active role in Turkey's relations with all 
countries. It stressed that the fundamental foreign policy principle o f the Party was the 
preservation o f world peace, and that the stability o f the state lay in the foundation o f 
its philosophy o f foreign policy. The platform also stated that Turkey should continue 
to  honour the international agreements she had signed, including the NATO Treaty. 
M oreover, it favoured further relations and cooperation with the EC and with the 
W estern World, o f which she was a member from the stand-point o f political, military 
and economic cooperation. It also stressed, however, that relations with the West, 
should be furthered in such a way as to balance the interests o f all the parties involved. 
As far as Turkey's relations with the Middle East and other Islamic countries were 
concerned, the MP believed that because o f her geographical location and historical ties 
it was only natural for Turkey to develop closer relations with those countries.
The Populist Party pledged to protect Turkey's national interests in the world 
and especially in its region by means o f a dynamic foreign policy. It also promised to 
exert extra efforts for detente in international relations, the strengthening o f peace and 
the maintenance o f the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity o f all nations. 
It addition, the party argued that it was necessary for Turkey to broaden the scope o f 
her international relations without discriminating on the basis o f the countries’ internal 
social order, so long as her interests and relations in international alliances and 
communities were not endangered. It was especially in favour o f developing close 
relation with the countries in the region and with developing countries, and stated that 
moral and cultural ties with the Islamic countries should be taken into consideration in
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formulating foreign policy. It believed in continuing membership in NATO and 
supported the desires for full EEC membership.
The N ationalist Democracy Party declared that the basic principle o f their 
foreign policy was "peace at home, peace in the world", thus implying their allegiance 
to  Ataturk. Also, it pledged to exert efforts in developing cultural, economic and 
political relations with the Western alliance and the Arab and Moslem countries. It 
emphasized the fact that Turkey was a member o f free world and the Western alliance. 
While taking an anti-communist stand, it stressed that Turkey's place in NATO should 
be strengthened and one of the aims should be full association with the EEC.
The Social Democrat Populist Party pledged sound foundations for national 
security adhering to Ataturk's principle o f "peace at home, peace in the world", which 
would be realized with a dynamic foreign policy. The party prime aims were given as 
protecting the interests o f the Turkish nation and contributing to the happiness o f all 
mankind. Its understanding o f international cooperation was based on the principles of 
friendship, mutual respect and non interference in internal affairs, and attached equal 
importance to the political and economic aspects o f foreign relations. It favoured the 
role o f NATO as a common defence organization which was a contributor to the 
security o f Turkey and therefore believed that membership in it should be maintained. 
The party also favoured membership in the European Community in the belief that it 
would not be to Turkey's interests to remain outside Europe politically and 
economically.
The True Path Party stated that its foreign policy was based on ensuring 
equality o f rights and treatment and balance o f interests in bilateral relations. It pledged 
that foreign policy would be conducted on the basis o f securing continuous security for 
the country through peaceful co-existence, contributing to world peace and developing 
foreign relations in line with the general principles o f the UN Charter. Finally, it 
favoured developing economic and social relations especially with Turkey's immediate 
neighbours.
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It seems from the foreign policy platforms sketched out above that there was an 
overall agreement between the political parties, representing more than 80% o f the 
electorate, on the main issues o f Turkish foreign policy.
It is striking that all the parties, which had representation in either 1983 or 1987 
Assemblies, had agreed on the need for Turkey to follow more active or dynamic 
foreign policy. This, o f course, indicates a common unhappiness among political parties 
about the hitherto followed supposedly "inactive" foreign policy. A strong desire for 
change in the country's foreign policy stance was also apparent. Moreover, there was a 
clear determination to vary and broaden Turkey's relations with even those countries 
whose domestic systems or foreign policy orientations were different from Turkey, that 
is Islamic and Communist countries. Apparently this willingness to move Turkey to 
more dynamic stand vis-a-vis relations with other countries came as a reaction to 
Turkey's immediate past, during which the inability o f weak coalition governments to 
facilitate their foreign policies often resulted in an unproductive, passive, and at times 
inadequate Turkey in its relations. Also the effects o f domestic changes and 
international dynamics were obvious in this new willingness on the part o f political 
parties, for the detente in international relations and revival o f Islamic consciousness 
inside Turkey helped Turkish leaders to overcome their and the public's, in general, 
fears for closer contacts with Communist and Islamic countries respectively. Also, 
restructuring Turkey's economic system along side free market economy, which all the 
major parties agreed on, heavily depended on exports earning and foreign investments 
that in turn demanded good neighbourly and steady relations with all countries,
especially regional ones.
Another common point among parties seemed to be on the issue o f Turkish 
membership to EEC. In fact, when Turkey under Mot.P government applied for full 
membership in 1987, only small, fringe parties representing at the time about 10-12% 
o f the electorate openly opposed it. They were the Prosperity Party (7.16% in 1987 
elections), Nationalist Labour Party (2.93%), Reformist Democracy Party (0.82%), and
O 1
Socialist Party (established in 1988 with no real power base).
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Again on the NATO membership issue, all the parties represented in both 
parliaments seemed to have a common understanding.
Since all the parties in both Assemblies seemed to have an informal consensus 
between them about the basic fundamentals o f foreign policy with which Turkey should 
be identified, most o f the disagreements appeared over, most o f the requests for general 
debates were tabled about, and criticisms were directed at specific actions o f the 
government rather than on principles behind those actions. One major exception to this 
was the continual annoyance o f the opposition parties in the face o f  frequent 
intervention in governmental foreign policy by Turgut Ozal after he became president. 
As will be shown below, most o f the time they were more disturbed by his interference 
rather than by what he actually did.
6. Public Opinion, Pressure Groups, Opinion-Makers and Foreign Policy After 
The 1983 Elections
Even in Western states, where societies are more conscious about their united efforts 
and participatory democracy is more developed, foreign policy is generally o f the 
secondary interest to the public in general and "public opinion" has relatively little to do 
with its formation. M ost people remain uninterested in foreign policy unless a specific 
issue captures their attention. This is even more correct in a country like Turkey where 
democracy is wavering, common access to decision makers is prevented by restrictions 
and limitations, and where foreign affairs, generally speaking, is rather a latecomer into 
the interest o f public opinion. Therefore, while examining the connection between 
public opinion and foreign policy in Turkey, one has to give priority attention to thcfse 
in positions more likely to influence ultimate or immediate decision making.
On the other hand, it should be remembered that, although the public in general 
is, even in the 1990s, far from dictating governmental foreign policy in Turkey, the 
common priorities and perceptions o f the people are reflected, however general it may 
be, in the country's foreign policy. In this context, especially emotional issues, such as
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the Cyprus problem or the rights o f Turkish minorities abroad, which frequently arouse 
general concern, would cause the governments to be more vulnerable to the leverage o f 
public opinion than usual. When this happens, while the governments would still try to 
manipulate public into their way o f conducting foreign policy, decision makers, in turn, 
most probably, felt restrained by the common emotional reaction and hence would 
comply with public opinion generally.
Traditionally in Turkey, the military, the students, and the trade and commercial 
unions constitute the origin o f the most o f the pressures exerted onto governm ents.^  
To these groups we could include the press which, at times, plays an important role in 
forming public opinion and whose interest in foreign policy by means o f expert and 
leading articles, though usually coloured with chauvinistic nationalism, is more 
profound and continual than others.
Although the above mentioned groups had enjoyed the freedoms o f the 1961 
Constitution previous to the 1980 intervention, their activities were curbed greatly by 
the arrangements o f the 1982 Constitution and other related laws. As mentioned earlier, 
the generals o f the 1980 coup tried, through depoliticization o f the society, to limit 
political activity to professional political groups and asked others to engage only in 
non-political actions in order to promote their self-interests. In the same manner the 
post-1980 depoliticized society o f the generals did not allow the press, the associations, 
unions or the universities to air views which would be harmful to national unity and 
order, a phrase which would include, as for as foreign policy was concerned, the 
mention o f  possible trade war between Turkey and the EEC, growing frictions between 
Greece and Turkey, allegations o f support to Armenian terrorists by Syria, or even
personal information about a visiting Saudi minister, in short, anything that was thought
83undesirable by the government to be said.
As some o f the legal restrictions for associational activities have already been 
mentioned, there is no need to reiterate them here, but it is sufficient to say that at the 
end o f  the military regime the activities o f the press were directed to publish news 
rather than opinions, o f the universities to teach rather than research, o f workers'
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unions to economic rather than political struggle, and o f other associations to self-
interest rather than general interests o f the public. As a result o f this forced political
inactivity, there was no genuine interest by these groups in foreign policy, even long
after the restoration o f a civilian regime. The notable exceptions were the highly
emotional ones that actually captured the interest o f the whole nation, such as the
repression o f Turkish minority in Bulgaria or in Western Thrace, or proposed Armenian
resolutions in the US Congress. Concomitantly with political and societal normalization
o f Turkey during the second half o f the 1980s, however, the foreign relations o f the
country attracted more interest from public opinion, the press and the specialized
associations. In contrast, the trade and workers' unions seemed to neglect foreign
policy altogether in their activities. The important exceptions were, o f course, the
commitment showed by the commercial unions and industrialists towards full
membership o f the EC and their constant pressure on government to continue its
liberalization and export-supported economic policies, which in turn necessitated good
84economic relations with both Western Europe and neighbouring countries.
The press, which was so closely scrutinized and controlled during the 1980-83
oc
period, gradually revived its colourful and lively coverage. Although, as stated 
above, much o f the press coverage o f Turkey's international relations were made from 
the nationalist point o f view, the more objective and serious series about Turkish 
foreign policy in general and its certain aspects in particular also frequently appeared in
O / T
the more prestigious papers.
The subject which attracted most attention in the press, be it series, articles or 
news, during the period was Turkey's relations with Greece, followed by the Cyprus 
problem. Together they constituted about one third o f all news coverage o f foreign 
affairs. Then came Turkey's relations with the US, with Western Europe (including the 
Council o f Europe and EC), the Middle East (including Iran-Iraq wars) and others. 
Although the interests o f the press coverage o f foreign affairs usually follow the events, 
the articles by resident correspondents tended to offer more general outlook and insight 
on Turkey's foreign relations and at times helped to produce public opinion. The press'
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role in drawing the public's attention to the repression o f the Turkish minority in 
Bulgaria and in creating an anti-war public opinion during the Gulf crisis o f 1990-91 
was particularly important. Also, the press added greatly to the suspicions about 
premier and later President Ozal's personal dealings with foreign policy and about 
alleged concessions made by him without the knowledge o f foreign ministry.
Apart from the press, such institutions as the Foreign Policy Institute, the 
Foundation o f Economic Development (IKV), Aydinlar Ocagi (The Guild o f the 
Enlightened), Mulkiyeliler Birligi (Associ?tion of Political Science Faculty Graduates), 
etc., and the Universities were also instrumental in Turkey's search for policy over 
certain subjects by organising conferences, meetings and publishing their proceedings. 
M oreover societies representing certain groups o f people, as, for example, immigrants 
o f Bulgarian Turks or Balkan Solidarity Society etc., were active in promoting certain 
ideas in the public opinion. Students, who were severely restrained by legal means and 
whose activities were constantly checked through the Higher Education Council, 
seemed on the other hand seemed to be passive observers o f happenings during the 
period and their influence over foreign policy could also be disregarded.
7. Foreign Policy Making and the Ozal Regime
7.1. The Setting
During the military regime, continuity was the main feature o f Turkish foreign policy. 
Turkey's tight international setting, exacerbated by her geopolitical situation, had its 
share in this continuity as well as the military leadership's desire to maintain it. During 
most o f  the period, Turkey and the Turkish foreign ministry found themselves in 
situations where they had little room to manoeuvre and repeatedly had to do a 
balancing act which on the whole, though risky at times, was well suited to Turkey's 
multidimensional links. During the period Turkey had not only seek to balance between 
the East and the West, but also had to resist pressures to sever her relations with
Europe.
223
Although Mr. Vahit Halefoglu, who replaced Mr. liter Turkmen after the 1983 
elections as foreign minister, was considered, like his predecessor, to be highly 
sophisticated diplomat who would be expected to personify the continuity o f Turkish
0 - 7
foreign policy, the advent o f the Ozal government, nevertheless, provoked 
speculations that there might be a shift in foreign policy o f Turkey, at least in emphasis 
if not in substance. The main reason for this was that Mr. Ozal had repeatedly made it 
clear that he wanted to promote Turkey's links with the Islamic countries, particularly 
in the economic field. In his government programme, presented to the National 
Assembly on December 19, 1983, however, Mr. Ozal dealt with foreign policy only in 
general terms and said nothing to indicate that there would be radical departures from 
the policies o f the past.
As stated earlier, it is one o f the major aims o f this dissertation to concentrate 
on the general directions o f Turkish foreign policy and highlight their connections with 
domestic, as well as external, inputs. Therefore, and in keeping with the essence o f this 
chapter, I will deal here only with the peculiarities o f the Mot.P governments and more 
importantly with some o f the personal characteristics o f Mr. Ozal, which might have 
had bearings upon the making o f Turkish foreign policy. Since the political system that 
had been created by the military regime actually produced the M ot.P and its chairman 
as credible political forces in Turkey after 1983, it seems appropriate to include this 
analysis in this chapter.
Before proceeding further, the extremely docile character o f the Motherland
Party governments and their subservient attitude towards Mr. Ozal should be noted and
evaluated. The political and legal factors that led to this docility were mentioned
earlier.88 The control o f Turgut Ozal over his party, especially at the early stages, was
so intense and absolute that it led a political observer to comment that "Motherland
89Party is not really a party but the Ozal Fan Club".
Early indications o f Ozal's tendency to rule alone were seen in the selection 
process o f cabinet appointments. He was said to have appointed ministers without 
consulting the party and this was supported by the fact that most o f the newly
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appointed ministers learned o f their appointments from the radio after the Cabinet list 
was released to the press. 9^ Such practices were continued throughout his premiership 
despite growing uneasiness within the party and the Turkish public in general.9  ^
Although various groups within the party did not like the process, they nevertheless 
found it expedient to accept it as reality since all the fractions within the party needed 
Ozal's personal support for their bid to takeover the control o f the party, and Ozal, well 
aware o f this situation, both encouraged these divisions and took full advantage from 
them to further his personal hold.9^ Moreover, it was frequently reported in the press 
during the 1980s that Mr. Ozal was taking the most important decisions with his close 
associates, separate from the party or the government organs and often in unofficial 
circumstances such as family gatherings.9  ^ The existence o f the "Hanedan" (Royal 
Family), as it came to be known, was cited by many analysts among the reasons for 
Motherland Party's failure in the 1989 local elections.9^
Among the legal changes that were carried out by the first Mot.P government 
within a few days o f its formation was the creation o f all-powerful undersecretaries 
directly responsible to the prime minister.9:5 This was in keeping with Ozal's election 
promise to streamline the bureaucracy, cutting the red tape and increasing efficiency in 
implementing decisions. Although the appointment o f undersecretaries for carrying out 
special tasks which had been undertaken hitherto by different ministries undoubtedly 
helped to  by-pass most o f the bureaucracy and speeded up the process o f decision 
making, it also made the undersecretaries, personally attached to the prime minister to 
whom alone they owed their jobs, more powerful than ministers, and thus "undermined 
the principle o f cabinet responsibility by placing virtually all the power in the hands o f  
the prime minister and his entourage o f undersecretaries".96
Although gradually spread out to comprise most o f the bureaucracy, this 
process went furthest in the reorganization o f economic affairs, Ozal's main 
preoccupation and an area in which he considered himself an expert. He created a new 
secretariat for the "Treasury and Foreign Trade" which became responsible not only for 
foreign trade, but also for foreign loans, banking, money policy, the organization o f
225
stock market, foreign exchange, and even public enterprises. In theory, it was attached 
to the Finance Ministry, but in practice it was independent o f and more powerful than 
that ministry, and was directly accountable to the prime minister.
Together with the above mentioned factors, these undersecretaries gave prime 
minister Ozal absolute control over the bureaucracy and let him run the government as 
he pleased. M oreover he started out with a good majority in the parliament and an 
ineffective opposition which offered neither criticism nor any alternative. While this fact 
led him to consider himself "without an alternative",02 he even attempted to by-pass 
the control o f  that docile parliament, or what was left o f it, with an extensive usage o f 
governmental decrees, thus in reality ruling without control.0**
In this context, it has been argued that Ozal favoured the American political 
system, but it seems that his admiration was essentially based on a superficial 
understanding o f that system, which provided, according to him, a powerful president, 
liberal economy and religious freedom.00 However, his lack o f in-depth knowledge o f 
the country and its system because o f his shallowness in ideological term s,100 led him 
to reach wrong conclusions. For example, it seems that he never considered the 
importance o f the separation o f powers principle or the existence o f various checks and 
balances in the American political system since he never liked the power sharing and 
strings attached to such a system.101
Although he had to get along with the military in the early days o f his 
premiership, the pressure from this channel faded in time and especially after 1985 he 
started to have absolute control over all policy making, at times by passing ministers 
and the cabinet.102 Thus Mr. Ozal's personal characteristics and beliefs are important 
factors that should be looked at while discussing Turkish foreign policy.
7.2. The ’’Economy First” Principle
The economy was Ozal's first priority when he became prime minister in December 
1983. He knew that the future o f his government was dependent first and foremost on
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the country's economic balance. Economic development and "ortadiregi kurtarmak" (to 
save the middle classes) were his catch phrases during the election campaign and he 
knew that the Turkish people cared about their economic well being more than
1 Q O
anything else. Besides, people knew him because o f his success in economic affairs 
in the early 1980s, and this constituted an important part o f the reason why the people 
preferred him in the 1983 elections to others. Therefore it was logical in a sense that he 
should tie everything else, including the democratic evolution and foreign policy o f the 
country, to the "economy first" principle.
It was reported that one o f his earlier orders to the foreign ministry was to 
provide a ten year time span free from external conflicts and pressures, during which 
Turkey could concentrate on economic recovery and development.*0^ The economic 
dimension o f  his foreign policy was ably summarized by Cemal as "he thinks that if 
nations connect each other with profit, they would orient themselves towards better 
relations. Let us develop foreign trade, tourism, banking, let us develop cooperation in
i r\c
every aspect o f economy, better political relations will follow". According to Ozal,
...the more individuals and societies engage in meaningful dialogue, the more 
will be the likelihood o f their reaching common ground and consensus. At that 
stage cooperation is possible and it is only through cooperation that mutual 
advantage in collaborating becomes visible and peoples start to have a common 
stake in each other's well-being and prosperity. To have something precious in
common is the basis o f interdependence.*0^
In the creation o f this interdependence, the most important role was to be played by 
economic cooperation. He believed that economic cooperation and interdependence
would eventually lead to peaceful and beneficial political relations, too, overriding
* 107 •regional and bilateral conflicts.
His economic pragmatism showed itself foremost in Turkish-American
relations. It was reported that he, noting the usage o f US economic pressures during its
embargo to Turkey after 1975, warned his close associates several times about
upsetting the US which "has long arms and could create inconveniences on all
fronts".*08 This led many to criticise him on account o f  his foreign policy exhibiting a
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was in a very "conciliatory mode" with the US and was thus degrading for Turkey. In 
turn he, on one such occasion, argued to a journalist that the US had monopoly over 
arms supplies to Turkey and to change this dependency would be, in addition to 
difficulties o f  adaptation, training and logistic problems, economically impossible. In 
another occasion he further argued that,
...world banking system evolves around America. American Banks outweigh all 
others among the banks which came to Turkey. Further most o f the foreign 
investments come from that channel. Even if it comes from another country, it 
would certainly have American capital behind it. Therefore while dealing with 
the US you should calculate all the pluses and minuses. It's not easy to amend 
relations with the US once you have broken them. We have to be very
careful. ^
It seems that in his foreign policy thinking US-Turkish relations attracted a great deal 
o f attention and the economic side o f it was the most essential. This connection was 
also important in affecting Turkey's relations with many other countries. For example 
Ozal knew that "America supports Israel in the Middle East and the Israeli lobby has a 
considerable weight in the US Congress", and therefore he concluded "relations with 
Israel should be kept cordial without attracting much attention from the Arab 
W orld".111
In Greek-Turkish relations, too, his economist approach was self-evident: "If
both nations would prefer better future, they should know that nobody would gain from
conflict . I f  they want to develop economically, they should cease conflict and spend
119money for economic development instead o f military advancements".1 With this in
mind he, despite widespread opposition, was favourably disposed from the beginning
towards rapprochement with Greece. In this context he also thought that the Cyprus
problem had burdened the Turkish economy and foreign policy more than it should. His
attitude in this area was shaped, among other things, by the belief that the solution of
the Cyprus problem and the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece would create a
favourable international environment for Turkey which would also affect foreign 
113inflows positively.
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M oreover, as will be elaborated further in the next chapter, his policy o f "active 
neutrality" during the Iran/Iraq war was mainly prompted by economic considerations, 
though this was also in line with traditional principles o f Turkish foreign policy. 
Further, despite various anti-secular and anti-Ataturk attempts o f the Khomeini regime, 
he resisted pressures to change his policy o f non-retaliation and react against Iran. As a 
result Turkey, as mentioned earlier, despite President Evren's opposition became the 
only NATO country to lower its flag upon Khomeini's death.
Together with his emphasis on economic necessities before other 
considerations, his "businessman attitude" towards foreign policy frequently created 
uneasiness among foreign ministry and military circles. However, Ozal responded to his 
critics on this front by arguing that he did not believe that a country, which was forced 
by its economy to look for foreign aid, could have political credibility either:
Economic development brings political weight. I believe that economy has 80% 
weight in foreign policy o f a country. Today all countries use their ambassadors, 
ministers and prime ministers to sell goods, and arrange political weight 
according to it. I have met many o f them, there are those who say "buy this 
product, we'll accommodate your business". That's why we have to be realist in 
this respect. I don't understand politics as making nice speeches in meetings. All 
depends on mutual benefit. And o f course economy gains special importance in
this benefit.114
In this respect, he did not hesitate to use economic leverage, whenever he could, to 
obtain political advantages in international relations as well as domestic politics. 
Especially soon after his advent to power, big public contracts were used, to a certain 
extent, to normalize relations with particular European countries which had 
deteriorated under the military regime.115 When this is understood it becomes clearer 
why, despite widespread criticisms, he insisted on taking hundreds o f businessmen with 
him on state trips: he simply believed that political relations could be improved by doing
profitable business.1 ^
His "economy first" principle had other rather indirect affects on Turkish
foreign policy as well. In domestic politics it meant that democracy and basic human
117rights had to wait until the economy was put on the right track to development.
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According to this principle , economic liberalism has to precede the transformation into 
liberal democracy with full human rights. These were necessary sacrifices for long term 
economic and democratic development.
First the economy to be purified from prohibitions, full liberalism will be 
attained. In this way economy will be powerful and grey economy and easy 
earning will be eliminated. In parallel to all this democracy will be enhanced. Is 
it not the same in the West that in the foundation o f the democracy lies liberal 
economy? Democracy could not be established with black market and queues. 
For democracy it is necessary that the economy should be on its feet. Where has 
it been seen otherwise, that is democracy evolved first and then capitalism
came?11**
On another occasion when asked whether he was going to change undemocratic 
regulations in labour laws that had been put there by the military government and had 
been criticised by Western Europe ever since, his answer was very illuminating, 
showing his perception o f democracy and freedoms vis-a-vis economic development:
Some o f our labour laws could be in contradiction with the ILO regulations. 
They would warn us in those aspects. But every country has its special 
conditions and problems. Most o f the Western countries have already reached 
industrial development. They had settled most o f their problems, related to 
economy, while they had not got this much freedom. It is easy for a country, 
which had solved everything, to argue about our short-coming. But it should be 
remembered that societies do not accept changes easily. There is the September
12 example which we had experienced. We have to be careful. 1 ^
It seemed that Mr. Ozal and his governments had separated the economic and 
political sides o f liberalism. While preaching economic liberalism, they crudely ignored 
its political components and clung to the political and human rights restrictions that had 
been placed by the military dictatorship as well as becoming in time the biggest 
protector and advocate o f the "September 12 regime".120 Their attitude vis-a-vis 
democratic principles was best demonstrated by their "no"campaign before the 1987 
referendum regarding political rights.121 The complications caused by this attitude in 
relations with the western European countries which had been sensitive in 
developments o f political and human rights in Turkey is self evident and unnecessary to 
dwell upon any further.
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7.3. Tactlessness and Irregularity of Thought and Speech
Another personal characteristics o f Ozal was his tactlessness and "off the cuff' 
speeches. His sudden ideas, announced without consultation with officials or further 
proper thinking, frequently resulted in embarrassment for the foreign ministry which 
was often left alone to deal with the situation afterwards. One o f his biggest blunders 
was o f  course his handling o f the problem o f the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. While 
bargaining was going on behind the scenes by virtue o f Soviet mediation, he, quite 
unexpectedly and apparently outside the knowledge o f foreign ministry, announced in 
the heat o f a political meeting that Turkey would accept every Turk Bulgaria chose to 
send, and was quite untactful, to say the least, in adding:
...they are called Bulgarian pigs. They are sending people without their 
belongings We will take them, we will get their belongings with force. They 
can't do anything. In reality, Zhikov is in limbo. We are pressing, don't worry 
what they have done will stick in their throats. I will force Zhikov to the 
negotiation table. I will bang his head. They are afraid o f the Russians, too. 
They will listen to them. We saw Bulgarian bluff. I told them send the Turks. 
They were not expecting this, they were bewildered. Don't worry, we will take
all o f th e m .^ ^
Naturally all the deals were off after this speech and Bulgaria started to send the
Turkish minority in their thousands every day, which at the end forced Turkey to close
its borders to immigrating Turks, hence another long standing principle o f Turkish
foreign policy was gone.
On another infamous occasion, at a meeting during the 1987 referendum
campaign, when some people among the crowd chanted "blue blue" - the colour o f the
"yes" vote in that referendum - he, quite naturally and apparently without giving any
deal o f attention to the shaky and very emotional character o f Turkish-Greek relations
or that this remark might have instigated the crowd against the Turkish citizens o f
Greek origin, was able to say that blue was also the colour o f Greek flag, thus hinting
123that the blue and therefore "yes" votes were symbolizing treason.
It should be noted that these speeches were made during political rallies and in 
front o f a Turkish audience. Ozal's mistake was in his thought that different messages
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could be delivered to different audiences, in this case domestic and international. In the 
final analysis, however, this attitude frequently resulted in misrepresentation o f Turkish 
positions on the international front. For example after the announcement o f  the EC's 
decision not to consider Turkish application, Ozal, apparently in an attempt to undercut 
possible political criticism at home, went on Turkish Television without actually seeing 
the report to claim that the report's content was "better than expected". After this it 
could not be expected that the official Turkish announcement, which came few days 
later, or Ozal's own appeal during his visit to France that the report was deeply 
disappointing, would carry the intended weight.12^
Similarly, it was noted by Guldemir that resembling mistakes were made by 
Ozal when conveying Turkey's uneasiness about for example the proposed Armenian 
resolutions in the US Congress. He further argued that since the US administration was 
receiving impressions from Ozal that Turkey could leave with a compromise solution in 
the Congress if this was to close the subject forever, they did not see any reason to
IOC
oppose the Armenian resolution when it came up in 1990. The same could be said 
in connection with the Kurdish issue after the Gulf war. It was argued that Ozal again 
gave the wrong signals to the US which, by leading Coalition forces to establish 
security and no-fly zones in northern Iraq, effectively allowed and helped the 
establishment o f a de facto Kurdish state there.126 Another example was given by the 
former Turkish ambassador Coskun Kirca who argued that after the Davos meeting, 
the US and Greek officials received impressions from Ozal's statements that he would 
make bold moves towards the settlement in Cyprus in spite o f opposition from the 
Turkish military and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktas.127 This attitude, which 
raised expectations abroad without foundation because there was no room to 
manoeuvre for a Turkish statesman at the time, inspired Bush to state that the meeting 
o f Ozal, Papandreou and Vasiliu, disregarding Denktas, could solve the problem, and 
further caused apprehensions within Turkey that Ozal was trying to get rid o f the 
Cyprus problem by simply giving it away.128 In the final analysis, these accusations 
were not true, but it was Ozal himself who gave the wrong impressions.
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Apparently, and maybe more significantly for the conduct o f Turkish foreign 
policy, the Turkish foreign ministry was also getting at times wrong signals from Ozal 
about his intentions. Under his rule, the foreign ministry never quite got rid o f the 
popular impression that Ozal was trying to by-pass the foreign ministry and thus could 
not see what he really wanted to do in more broader picture. As a result they could not 
cooperate efficiently with him during either his premiership or presidency. The main 
responsibility for this failure should belong to Ozal who, because o f his style, gave the 
wrong impressions. In reality most o f the ideas and policies pursued by Ozal were quite 
in line with the foreign ministry's policy programming studies. M ost o f the time some 
sort o f  study was already taking place within the ministry before Ozal's personal 
involvement in the specific issues. But once he got involved, because o f his image and 
style, the foreign ministry always found it difficult to admit that they would have done 
the same thing even if Ozal had not intervened. For example, during the Gulf war, quite 
obviously there was no option for Turkey but to follow UN decisions. Ozal's mistake in 
this context was not that he followed the UN decisions, which was also the general 
advice o f  the foreign ministry, but he intervened aggressively without authority and 
prudence. Had he not intervened the foreign ministry might have still taken the same 
decisions since the international environment and Turkey's own historical developments 
were such that Turkey could not have followed any other option regardless o f  who was 
eventually conducting the foreign policy. But the difference between Ozal and the 
foreign ministry's approaches could have still been recognised easily from the more 
subtle and diplomatic tone in official statements and also from more cautious approach, 
a possible wait-and-see attitude, in policy initiations. Therefore the deepest dissension 
between the foreign ministry and Ozal seemed to be confined to differences o f style and
authority not substance.
This observation was also quite true for most o f the time in relations between 
Ozal and foreign ministry officials, who never quite accepted him as "one o f the 
family",129 and because o f his image and style could never get around to  say that they 
would have done the same things had it not been Ozal who publicized the ideas. In
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turn, Ozal himself could not see this fact as well, and accused foreign ministry o f  using 
backward methods, hindering his reforms in foreign policy and opposing him with the 
intention o f preserving their hold over foreign policy initiation. His general dislike 
towards bureaucracy and his frequent by-passes o f official channels also played an 
important role in this officially unexpressed misunderstanding between Ozal and the 
foreign ministry.
7.4. O ne-M an A ttitude and The Usage of Personal Connections
Apart from his tactless remarks, Ozal, during his period in office, also made frequent 
speeches touching on foreign policy issues and offered concessions in specific policy 
matters without actually consulting the foreign office. Foreign ministry officials, for 
example, learned one day from the press together with the rest o f the country that the 
prime minister had suggested four-sided (Greece, Turkey, Greek and Turkish Cypriots)
meetings to solve the Cyprus problem, and also announced the abolition o f visa
• • 130requirements for Greek citizens.
This attitude was explained by some with his precipitateness and pragm atism .
He liked to see concrete results as soon as possible and did not like bureaucratic
procedures which tended to slow down developments. This was expressed by one
M ot.P party leader as "...because his rush. He knows that if he follows official channels
it will take time. But our premier likes to put his ideas into action first thing in the
morning".131 His former mentor, Demirel, offers another evaluation: "He doesn't like
paper work. He likes new things and enjoys experiments. Everyday he wakes up with
new inspirations but doesn't like further calculation. Therefore he usually jumps *to
conclusion. He can take off the plane but can not land it".132 As a result one comes
across many sudden turns and twists in Ozal's daily foreign policy conduct. Fast and
quick decision-making and speeches given in haste were characteristics o f  Ozal's 
133foreign policy.
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This attitude, o f course, also shows, in addition to his desire to obtain results as 
quickly as possible, his low regard not only to bureaucratic red tape but also to legal 
strings. He frequently overrode his legal limits both during his premiership and 
presidency. During his presidency he meddled with government affairs instead o f  acting 
neutral as required by the constitution, and during his premiership he by-passed 
ministers and dealt with undersecretaries and even some times with plain secretaries. 
This attitude was taken by his critics as indicative o f Ozal's lacking o f ideological 
insight and notions o f legality and state.
Although pragmatism was one o f his foreign policy's positive characteristics, 
especially during his premiership when he had more power and freedom o f movement, 
it also admittedly led to differences between Ozal and the foreign ministry from time to 
time since the ideological and legal stands were still constituted as important parts o f 
the latter's policy planning. In this context once he wrote that idealism, being a 
politician, was not his creed and that he tried to "Work out what is possible and feasible
IOC
within the constraints o f a given s y s t e m " . H e  believed that Turkey's long-standing 
foreign policy problems could be solved by pragmatic thinking and rational acting 
instead o f being doctrinaire all the time. In this context, it could be argued that his 
approach towards the Middle East and the Arab world was oriented by his pragmatism 
which dictated that closer relations with the Islamic world could boost Turkey's both 
economic and political credibility, rather than his emotional disposition towards Islam.
Resulting from his pragmatism and desire to achieve quick results, another 
aspect o f Ozal's foreign policy was his insistence on using his personal connections 
instead o f official channels. This was o f course in line with his overall relaxed-style .of 
governing and his distrust against official system. We already mentioned how he by­
passed the bureaucracy using his close associates whenever he did not agree with it. He 
believed that bureaucracy creates formalities in order to expand its influence over 
government machinery and society in general, and argued that the foreign policy 
making should not be left in the hands o f the bureaucrats who were only interested in 
preserving the status quo136 This kind o f action in the foreign policy area, however,
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created not only embarrassments for the foreign ministry but also problems for Turkey 
because o f the peculiarities o f the subjects it deals with.
The famous Davos meeting with the Greek premier Papandreou, for example, 
was primarily arranged outside the official channels, whose opposition was 
overwhelmed by Ozal's desire to meet Greek premier on the grounds that this could be 
the beginning o f a very fruitful relationship between the two countries. It was also 
reported that his connections with Saudi Arabia were realized by his brother Mr. 
Korkut Ozal who had business cooperations with Saudi partners. His meetings with
American bankers and businessmen during his various visits to the US were usually 
arranged by his American friends rather than the foreign ministry. His confidence on
outside channels was so great that when he could not meet Gorbatchev during his visit 
to the USSR while he was prime minister, it was reported that he got angry with the 
foreign ministry officials and said to his entourage "if you have left this to me I would 
have arranged it". ^ ^
Using outside channels was also consistent with his belief that personal contacts 
were very important in foreign relations and for further rapprochement between 
states. ^  Therefore he always tried to use his personal friendship with other world 
leaders, especially George Bush and Margaret Thatcher, to create a more responsive 
attitude towards Turkey. His reliance on personal experience rather than official 
evaluation was evident, for example, in his comment on President Bush' remarks that 
only Ozal, Papendrou and Vasiliou could solve the Cyprus problem, thus excluding 
Denktas from the process. Ozal answered the critics by arguing that he was a friend o f 
president Bush and knew him well, that he probably made a mistake or simply forgeUo 
mention Denktas's name and this should not be interpreted as an official US attitude. O f 
course he, at the time, was disregarding the fact that Bush s remarks were made in a 
press release which is normally prepared beforehand.
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7.5. The Islamic Connection
It was argued that Ozal was an undercover Islamist and wanted to lead the Islamic 
149
World. His remarks o f the sort that "Islamic countries looked at one time to the 
Ottoman Empire as a leader o f the Islamic World. We will lead these countries and this 
will give Turkey more importance in Western minds" only helped to establish these 
allegations. O f course, it was a contradiction for an Islamist to apply for EC 
membership. How could this be explained? According to those who believed that Ozal 
was in reality an Islamist, this was not really a contradiction because, they argued, he 
was a very pragmatic man. He knew that in order to attain a powerful economy it was 
inescapable for Turkey to opt for Western Europe.
I doubt that Ozal feels himself as European. I also doubt that he wants 
European Community membership in the context o f the 100 years o f Turkish 
development process. Personally, I believe he is a Turkish nationalist and a 
Muslim. His orientation towards EC derives from his pragmatism. He thinks 
that EC is a powerful club, thus could provide economic benefits. He doesn't 
see this in ideological context. For Kemalism, on the other hand, becoming a 
part o f Europe is an ideological target. Ozal only wants to be member o f a 
powerful club while governing the country. While feeling inside that Turkey is 
an Islamic country and should be positioned within the Middle East, he thinks
that being an EC member at the same time is a good thing. ^ 4
According to more conspiratorial opponents, he showed the boldness of
applying to EC, because he knew well that the Community would not accept Turkey,
and thus he then could use this refusal to take Turkey into the Middle East, overriding
the opposition o f the military and bureaucracy. And even if Turkey was accepted, they
argued, he hoped that, after strengthening its economy, Turkey could have more easily
145led the Islamic countries.
For others, those who did not believe that Ozal was trying to take Turkey into 
the Islamic world, and for his followers, he was aiming to place Turkey in a unique 
position between the East and the West. This was a favourable option because it would 
have allowed Turkey more manoeuvrability in foreign policy as well as being more 
economically advantageous. They believed that Ozal had reached a personal synthesis
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o f the West and Islam.14^ They say he was a devout Muslim but favoured American- 
style secularism, as opposed to the Turkish version.14^ Daniel Newberry, American 
Consul General in Istanbul during the 1980s was one o f them who argue that:
Turkey turned towards the East because o f economic problems, not because o f 
Islamic or fundamentalist explorations. The willingness o f  the Islamic countries 
to do business with Turkey and Turkey's wish to find support for Cyprus 
problem also played a part in this. ...I don't believe that Ozal is a captain o f a
ship which travels towards the East.148
Although doubts were frequently expressed about how Islamic belief and 
western capitalism could be harmonized within a person or a state, Ozal apparently did 
not see any contradiction when he attempted to explain correlations between Western 
style capitalism and the Islamic market system, thus showing that they were actually 
compatible and complementary not competing:
Both Islamic and Western systems are based, before anything else, on free 
markets. In the Islamic market system, too, the prices are determined by the 
market forces. Both in Islam and in Western capitalism everything works 
according to a minimum number o f laws. In these systems the state only has 
minimal role. Because o f certain organic obstacles which prevent monopolies in 
Islam, Islamic market system is better equipped for free competition. Alms­
giving (zekat) and profit sharing instead o f usury (tefecilik) constitutes this 
obstacles. On the other hand, because o f moral reasons, competition is not as
ruthless and merciless in the Islamic market as in the W est.149 
7.6. C oncluding Rem arks: Visionary or A dventurer?
The officials o f the Turkish foreign ministry were among the worst sufferers o f Ozal's 
one-man rule and de-bureaucratization attempts. Once he established his power 
domestically he did not leave foreign policy to experts either and whenever he faced 
problems in domestic politics, he turned to foreign relations as a way out. For the 
foreign ministry officials, however, his foreign policy style, based on hasty made 
speeches, one-man decision making process, and a tendency to turn to extraordinary 
and irregular tracks, was a major cause for uneasiness.
On the positive side however, he had a general vision o f Turkey in the year 
2000 and also a vision o f foreign ptblicy that should accompany her economic
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development. Existence o f a long term vision and initiative taking attitude were two 
things that had been curiously missing in Turkish foreign policy.
He wanted to lead a country which would have a say in world politics. 
According to him Turkey was one o f the important rings o f the chain o f states in the 
world and Turkey's problems could be tackled best by capturing the world's 
imagination, becoming a leading country in her region, and associating closely with the 
world's leaders. As he regarded the US as an undisputed world leader, there was no 
question in his mind but to lead Turkey to a closer economic and politico-strategic 
cooperation with the US. As a result, he believed, Turkey could claim her place among 
the countries which were building the "new world". Obviously during this process he 
was going to be the leader o f his country.
I f  one looks closely at Ozal's statements during the Gulf war, it becomes clearer 
that Turkey, coached by Ozal, left its long-watched motto o f "peace at home, peace in 
the world". True, the foreign ministry officials and government leadership were still 
arguing that Turkey did not possess any notion o f expansion or adventuring foreign 
policy, but the vigour that had been felt earlier in such statements was somehow not 
there any more. One almost gets a sense o f feeling that Turkey under Ozal's leadership 
could have attempted almost anything in order to attain his vision o f Turkey, that is 
becoming one o f  the leading nations o f the world by reaching a credible regional power 
status.150 It was quite obvious that Ozal would have taken Turkey easily into the Gulf 
war in order to realise his ambition o f Turkey in the year 2000 if he was not opposed 
and prevented by the general opposition within the country and more significantly lack 
o f  support from the military and indeed the government, to o .151
It was one o f the cornerstones o f Ozal's foreign policy philosophy that Turkey
should became a "regional power". He described the situation created by the end o f
cold war and breaking up o f the former Soviet Union as an "historic opportunity" for
the Turks, and urged the TGNA not to "throw away this change which presented itself
152for the first time in 400 years".
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According to him Turkey had to use its geographic position between the East 
and the West positively, and, instead o f acting like a "static bridge" whose only function 
was to  witness things that passed over it, Turkey should become a "connecting bridge" 
where the East and the West would meet and their culture would melt together to 
create a unique Turkish contribution to the World. Only in this way could Turkey solve 
her domestic problems and, at the same time, become a powerful country whose word 
would be listened to and respected in world politics. And this was to make the 21s* 
century truly a Turkish one. * ^
It was this foreign policy understanding that stretched the foreign ministry to its 
limits during his premiership. He used to criticise foreign office bureaucrats and the 
foreign policy they were representing as being passive agents and spectators o f the 
world events that evolved around them. According to him keeping Turkey away from 
international conflicts and problems alone, which meant in the past isolation o f the 
country from the world, would not help to build a powerful Turkey. He believed 
that what Turkey needed was a powerful and determined foreign policy and that foreign 
ministry bureaucrats were not up to it and could not keep pace with his active foreign 
policy. Therefore, when opposed by the foreign ministry, he left them behind and 
conducted Turkish policy during the Gulf war alone. During the process he criticised 
the foreign ministry by arguing that,
Turkey can not continue with its former foreign policy any more. She cannot act 
with the principle o f "bana dokunmayan yilan bin yasasin" (-keep away 
from troubles which are not o f direct concern to us - "live and let live"). To 
retreat into a shell without any intervention when faced by problems is not a 
contemporary idea. There is no such a thing for Turkey as neutrality. We have
1 r / T  %
to be on the side o f the modern world.
Although Ozal's "active foreign policy" notion was more or less in line with the 
foreign ministry's "multi-dimensional foreign policy concept, which was first 
formulated in the mid-1970s, the difference between them, however, was still 
substantial and was not confined only to the foreign ministry's resistance to change. 
While the foreign ministry favoured more detached and risk-free foreign policy based
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on keeping Turkey out o f regional troubles and maintaining a balancing act between 
different states, regions and ideologies in general, Ozal favoured policy initiation 
instead o f  reaction to developments and more involvement in international issues and 
taking part in regional problems, which carried a certain amount o f risk for active 
involvement in military conflicts as well.157 He argued that:
Turkey is not small but a big state in her region. In connection with her 
geographic location Turkey is indeed in a position where regional problems 
inevitably have impacts on her. In this sense it is in Turkey's interest to follow a 
more active policy. Beyond the policies o f independence and reservedness, my
approach is interdependence and cooperation.15^
H e wanted to see a foreign ministry which would create new ideas, open new options 
and initiate new policies. Moreover, in his "active" foreign policy, armed conflict 
became just another tool which could be used "when necessary" to reach higher ideals. 
On the other hand, it was also chilling to hear from Ozal on Television, while listing his 
reasons in favour o f sending troops to the Gulf, that he was the last person who wanted 
to enter the war,
but you make war when necessary. Also there is the education side o f  it. This 
war is not in our control. It is not us who decides for war. But when it happens 
it is better to be there to see the organization o f it. This kind o f opportunity 
would present itself maybe in 100 years, which could be very important for
those who dedicated themselves to this job .159 
Sending troops to a war in which Turkey did not have a say about its start or conduct, 
for the sake o f observing modem military techniques, is at the least a dangerous and 
strange idea and goes a long way to show how far Ozal could have gone had he been 
left alone.
%
According to him, in order to attain big power status Turkey had to think 
big.160 Being able to think big meant to take "calculated risks", as he liked to describe 
it. But this was not to be confused with mindless adventurism. During the Gulf War he 
told an American TV station that he was not gambling; "Had I gambled I would have 
taken Saddam's side. I am an engineer and I approach to my subject with mathematical
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calculation. I am looking at it like a chess game".161 He further elaborated this 
approach on Turkish Television by arguing that
...you don't gamble with such things as war. In the press they talk about 
President's gamble. If  you gamble, there is losing as well. However in this kind 
o f  situation winning should be the only basis, not losing. You have to play 
strong. I mean our play is not a gamble. Why? Because we are on the side o f 
the UN, our whole policy parallels UN. We imposed UN decisions, we are
together with the UN, how could this be a gamble?162
"Think big and move bold" gradually became the watchwords o f his foreign 
policy, especially during his presidency. Thus, just before his death he was criticising 
the government for inaction and being unable to "think big and act swiftly" in the 
Bosnian and Caucasian conflicts.16^
It was also argued that he wanted to be remembered among the world's greatest 
leaders, thus especially after becoming president, he was more interested in world 
politics than specific foreign policy problems o f Turkey, and that Cyprus question, for 
example, was, for him, only one o f the world's problems that needed be solved and was 
important only as far as its connections with other world issues.16^ At one stage it was 
also argued that he wanted to get the Nobel peace price, and to have this, he figured, he 
had to either end the Iran/Iraq war or find a solution to Turkish-Greek disputes. Once it 
became clear that Turkey was unable to mediate a durable peace between Iran and Iraq, 
he turned to Greece and met Papandreou, an action which actually got him a 
nomination for the prize.16^
Gokmen argues that Ozal did not think the world as big as some others thought 
and saw Turkey's place in the world politics bigger than it actually was. Indeed, one 
o f his consistent complaints was that the Turks, entangled with their domestic 
squabbles, did not realise how important Turkey was in the world: "Our biggest 
mistake is to see Turkey smaller than it is. Foreigners think Turkey 3-4 times bigger 
than we do. They consider her as an important regional power. We on the other hand 
think otherwise, and cannot unite against problem s...'.16 This belief led him to
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conclude that Turkey should play a more important role in world politics, and especially 
in the organization o f the "new world order":
I expect to see a beautiful world in the 21s* century...Of course war is not a 
good thing. But if somebody comes and tries to prevent our ideals to reach this 
beautiful world, and if other people, who want to remove this obstacle, come 
forward and ask our help to put this man away, we should give this help. 
Otherwise we become short-sighted and selfish people. I want to ask our 
people, who say "we don't want war", whether they realize, while opposing
war, that we are losing peace? ^
The remaining question in here o f course is whether such noble aspirations are 
compatible, or indeed realizable, with the capabilities o f a middle-power state like 
Turkey, the answer to which could only be given in the longer term and would 
inevitably determine the ultimate judgement on Ozal's foreign policy.
8. Conclusions: Foreign Policy Implications of The Post-1983 Political System
First o f all, especially during the first part o f the transitional period (1983-1987), the 
military's influence over foreign policy as well as domestic politics was evident. The 
agents o f this influence were the President Kenan Evren and the NSC where the 
military was able to convey its views to the government. * ^
The NSC was given an important role by the Constitution in the "formulation, 
establishment and implementation of the national security policy o f the state" (Article 
118). One should not forget that in the Turkish context, the national security policy, in 
addition to "the preservation o f the existence and independence o f the state", included 
maintenance o f "the integrity and indivisibility of the country, and the peace and 
security o f  society", evident references to Kurdish separatism and extreme political 
ideologies, which at this time included religious fundamentalism as well as communism 
and ultra-nationalism. Further, according to the Constitution (Article 118), the Council 
o f Ministers should give "priority" to the recommendations made by the NSC, and most 
o f the time the government had to follow the NSC's advice, especially regarding the 
continuation o f Martial Law. The existence of martial law, and subsequently the state o f
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emergency, long after the return of civilian government, in spite o f pressures from 
outside the country especially from Western Europe, can best be explained by the 
military s insistence on that.*7^ There were also rumours that prime minister Turgut 
Ozal was talked into bombing Kurdish guerrillas inside Iraq by the military.*7 * And it
was the military which restrained him making too great concessions on the Cyprus or
1 77
Aegean issues. Certainly, the 1987 near-war situation with Greece over the Aegean
continental shelf had much to do with PM Ozal's absence from Turkey at the time o f 
1 73the crisis.
Another important side of civil-military relations in the early years o f the third 
Republic was the arrangements and accommodation between President and the Prime 
Minister. Although president Evren talked against Ozal before the elections, afterwards 
they developed a good working relationship. The harmony was so much smoother than 
it had been expected that it has been argued that some sort o f symbolic power sharing 
existed between president Evren and premier Ozal.*7^ In this relationship Ozal's 
responsibilities involved economy and day to day politics while internal security,
17c
defence and foreign policy would be controlled by the President. J It is difficult to 
certify these claims, for both Evren *7^ and Ozal177 denied the existence o f such a 
division o f  labour. The speculations of this nature were, o f course, particularly 
embarrassing for the prime minister and he complained publicly o f not being asked 
questions by journalists about the country's foreign policy. "I am responsible for the 
foreign policy, you know. Why don't you ask some questions about it" said Ozal in one
o f his press conferences.*7**
O f course, it is almost certain that, while trying to manage through the difficylt 
period o f transition, Ozal was particularly careful of not provoking the military by 
insisting on actions to which they would object. 7 In this context President Evren 
emerged as mediator between government and the military. This coordination between 
Evren and Ozal allowed the government to move quicker towards democratization than 
previously expected. It seemed that, as time passed, president Evren became more 
reluctant to use his excessive powers and allowed the government to exercise more
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independence. In fact, in his risky move in June/July 1987 o f appointing a new chief 
o f staff, while ignoring the military's candidate, Ozal secured the support o f President 
Evren against the military. * ^  *
In the foreign policy arena Evren's involvement seems to appear more 
frequently in the early days o f the government. In his memoirs Evren made frequent 
entries between 1983 and 1986 about foreign policy issues and discussions with prime 
minister Ozal during the government's first year, whereas he made fewer entries 
concerning the period o f 1986 to 1 9 8 9 .^^  Keeping in mind that difference could be 
the result o f the number o f important foreign policy issues Turkey had faced during the 
periods, the disparity also goes a certain way to explain the President's involvement in 
foreign policy.
The extensive powers entrusted by the 1982 Constitution to the President,
coupled with his elevation to that post with 92% o f popular vote as well as his
immediate background as the leader o f an all powerful military junta, enabled, and in
fact forced at times, President Evren to take stands and be counted in foreign policy as
well as domestic issues. * ^  O f course the inexperience o f Ozal and his government in
handling issues had its share, at least in the early months, in Evren's visibility in foreign
policy. He explains, for example, in his memoirs that he, though unwilling to attend,
went to the IV ^  Islamic Conference in January 1984 because "Ozal did not know
subjects in depth and therefore he might have accepted some decisions in the summit
184that we should not endorse".
Leaving aside the military's continual involvement in foreign and security 
policies, the political system, which they had devised, also caused its share o f problems
in Turkish foreign policy.
Firstly, the restricted character of the 1983 elections generated criticisms 
outside Turkey, especially from Western Europe, and preconditioned Turkey's future 
democratic development vis-a-vis its relations with those countries. Even before the 
elections, the results were condemned by many Western critics as "undemocratic and 
unrepresentative o f  the Turkish people".185 Most o f the criticism at this point was
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directed at the limited participation in Turkey's domestic political scene after several
parties which wanted to run in the elections were disqualified by the military. As a
result, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council o f Europe aired its suspicions about
forthcoming elections and advised against the return o f Turkish parliamentarians from
the new parliament to the Council's Assembly. It also instructed the Committee o f
Ministers o f  the Council o f Europe to begin proceedings in January 1984 for the
complete exclusion o f Turkey. During the discussions, it was argued that the new
Turkish constitution had not been applied democratically, that new laws had not been
freely discussed, and that the military junta had curtailed the formation o f political 
1 87parties. Though the victory of Motherland Party in the elections rather than NDP or
PP lent credibility to the elections and pleased the Western governments, it was still
unacceptable for Turkey's critics in western public opinion or organizations such as the
Council o f Europe since it looked at this time only like the lesser o f three evils. ^
Therefore, it was not surprising that the Council of Europe at first strongly resisted the
idea o f letting Turkish parliamentarians take up their seats in its parliamentary
assembly. ^ 9 Although they were, finally, allowed to take up their seats, 199 the
European critics continued to concentrate on dissatisfaction with Turkey's "progress
toward democracy"191, and further problems were aroused when Turkey wanted to
192claim the presidency o f the Council o f Europe from January 1985 onwards.
The European Community, too, did not hasten to normalize its relations with 
Turkey, an attitude which caused a Turkish journalist to comment in June 1984 that 
Turkish - European Community relations were at "dead point".193 The mutual distrust 
were such that, even a year after the 1983 elections, the European Parliament could still 
advise the Council o f Ministers to keep relations with Turkey on halt.
Although the victory o f Motherland Party in the March 1984 local elections, in 
which all the existing political parties were allowed to participate, was interpreted by 
many as conforming Ozal's popular mandate and allowed him to claim his legitimacy in 
a democratic system, his lenient attitude toward political, legal and social restrictions 
and the continued state o f emergency maintained criticism at a high level. Also the
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repeated allegations o f torture and human rights abuses were o f great concern to both 
Turkey's critics and policy-makers.195
A celebrated incident that immediately captured widespread attention in the
W est and which also caused great embarrassment to the government, was the martial
law authorities' decision to prosecute 56 intellectuals, soon after the March 1984 Local
Elections, who were accused of being the "ringleaders" o f some 1300 scholars, writers,
artists, politicians, who petitioned the President for wide ranging democratic freedoms
and an amnesty for the political prisoners.196
However, it was not in the monopoly o f the martial law authorities to  cause
embarrassment for Turkey in the international arena. The government, too, had its
share. In June 1985, the government brought forward and, despite the fierce opposition
from all quarters, passed a new police bill which gave excessive powers to  the 
197police. What complicated the matter, as far as Turkey's foreign relations were
concerned, was the involvement of the EEC representative in Ankara, Mr. Gwyn
M organ, who had warned several deputies and journalists "informally" that enactment
o f  the bill in its original form could deliver a severe blow to Turkish hopes o f  eventually
joining the EEC. Prime minister Ozal immediately denounced both Mr. Morgan for
interference in Turkey's internal affairs, and Mr. Claude Cheysson, the EEC
198Commissioner for external relations, who came to Mr. Morgan's defence. The row 
was only cooled down by Mr. Morgan's extended leave from Turkey.
The responses o f the Ozal governments to this European critics were not 
fundamentally different from those of the military regime. They, too, argued that the 
problems o f Turkish democracy were exaggerated in the West, and denied the 
allegations o f human rights abuses and torture by arguing similarly that they were 
originated by those who did not want to see a powerful Turkey taking up its rightful 
place among the democracies o f western Europe. Mr. Ozal even defended the military 
regime's record on human rights, claiming that it had been too much exaggerated by 
Amnesty International".199 The visible difference was only on the style they used not in 
the substance; Turgut Ozal was more "political" than the supposedly "indifferent" and
247
bitter Evren. He recognized the importance o f the human rights and torture issues 
on the normalization o f Turkish - European relations. Consequently, while still denying 
most o f  the allegations, Ozal accepted individual application to the European 
Commission o f Human Rights, in January 1987, albeit with many reservations.201 
Turkey also endorsed the European-wide convention against torture in 1988. Foreign 
Minister Mesut Yilmaz told the state radio that the decision to sign the convention 
signalled the "government's determination to protect and progress human rights".202
This more conciliatory attitude, despite the fact that many restrictions on 
individual rights continued to exist within the country and allegations o f torture and 
abuses o f human rights persisted all the time,203 allowed Turgut Ozal to claim Turkey's 
respect for human rights, and thus helped to put Turkey's relations with Western 
Europe on the right track. In December 1985, for example, five West European 
countries which had complained against Turkey to the Human Rights Commission o f 
the Council o f Europe dropped their charges in return for promises from the Ozal 
government that martial law would be entirely lifted within 18 months, that some sort 
o f  amnesty would be introduced, and that visitors from the Council o f Europe would be 
admitted to monitor progress.204 And soon after the 1986 by-elections, which further 
proved that a Western definition o f democracy was slowly returning to the country, 
relations with the EC resumed after a six-year break.205 And this was followed in 
November by Turkey's election to the chairmanship o f the Council o f  Europe's 
Ministerial Committee,200 which was viewed as recognition o f progress towards full
democracy, although misgivings about Turkey's position on human rights were thought
• 707 to remain.
Though Turkey evolved towards democracy all the time during the 1980s, the
democratization process was yet to be completed when Mot.P lost the elections in
1991. Despite the fact that most o f the lost ground, as far as political and human rights
concern, was recovered especially after the 1987, the criticisms continued albeit
sporadically, over such issues as minority rights, academic autonomy, ban on
208
Communist parties, hunger strikes, maltreatment o f prisoners etc.
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Another important result of the political system, forcibly created in 1983, was 
the credibility loss o f the official opposition parties soon after the elections, which 
allowed the emergence o f extra-parliamentary opposition parties, and thus impeded 
powerful parliamentary checking over the government's foreign policy as well as its 
other policies. This continued to be the pattern even after the 1987 elections because o f 
the large majority that the Mot.P was able to obtain in the elections through the 
changes in the election process.
M oreover, the legitimacy discussion of the new system and the parties, and 
concentration o f the major political forces in the country about that issue, left foreign 
policy, at least until 1987 when the alliances within party system seemed to be settling 
down, in the hands o f government leaders who most of the time were able to keep it 
unchecked by the public. O f course, apart from the preoccupation o f public opinion and 
pressure groups with domestic politics, the actual legal arrangements, as mentioned 
earlier, kept the government for some time free from public pressure on foreign policy.
Finally, the political system created by the military regime affected Turkey's 
prospective foreign policy, as its domestic politics, by opening the way to Turgut Ozal 
to become first prime minister and then the President. The examination o f his role in the 
changing patterns o f Turkish foreign policy confirmed that, once Mr. Ozal diverted the 
military's pressure from his back, the system, on the one hand, allowed him effectively 
to  challenge the traditional grounds of foreign policy making, but, on the other hand, 
created tension within the policy-making bodies o f the state.
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permission or were discouraged to form a party. See Anilar, Vol. IV, pp. 25, 305 and 
312-13; Dogan, op. cit., pp. 228-230.
. The NDP was initiated under the leadership o f PM Ulusu before passing it over to 
Sunalp. The PP was established under the leadership o f PM s permanent 
undersecretary Mr. Necdet Calp who had also been personal secretary o f Ismet Inonu. 
And Mot.P was organized by Turgut Ozal who, unlike his earlier master and 
benefactor, Demirel, worked closely with the military and was a government minister 
until his resignation in 1982. See Dogan, op. cit., p. 206.
37 . In his speech he described Turgut Ozal as irresponsible and urged his audience to 
vote for an administration which would continue the policies o f the NSC; "If you are 
happy with the activities o f the NSC over these three years, I am convinced that you 
will bring to power an administration which will continue the Council's policies and 
will not again push the country into confusion". See Milliyet, November 5, 1983.
38 Ibid
3 .^ Info Turk, October 1983.
40. fo r  Sunalp's evaluation o f the results in the first parliamentary group meeting o f  
the NDP on 25 November 1983 see Dogan, op. cit., pp. 413-420.
41. This resentment was quite rightly captured by the opinion polls, publication o f  
which banned later on preciously for that reason. According to a poll, which could not 
printed in Turkey, in the first week o f the November 1983 only %16.6 o f a sample o f  
voters expressed their support for the NDP, whereas %21.3 supported the PP and 
%39.15 said they would vote for the Mot.P. The Times, November 5, 1983, p. 5. 
Also, it should be noted that, as the election campaign progressed, the military, as well 
as people, did not like the Sunalp's militaristic and authoritarian style and arrogance. 
He acted during the elction campaign as if he was already elected as PM though his 
appearance in public and on TV was so poor. Similarly, although the military clearly 
prefered a centrist party, they wanted to see somebody like Ulusu as PM who was both 
"general and gentleman" not Sunalp who appeared as "general and hardliner". See 
Dogan, op. cit.. pp. 411-413.
42. Mortimer, E., "Conservatives Win Despite Appeal By Evren", The Times, 
November 8, 1983, p. 7.
43 Ozal's cabinet was approved by President Evren on 13 December 1983. He read his 
government programme in the TGNA on 19 December and received confidence vote 
on 24 December by 213 to 115 with 65 abstentions. Keesing's, June 1984, pp, 32925- 
32926. For the debate o f the programme in the parliament see TBMM Tutanak Dergisi 
(Minutes o f the TGNA), Term: 17, Year: 1, Vol. 1 (5),December 22, 1983, (Hereafter 
referred as TBMM-TD).
44. Guardian. November 3, 1983; The Economist, November 10, 1983.
45. Abadan-Unat, pp. cit., p. 17.
46 Ibid.
47. Briefing. December 30, 1991, p. 14.
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48
. The generals were particularly furious when 150 former JP MP joined together to 
GTP with much excitement. Anilar, Vol. IV, pp. 95-104.
49 Keesing's, July 1986, pp. 34496-34497.
50 lhfi_ECQllQmist, May 17, 1986, "Party Games", p. 69; Keesing's, Ibid., p. 34497.
There had been some lingering doubts about the legitimacy o f the government 
since it had been widely claimed that Mot.P would not have won the 1983 elections if  
it had to face SDP and TPP, both were prevented by the generals to run. Thus, the 
March 1984 local elections acquired the character o f an early referandum on Mr. Ozal 
as well as those parties. See the Economist, March 31, 1984, "A Boost For Ozal", p. 
56.
52 Ibid.
53 . For the results o f  1984 local elections see State Statistic Institute, Mahalli Tdareler 
Secim Sonuclari, 1985 (The Results o f the Local Elections, 1985).
54 Abadan-Unat, op. cit., p. 24.
55. The Economist. March 31, 1984, p. 58.
The Article 84 states that "the loss o f membership by deputies shall be decided by 
an absolute majority...in respect o f deputies who...resign from their party in order to 
join another party, or take up a ministerial post in the Council o f Ministers...".
^7 . Dodd, op. cit., p. 97.
For results o f 1987 Referandum see Resmi Gazete, September 12, 1987, No. 
19572. After the referandum Demirel assumed the leadership o f TPP, Erbakan o f the 
RP, Turkes o f  the NAP and Ecevit o f  the DLP.
59 State Institute o f Statistics, Results o f General Election o f  Representatives,
2 9 . 1 , i m  No. 1273, pp.2-3.
60. As a result o f  the new election system deviced by the Ozal government to ensure 
MP winning, serious imbalances appeared between the percentage o f votes the political 
parties received and the seats they obtained in the parliament. The Mot.P obtained 
64.9% o f the seats in the Assembly with only 36.3% o f all votes. Ibid.
^1. Yesilada, op. cit., pp. 371-372.
62 Before the elections prime minister Ozal implied that he would resign if the popular 
support drop to an unsatisfactory level (=~%30). See Cemal, H., Ozal Hikayesi (Story 
o f  Ozal), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1989), pp. 11-16 and 279-284.
63. Milliyet, June 15, 1989. The poll was conducted by the "Konda Arastirma Sirketi", 
May 26-28,’ 1989.
^4 . Milliyet, November 1, 1989, p. 1.
65. See Vali, F, Bridge Across the Bosprus: The Foreign Policy o f Turkey (Baltimore,
London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), pp. 72-73.
66. For example in 1979 PM Demirel was unable to press ahead with the desired 
Turkish application for full membership to the EEC because o f minority status o f his 
government in the parliament, and the well-known opposition o f NSP for such a move.
67 This was particularly true for the Motherland Party which could not attract many 
experienced politicians at first because it had widely believed that it would not be
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allowed to run in the elections, and, even if it did so, would not get too far. See 
Dogan, op. cit ., pp. 390-391; Heper, H., "The State, Political Party and Society in 
Post-1983 Turkey", Government and Opposition Vol. 25 (1), 1990, p. 332. It was 
also arqued elsewhere that the Motherland Party was largely composed o f opportunists 
"who jumped on to Mr. Ozal's bandwagon" in autumn 1983, when he emerged as the 
likely election winner. The Economist, June 16, 1984, "Growing Pains", p. 47.
Kalaycioglu, E., "The 1983 Parliament in Turkey; Changes and Continuities" in 
Heper, M. & Evin, A. (eds.), State.... Democracy and The Military; Turkey in the 1980s 
(Berlin, New York: de Gruyter, 1988), p. 51. The first figure includes all the deputies 
who served in all o f the national parliamentary bodies, including 1961 Constituent and 
1981 Consultative Assemblies. If we exclude the above-mentioned assemblies from our 
calculation, it would give the result as only %9 o f all the deputies being served 
previously in the multi-party parliaments.
^9. The fact that the author refers to a common resentment among the deputies being 
designated as "professional politician" shows the strength o f pyschological low-esteem 
o f being politicians after the 1980 experience. Ibid ,p. 59, footnote 21.
70 . For findings and their interperation see Ibid., pp. 54-60.
71 . Heper, op. cit., p. 332. Also for more general question o f party loyalty in the 1983 
parliament see Kalaycioglu, Ibid., pp. 56-58.
7^. For the analysis o f the turnover pattern in the 1983 Assembly see Kalaycioglu, 
ibid., pp. 49-51.
7 .^ Ibid., p. 61.
74. The three were; the general debate on 11.2.1986 about government's general 
foreign policy; the general debate, in closed session, on 13.2.1985 about repression o f  
Turkish minority in Bulgaria; and the general debate on 2.9.1986 about Turkish 
military operations in Iraq, which tabled earlier by the government. There were none 
accepted in the 1987 Assembly. See TBMM-TD. 17-1, 2 & 4, above mentioned dates.
75. TBMM-TD. 18-1,5.
76. TBMM-TD. 11.2.1986 / 17-3, 25 (65), pp. 20-29.
77. For selective complaints see TBMM-TD. 17-3, 23 (54), p. 45, 10.1.1986; 17-4, 35 
(70), pp. 164-165, 22.8.1986; 18-1, 3 (10), pp. 50-52, 5.1.1988; and 18-3, 25 (60), p. 
354, 14.9.1989.
7 .^ See, for example, TBMM-TD. 18-3, 40 (95), 23.5.1990.
79. See reasoning o f the request for general questioning by Suleyman Demirel, MP* 
and his 59 friends in TBMM-TD. 21.5.1991, 18-4, 61 (119), pp. 25-27.
80 The views o f  political parties deduced from various issues o f daily Milliyet and 
weekly Newspot as well as from the publications o f Directorate General o f Press and 
Information, Political Structure o f Turkey (Ankara: 1985), phamphlet; Turkey; and 
o ffic ia l handbook (Ankara: 1990); Turkey 1982 (Ankara: 1987). Also Dogru Yol 
Parti si T1l71,k ve Program! (The Institutional Law And the Programme o f the True 
Path Party), (Ankara: Tipar, n.d.); SHP Istanbul II Orgutu (SDPP Istanbul Provincial 
O r g a n isa tio n ) Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti: Program  Tuzuk (Social Democrat 
People's Party; Programme and The Institutional Law), (Istanbul: n.d.); Electoral 
Manifestos o f  the Motherland Party for the November 6, 1983 and November 29, 
1987 Genenral Elections.
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81 . For a summary o f the views o f political parties on membership see Bozkurt, V., 
.Turkiy e -Ve . Avrupa Toplulugu (Turkey and the European Community), Altematif 
Universite, No. 20 (Istanbul: Agac Yayincilik, 1992), pp. 34-43.
82
. Although it could be argued that farmers form the biggest group o f  pressure in 
Turkey as far as prices and taxes for agricultural produce concern, since it is an 
unorganized pressure group and their influence do not fell onto foreign policy o f  the 
country, they together with the military, which much attention diverted to in the 
previous chapter, are omitted from discussion here.
83 .For the difficulties o f  running a newspaper during the military regime and various 
examples o f  the ridicules prohibitions see Cemal, H., 12 Eylul Gnnliigu; Demokrasi 
Korkusu (12 September Diary; Fear o f Democracy), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1986).
84 . See Bozkurt, op. cit.; and Turkish Union o f Chambers o f  Commerce and Industry 
and Commodity Exchanges, Turkiye, Avrupa-Turkiye Iliskilerinin Nasil Goruyor? 
(How Turkey Sees Turkish-EC Relations), (Ankara: Tobb, 1989).
oc
. Much o f the findings here are drawn mainly from the personal observation o f  
various Turkish dailies during the period and supported by a through-search o f daily 
Milliyet. Also Kilercioglu, O., Basinda Pis Politika, 1984-1987 (Foreign Policy in the 
Press), (Ankara: Nurol Matbaacilik A.S., n.d.) and various bulletins o f Directorate 
General o f Press and Information, labelled as Yerel Basin ve P is Politika, (Local Press 
and Foreign policy) were consulted.
8*\ See, for example, Newspot, September 7-10, 1984, "Fundamental Principles 
Shaping Turkey's Foreign Policy"; Milliyet, July 20-22, 1991, "Kibris Dosyasi" (Cyprus 
File); Milliyet, September 27-October 1, 1992, "ABD'nin Kurt Karti" (Kurdish Trump 
o f  the USA).
87. It was later argued that the ministership o f Mr. Halefoglu was proposed by 
president Evren and accepted by Ozal. See Yavuz Donat, Qzalli Yillar (Years With 
Ozal), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1988), p. 43. In this context it is significant to note that 
Mr. Halefoglu was, at the time o f his appointment, about to retire as ambassador to 
M oscow and was not known personally by Turgut Ozal. It was also reported in the 
Turkish press that Mr. Halefoglu, through his son, had connections with ENKA, a 
holding cooperation whose owner Mr. Sarik Tara was a close associate o f Mr. Ozal 
and was reported to be influential even in the policy making. See Nokta, 5-11 
November 1984, p. 15.
88 The most important reasons for docility and personal attachment o f the Mot.P MPs 
to their leaders were derived from their election process. Mot.P, which had very littlfe 
intra-party democracy, never used preliminary election system to determine its 
candidates. All the candidates were chosen by Ozal himself usually on the basis o f  
personal attachment rather than achievement. Being elected because o f Ozal's wish and 
favour in a sense later affected personality and attitudes o f the MPs. The same 
argument was also put forward by Mot.P's deputy chairman Mr. H. Ozalp. See his 
interview by Emin Colasan in Hurriyet. "Pazar Sohbeti", March 13, 1988.
89. Gungor Uras, Nokta, December 26, 1983 - January 1, 1984, p. 48. The literal 
translation o f the phrase he used was Ozal Lovers Society (Ozal Sevenler Demegi). 
Similarly Yavuz Gokmen, Ozal Sendromu (Ankara: Verso, 1992), p. 110 argues that 
all the ministers and Mot.P MPs in the early days were worshipping Ozal. He also 
records an occasion when Minister o f Culture Mukerrem Tascioglu, being asked
256
whether Mot.P MPs loved Ozal very much, told to him "how could I not love him. I 
was selling water pipes in the Persembe Market, he made me minister'', p. 100. One- 
man show character o f the Mot.P was also so evidently demonstrated by the fact that, 
apart from Mr. M Kececiler, Ozal's close associate, and Mr. H. Dogan, Ozal's nephew, 
the 30-odd founders o f  the Mot.P learned the name and the emblem o f the party they 
were establishing just before the official establishment day. The name and the emblem 
o f  the party was chosen by Turgut Ozal himself and kept like a "state secret".See 
Yalcin Dogan, op. cit., 332-333.
9 .^ Betul Uncular, Iste Boyle Bir Meclis (Such is the Parliament), (Ankara: Bilgi 
Yayinevi, 1991), p. 21. About lack o f intra-party democracy and one-man rule o f  Ozal 
in Mot.P see Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, pp. 126-132; Gokmen, ibid., pp. 143-144.
9 .^ For example after the 1987 elections Mehmet Barlas wrote in the daily Gunes 
editorial on December 22, 1987; "...take the new ministers in this latest Cabinet list, 
they learned their appointments only at the last minute like national lottery winners. 
Even themselves cannot explain who is appointed where on what grounds". Even 
Ozal's own brother Korkut Ozal, who was not active in politics at the time, was critical 
o f his anti-democratic actions within Mot.P; "There is a party, and there is its leader 
Turgut Ozal. Anything and everything which have been done belongs to him. Nobody 
else is responsible either for rights or wrongs...The last word always rests with him. 
For instance I heard and could not believe that in the latest local elections all the 1300 
mayoral candidates were chosen by central committee, that is Turgut himself. Can you 
imagine...". Interview by Nokta, April 23, 1989, p. 15.
9^. Ozal's belief in his one-man hold over the party was so self-evident in these 
remarks regarding party management; "Nobody knows what I do". Hurriyet, August 
14, 1989, p. 14. These were o f course quite unfortunate remarks for a leader o f a 
governing party in a supposedly democratic system.
93 This was criticised even by the high ranking party officials, normally close to Ozal. 
See an interview by Emin Colasan with two Mot.P Central Committee members, Mr. 
E. Asik and Mr. A. Pehlivanli in Hurriyet, January 22, 1989.
94 por ^  analysis by Mr. Mehmet Kececiler, strong man o f the Mot.P constituencies, 
see an interview by M. Yasar Bostanci, Yeni Asir, April 1989. The existence o f  
"Hanedan" was even reported in the foreign press. See for example Financial Times, 
December 12, 1988; The Economist. November 6, 1987; Reuters, February 1989. For 
the analysis o f Hanedan phenomenon and its members see Cemal, Qzal Hikayesi, pp. 
136-153; Gokmen, op. cit.. pp. 125-127.
%
95. It was reported that most o f the ministers did not know what was happening at the 
time or what role these undersecretaries were going to play in the longer run, because 
o f  the fact that most o f  the ministers had not had any previous political experience and 
were not aware o f the working principles o f Turkish governmental system. It was 
argued that in the first cabinet meeting ministers, who were still in shock o f both being 
elected as MPs as also being suddenly elevated to ministerial posts, were forced by 
Turgut Ozal to sign empty government decrees which were later filled up by him and 
used in his early-day sweeping bureaucratic reforms. Moreover, it was later alleged 
that signing o f empty decree papers became a frequent process in the Mot.P 
governments whose ministers were required, upon their appointment to submit their 
undated resignation to Mr. Ozal to be used in an appropriate time. See Cemal, ibid., 
pp. 122-125.
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9*\ Feroz Ahmad, "The Transition to Democracy in Turkey", Third World Quarterly 
Vol. 7 (2), April 1985, p. 219. This was seen by some as a step towards American 
style centralization in which under-secretaries, appointed by the political regime, not 
the ministers were in control. See Yalcin Dogan, Cumhuriyet, "Bakanlar UstU 
Mustesar" (Above-ministers undersecretary), December 16, 1983. Correctness o f his 
early predictions became all too apparent only towards the end o f  1989 when, while 
the tenure o f  president Evren was coming to end, prime minister Ozal started to talk 
about desirability o f  establishing an American style presidency in Turkey.
97 . In an interview by Guneri Civaoglu, Gunes. October 2, 1986.
98 . The right to use governmental decrees with a force o f  law was formally put into 
the constitution after the 1971 military intervention. However, it was not widely used 
until Mot.P government which at the end was accused o f abusing this power by 
extensive usage. Until September 1980 (9 years) only 34 (about 11.5% o f the total) 
governmental decrees were issued, and during the military regime between 1980 and 
1983 91 (31.1%) decrees were used. However during Ozal's first five years in the 
government he issued 161 (56.2%) governmental decrees. If we consider the fact that 
during the same period only 354 full-fledged law were enacted by the parliament, the 
extensive usage o f decrees (about 1 decree per 2 laws) by the Mot.P becomes obvious. 
Moreover, 63% o f  those 161 decrees had not yet by March 1989 been brought before 
the Parliament to receive approval. These figures were taken from a research by SDPP 
MP Mr. Cahit Tutum, cited in TBMM-TD. 18-2, 29 (100), 13 June 1989, pp. 41-45.
99 Cemal, op. cit p. 113; His admiration towards various points o f American system 
became a main subject to a book by Guldemir, U., Texas - Malatya (Istanbul: Tekin 
Yayinevi, 1992).
100 Gokmen, Ozal Hikayesi. p. 175; His lack o f in-depth understanding o f  American 
culture was effectively demonstrated by Guldemir, ibid, pp. 54-72.
101. Geycay Saylan's evaluation in Arcayurek, C., Nami 864 Rakimli Tepe; Cankaya 
(So-called 864 Altitude Hill; Cankaya), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1989), pp. 160-161.
1^2 Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi. p. 72 argues that towards the end o f 1984 premier Ozal 
started to tell to opposing Evren, regarding firstly economic and later on political 
subjects, that those were the "government's appreciations".
A  survey published by daily Milliyet on January 15, 1984 showed that Turkish 
people put the economic recovery on the top o f their priority list.
Cemal, Ozal hikayesi, p. 288.
105. IbidL, p. 114.
106. Newspot. "President Ozal and His Vision o f  Turkey in World Affairs; Quotations 
in Memoriam", April 21, 1993, p. 4.
107 In an interview on Turkish TV-1 on January 18, 1991, by Ugur Dundar. See the 
text o f the interview, released by TRT, Cumhuibaskaiu Turgut Ozal lie 18 Peak 1991 
Tarihinde TV-Vde Hodri Mevdan Programinda Yapilan Mulakat pp. 10-11. Hereafter 
referred as "TRT".
Cemal, op. cit.. p. 288,
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. In a meeting with journalists and businessmen in Istanbul on September 16, 1984. 
The journalist was Hasan Pulur and printed this argument in Hurriyet September 19 
1984.
110 Gunes, M arch 25, 1985.
111. Gunes, M arch 23, 1984.
112 During his visit to the "Society o f Parliamentary Correspondents" on April 10, 
1987, cited in Cemal, Qzal Hikayesi, p. 291. According to 1988 figures, Turkish 
military expenditures reached 30% o f National budget.
IhidL, p. 291.; Guldemir, Qp. ci t ,  p .316 ; N ur Batur, Cumhuriyet, April 19, 1993, 
p. 17; Derya Sazak, Milliyet, July 20, 1991, "Interview with Ozal".
* Gunes, M arch 23, 1984, cited in Cemal., ibid., p. 294.
115 . One o f the more important examples was the Turkish effort to obtain Swedish 
neutrality in the Council o f Europe during the debates and vote about Turkish 
presidency in 1984. It was estimated before the vote that Turkey was going to lose 
with one vote. In the event Turkey's Stockholm representative, with direct instructions 
from prime minister Ozal, hinted to Swedish authorities that they might lose a multi­
billion dollar contract concerning the establishment o f  a light-metro system in Istanbul. 
It may have been just a casual connection but the Swedish vote was at the end turned 
to  neutral from negative and Turkey obtained the presidency. This connection was 
mentioned later by Turgut Ozal himself in a dinner with a group o f journalists and 
writers in Istanbul in September 1985. Cited in Cemal Ozal Hikayesi, p. 115.
SamiKohen, Milliyet, "AlemBizi D ahaBuyukGoruyor", April, 20, 1993.
^ 2  This phenomenon is looked into more closely in Chapter Seven.
In a luncheon with a group o f journalists in October 1986 in Istanbul. Quoted in 
Cemal, op. cit.. p. 307.
119 Interview by Hasan Cemal and Yalcin Dogan in Cumhuriyet, October 28, 1987.
120 During the eight years o f  Mot.P government none o f  the anti-democratic 
regulations put into effect by the military regime were corrected, despite the fact that 
there was a broad political consensus on this. There were two exceptions for this; the 
"Police Authority Law" which actually increased police powers with more restrictions 
on people's rights and the "election law" which was amended several times to give 
M ot.P winning edge in the elections.
121. Their double-faced and opportunist attitude forced one eminent Turkish political 
sociologist to  ask herself "who is liberal in Motherland Party?". Her answer is self 
explanatory; "...they call liberal those who let his wife to drink alcohol, sent his 
children to  private schools, travels to Europe, in short they call normal urban life as 
liberal. This party campaigned 'no' in the referendum and nobody in the party rebelled 
against it. Hence there is no liberal in this party. In my understanding this party is not 
even modem, but only conservative". N ur Vergin, Nokta, May 1, 1988, p. 27. Ozal's 
attitude towards political rights in general and during the referendum campaign in 
particular is dealt in detail in Cemal, Ozal Hikayasi, pp. 205-221; and Erbil Tusalp’s 
T arih le  Y u z lesm e; Evreninki mir Ozalinki mi? (Confrontation with History: Evren's or 
Ozal's?), (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1992) is wholly dedicated to  exposing similar 
attitudes o f  Ozal and the military government towards human rights, torture and 
democratization issues in Turkey.
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122. M illiyet, July 1989, cited in Cemal, op. cit., pp. 105-106 (Date not given).
*23. Cemal, ibid., p. 85
^2^. Cumhunyet, "Disislerinde Aciklama Krizi" (The Announcement Crisis in the 
Foreign Affairs), February 17, 1990.
125 For further evaluation o f impression given by Ozal to  American officials about 
Armenian efforts to pass a resolution to commemorate alleged Armenian massacre o f 
1919 see Guldemir, op. cit., pp. 260-293 where he quotes Ozal saying that Armenian 
efforts were like "one-shot bullet. Once fired it would be all over and we can get along 
with our business as usual".
126 Turan Yavuz, ABD'nin Kurt Karti (USA's Kurdish Card), (Istanbul: Milliyet 
Yayinlari, 1993), pp. 149-218; Guldemir, ibid., pp. 396-418.
1 7 7
1 . Personal Interview, April 5, 1993, Ankara, Turkey.
^2^. Cited in Guldemir, ibitL, p. 456.
129. Ibid, pp. 122-124 argues that foreign ministry officials with their highly 
sophisticated traditional educations and western minds neither liked Ozal and his 
"arabesque" style, as eastern culture is wrongly labelled in Turkey, both in life and in 
government, nor entirely trusted his intentions about the future o f the state, secularism, 
or anything related with foreign affairs.
*3^. Cemal argues that the abolition o f visa was initially suggested to prime minister 
Ozal by a newspaper owner, Mr. Haldun Simavi, before his second press conference 
where he made the announcement. The reason was apparently being that o f "calling a 
press conference to announce goodwill is not good enough by itself, you have to have 
something important to say or to give". See Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, p. 107.
13 *. Yavuz Donat, Tercuman. "Vitrin", May 1, 1987.
132 Interview with Hasan Cemal in June 1988, reprinted in Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, pp. 
107-108 and 110.
133. Guldemir, op. cit.. p. 111.
l 3^. See an interview with A.B. Kafaoglu in Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, p. 116; Guldemir, 
ibid., pp. 51-52 comments that he "never got the impression that Ozal had a substantial 
idea about state. The two notions that were lacking in Ozal were law and state 
philosophies. Absence o f these notions were preventing Ozal from becoming a true 
'statesman'...It cannot be forgiven that an intelligent man like Ozal did not know these 
things". Both Cemal and Guldemir cite the number o f annulled laws during the Mot.P, 
governments as a proof o f Ozal's lack o f legal-state notion. Between December 1983 
and April 1989 37 laws were annulled by the Constitutional court, which was a high 
proportion in Turkish standards. See Cemal, ibid., p. 117. Also a remark made by Ozal 
during a debate in the Parliament about the constitutionality o f a proposed law was 
taken by many as self-explanatory; "What could happen had the Constitution breached 
once?"
135. Ozal,T., Turkey's Path to Freedom and Prosperity", The Washington Quarterly, 
Vol. 10 (4), Autumn 1987, p. 61.
136. Guldemir,Q{L_ciL, p. 106.
*32 . It was reported that the preliminary soundings for a dialogue were earned out by 
Mr. Sarik Tara, a close friend o f Ozal and a leading businessman, with a Greek
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businessman. Ibid., p. 108 and Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi p. 290. I f  this was true it makes 
more sense that the meeting took in Davos during a conference organized by the 
World Economic Forum, whose director Swedish professor Karl Schwapp was also an 
executive committee member o f  Mr. Tara's ENKA holding's.
Cemal, ibid., p. 119. Guldemir, ibid., p. 108
1 on
Among his American friends, Mr. Frank Zarb, associate partner o f  an American 
firm Lazare Frere, Mr. John H. Berson, director o f Turkish branch o f  Citibank between 
1981 and 1984, and Mr. Rodney Wagner, deputy president o f Morgan Guaranty which 
undertook the evaluation o f  Turkish privatisation, were named several times in the 
Turkish press. For further references see Cemal, ibid 3 pp. 118-122, who had 
interviews with them in May 1988, and Guldemir, ibid 3 pp. 107-110.
140 Cemal, ibid., p. 119.
141. N ur Batur, Cumhuriyet, April 19, 1993.
14^. Aybay, A, Sabah, November 10, 1983; Selcuk, I., Cumhuriyet, May 21, 1987.
143. The Wall Street Journal, December 5, 1983.
144 Steinbach, U., Interview with Ikibine Dogru Dergisi, May, 21, 1993, p. 20.
^4~\ See Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi, pp. 179-180 and 17-20 where he repeated his 
interview with an American diplomat who put forward this argument.
*4^. See for example interviews by Guldemir with American scholars Graham Fuller 
and Edward Luttwak in Guldemir op. cit., pp. 372-386.
*4^. Yalcin Dogan, Cumhuriyet, December 15, 1986.
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CHAPTER SIX
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE RESURGENCE OF ISLAM IN TURKEY1
1. Introduction
During the 1980s Turkey's foreign policy drew markedly closer to the Islamic World, 
while, quite simultaneously, an Islamic reassertation was taking place in the domestic 
scene. The most important aspect o f these developments, for our purposes, lies behind 
the question o f whether the new orientation in foreign policy was a deliberate extension 
o f Islamic revival within the country, or whether the revival was a natural outcome o f 
Turkey's warmer relations with her Middle Eastern Islamic neighbours? The simple 
truth was that both developments were taking place at the same time and constantly 
reinforced one another. The query remains then as to the relative influence o f each of 
these developments on the other, and vis-a-vis other factors that brought about 
Turkey's new orientation in foreign policy. Since the "other factors" fell into the interest 
o f other chapters, we shall only deal here with the scale and nature o f Islamic 
reassertation in Turkey, so as to enable us to determine its effects on and connection 
with her foreign policy in the 1980s.
2. Domestic Developments
2.1. The Military Regime and Islam
The success o f the Iranian Islamic Revolution in replacing the Shah's monarchy with an 
Islamic Republic gave new impetus and created a new turn in both Muslim 
fundamentalist activity and Islamic reassertion in Turkey, as happened throughout the 
Islamic world.
While the leader o f the National Salvation Party (NSP), Prof. Erbakan, was 
calling on the Muslim countries to unite against both the Soviet Union and the United
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States, and claiming that Turkey was a "tool" in the hands o f the West,^ the extremism 
o f his party and its sympathizers, displayed in a rally for the "liberation o f Jerusalem", 
constituted one o f  the reasons for the military intervention o f September 12, 1980.3 
Consequently, the Military government was relentless against Muslim fundamentalism, 
which the generals considered to be as dangerous as communism for the country's 
integrity. Erbakan, who, together with other political party leaders, was taken 
immediately into "protective custody" on the day o f takeover and, like NAP leader 
Turkes, arrested a month later, was tried with 33 other NSP members, starting from 
April 24, 1981, with charges o f attempting to create an Islamic state in Turkey.^
Moreover, the secular nature o f the Turkish state was once again emphasized in 
the new constitution,^ and restrictions were placed on wearing beards and turbans for 
students and civil servants,^ which triggered an immediate and widespread reaction in 
religious quarters and became a controversial subject among the Turkish public as well 
as in the Press and the Consultative Assembly.
Although the military attempted to crack down heavily on fundamentalists, 
they, nonetheless, did not fail to recognize the important role which religion could play 
in achieving the "unity and togetherness" o f the people and in eliminating influences of 
"foreign ideologies" on the younger generations. Hence, the military regime, despite its 
initial alertness about Islamic resurgence, attempted to use government-controlled 
religion as a means o f depoliticisation o f the masses. The spiritual and mystical message 
o f moderate Islam, which was also seen as an antidote to Communism, was thought to 
be the best cure for an overly politicized society. Therefore, while all the political and 
social groups were under significant pressure from the military regime, the non-violent 
Islamist groups found leniency and enjoyed great deal o f freedom in their activities. 
With these ideas in mind and also in order to eliminate the harmful influences o f 
religious "ignorant fanatics", "opportunists", and "political manipulators" on the 
younger generations,8 the military regime went further than any other government and 
in the fall o f  1981 made religious education compulsory, albeit by the lay teachers and 
under the strict control o f the state.9 Though its implications for the principle o f
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secularism were hotly disputed,1^ providing compulsory religious education was, in 
fact,
a part o f a damage control operation aimed at keeping the growth o f Islam 
within certain boundaries to prevent it from posing a threat to the secular
foundation o f  the Turkish state in the future. 1 1
Thus the purpose o f the course on religion and ethics was established with this 
in mind as:
to provide students...with knowledge on religion in general, the Islamic religion, 
ethics...in line with the Turkish national educational policy and its general goals 
and principles as well as Ataturk's principle o f secularism; thus, to strengthen 
from a religious and ethical angle, Ataturkism, national unity and solidarity and
humanitarianism as well as to bring up ethical and virtuous human beings.1^
Moreover, courses on religion were also introduced to the prisoners from spring 1982 
1 ^onwards. It was thought that citizens, with a better knowledge o f Islam, would be 
less vulnerable to religious exploitation.
This new attitude towards religion by the military, while showing a growing 
rapprochement between the concept o f the secular state o f Kemalism and social reality 
o f popular Islam, formed another part of the new understanding o f Kemalism by the 
state elites. As mentioned earlier, though the military still regards itself as the guardian 
o f the Kemalist principles, the interpretation o f those principles is made now with a 
more conciliatory effort. Thus secularism is no longer seen as being at odds with day- 
to-day Islam and, with an acceptance o f usefulness o f traditional and religious symbols 
for national unity and solidarity, the state elites o f today are not adamant as far as 
reaching a new Turkish socio-cultural identity, embracing Islam, is concerned.*4 This 
new understanding meant, at the end, an unprecedented recognition o f Islam as* a 
religious and social phenomenon capable o f contributing towards restoration o f 
cohesion and unity within Turkey.15 And it seemed, at least for the time being, the 
measures that followed the September 12, 1980 intervention were successful at 
reaching that cohesion and unity, together with reducing the exploitation and abuse o f 
religion for political purposes.
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However, the appearance was deceptive. The strategy o f using religion as a tool
to disarm the society from "harmful ideologies", thus acting leniently towards Islamic
groupings, carried within it the seeds o f a potential danger for radicalization o f society,
a result from which the military was professedly trying to protect the masses. In fact,
the first signs o f increasing popularity o f religious order and radically different Islamic
groupings were seen in 1983-1984. There was a boom in the publication o f Islamic
journals and translated books which brought the influence o f radical Islam from other
parts o f the Muslim world. Moreover, since all potential opposition to the military
regime was suppressed and strictly supervised, the Islamic groups emerged successfully
after 1980 as the chief opponent o f the regime, which in the long run attracted more
radical and extremist groups into their ranks. Consequently, instead o f the Marxists and
ultra-nationalists, who were under criminal investigation and therefore lost most o f their
power and supporters, Islamists for the first time posed a bigger threat to the state.
Their real power did not lie in the actual number o f Islamists but in the potential appeal
o f  Islam for the frustrated people o f the urban centres, the adventurous new middle
classes, and young university students with a rural background who were shocked in
the big cities and looking for a new identity.
Towards the end o f their regime, the military leaders, disturbed by the
momentum that the Islamist tendencies were gathering and conscious that Islam was
emerging for the first time as an independent and oppositional political force which
would continue to have a role in Turkish domestic politics, seemed to have lost their
earlier certainty about the country's future regarding Islamic radicalism. Confident
enough in the fall o f 1981, general Evren responded to a question that he did "not the
least" fear any upsurge o f Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey.16 A few years later,
17however, he felt compelled to warn against attempts to restore theocracy in Turkey.
Former premier o f the military government Bulent Ulusu was also troubled, hardly after
a year he left power to the Motherland Party o f Ozal, about Islamic radicalism which he
18reportedly regarded as posing even more threat to the country than the communists.
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2.2. Islam During the Motherland Party Governments
In the above atmosphere, the future o f the state's secular nature seemed rather bleak to 
the old-guard secularists after the advent o f Mr. Ozal to the premiership. The 
suspicions o f the former were not altogether groundless, especially if one considers the 
latter's previous record. His appearance as a devout Muslim; his unsuccessful bid for 
deputyship on the NSP list in the 1977 general elections; his alleged family bond to 
Islamic circles through his close associate Mr. Mehmet Kececiler who was former NSP 
mayor o f  Konya previously to 1980 intervention, and through his brother Mr. Korkut 
Ozal who was MP for NSP, too; and his apparent collaboration with former NSP and 
NAP followers within his party made him somewhat untrustworthy in the eyes o f the 
secularists about his intentions. Hence the suspicion never died away as to whether he 
was a liberal modernist, somewhat revolutionary in the eyes o f his supporters, who 
tried to consolidate Islam within secular, modem and democratic Turkey to reach a 
"Turkish-Islamic synthesis", or whether he was simply an Islamist under the disguise o f 
liberal democrat, essentially another "Erbakan with a swallow-tail c o a t" .^  The moves 
made by the M ot.P governments towards Islam were not helpful in dispelling these 
fears either. The influence o f pro-Islamist groups on the first Ozal government became 
apparent from a series o f measures taken by the government in 1984, ranging from 
clothing restrictions for teenage-girls taking part in sport displays, and efforts to 
introduce Arabic language courses into the secondary and high schools, to the 
introduction o f bills in parliament that would classify beer as an alcoholic beverage and 
authorize the building o f a mosque on the premises o f the Turkish Parliament.
These activities were not missed by President Evren, or the Press, who kept a 
watchful eye over the government's business. Apart from giving warnings during his 
various inspections and tours o f the country, he openly exerted pressure over premier 
Ozal in the NSC, which frequently "advised" the government to look into Islamic 
fundamentalism se r io u s ly .M o re o v e r, he pressed for and obtained the replacement of
270
Education Minister Mr. Vehbi Dincerler, who was associated with the religious-leaning 
wing o f the Mot.P and was at the forefront o f introducing the above mentioned bills, as 
well as trying to prevent the teaching o f Darwin's theories.21
Premier Ozal, however, seemed content with the existing situation and 
continued to give assurances that, according to government figures, there was no 
serious threat o f Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey.22 He also resisted being drawn into 
discussions about Islamic fundamentalism because, he argued, "...this can hurt the
no
feelings o f the true believers". However, in early 1987, he, too, was forced to 
acknowledge the threat o f Islamic extremism.2^ There were already reports that several 
brotherhoods were conducting subversive activities in their established underground 
centres and in schools. The most alarming aspect o f their activities, for the future o f 
the country, was their efforts to infiltrate the Turkish Armed Forces and the Police.2^ 
Though alarming for the regime and secular elites, neither these extremist - i.e. 
fundamentalist - groups nor their activities seemed to command a large following 
among the Turkish people at large. A public opinion poll, published in Milliyet on 
January 23, 1987, showed that only 7% o f those who described themselves as Islamist 
supported the concept o f an Islamic state based on Sharia. Also, in November 1987 
general elections, the Islamic oriented WP obtained only a disappointing 7% o f the poll. 
It seemed that premier Ozal was correct in claiming that Turkey was different from Iran
in that Turkey did not have an institutionalized priesthood and therefore an Iranian style
97Islamic revolution in Turkey was not conceivable. This was true in the sense that 
Turkey's secular and democratic roots are embedded much deeper in society than those 
o f Iran at any time.
However, the irritation from the growing Islamic activism was such that the 54
SDPP MPs submitted a motion to the TGNA on January 20, 1987, requesting a
parliamentary investigation to determine the dimensions o f the activities directed
• • • 28against secularism and to determine the measures to be taken against these activities. 
During the discussions Prof. Erdal Inonu, the leader o f SDPP, seemed to be disturbed 
most by the apparent leniency showed by some government ministers towards Islamic
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activities and argued that the government should not assist those groups that wanted to 
encourage antisecular behaviour.2^ The motion, however, was rejected at the end by 
the M ot.P majority who seemed unwilling to cooperate in actions to be taken against 
religious g ro u p s .^
Moreover, after TPP's entrance into the parliament as a result o f November 
1987 elections, which proved the seriousness o f the threat posed by the TPP to the MP 
in centre-right politics, the intra-parliamentary competition between those two parties 
for conservative votes acquired a new turn. The TPP deputies, for example, joined 
Mot.P in campaigning against the ban on female students wearing "turban" (Islamic 
headgear) during classes, in accordance with Islamic practice. Though the draft law was 
threatened with veto by President Evren, they were able to get around that veto by an 
administrative change in university regulations. What followed was the ruling o f the 
Constitutional Court against the move, leading to counter-changes in university 
regulations, which in the end created widespread irritation among common believers, 
demonstrations by religious students and many more discussions and controversy 
around the general principles o f secularism and freedom o f belief, worship and dress.
In the middle o f the dust created by the turban controversy there were voices
within the parliament demanding that Ayasofya Mosque - St. Sophia Church before
1453 - which was turned into a museum under Ataturk, be re-opened to Muslim 
33worship.
More important, perhaps, for its possible impact on the formation o f decision­
makers and thus on government policy, was the proclamation o f Mot.P itself as 
"nationalist and conservative" and its offer o f a "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" for Turkey's 
identity problem. It could be argued that this was a pragmatic response by premier Ozal 
to the existing balance within his party which was increasingly swinging into the control 
o f the former NSP loyalists who were referred to as "Selametciler" (Salvationists) and 
o f the former NAP sympathizers who were called "Hareketciler" (activists). The so- 
called liberals at the time - between November 1987 and June 1990 - were also 
struggling for power along these powerful groups but with no avail. Premier Ozal's
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own solution to this power struggle within his party was the adaptation o f "Turk-Islam 
Sentezi" (Turk-Islam Synthesis) as the party motto.
It was not, however, an altogether new idea. The synthesis was first formulated 
during the 1960s by the members o f the A ydinlar Ocagi (The Guild o f the 
Enlightened) as an attempt to conceptualize the common beliefs and ideas o f the right 
in Turkey. Premier Ozal's acknowledgement o f it, albeit under the mounting pressure of 
that group within the M ot.P, led to the realization o f their long-waited ambition: 
religion as a state ideology in a secular setting.
The stand o f the "Turk-Islam Sentezi" argues that the solution to Turkey's 
problems encountered on the way to becoming a powerful country could be found only
1 Cby the unity o f Turkish nationalism and Islam. It also, among others, calls for 
realignment o f religion and state, creating a moral, patriotic and ordered society with 
Islamic conscious, closer relations in foreign policy with Islamic states, and elimination, 
or at least control, o f the atheists, materialists, communists, separatist, humanists, other 
religious groups, leftist, elitist and statist intellectuals.
One o f the interesting points o f these developments was the fact that the Mot.P 
did not publicly adopt this ideological stand in its party congresses. It was rather an 
evolutionary process which came about with the occupation o f more and more seats in 
the Ozal Cabinets and the party central organization by the members o f the "holy 
alliance"36
Although after the humiliating defeat o f Mot.P in the March 1989 local 
elections, most o f the members o f the Islamic faction within his cabinet were replaced 
with liberals by Mr. Ozal, thus putting the responsibility o f failure squarely on the 
alliance, their strong bid for power became more apparent after he was elected 
President and chose his own successor as prime minister on November 9, 1989, two 
days before the Mot.P Congress, which was expected to perform the task, could do 
so.22 Among the new ministers to join the cabinet were a leading Islamist, Mr. M. 
Kececiler and a nationalist, Mr. M. Tasar, both o f whom had hitherto been left out of 
Mot.P cabinets because o f president Evren's opposition to such appointments. It
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seemed "the alliance" was collecting due rewards for its vigorous campaign and fervent
support for Mr. Ozal's presidency. Although, "the liberals", who were not contented
with the outcome, finally succeeded in replacing Mr. Akbulut with Mr. Yilmaz as Party
Chairman and then as Prime Minister in the Mot.P Congress o f June 1991, the
fundamentalist activities, until then, had reached alarming proportions. Fundamentalist
university students had begun wearing Islamic dress, public rallies had taken place in
the name o f Islam, religious programmes had increased on state radio and television,
and fundamentalists had been appointed to key positions in the state bureaucracy. In
particular, the ministries o f Interior and Education seemed to be increasingly dominated
by Islamic groups. Also, the 1990 budget, putting it ahead o f many ministries, had
increased the spending o f the Presidency o f Religious Affairs by 237%, which had been
apparently directed to hire more personnel in a time when the Presidency was, for the
3 8first time, demanding to be made an autonomous body. The above mentioned calls
for the conversion o f the Museum of Ayasofya into a mosque were aired, then again,
around the same time with a nation-wide campaign which was openly supported by
several Cabinet Ministers without any opposition from the premier AJcbulut and the
President Ozal.*^ A further demand for the setting up o f an Islamic Institute to give
civil servants refresher courses on religious doctrine was rejected by the Parliament,
while a mosque was opened in the TGNA on January 12, 1991 with Mot.P deputies
declaring that the Turkish nation was Islamic.4^
Also in 1990, Islamic fundamentalism, too, took a new turn with assassinations
o f prominent figures who were outspoken against it. This was a new phenomenon in
Turkish political life since before 1980 Islamic fundamentalists were - unlike the
Marxist left and the nationalist right - not linked with political violence. The series of
fundamentalist assassinations started on January 31 with the killing o f Prof. Muammer
Aksoy, a former Social Democrat deputy and president o f the Turkish Legal Profession
Foundation, by a group called "Islamic A ction"41 On March 7, Mr. Cetin Emec, a
prominent journalist o f the daily Hurriyet and a staunch Kemalist, was also shot to
49death by the fundamentalists, named as "Islamic Revenge Movement". Although
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these killings deeply horrified ordinary people, who had not forgotten the horrors o f  the 
political killings o f the pre-1980 period, many intellectuals, who were also affected and 
alarmed to a certain extent, began to argue that the intelligentsia must try and create a 
dialogue with Turkey's resurgent Islamic movements, even if one o f the goals o f those 
movements is to eliminate secular and westernising values from Turkish political life. At 
the same time, however, the fundamentalist killings continued with an increasing rate, 
culminating in the killing on January 1993 o f Mr. Ugur Mumcu, a columnist in the left- 
wing daily Cumhuriyet, who was still writing forcibly in defence o f secularism and 
whose assassination generated huge spontaneous demonstrations from common people 
who were reminded by these series o f assassinations about the dangers o f 
fundamentalist takeover in the country and intensified the debate on religious extremism 
ever since.
As a result o f this radicalization o f Islam, the view, mainly from abroad, was 
aired to the effect that the enhanced role o f religion was an important problem for 
Turkish democracy. Excepting the preoccupation o f the fundamentalists with the 
religion, the political life in Turkey, however, evolves more around social and economic 
issues than issues dictated by religion. Though the views o f political parties on religious 
issues could be o f importance during election times, they are certainly not the 
determining factor.43 The realization o f this factor had led Toprak to conclude that 
Islam in Turkey, unlike other Muslim countries, is not a sufficient catalyst for mass 
mobilization.44 As demonstrated by the electoral returns o f the Islamic parties in 
Turkey through the years, economic development and other secular policies take 
precedence over religious issues. Thus, the issue that remains is that if the religion had 
become a "vehicle rather than a goal" in domestic politics,45 what role would it can 
play in the determination o f foreign policy?
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2.3. The Domestic Revival of Islam and Foreign Policy Formation
2.3.1. Public O pinion Level
Chapter IV already highlighted that public opinion in Turkey, as in other developing 
countries, carries less weight in the formulation o f foreign policy than say in Western 
Europe. It also touched upon the idea that the revival o f Islam at a popular level might 
have helped to dispel the long lasting hesitations o f state elites towards having closer 
relations with other Islamic countries. Those hesitations had been mostly encouraged by 
the fears that closer relations with Islamic countries might increase the general Islamic 
awareness inside Turkey, which might result in a greater impact o f Islam on political 
and social life. In the extreme, some sort o f Islamic takeover o f the state was most 
probably pictured by the state elites, including the military. However, once those elites 
came to terms with, or at least accepted the existence of, the new enhanced platform o f 
Islam in Turkish social and political life through resurgence o f popular Islam during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, on the one hand, and through realization that the state- 
controlled Islam could be used for their own purpose - that is to provide unity and 
togetherness, on the other, a question was frequently raised as to what harm could 
come, leaving the profits aside for the moment, from establishing friendlier relations 
with other Islamic countries. In this context, the role o f the Islamic revival at a popular 
level in affecting foreign policy would seem rather flimsy and disingenuous. But it 
should be remembered that there was a time when even the idea o f being remotely 
connected with the Islamic Conference, let alone joining it, created many fears in 
Turkey. The enhanced role o f Islam in daily Turkish life and consequent pressures from 
public opinion must have had some sort o f impact on change o f hearts at the elite and 
governmental levels vis-a-vis Islam in general and contacts with Islamic countries in 
particular. Also, one must not forget that the public chooses its representatives to 
govern and elevates them to positions from where they can effect the formulation o f 
foreign policy at much higher levels. And if we can assume that the public chooses
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people who are like-minded with common contemporary feelings and ideas, the 
contribution o f people in general towards foreign policy formulation became more 
apparent. O f course this contribution has still been rather subtle, when compared, for 
instance, with the more decisive effects o f the army or the elite in general.
It was noted earlier that Islam, replacing the left, became the main opposition 
force in the 1980s for the established order. The change, however, was less than 
sudden, and although radicalization and effectiveness o f political Islam became more 
visible in the late 1970s and 1980s, its psychological, socio-political, and economic 
roots have their own pasts. Its inception in the 1970s was not accidental, but rather a 
result o f interactions o f many variables. Among them were economic and social 
changes, which resulted in a widening gap between poor and rich, and between 
traditional small town settings and modern city dwellings. Other factors included social 
injustice, political and economic underdevelopment o f certain groups and centres, 
political repression, a need for an indigenous ideology for explaining the ambitions and 
needs o f those groups after the failures o f nationalism and socialism to do so, and 
above all a realization o f the political potential o f Islam as an ideology o f opposition. 
There is no need here to go into the details o f Turkish socio-political developments 
during the 1970s and Islam's role within i t , ^  but what eventually followed in the 1980s 
was the realization by the state elites, mainly and perhaps more importantly by the 
military, that Islam as a popular political force in the region would not go away in the 
foreseeable future; that "Kemalism" and "Westernism" cannot serve the purposes of 
religion for the growing number o f Turkish people who were unhappy with the 
increasing dependence on the West and unsatisfied with the western answers to their 
p rob lem s;^  and that the Islamic reaction in Turkey was one o f increased observance in 
people's private life, which could be directed to supplement the government's policies, 
and not a desire to project Islam as political system, though this was also on the 
increase. Whatever the nature o f the Islamic revival in Turkey, however, there is no 
doubt that the influence o f Islam in Turkish politics and society had increased 
dramatically under the military regimes and the Mot.P governments. What followed
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was a broad recognition o f Islam in unprecedented levels since 1923 as a component o f 
public l i f e .^  Be it a genuine belief in the capacity o f Islam acting as a socio-cultural 
medium in modem world; be it a desire to use religion as an instrument o f conservative 
social c o n tro l;^  or be it a wish to undercut the disturbing manifestations o f  religious 
fanatics and the exploitation o f Islam for political ends, the underlying reason for this 
recognition does not matter much for our purposes so long as it is understood that the 
re-Islamization o f the society reached, since the 1980 coup, to governmental and elite 
circles and the developments at the popular level have contributed, in this way, to 
formulation o f government policies, including foreign policy. In this context, it could be 
argued that the slow reassertation o f Islamic values in society as a whole and its 
recognition by the State in general have helped in establishing more open and receptive 
attitude toward overtures from Islamic countries, and consequently bridge the way for 
Turkey's closer contacts with the Middle East.
The Islamic revival in Turkey could have affected Turkey's Middle Eastern 
reorientation in another, albeit more obscure, way. Seeing that the reassertation o f 
Islamic values in the society was well under way and thus tempted to use religion in a 
petty political way, the governments might have felt that showing friendlier attitude 
towards the Islamic countries would generate votes from certain groups if not the 
whole society. This was essentially true for the second government o f Mr. Ozal, who 
had increasingly to rely on Islamic values to split the conservative votes, and had to 
resort to the Turk-Islam synthesis for creating cohesion within his otherwise divided 
p a r t y . O n  the other hand, it should be noted that Turkish public opinion, which has 
always been divided over Islamic policies and relations with Islamic countries, has no 
real power to force the government into unwanted policies, especially in foreign affairs. 
However, the government might chose one policy or other in order to win sympathies 
o f certain sections o f the society, regardless whether there is strong desire in the public 
for such policies. This, at times, could lead to contradictory stands by the government, 
as demonstrated by prime minister Ozal’s eagerness, while applying for full membership 
o f  the European Community, to have it known that he was still a practising Muslim.
Therefore, we can conclude that the resurgence o f popular Islam in Turkey 
could influence its foreign policy only in the above mentioned indirect ways. O f course, 
the extent o f that influence - or even existence o f it for that matter - is too vague to be 
measured.
2.3.2. The Elite Level
Up to 1980, the elite in Turkey had a long tradition o f secular attitude.^ * Especially the 
military and civilian bureaucratic elites, having the history o f being in the forefront of 
both the late Ottoman modernization efforts and the Kemalist reforms, had carried the 
banner o f the secular state. On the other hand, deviations from a secular stand had been 
seen on the side o f the political elite from time to time, though they too, were careful 
not to ally themselves with religious fanatics.
However, since the 1980 coup d'etat and following socio-political upheaval with 
its Islamic elements, the Turkish elite is no longer a homogeneous body. We have 
already seen how the military elites' understanding o f Kemalism, in particular the 
principle o f secularism, had changed and given way to the existence o f Islam within 
society as its corporate part. Once the biggest defender o f secularism (the army) gave 
way to collaboration, many o f the individual elites, also increasingly started to feel that 
the existing state ideology (i.e. Kemalism) was no longer enough to provide a
C O
comprehensive world view which would satisfy their personal and moral needs. 
Consequently, some o f them turned to religion, at least in their private lives, to find a 
way out.
Also after the 1980 coup d'etat, the Turkish elite found it impossible to express 
themselves through parties and associations, which had all been banned. They were 
further intimidated by the widespread arrests and reports o f torture in detention. Under 
the circumstances, with the above mentioned relatively relaxed attitude toward religion, 
most o f  the elite realized that there was no other way than either to become apolitical
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or to make recourse to Islam to express their opposition to the existing regime. Many 
chose Islam. Even a number o f former leftists became Islamists. ^
Finally, they increasingly started to argue that the secular intelligentsia must 
understand the needs and desires o f religious-minded ordinary people, and a dialogue, 
which in the end would elevate Islam to its rightful place within the society and in the 
secular state system, should be c r e a t e d . M r .  Ozal, then, came to be regarded by many 
o f  them as an ideal prototype politician; a religious personality with a spirit o f  free 
enterprise.
M ost o f the non-Islamist elites, too, excepting old guard secularists, did not 
openly oppose such an idea, because, as already mentioned, after the traumatic 
experiences o f political violence and social disorder during the 1970s, they too came to 
realize that acceptance, not complete rejection, o f religious moral symbols could 
strengthen the social cohesion. 55 O f course, this does not mean that they would accept 
anti-secular options for Turkey's future. Far from it. M ost o f the elite have remained 
committed to the pro-Western outlook of Kemalism. But at the same time, under the 
mixed influences o f international and domestic developments, they have started to have 
second thoughts about Turkish identity for both internal and external purposes. 
Consequently, they began to question Turkey's place in the international system. 
Although most o f the intelligentsia is in agreement with political elites that Turkey's 
NATO membership should be continued, they now question the necessity o f being a 
member with closed eyes. They emphasize that Turkey's national interests would not 
always correlate with those of the US or other Western allies.
As a result, most o f the elite now not only accept religion as an integral part .of
Turkish identity, but also refer, when talking about the Middle East, to religious, in
addition to historical and cultural, links between Turkey and them.56 It seems that the
Turkish elite has now came to terms with the reality that "Turkey is after all by history
and geography a Middle Eastern country, by religion a Muslim country, and by
ii 57economy a developing country".
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There are o f course still controversies and disagreements about the extent to 
which Islamic influences should be allowed and tolerated. Nevertheless, the positive 
foreign policy towards the Middle East, initiated on the basis o f economic, political and 
security concerns and followed with enthusiasm by Turgut Ozal, nevertheless, fits quite 
well with the new world view o f Turkish elites.
On the other hand, as in the case o f the public opinion, it is difficult to 
determine the actual extent o f the influence o f this new understanding o f Islam by the 
elite over country's foreign policy. However, it could be argued that tolerance on the 
secular elite level and conceptualizing by the Islamist intellectuals have considerably 
aided formulation o f Turkey's new orientation in foreign policy.
2.3.3. The Government Level
The Motherland Party governments' encouragement o f the revival o f Islam within the 
country was pointed out earlier. Prime Minister Ozal and his governments were also at 
the front o f the new opening towards the Middle East. The correlation between the two 
events seems obvious, yet it is difficult to pin down the extent o f interaction. Although 
the Islamists within the party, like those outside, were calling for more intimate and 
steady relations with the Islamic world, the influence o f these calls on the formation of 
foreign policy and opening towards the Middle East is difficult to assess since many 
other variables - such as economic benefit, national security, and political gains - were 
also involved. It should also not be forgotten that, even though the Mot.P called itself 
nationalist-conservative and opted for Turk-Islam synthesis, it was the same Mot.P 
which has reaffirmed Turkey's commitment to the West and under Ozal's leadersliip 
applied for European Community membership.
Moreover, most o f the Islamists within the party, like everybody else, were 
rarely interested in foreign policy and were usually locked into either intra-party power 
struggles or in one o f the many controversies concerning religion, secularism, the state 
or other such issues. Further, premier Ozal's governing style, which used a small group
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o f experts, tightly knit and loyal to him, made outside intervention very difficult. 
Especially in foreign policy, which became premier Ozal's pet interest particularly after 
1985, sometimes even the foreign minister did not know what specifically was going 
on, let alone cabinet ministers or Mot.P deputies.
In this context, the effects of the Islamic faction were probably slight and 
indirect, slightly more than the influence o f popular religious revival in the country as a 
whole. On the other hand, Ozal did not want to alienate the Islamists within and 
without his party because he hoped they would bring more votes. While he tolerated 
and even supported them in domestic politics, it should not be unnatural to expect that 
he wou!d act in foreign affairs sometime or another with this in his mind. For example, 
the hastily taken decision in November 1988 to grant immediate recognition to Yasser
C O
Arafat's newly proclaimed Palestenian state, rings some bells. Although it was in
accordance with Turkey's Middle Eastern policy and was approved by all parties, the
swiftness and the speed o f the decision, which was so unlike the Turkish Foreign
Ministry, brings into mind the memories o f preoccupation o f Islamists with Israel and
the Palestinian cause in foreign affairs. On the other hand, the government would not
have suffered from any damage if it had adopted a more cautious line and waited for
sometime. But the immediate recognition, though most probably not pressed by the
Islamists, would without doubt have warmed their hearts as well as pleasing the Arab
states. Therefore, like small deeds in domestic politics towards Islam, with the quick
and enthusiastic recognition, the government might have hoped to capitalize on the
feelings o f people, who, to the extent they were concerned, were favourably disposed
toward the Palestinian cause, thereby winning their favour. The argument that the
government was playing to domestic opinion for fresh political support at a time when
the economy was going downhill, was made more plausible by the fact that the
announcement to recognize the Palestinian state was made by prime minister himself, a
hardly necessary gesture. Also, Turkey's subsequent reluctance to upgrade the status of
the PLO office in Ankara to full embassy level even after 30-odd states had done so,
59apparently in order to balance her earlier rush, strengthens our argument.
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In this context, one must also bear in mind the characteristics o f Mot.P's 
approach to foreign policy issues, which was aimed at times at maximisation its 
domestic gains and which was ably described by one o f its foreign ministers as an 
explanation o f Turkey's haste to recognize the Palestinian state; "while there is a 
national consensus on foreign policy", announced Mr. Yilmaz, "the Motherland Party 
government believes in taking initiatives rather than waiting on events. "66
The Turk-Islam synthesis was not, however, always on the side o f  the general 
consensus on foreign policy. The question o f Turkey's future EC membership was one 
o f  those areas that highlighted the difficult and awkward situation premier Ozal was in. 
His support for the synthesis for domestic political reasons alienated the members o f 
the liberal wing o f the Mot.P who favoured Turkey's membership in the EC along with 
modernization o f society. Yet Ozal, while supporting synthesis, also advocated 
Turkey's membership o f the EC, which undoubtedly would encourage further emphasis 
on Turkish westernization, contradicting the synthesis. This contradictory stand could 
well be one o f the reasons for the challenge against Ozal, administered by the holy 
alliance during the 1988 Mot.P convention.
At the state level, Turkey's sensitivity over secularism and scepticism about 
Islamist, especially fundamentalist, movements is best documented in the debate about 
lifting the ban on Turkish Communist Party.61 After Turkish application for full 
membership in the EC, Turkey became subject to criticism from European countries 
due to its ban on communist political parties. Taking into account the crisis that 
communist political practice was experiencing after the developments in Eastern 
Europe, the Turkish government wanted to lift the ban. However, the main dilemma for 
Turkey was that the ban covers religious and fascist parties as well as communist ones, 
and it would have to be lifted on all political tendencies. That meant the legalization o f 
Islamist political parties at a time when fundamentalist Islam was becoming stronger 
and anti-secularist waves growing rapidly in Turkey. Thus, also taking the region's 
shaky political situation into account, to give full political rights to the Islamists 
alongside with communists seemed too risky a step for the existence o f the state, and
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Turkey declined to do so for a long time, even if meant facing European criticism o f 
being less than a full democracy.
Another irony in Turkey's foreign relations, created by the religious revival, was 
demonstrated by the "Turban" issue. At the end o f long controversy, touched upon 
earlier, the government, in order to appease popular sentiments and escape from 
responsibility, finally issued a decree in March 1990 which authorised individual 
universities to decide whether or not to allow Islamic headscarves on campuses. 
However at this time a powerful threat was promptly raised by those female students 
who might be affected by the reinstatement o f the ban by the universities that they 
would take the government to the European Court o f Human Rights on the grounds 
that their individual right to wear a headscarf at the university was d e n i e d . T h e  
European Court was bound to rule in their favour. Ironically, this would further darken 
Turkey's image on human rights. The issue seemed to place Turkey in yet another 
vicious circle when some advocates o f the ban vigorously defended it on the ground 
that "this show o f influence" by the fundamentalists would be bad for Turkey, especially 
in her application to join the E E C .^  The irony, o f course, is that it has been abuses and 
restrictions o f human rights that has kept Turkey far apart from Europe.
3. External Developments
3.1. Foreign Intervention in Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
As already shown above, Islamic activities in general and fundamental extremism in 
particular became gradually more and more evident during the 1980s, and especially 
after 1987, coinciding with the advent of "holy alliance" into power within the Mot.P 
and thus in the government, there was a boom in both the number o f extremist Islamic 
organizations and their activities. But what was more disturbing for the state was the 
external connection o f anti-secularist, Islamist groups. Again gradually, it became 
public that many o f those groups were supported by - or receiving aid from - some 
other Islamic countries, mainly Iran and Saudi Arabia. But the involvement o f other
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countries, such as Libya, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon was also mentioned in aiding these 
groups though to a lesser extent. There were frequent reports in the press to the effect 
that while some o f these countries affiliated themselves more closely with the activities 
o f  certain sects,6^ they also helped in general to promote Islam in Turkey, as in other 
countries, by sponsoring and encouraging the circulation o f Islamic publications.66
A major scandal about foreign involvement in the promotion o f Islam emerged 
in 1987 when a prominent Turkish journalist uncovered that in the period o f 1982-1984 
the salaries o f Turkish clergymen, employed by the government to serve Turkish 
immigrants in Europe, were paid by a organization called Rabita-ul Islam (The Muslim 
W orld League), founded and sponsored by Saudi Arabia.66 The payments were made 
in connection with the office o f the Presidency o f Religious Affairs which allowed the 
organization to operate within the Turkish communities abroad to promote Islamic 
values and morals despite the fact that its purely Islamic goals contradicted the secular 
principles o f the Turkish state. 67 The scandal got even worse when it was revealed that 
President Evren himself had signed his consent.
What is more significant, however, is that a Turkish offshoot o f Rabita was
established by, among others, Mr. Salih Ozcan and Mr. Ahmet Gurkan, who later
became founding partners o f Turkish Faisal Finance Corporation, the first non-interest
Islamic banking institution in Turkey, which distributed shares among mainly Mot. P
politicians, including Mr. Korkut Ozal.69 While the establishment o f the former
organization internalized a foreign organization with its characteristics contrary to
secularism, the latter provided a further legal springboard to offer financial support to
wider Islamic activities.70 Moreover, while the participation o f same people in the
establishment o f both organizations were seen as suggestive o f dubious intentions, the
involvement o f politicians from the government circles and other individuals who were
close to premier and thus likely to exert significant influence on his policies, e.g. his
brother, caused discontent particularly among the secular intelligentsia who considered
71these activities being contrary to the secular nature o f the state.
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Iran, too, in connection with its aim to export revolutionary Islam to other 
Islamic countries, was very active in Turkey. Apart from the smuggling o f propaganda 
literature into Turkey, the transmitting o f radio programs to agitate religious feelings, 
the attempts to win over university students and trying to work its way into Turkey 
through Turkish communities in Europe,7^ Iran also openly intervened in Turkish 
domestic politics by way of statements and speeches from leading members o f the
7 0
Iranian government. Especially after the end o f the war with Iraq, Iran intensified its
activities among Turkish Islamists, and its attacks on secular principles o f Turkish state
and insults on Ataturk's person became frequent.7^ Further, during the turban
controversy, Iranian denunciation o f the banning o f the Islamic headdress in Turkish
universities led to angry exchanges between the two countries. 7^
However, there were other incidents even before the end o f the war which
provoked controversy between the two countries. Especially critical behaviour of
Iranian prime minister Mir Hossein Moussavi, while visiting Turkey, about the
westernizing reforms o f Ataturk and his refusal to pay a courtesy visit to his
mausoleum, an established stopping point for official visitors, were taken by many,
among them the military, as insults to the Turkish state.
Relations with Iran were also strained when the Iranian government gave a
warning to Turkey, after President Evren's speech on TV on January 8, 1987, during
which he tackled mostly what he described as the mounting threat o f Islamic
fundamentalism, that future cooperation depended on Turkey's "respect for Islamic 
77values".
Furthermore, Iranian activities in Turkey did not only take the form o f  
propaganda or intervening statements. Especially from 1987 onwards, the threat of 
violent extremism in Turkey appeared to have been either planned and directed or 
otherwise actively supported by Iran.78 In February 1987, a pro-Khomeini group was 
discovered by the Turkish security forces. It was reported that the militants o f the 
Nationalist View Organization, based in West Germany and led by a former Turkish 
clergyman Mr. Cemalettin Kaplan, were receiving military training in Iran with funds
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and arms supplied by the Islamic regime in Iran, and were later infiltrating Turkey to set 
up organizations for the purpose o f destroying the existing regime. ^  Also Iranians, 
along with Afghans, were caught during the fundamentalist demonstrations in
o n
Istanbul, and it was reported in early 1987 that the Iranian consulate in Erzurum was 
taking an active part in fundamentalist movements around the region, after which 
Turkey was compelled to warn Iran to desist from missionary activity in eastern 
Turkey. 8 ^
Under these circumstances, it seemed that behind Turkey's policy o f handing
back the Iranian refugees who had crossed the border during the Iran-Iraq war,
although this was criticised internationally, lay the concern to stop Iranian efforts to
infiltrate Islamic militants and propagandists into the country. 8^
It should be noted here that, although Khomeini's rhetoric failed to generate
great appeal among Turkey's sizeable Shia minority, who have traditionally been
committed to secularism as an antidote to Sunni- zeal and domination, the Islamic
revolution in Iran, nevertheless, was bound to attract some attention from Turkish
Islamists generally. Therefore, the Turkish government was sensitive to any intimation
from Iran about the country's Islamic nature. As a result, relations almost reached
breaking point when the Iranian envoy to Turkey, Mr. Mottaki, attended a meeting
organized by the Welfare Party in Konya. The irritation and tension between the two
countries were such that in March 1989 both countries temporarily withdrew their
ambassadors.83 Although the new Iranian Ambassador, Mr. Mohammed Reza Bagheri,
visited Ataturk's tomb in a markedly conciliatory gesture, Turkish-Iranian economic
and political relations, which boomed during the war with Iraq, have continued Xo
84suffer from deteriorating diplomatic relations and prevailing mutual distrust.0^
The sources o f international involvement in fundamentalist activities in Turkey, 
as mentioned earlier, were not limited to Iran and Saudi Arabia. An indication o f wider 
involvement was brought into the open by a police operation in November 1982, during 
which the members and founders o f the Turkish off-shoot o f Hizb-ul Tahrir (The
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Liberation Party) were caught. Seventeen out o f 22 arrested were Jordanian and 
Palestinian students in Turkey while five were Turks.85
When one observes that these interventions from the Middle Eastern Islamic 
countries increased after 1980 and coincided with Turkey's economic and political 
opening toward the Middle East, the inevitable double-edged question comes into 
mind: did, as the Kemalist elite had feared all along since the birth o f the Republic, 
meddling with Middle Eastern affairs bring about this foreign interference? Or was it 
the other way around, with foreign intervention contributing to the resurgence o f Islam 
in Turkey and consequently leading to changes in foreign policy?
Although the correlation between these two developments seems clear in the 
first instance and some sort o f plausible connection could be formed between Turkey's 
political, and especially extensive economic, links with the states like Iran and Saudi 
Arabia and their intervention in Turkish affairs, a more thorough enquiry and 
understanding o f Turks and Turkish foreign policy would indicate negative answers to 
both questions, indeed more so in the second instance than in the former.
I f  we take the second question first, it should be mentioned at once that the 
Islamic resurgence in Turkey is, for reasons that cannot be taken up here, due more to 
domestic political and social conditions and to the spill over effects o f the similar
ozr
feelings and examples abroad than to direct foreign intervention or encouragement.00
As far as Iranian efforts to light up a revolutionary change in Turkey were 
concerned, they seemed, almost from the beginning, doomed to failure. In the first 
instance, as I have already mentioned, the Shia minority in Turkey, the most likely 
group to be targeted by the Iranian propaganda due to sectarian similarities and the 
close proximity to Iran o f the area they occupy, seemed adamant in facing Iranian 
propaganda and agitation. The Sunni activists, too, though impressed by the success o f 
Islamic revolution in a neighbouring country, largely remained indifferent, at best, 
towards Iranian advances.87 Moreover, as indicated by almost every Turkish expert, 
Turkey's socio-political and economic developments as well as its experiences with 
Islam and secular settings, have been very different from those o f Iran, and these
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differ ences, together with the absence o f an established Islamic hierarchy (like the
Mullahs in Iran) signify the difficulty, if not impossibility, for Iranian style revolution in
88Turkey. Also, being originated from and directed by a country that represents both 
one o f the historic enemies o f the Turkish state and a "heretical sect" to Sunni Islam, 
considerable reduced the changes o f success o f Islamic propaganda by Iran. Had the 
Islamic revolution taken place in some other Islamic country, then one might speculate 
that the spill over affect o f the revolution would have been much greater.
We must also bear in mind that Turkish nationalism has been traditionally in 
direct opposition to any sort o f foreign involvement in Turkish affairs, and does not 
accept the legitimacy o f intervention on any grounds, including religious brotherhood. 
Therefore, it is only natural to expect that the Turkish state would act more swiftly 
towards efforts from abroad to widen the recognition o f Islam than to a domestic 
resurgence o f Islam, which, as already noted, was treated with some leniency. One 
might expect to see the same effect o f a nationalist emotional reaction toward foreign 
involvement in Turkish affairs on former NAP sympathizers, some o f whom joined the 
Islamists after the 1980 coup while others lent their votes and support to Mot.P. 
Hence, foreign involvement in Turkish affairs would have been counterproductive due 
to  possible nationalist reaction, and because it would inevitably invoke fears o f 
fundamentalism among the governing state elite, it could reduce the chances o f both 
Islamic revival in Turkey and closer relations with other Islamic countries.
As for the first question, it is only natural that Turkey's recent interest in the 
Middle Eastern affairs should generate, in turn, more interest from other states in the 
region in Turkish affairs and more interstate connections should be expected. It is also 
arguably correct that the strong economic ties with states like Iran, Iraq, Libya and 
Saudi Arabia, and the necessity o f sustaining growing export markets in the Middle 
East for the Turkish economy, might have generated more tolerance on Turkish side 
towards foreign intimations. And the principle o f reciprocity would call for less strict 
observance o f non-interference as Turkey, too, was increasingly willing to play a more 
important and active role in Middle Eastern affairs. However there are, o f course, limits
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to this tolerance and susceptibility towards foreign interventions, and especially the 
secular nature o f the state is something that neither the army nor the government would 
like to see meddled with from outside Turkey. In this sense, only the very indirect 
interests o f "conservative " Islamic states, such as contributions towards mosque 
restorations or funding joint research promoting Islam as a cultural identity, would have 
been allowed, not the promotion o f revolutionary Islamic change by hard-line states, 
including Iran and Libya.
Furthermore, it should be noted here that the main reasons behind the Iranian 
efforts to infiltrate Turkey or intervene into Turkish affairs were the revolutionary zeal 
and aim o f the Iranian regime to export its ideas into neighbouring countries. In this 
context, Turkish tolerance for such activities, if there was any and whatever the reasons 
behind it - i.e. domestic Islamic resurgence, economic necessities or a new reorientation 
in foreign policy, had only a secondary importance in generating these interferences.
3.2. The Revival of Islam, Western Perceptions and Responses, and Turkish 
Foreign Policy
As demonstrated before, the Turkish state since its establishment in 1923, has moved 
consistently despite occasional set-backs, towards becoming a modern and democratic 
nation state. The way she chose to attain this goal has differentiated her fundamentally
Q Q
from other Islamic countries; that is westernization and secularisation.
The concept o f national identity however, has never been clear cut either inside 
or outside Turkey. Although there was no question about it in the minds o f the 
modernizing elite, the place of religion within this identity, however, has always been 
the cause o f a certain amount of anxiety, not necessarily only within Turkish society, 
but also in the minds o f Turkey's Western allies. The root o f the problem, perhaps, is 
that no one knows for sure where Turkey belongs. Is it a European country, as its 
ruling elite claims? Or is it part o f the Middle East, which is what it looks like on the 
map and recent Islamic resurgence tends to confirm? It seems somehow anomalous to
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many Europeans that a major Muslim country should be member o f  NATO and the 
Council o f Europe, and an associate member o f the EEC - eligible eventually for full 
membership under the terms o f the association agreement. Under the circumstances it is 
only natural that the ambiguity o f Islam coexisting with secularism in Turkey would 
become even more pronounced during the 1980s when both the country's internal 
developments and its external relations were affected by the world wide Islamic 
resurgence.
After the Iranian revolution in 1979, it seemed that there was a common 
perception in the West that Turkey was going to be the second place for an Islamic 
show-down. There were frequent questions in the western press as to whether Turkey 
would be the next country to fall to the fundamentalists' g ra b .^  Coupled with Turkey's 
own socio-economic problems and political violence, an extremist Islamic resurgence 
was thought to be the end o f Turkey as a Western ally.
It seemed that Turkey's Western allies had become even more worried than she
had about both the country's future and its place within the Atlantic Alliance. In this
context, one remembers a western journalist asserting that "the West Europeans still do
not know what to think about Turkey, and most o f them manage not to think about it
at all for most o f the tim e" .^  The statement seems true so long as it is remembered
that, maybe because o f this "ignorance" of Turkey, they tend to exacerbate things when
they do think about Turkey, like the constant danger posed by Communism for so long,
92and more recently by Islamic fundamentalism to the country's future.
The commonly accepted fact by Turkish experts that secularism in Turkey was 
firmly established and that the possibility o f Islamic takeover seemed dim, did not 
matter much in the eyes o f western journalists and politicians alike, who already started 
to see Islam as another challenge for Western liberal democracies after communism.
However, the recent exaggeration o f the strength o f Islam in Turkey created 
double sided responses from the Western World. On the one hand, it forced the 
Western states, as a result o f the fear o f "loosing her altogether to religious fanaticism", 
to be careful in their criticism and dealings with Turkey by creating a common feeling
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that something should be done to help her to overcome this "menace". Consequently, 
the military coup was welcomed in the West, generally as a mean to end all these 
uncertainties. Although the West European welcome later turned to bitter criticism on 
other accounts, like restrictions over democratic and human rights, the military's crack­
down on Islamic groupings generally went unnoticed, if not welcomed. The US, on the 
other hand, continued to back the military regime with an eye on growing Islamic 
fundamentalism elsewhere as well as on other strategic considerations.
On the other hand however, it reimposed, at another level, the old uncertainties 
and suspicions about the country's Islamic nature and led to questions about the 
wisdom o f allowing her to be part o f Europe. O f course, the argument in connecting 
rising Islam and Europe's reluctance to open its arms to Turkey works both ways, as 
militant Islam in Turkey tends to see itself as a response to domination o f western 
values and life style as well as an extension o f the world wide resurgence o f Islam. 
Thus, it may also equally be argued that "unless Europe recants, Turkey may drift away
go
into unpredictable paths".
The truth is somewhere in between. There has been widespread presupposition 
among western observers, just as among many Turkish intellectuals, that Turkey was 
suffering from acute Islamic radicalization. Like their Turkish counterparts, they, 
perhaps wrongly, interpreted Turkey's search after 1980 for social and psychological 
formulas for her future identity as deviations from secularism and modernism, and 
sometimes excessively as fundamentalism. The confusion seems to have originated from 
the lack o f commonly agreed definitions for "Islamism" or "Islamic Fundamentalism". 
As noted earlier, in 1987 only 7% o f those people who called themselves "Islamist" 
favoured a Sharia-based Islamic regime in Turkey 94 One might expect that this survey, 
which also showed that only the most poorly educated people who are unemployable in 
a fast developing country have lost their hope in the system and favour turning to the 
Islamic past, should have helped to dispel some fears and miscategorizations o f 
"Islamism", at least in Turkey. However, the reality is much too intricate and 
complicated by a variety o f factors, among them the laicist attitude toward Islam, to be
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resolved with such ease. It might be too much to expect from the western observers to 
understand the "reality" behind the bogey o f an "Islamic threat to the secular Turkish 
Republic" while even most o f the Turkish people cannot agree on the true nature o f the 
Islamic reassertation in Turkey or Islam's place within the secular setting in general.
Again after the Iranian revolution there was another common perception in 
many western minds as to the fact that Western institutions, such as secularism, 
pluralism, democracy and modernization, were inappropriate for Muslim countries and 
Islamic resurgence would finally substitute and destroy the efforts o f democraticization. 
The "failure" o f Turkish democracy for the third time in 1980 and subsequent events of 
torture allegations and human rights abuses only helped to reinforce this belief to put 
Turkey in the same picture with other Islamic countries. Also, perhaps as a result o f the 
simultaneous revival o f Islam throughout the Islamic world, there was a strong 
tendency in the West to regard the present Islamic world as an integrated "entity".96 
Thus Turkey's moves toward closer relations with other Islamic countries, which 
coincided with a domestic revival o f Islam that was seen as an extension o f world wide 
Islamic resurgence, were regarded, quite mistakenly, as efforts to become part o f that 
"entity".
Under the influence o f the above mentioned assumptions and against the 
backdrop o f an Islamic revival in Turkey and the radicalization o f Islam in the world in 
general, the Western states tended naturally to regard such issues, like downgrading o f 
her representation to Israel,96 her refusal to side with Britain on the "Salman Rushdie 
Affair"97 or with the USA on Tripoli bombing,98 and lowering her flag as a sign of 
respect for the death o f Ayateollah Khomeini,99 as signs o f Turkey's new realignment 
with Islamic countries in the world system. They wrongly related these moves in 
foreign policy to the revival o f Islam domestically. Consequently, these moves were 
used in Brussels and other Western capitals to intensify the argument that Turkey was 
not a "European" country. O f course the reality is somewhat different and could only be 
understood by examining both Turkey's relations and frustrations with western Europe
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and the USA during the 1970s and 1980s, and also the reasons behind her needs to
widen her options and extend her relations toward the Middle East.
Although Islam has some influence on the configuration o f power in the Middle
East, and thus indirectly on the international system, it would be wrong to assume that
all Islamic states would act in the same manner when facing given conditions.^99
Equally wrong was the assumption that, since she was extending her relations with
Middle Eastern states both in economic and political terms, Turkey would act in
accordance with either Islamic principles or the perceptions o f other Islamic states in
international politics.
It also seemed difficult for some to comprehend the Turkish desire to keep
separate, on the one hand, the secular nature o f the state and Islamic revival within
Turkey, and, on the other hand, Turkey's behaviour in international politics. Whatever
happened in Turkey during the 1980s with regard to the Islamic revival, it seemed that
the decision making process was still working rationally, and secularly, between given
options without resorting to religion as a source o f inspiration. However, as Weiker
perceives, it is not entirely impossible to see that "those who would like to see greater
emphasis on Islam as a guide in foreign relations would gain the upper hand if pressures
from the international (that is Western) community become too strong", which in the
end would have implications on Turkish attitudes towards Europe and NATO as well
as the Islamic world. *9 *
Western observers, while calling for the establishment o f truer democracy in
Turkey, may also find it difficult to understand that the further consolidation o f Turkish
democracy would inevitably lead to further reassertation o f certain Islamic values which
109had hitherto been suppressed under the authoritarian secularism. ^ It should be 
further noted here that Western Europe was also less than honest in dealing with the 
democratic rights o f the Turkish people. Possibly because o f their perceptions o f an 
Islamic revival, the western Europeans were silent throughout the trials and repression 
o f both NSP and other non-partisan Islamic groups, in direct contradiction to their 
attitude toward centrist and leftist parties and groups. The trials o f members o f the NSP
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or any other religious groupings did not receive much media coverage in the West 
either, except from time to time to reassure and hail the Islamic crack-down in Turkey. 
Hence, one still comes across such profound ironies as "despite the alleged dominance 
o f Western values in Turkey...which purports to be secular state, the banning o f the 
headscarf can still cause passionate protest". The author seems to forget the 
existence o f such "Western values" as freedom of belief and o f dress, and is obviously 
unaware o f the "passionate" defence o f the headscarf by some secular Turkish 
intellectuals on the ground that in democracies everybody should be entitled to chose 
his/her clothing. Also the fine line o f similarity between the actions o f a democracy to 
force women not to wear Muslim dress and those o f an Islamic state to force them to 
wear it seems to be missed altogether.
As a result o f these misperceptions, while the Western observers tend to regard 
the revival o f Islam as an important obstacle in front o f Turkish democracy, the Turkish 
leadership, keeping in touch with Islam as well as Kemalist principles, sees no 
contradiction between an opening towards the Islamic world and the strengthening of 
its ties with the European Community. It was the ultra - secularism o f the old guard 
westernizing elite that created imaginative barriers for so long for the existence o f such 
a double - edged relationship. It should not be forgotten that, without denying the 
importance o f other factors, the conspicuous turn o f Turkish foreign policy towards the 
Islamic world in the 1980s was initially triggered by the crisis in Turkish - European 
relations.
4. Concluding Remarks: Islam and Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 1980s
At the beginning o f this chapter, two intermingled questions were posed as to whether 
the recent reorientation o f Turkey's foreign policy toward the Middle East has been the 
result o f an Islamic revival within the country, or vice versa. After necessary 
considerations given above, it seems that the correct answer is that neither o f them has 
been the determining factor although each o f them was influenced by the other.
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Behind the reorientation lies a complex web o f factors, both internal and 
external. Among domestic factors, religion has played a certain part, but this does not 
mean that such an important move on the Turkish side has come about solely as a result 
o f the revival o f Islam in Turkey.
It is true that the foreign policy manifestation o f an Islamic revival in Turkey 
appeared in a form o f calls for Turkey's greater involvement in the Islamic world and 
its organizations. But the process had already begun in the mid-1960s when Turkey, a 
traditionally loyal ally o f the West, began to reorient her foreign policy towards greater 
cooperation with states belonging to Soviet or non-aligned blocs, and towards a more 
flexible approach in foreign policy. The change had originally been formulated under 
the pressure o f a need for an adjustment in a changing international system, and 
Turkey's disappointment with western policies on the Cyprus issue, and her desire to 
gather more international support for her cause were largely responsible for this 
re o r ie n ta t io n .^  Because o f common historic, cultural and religious affiliations, the 
Middle Eastern Islamic countries in particular were the cornerstone o f Turkey's new 
rapprochement efforts to the Third World. Other important reasons were Turkey's 
economic difficulties and her urgent need to seek out new trade partners and new 
sources o f financial aid. As the country's economic difficulties grew, particularly after 
the 1973 oil crisis, this latter factor became even more crucial, and Turkey's courtship 
for friendship o f oil-rich Arab states increased dramatically. Apart from cultivating 
bilateral relations with individual states, Turkey began to take an increasingly active 
part in the Islamic Conference and various other associations o f the Islamic world. 
After the start o f the Iran-Iraq war in 1979 and Kurdish insurgency in southeastern 
Turkey from 1984 onwards, the security dimension was also added to the reasons for 
which Turkey sought closer relations and collaboration with the Middle Eastern states. 
Also, it should not be forgotten that the Middle Eastern markets have assumed an 
increasingly important role for Turkish exports, especially after the advent o f  Turkey's 
new export-oriented development policies.
296
Therefore, the post-1980 reorientation o f Turkey's foreign policy towards the 
Middle East was, by all means, in accordance with general principles o f Turkish foreign 
policy, though the economic and political openings were followed with much more 
enthusiasm. In this new drive the revival o f Islamic conscience in Turkey, along side 
economic necessities and affects o f international and regional imperatives, played its 
part by means of, probably, clearing fears from the minds o f decision makers about the 
possible domestic repercussions o f such a move.
It could also be argued that the revival o f Islam in Turkey gave domestic 
political justification and incentive to policy makers for following more vigorously the 
foreign policy option on which Turkey had already embarked. Further, it enabled 
governments to claim credibility in the eyes o f Islamists, and thus obtain more votes.
However, to argue that it was only the result o f the Islamic revival in Turkey 
would be not just a great exaggeration but also a great error. Although domestic 
factors, including religion, have played a certain part, this reorientation can only be 
explained through a wider analysis o f significant changes that have taken place in the 
international system, in the Middle East regional sub system, and in Turkey's bilateral 
relations with the USA and the Western European states during the time period o f the 
1960s to mid-1980s.106
The above mentioned arguments also hold for the second part o f our query, that 
is, as conventional experts o f Turkish foreign policy might put it, the belief that 
Turkey's closer involvement with "shifting sands" o f the Middle East, which she should 
have kept apart from, brought both foreign intervention into Turkish affairs and greatly 
affected Islamic revival in Turkey, thus in the end influencing the country's stand .in 
foreign affairs.
Another question that has been raised from time to time, both inside and outside 
Turkey, was whether the secular nature o f the Turkish state contradicts Turkey's closer 
involvement with Middle Eastern affairs, and also whether is it an obstacle to her 
participation in the Islamic Conference.
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It would seem that, after dealing with each other long enough, Turkey and other 
Islamic countries came to an informal understanding, in which neither part 
preconditions any change in the other's stand in world politics and in its political 
system. In the bargain, the Arab-Islamic countries seem to have accepted, though not 
necessarily endorsed, Turkey's secular and westernised outlook and her special 
arrangements with the Western alliance system, while Turkey in turn no longer acts as 
an agent o f  the West in her dealings with the Middle Eastern states. Each side seems to 
be content with the collaboration they are having and does not aim, at least openly, to 
challenge the other's standing vis-a-vis Islam and the international system. Any 
deviation from this understanding, as Iran tried to affect the course o f Islamic action 
within Turkey during the 1980s, causes a cooling-off in relations.
As for the Islamic Conference, the Turkish Foreign Ministry sees no conflict 
and actually supports Turkish membership on account o f various reasons. It seems that 
again Turkey and other member states have worked out a way o f coexistence for a 
secular country within essentially a religious-oriented organization. Although Turkey 
usually tries to emphasize the economic cooperation side o f the organization and inserts 
reservations at each conference, she, at the same time, enjoys her full membership by 
taking part in its activities at the highest level, as much as her constitution and 
fundamental principles o f her foreign policy allowed. And the other members seem 
perfectly happy with the role Turkey is playing within the Organization and do not 
force Turkey to accept its recommendations if they contradict the principles she is 
attached to .10^ The question has also been raised as to whether the increased level of 
Turkey's representation in the Islamic Conference has connections with the increased 
visibility o f popular Islam in Turkey. The answer to this query seems negative, too. In 
response to this question, in March 1993 ex-president Kenan Evren pointed out that 
increased representation had been demanded by the foreign ministry since the late 
1970s and argued that the aims o f Turkish foreign policy, namely to widen her relations 
and to be an influential partner in the Middle Eastern affairs, demanded this increase. 
H e also added in passing, that, considering deteriorating relations with western Europe
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and the pressures she was facing from those countries, Turkey needed new friends and 
"every support she could get".108
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CH A PTER SEVEN
FO R E IG N  PO LIC Y  AND REV ITA LIZA TIO N  O F TH E TU RK ISH  ECONOMY
1. In troduction : The Political Economy of Foreign Policy and The T urkish  Case
The economic system o f a country, which is the result o f a political process that reflects 
a general world outlook o f a government as well as the economic needs and priorities 
o f a country, may exercise significant influence on a country's foreign policy in addition 
to its economic development.
Broadly speaking, the process o f choosing an economic development strategy
for a country usually reflects a basic political-ideological choice in the first place. Once
chosen, however, any economic strategy has its constraints on, and prerequisite needs
from, the political system. A centralized economic system, for example, requires a
strong state and is complemented by a centralized (sometimes totalitarian) political
system. 1 This system in turn may alienate liberal states in foreign relations while
attracting attention from other centralised governments. A de-centralized market
economic system, on the other hand, may help to build favourable foreign relations with
the states that share the same world outlook. Economic costs to pay for this option for
a developing country, however, may prove to be higher than expected, in reality
including threats to existence of national economy under the competitive pressures
from the outside world. Nonetheless, it is increasingly apparent in the post-cold war era
that choosing an economic development strategy is usually linked with the country's
stand in world politics as well as priorities of its domestic political system and economic
needs.2 Therefore, states may sometimes prefer one option to another under the
%
political considerations, though some economic deficiencies may later emerge from 
their politically-oriented choices. Since, as already stated in previous chapters, a 
country's foreign relations could be affected, and sometimes determined, by its 
domestic political system, the importance of selecting a suitable economic system to the 
priorities o f  country's political system and its general foreign policy became clearer.
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In this context, it was argued that Turkey's economic crisis during the late 
1970s was derived from her political and economic position on the periphery o f the 
world capitalist system; that therefore, a major economic reconstruction and changes in 
her development strategy were necessary; and that her position in the international 
political system should also be reconsidered accordingly.^ As a way out, some analysts 
were arguing in favour o f free trade option and membership o f the European 
Community,^ while others were advancing mainly the idea o f regional cooperation.^ 
The main argument actually derived fforri the peculiarities o f the history o f Turkish 
economic developm ent.
During the 1950s Turkey, as a peripheral country with a special geographical 
position, developed under American hegemony. After Turkey became an associate 
member o f the European Community in 1963, however, Common Market countries 
began to  replace America in dominating o f the Turkish economy, though not 
necessarily its position as main supplier o f foreign aid. Further, prompted by the labour 
shortage in Western Europe and exacerbated by the labour surplus in Turkey, there 
were, by the late 1970s, about a million Turkish workers in Europe sending home 
remittances o f around $1 billion a year. At the same time the EEC countries were 
accounting for 60% o f foreign trade, while the US share declined to less than 10% and 
trade with the Middle Eastern states was largely confined to one commodity; oil.
Also in the late 1970s Turkish industry, expanded in the previous two decades 
within a protected environment and orientated mainly to the internal market, was forced 
to turn to export markets, both because it was impossible in the late 1970s to find 
foreign exchange in order to buy raw materials, intermediary goods and technology, 
and because the internal market was by then soaked with cheap and low quality durable 
consumer goods. Such a turn, however, could not be realized unless Turkey had closer 
links with markets provided by the underdeveloped countries, both because 
competitiveness o f Turkish products in the developed countries was low and also 
European recession was affecting markets in the developed world. Even though 
Turkish industrialists had accordingly in the late 1970s attempted to established trade
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relationship with the immediate Arab countries o f the hinterland, such an economic re­
orientation, however, required a political transformation, too, and a step in that 
direction was not forthcoming from the government because such a Third-Worldist 
stance was associated at the time with the greater state control over the economy and a 
leaning towards the Soviet bloc.
At the same time, Turkish resentment o f the West on economic grounds was 
also evolving. Basically, Turkish reassessment o f its post-war western orientation had 
come after the US embargo in February 1975 because o f Turkish intervention in 
Cyprus. Together with the reduction o f financial help coming from western Europe 
because o f recession there, the economic problems caused by the embargo forced 
Turkish elites to reconsider the wisdom of Turkey's western orientation. Also, since the 
1950s Turkish economic dependence on the West and reliance for continued economic 
assistance had become a regular part of Turkish politics. But, at the same time, the 
frequent pleas for western help created a growing disenchantment with both the EEC 
and the US.^ Therefore, there was also a parallel drive to diminish Turkey's reliance 
upon the West in favour o f expanding economic and political ties with states in 
Turkey's immediate geographical environment. It was a major argument that to ensure 
independence in its foreign and economic policies, Turkey must pay attention to its 
immediate neighbourhood and that friendly ties with states in the Middle East, Balkan, 
Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean would permit flexibility in Turkish foreign 
policy, reducing her dependence upon military alliances centred outside the region as 
well as allowing different models and expanded assistance for Turkey's goal o f rapid
n
modernization.
Therefore by 1980, discussions about the manner in which Turkey should be 
rescued from her economic crisis was inevitably included in ongoing debates about her 
future political, economic and international orientation and about the merits and 
possibilities o f an increased regionalization of her policies. Thus, the various questions 
arising in connection with the economic development problem brought, at the same
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time, the most basic foreign policy issues, such as the principle o f westernization, into 
the discussion.
In the discussion, the growing awareness that the West no longer possessed the 
ability or the inclination to make an effort to better Turkey's condition without a major 
restructuring o f her economy made the option o f a deliberate regionalization o f 
Turkey's political and economic policies increasingly attractive for Turkey. On the other 
side o f the coin however, the economic need for huge foreign aid, which could come 
only from the West, and Turkey's traditional modernization drive were heavily drawing 
on to the EEC option. At the same time, however, it was clear that continuation of 
Turkey's close relations with the West, without changing her economic policies carried 
within, at least in the short run, serious risks o f economic and social unrest which might 
have placed the very existence o f Turkey's modernization drive in question. Moreover, 
in the event o f Turkish membership o f the EC, the country would have been put in a 
difficult position due to both the absence o f compatible development strategy and
o
competitive economy with the developed members. It was obvious that in order to opt 
for the EC option, the government needed to draw up a clear development concept, 
compatible with other Community members. It was certain that Turkey's economic 
system, as it existed then, would have created special difficulties with a view to full EC 
membership as it would lead to a distortion o f market forces in the domestic as well as 
the external market, thereby creating heavy burdens on her economy, too.9 Hence the 
question facing the government in the late 1970s was not a simple choice o f strategy 
which Turkey would follow in her quest for development, it was also the major 
challenge relating to Turkey's future socio-political existence and her place in the 
international system. In this context, the so-called "January 24 decisions" embodied a 
much higher significance for the country's future than their economic importance alone.
When the government finally decided in early 1980 which development strategy 
Turkey was going to pursue for the coming decades, it was clear that the authorities 
opted for the EEC option, even though they also empathized the importance of 
diversifying Turkey's trade relations. The political considerations seemed to play a
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major role in determining the government's decision. There were those among the 
Turkish intelligentsia, press and technocrat class who argued that Turkey lives on a ten 
year cycle o f economic growth, decline, political violence, military intervention and 
stabilization. It was thought that economic development would break this cycle, and, in 
this context, Turkey's eventual membership to the EC was seen as guarantee both to 
further sustained economic development and also against another military intervention. 
Therefore future EC membership was an overriding political aim, in addition to obvious 
pressing economic necessities, in the minds o f government officials when they decided 
to embark on the January 24 programme. It was thought that the reforms would pave 
the way for Turkey's greater integration into the world economic system and would 
bind her more closely to the West in general and to western Europe in particular. At the 
end o f the road, there seemed EEC membership, promising help both in economic 
development and political stability. Further it was thought that Turkey's economic 
liberalization would eventually secure her political liberalization, too. Although 
economic liberalization in a country does not necessarily have to lead to political 
liberalization or democratization, it seems that both processes are, at least, loosely 
connected with each other since history shows that liberal changes in economic policies 
have either preceded or sometimes followed the moves toward more political 
freedoms.*9
This connection, imaginary or real, between the level o f economic development 
in a free market economy and democracy, heavily weighed upon the final decision. 
Moreover, closer links with the West, particularly membership o f the EC, were also 
regarded as important in checking the growth of extremist groups such as religious 
fundamentalists, communists or Kurdish separatists, which were regarded as being 
dangerous for both economic development and Turkish democracy.
It was argued in Chapter III that the economic system o f a country is generally 
in close accord with its political system and understanding o f its place within outside 
world, and in principle similar regimes are assumed to be responsive to one another, 
though there may be exceptions to the rule. In this context, the chosen economic
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system o f a country is a helpful indicator o f a country's political system and eventually 
its foreign policy. On the other hand, it must be emphasized that the officially 
pronounced economic system o f a country may differ, at one time or another, from the 
one that may appear as more compatible to the existing political system. To be specific, 
this seemingly contradictory appearance between political system and economic policies 
existed, for example, in Turkey during most o f the 1980s. In the first instance, the 
military government's decision to go ahead with liberalization policies, adopted by the 
previous civilian government, was seemingly contradictory while they were embarking 
to create an all-powerful central state machinery. From the outside, the chosen 
economic system did not seem, to say the least, compatible with their overall 
governmental philosophy which aimed at re-establishing respectability o f the state, by 
force and in defiance o f individual and political rights if necessary. The economic 
system they embarked upon, on the other hand, aimed at integration with the world 
trade system in general and called for greater cooperation with western Europe in 
particular. One o f the main prerequisites o f such intimate cooperation with the 
European states was, o f course, that o f having liberal democracy as a political system, 
not military dictatorship or some sort of guided democracy, which they envisaged to 
attain in the medium term. This basic contradiction between liberal economic systems, 
which was pronounced as the choice o f the Turkish authorities for the country's future, 
and centralised political system with its restrictions on basic rights, which they 
admittedly wanted to sustain in Turkey, continued to exist during most o f the 1980s 
even after the advent o f civilian government in 1983. Though the civilian governments 
o f Turgut Ozal proved to be much more dedicated to liberal economic policies than any 
previous government, they still found it economically expedient to ignore the political 
essentials o f the economic system that they were so wholeheartedly following and hold 
on the restrictions on basic individual and political rights as long as possible. This 
limitation, in turn, allowed the continuation o f austerity policies and politico-economic 
restructuring without much opposition or unrest. This o f course created an awkward 
position within Turkey and also caused embarrassment in external relations.
The dilemma between "fast but disciplined" and "slow but democratic" way o f 
development was nothing new for T urkey .^  What was new, however, was that the 
advocates o f the idea that a certain amount of concession from the basic freedoms were 
acceptable, if not desirable, for the long-term success o f development and 
modernization, were in power and others, that o f supporters o f the belief o f 
development within democracy, were trying to stage a come back. Their domestic 
political struggle, however, had repercussions for Turkey's foreign relations since the 
liberal democracies o f western Europe, which Turkey was inspiring to join one day, 
were deeply involved in reshaping Turkey's future economic and political development. 
In this context, questions o f whether Turkish democracy would have much more 
chance o f survival in a market-oriented economic system, and whether further political 
liberalization would undermine Turkey's economic development, were to be asked 
increasingly both inside and outside Turkey in the discussions concerning Turkey's 
future economic system and attained further importance to it, in regard not only to the 
country's economic development, but also to her democratic evolution, and 
consequently her place in the international system.
At another level, any given country's foreign policy is responsive to the interests 
and needs o f the various economic development strategies pursued by governments. 
The connection between these two concepts, i. e. foreign policy and economy, is also 
important for bilateral relations between countries as well as between economic 
systems and blocs. Disagreements on the economic front can cause political tension and 
problems, while political tension between states would also result in creating 
unfavourable situations for bilateral economic relations and for world trade in general..
In this sense, the future o f world economy is increasingly related not only to 
solving the problems o f production, energy, transfer o f raw materials and technology, 
demography, inflation or recession, but at the same time to protecting peace, solving 
political conflict, preventing armaments and diverting those funds to economically 
productive areas and so on. If  we take up the Turkish case in this context, we could 
see, as former foreign minister Turkmen put it, that not only "Turkish foreign policy in
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general and attitudes against international and especially regional developments and 
bilateral relations with those countries heavily affect economic relations", but at the 
same time "our economic interests also affect our political cho ices".^
As already mentioned in Chapter III, for example, Turkish-European economic
relations were affected by the political problems existant during the military regime in
Turkey. A decline in the volume o f trade and postponement o f economic aid were the
consequences of, among other things, continuing political tension between Turkey and
Western Europe. By the same token, while political tension was affecting negatively
Turkey's trade with European countries, her export markets rapidly grew during the
early 1980s throughout the Middle East and North Africa, as a result o f not only
expansion in the markets o f oil-exporting countries but also Turkey's renewed political
efforts there. The reverse was also true that sometimes officially unspoken economic
1 Sreservations inevitably affected political realities, thus created a vicious circle. The 
net result was that by 1982, the Middle East and North Africa replaced western Europe 
as Turkey's main trading outlet and Iraq displaced West Germany as her main trading 
p a rtn e r .^
Beyond this, international economic developments would'" affect a country's 
economic system and national interest, and intum therefore, its foreign policy stand. To 
mention one among many examples in Turkish case we can cite that one o f  the biggest 
problems that both Turkish economy and Turkish representatives abroad were faced 
with in the late 1970s was to conclude daa's tc  compensate the country's desperate 
shortage o f energy through oil which had became an expensive commodity after the oil 
crisis o f 1973-74. It still creates bitter criticisms among the older generation o f  foreign 
ministry staff to mention the fact that during the winter o f 1979 when Turkey needed 
just enough oil to heat the ministries, her '"Muslim brothers" in the Middle East,, 
contrary to the established international custom,, square!)' refused to deliver it. on credit 
because they thought that Turkish bankruptcy was imminent. ^  During the 1980% 
however, Turkey was offered much more oil than she needed at very favourable prices, 
because o f decline in oil prices in the world market, that in. the second half o f  the 1980s
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she felt strong enough to make cuts for the first time in the heavy subsidizes o f the 
domestic oil market. These attitudes in turn affected the psychological, if not actual, 
environment for political cooperation with such states.
On the other hand, international political realities also have economic 
consequences. The above-mentioned price cuts were specially aided by favourable 
offers from both Iran and Iraq in their efforts to win Turkish sympathy, or at least to 
prevent it from falling to the other side, in their continuing w a r .^  Likewise Turkey's 
tourism earnings have largely fluctuated in connection with political developments 
within and outside the country. In 1986, for example, concerns over terrorism in 
Europe and escalation o f the Iran-Iraq war, and in 1992, the war over Kuwait sharply 
reduced the number o f tourists coming to Turkey. Similarly, current Kurdish insurgency 
in the southeast o f Turkey is having adverse effects over Turkey's tourism earnings.
Since the establishment o f the Republic in 1923, development has been one of
1 Gthe major aims o f both Turkish domestic and foreign policies. Influenced by the semi­
colonial status o f the late-Ottoman empire in its last years, early republican leaders were 
adamant in economic independence o f the country as much as political survival. After 
the Second World War the Soviet threat replaced the danger o f Western colonialism 
and continually helped to reinforce the belief that economically and industrially 
developed Turkey was the only viable option for independent survival. Her experiences 
o f  economic domination by the West during this period only strengthened Turkish 
desire for economic development and its role as a foreign policy goal. In this context, 
industrialization, higher agricultural production, better training and education, and 
higher level o f living standards became necessary prerequisites for political 
independence as well as ultimate challenge on the way to raise the Turkish nation to the 
level o f  modern world. This way o f thinking, though adapted to suit contemporary 
requirements, has remained one o f the basic cornerstones o f both Turkish economic
philosophy and foreign policy ideology.
Moreover, Turkey's exacerbated economic problems during the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, and premiership o f Turgut Ozal, who was a technocrat rather than
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statesman and economist more than politician, raised the economic issues further into 
the limelight during the 1980s as well as increasing their influence over foreign policy.
Also during the 1980s, realizing that Turkey's foreign relations were affected by 
her economic policies and problems with other countries, the Turkish foreign ministry 
restructured itself to cover the economic dimension o f foreign policy and Turkish 
ambassadors and special envoys increasingly started to tackle economic issues with
9 f)
their host countries. Furthermore, during the 1980s, official visits to  various 
countries became much more closely linked with the export drive, and manifestations of 
the importance attached to the economic side of international relations by the Turkish 
government were apparent in the increasing number of businessmen who constantly 
accompanied Turkish statesmen during their foreign trips.
Therefore, although a detailed analysis o f Turkey's economic development and 
its problems are beyond the purposes of this study, we cannot escape from dealing with 
the economic incentives o f Turkish foreign policy, more so because this dissertation 
aims at providing an explanation for Turkish foreign policy in an era during which the 
most dramatic changes in Turkish economic history took place. On the other hand, 
although economic policies and, to certain extent, ideology, prevailed in Turkey today, 
differ from those of the late 1960s and 1970s, the economy still bears reminders o f the 
events o f  those years.^ ^  Therefore, while explaining foreign policy-economy relations 
in the Turkish context, a broad summary o f Turkey's latest economic crisis .and 
subsequent measures taken by the Turkish governments, sketchy as. it may be, is 
necessary in order to be able to single out connections .and contradictions between the 
aims o f  economic strategy adopted after 1980 .and directions o f Turkish foreign policy 
during the same period. Moreover, Turkey had been perceived by international 
monetary opinion as one of the few examples of a successful transition from an inward 
to  an outward oriented economy, as well as a mode! o f  stabilization and adjustment. 
Therefore Turkish experience in the '1980s as emerging .successfully from a debt crisis 
in an adverse world environment through market-oriented economic policies may 
provide an ample case study for other heavily indebted developing countries in regard
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not only to economic side o f her experience but also foreign relations side o f it, 
especially in connection with her dependency relations with the lending countries and 
international organizations and how these relations affected her conduct o f foreign 
policy.
2. The Basic Problem : B ackground, Responses and  Results
During the first eight months o f 1980, prior to the military coup on September 12, the 
Turkish government was fighting an uphill battle against an ever-worsening economic 
situation, while political stalemate in the parliament and elsewhere was slowly eating 
away precious foundations o f Turkish democracy, and deaths on the streets as a result 
o f political violence and terrorism were amounting to civil war proportions.
Basically, the economic problems that were faced by Turkey towards the end of 
1970s included "an acute shortage of foreign exchange, a large balance o f payments 
deficit and a growing stock o f external arrears" 3?  Together with high and rising 
unemployment and inflation, declining growth and a bottle-neck in production, the 
above mentioned deficiencies forced Turkey into the worst economic crisis o f  the 
republican e ra .^  Beneath the surface, however, lay more important structural
O A
inconsistencies that culminated into a "crisis of the system".
Although adverse economic developments in the world environment and 
external shocks, such as quadrupling o f oil prices, an increase in world interest rates 
and tight monetary and trade policies adopted in the West as a result o f World 
recession, had aggravated Turkish economic problems, the crisis was admittedly 
brought about mainly as a result o f "often inconsistent, unstable and irrational" 
domestic policies 25 These included postponement o f  structural adjustments, large 
public sector deficits, an overvalued exchange rate, preferential treatment for industries 
aimed for domestic market, and a lack of incentives for the export sector, most of 
which were side effects of the inward-looking development strategy, based on import- 
substitution. O f course, severe socio-political instability and ensuing anarchy in the
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country had their shares as well by disturbing work peace thus reducing productivity 
and increasing work losses.
The origins o f Turkey's 1978-79 economic crisis dated back to the first oil crisis 
o f  1973-74, after which Turkey, unlike many developed and developing countries that 
opted for slow growth rate or even recession as a way out, did not adapt herself to 
post-crisis economic realities and attempted to sustain her high-level growth rate,
mainly geared by huge public sector investments based on foreign borrowing and
9 f \inflationary money supply. At the same time, with the clear intent o f import
substitution, prices and interest rates were controlled and the exchange rate held
constant despite over-valuing o f the Turkish Lira (TL) in order to protect Turkish
industry. This proved temporary, however, as the policies applied aggravated the
adverse balance o f payments effects o f external shocks by giving way to reduction in
97export market shares and increases in import shares. As a result, throughout the 
1970s Turkey's current account deteriorated sharply, moving from a surplus o f $600 
million in 1973 to a deficit o f $560 million in 1974 and $1,648 million in 1 9 7 5 .^
Furthermore, workers' remittances from abroad, which had been used in the 
early 1970s to balance trade deficits, decreased significantly from 1975 on, as a result 
o f the unrealistic official exchange rate (TL was overvalued by 35 to 40%), low level o f 
interest rates in contrast to the high interest rates in Europe, resulting from recession, 
and cut backs on foreign labour in the European firms. Consequently, the burden of 
financing the balance o f payments deficit was left almost entirely to reserves and 
increasingly to the short-term foreign commercial debts and resheduling o f old arrears. 
Although foreign borrowing allowed the government to cover the deficit in the short 
term, added debt and debt-servicing, however, further aggravated the crisis. Finally by 
1978, Turkey's borrowing possibilities were virtually exhausted and it became 
increasingly difficult to obtain foreign exchange necessary to purchase the imports 
needed for the normal functioning o f the industry. With increasing foreign exchange 
stringency, there came considerable shortages o f energy, raw materials, and spare 
parts.29 Faced with this crisis, Turkey's creditors, under the leadership o f the IMF,
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initiated a rescue operation" while the governments continued to try various ad hoc 
adjustment measures. Among the conditions asked by the IMF for conclusion o f a 
stand-by agreement and for the extension o f further credits were; reduction in the 
economic growth rate, a wage freeze, 20-25% devaluation o f Turkish Lira (TL), and a 
further increase in consumer prices.39 To carry out the "rescue operation", in concert 
with the IMF "austerity package", a consortium o f seven foreign banks began work in 
early 1979 on the rescheduling and reordering o f Turkey's massive foreign debts, which 
the Financial Times called "one o f the largest such operations in financial history, 
involving some $6 billion".3 *
However, two consecutive gradual stabilization programmes, initiated by the 
government in April 1978 and again in July 1979 under the IMF pressure and in 
connection with stand-by agreements with that organization, failed mainly because the 
authorities were unable to sustain the adjustment efforts due to primarily lack o f 
commitment in the government circles to the programmes and difficult socio-political 
upheavals that country was experiencing. Also, the limited nature o f the measures 
taken, such as devaluation o f the Lira without sufficiently adjusting prices and 
financially balancing state enterprises, largely affected the outcome.
By January 1980, the government, however, realized that there left no choice 
but to undertake a comprehensive and far-reaching economic programme if Turkey was 
to  be saved from bankruptcy.32 It was obvious that the policies applied in Turkey after 
1973, rather than adjusting to the external shocks, aggravated the situation.
Against the backdrop of political deadlocks, violence and worsening economic 
situation, January 24, 1980, marks an important date in Turkish economic history. On 
that day, the Demirel government approved a new economic programme which 
included IMF-type orthodox austerity measures for stabilization and later liberalization. 
The programme, which included strong macro-economic stabilization measures as well 
as fundamental reforms aimed at liberalization, was prepared by technocrats working 
under the leadership o f  Mr. Turgut Ozal, then undersecretary responsible for the State 
Planning Organization, and supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
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Essentially, the underlying novelty o f the January 24 1980 policies, within 
Turkish economic history, was their common aim to reorient economic policy from 
state intervention toward greater reliance on market forces.33 Before January 1980, the 
primary feature o f the Turkish economy had been the high degree o f state involvement, 
dating from the 1930s.3^ The most obvious characteristic o f the modem Turkish 
economy, distinguishing her from her OECD counterparts, had been the important role 
played by the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) in every aspect o f economic life.3 ^  
The January 1980 programme, however, aimed at moving away from the determining 
role o f the SEEs in national economy in favour o f private enterprises.
The most dramatic break with past policies, however, was the decision to open 
up the Turkish economy to foreign competition and investment whereby Turkey for the 
first time embarked on a set o f policies aimed at permanent transformation o f the 
economy and the nature o f government - economy relations. It was indeed, as a Turkish 
weekly magazine called it, an "economic earthquake". Until 1980, Turkey had 
pursued autarkic economic policies in order to protect domestic industry from foreign 
competition, and placed emphasis on import-substitution and production for the home 
market as a development strategy.3^ The motivation underlying these policies was
t V i
defensive rather than economic and dated back to the country's 19m century 
experience, when, because o f the large foreign debts and following state o f default in 
1875, the Western powers forced the ailing Ottoman empire in 1881 to put its major 
public income facilities under the control o f an international "Public Debt 
Administration" whereby lender countries directly administered and collected most of 
the tax revenues to service the debt.38 The Administration was not formally abolished 
until 1928 and the final payment on the Ottoman debt was made by Turkey in 1954, 
exactly a century after the first loan.39 Moreover, Allied powers attempts after the first 
world war for the continuation o f the "capitulations", economic privileges given to the 
western powers by the Ottoman empire, and their insistence on fixed lower tariff 
barriers for western products even after the establishment o f the Republic generated 
strong resentment towards western capital and high consciousness about national
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economy . Thus, as soon as the tariff restrictions o f the Lausanne treaty had expired in 
1929, higher barriers were introduced not only to protect local industry but also to 
make it difficult for foreigners to operate in and infiltrate to Turkey; a philosophy that 
remained unchanged more or less until 1980.49 M oreover the national, as opposed to 
foreign controlled, economy and self-sufficiency were heavily stressed by the 
administration. Under these conditions Turkish industry, mainly producing consumer 
durables for domestic market, grew up artificially, and therefore, when it faced a capital 
bottle-neck in 1978-79, was not able to adopt itself to the changing international 
environment. In this sense, the 1980 break with the past represented a major and 
definitive change in economic philosophy, which amounted to a interesting 
confrontation in Turkey between the etatist tradition of bygone Kemalist era and the 
prescriptions o f Milton Friedman's monetarism. At the end what used to be closed, self- 
sufficient, low growth economy, built on state capitalist lines laid out in the 1930s was 
suddenly opened to the World.
The Programme also included drastic measures to stabilize the economy by 
reducing inflation, encouraging exports, improving the balance o f payments situation, 
and gradually removing both trade barriers and foreign exchange restrictions 4 *. As a 
start, the Lira was devaluated 48.6%, a much higher level than the IMF was asking, 
which was followed by seven other devaluations in 1980, reaching 144% combined 
nominal devaluation rate at the end o f 1980 42 Then price controls were eliminated, 
and restrictive monetary and flexible interest rate policies, aimed at raising the domestic 
savings, were implemented. Further, in order to keep the domestic price structure in 
line with that o f the world market, a flexible exchange rate policy with daily 
adjustments was adopted after May 1981. The trade and external payments were 
liberalized, and various measures providing direct and indirect incentives for export 
were introduced.43 The programme emphasized export promotion as the only lasting 
remedy for Turkey's chronic balance o f payments problem 44 In an effort to reduce 
government spending, SEEs were denied subsidies and were placed under an 
independent management. The investment programme was rationalized and priority was
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given to the key sectors o f agriculture, energy and transport. And a more favourable 
climate and extended guarantees were called for attracting foreign capital.
Although these radical measures and other structural reforms involving the 
fiscal system and the financial markets ended fifty years o f protectionism in Turkey and 
marked the beginning o f a period with far-reaching structural changes that could lead to 
a western style free-market econom y,^ by then, however, the political situation in the 
country had deteriorated to unprecedented levels and to govern the country properly, 
let alone to implement extremely unpopular austerity measures, became almost 
impossible. And at that moment, the military stepped in to end the rampant anarchy and 
terrorism, and instituted a series o f sweeping institutional changes. These changes, as 
explained earlier, included such amendments to the political-legal framework as a new 
constitution, a new law on political parties, and an election law. There were also speedy 
changes to the economic legal framework, as opposed to the inability o f the civilian 
government to promulgate the January 24 programme into a law and use of 
government decree to by-pass the need for parliamentary approval. The military 
government speedily implemented changes in the tax law, labour relations and 
collective bargaining law, and banking and financial markets, as well as going ahead 
with social changes like the creation o f new arrangements for education, birth control, 
and the provision o f health services in general, most o f which had not been possible 
before because o f parliamentary paralysis.
Also as part o f the January programme, many administrative changes, such as 
the centralization o f wage negotiations under the auspices o f  the Supreme Arbitration 
Council, the establishment o f a Money and Credit Committee to co-ordinate monetary 
and credit policies and by implication determine the level o f interest rates, and the 
setting up o f new departments to process foreign investment applications and promote 
exports, were speedily implemented. These far-reaching institutional changes were 
expected to put Turkey on a higher economic, social, and political development track, 
with especially Western Europe.
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The commitment of the military government to the implementation o f the 
programme was crucial for its subsequent success, for before the coup d’etat the civilian 
government, despite initiating it, was not able to fully comply with the programme 
because o f possible short-term political consequences of the programme, such as rising 
unemployment and a decline in real wages.^  The military, however, free from political 
and electoral constraints, was able to leave the economy to technocrats and execute 
tight-monetary policies with precision. Their decision to follow up the plan and elevate 
its planner, Mr. Turgut Ozal, to a position in charge o f economy enabled the 
programme's continued enforcement during the military regime. Moreover, restrictions 
on political rights and a ban on union activities allowed the military government to 
ignore social consequences of the economic measures they were taking, in addition to 
increasing productivity by preventing strikes and pay rises, and by assuring work 
peace. Restrictions on social and political rights, however, were the prices to be paid 
in the short-term for economic recovery in the longer terrn.^0
Despite frequent official pronouncements to the contrary, the programme 
showed great deal o f resemblance to orthodox stabilization packages introduced in a 
number o f other developing countries, often by authoritarian governments and under 
the IMF's auspices.*50 As a result o f the military regime's almost scrupulous 
implementation o f the economic programme, initiated by the last civilian government, 
and the fact that the first step in the direction o f liberalization corresponded with the 
beginning o f the military regime, arguments were forwarded to the effect that the 
success o f the programme depended on total, and almost ruthless, execution o f  its 
entirety in detail from a central control position; that some sort o f  a centralized, if not 
authoritarian, government was preferable; that execution o f policies by a one 
man/group dedicated to the programme and free from political constraints was 
essential; and that in fact the advent o f the military regime into power ensured the initial
success o f the programme and was the real intention o f  the country s elite bourgeoisie
. • 51right from the beginning.
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The argument runs as follows: the coalition governments formed in Turkey 
during the period o f 1973-80, numbered thirteen, were not able to resolve the mounting 
economic problems within the democratic framework, which had brought Turkey to the 
brink o f  major collapse and, at the same time, led to increased unrest and militancy 
among the masses that alarmed the military and caused the in tervention.^ According 
to this argument, put forward mainly by "left-leaning" academics, the 1971 military 
intervention, too, was a response to the deteriorated economy, the mass strikes and 
demonstrations which fo llo w e d .M o re o v e r , the generals had an added interest in 
preserving the "neo-colonial" status quo because o f their involvement in the 
economy. ^  Since the early 1960s, the armed forces had, through the establishment o f 
the Army Mutual Assistance Association (OYAK), emerged as one o f the largest 
industrial and commercial interests in Turkey and become an integral part o f the 
economy. Moreover, starting with the Demirel government in the late 1960s the 
army had received much better pay and conditions, with subsidised housing and well- 
stocked PX stores, and had become more part o f a conservative establishment, at a 
time when the Turkish economy and society had been opened to the liberal ideas o f the 
rest o f  Europe.
It naturally follows that given its important position in the economy the military, 
alongside the rising Turkish monopoly bourgeoisie, had a substantial stake in the 
maintenance o f economic and social stability. Therefore, the argument concludes, when 
deterioration emerged in both areas, there left no choice for the army but to intervene, 
and their implementation with a vengeance o f the policies adopted by the Demirel 
government, which was essentially the representative o f Turkey's rising small and 
monopolistic bourgeoisie, was a logical consequence.
It is true that the social and political transition in Turkey, with its economic 
connections, has not been smooth and has led to violence at times within the country, 
which o f  course at the end became one o f the most pronounced reasons for the 1980 
military takeover. Moreover economists generally believe that increasing poverty 
resulting from maldistribution of income, uneven development o f different geographical
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areas o f the country, unemployment, and a decrease in the standard o f living have been 
the main causes o f this political and social unrest,^6 and without military intervention, 
the future of the programme with its socially destabilizing effects and with a shaky 
minority government looked bleak. 62
These arguments notwithstanding, however, whatever the reasons for the 
military intervention and their adherence to the January 24, 1980 programme, one thing 
was clear that the response o f the country to these policies was impressive and 
represented a welcome break both for the hard-pressed Turkish people and also for the 
IMF, which had to face unfavourable reviews o f other austerity programmes that were 
implemented earlier in Latin America and other heavily indebted nations.
Initially, marked and rapid progress was achieved especially on the balance o f 
payments, inflation and growth fronts. Inflation, which had been running well over 
100%, fell to about 40% in 1981 and 30% in 1 9 8 2 .^  GDP, which had declined to a 
negative growth o f -1.1% in 1980, grew about 4,5% in 1981, mainly because o f the 
better export performance, realizing 4.3% real growth rate in 1982 60 The anneal 
growth rate o f the GNP, which declined to 3.0% in 1978, - 0.3% in 1979, and - 0.7% 
in 1980,6 * came back up, following the broad based stabilization measures at the 
beginning o f 1980, to 4.3 and 4.45 in 1981 and 1982, respectively. There was 
significant improvement in both the trade and current account balances. Compared to 
25% in 1980, exports rose by 55% in 1981, reaching $5.69 billion in 1982 while 
imports steadied at around $8.5 billion.62’ The value o f work taken on by Turkish 
contractors abroad, mainly in the Middle East, rose from $1.5 billon to  $7.5 billon 
within one and half year 63 Workers' remittances reached $2.35 billon in 1982 in 
response to more realistic exchange and interest rates 64 As a result, also by virtue o f 
keeping expenditures low in real terms while increasing revenue, the current account 
deficit was reduced from a peak o f $3.2 billion in 1980 to $2.1 billion in 1981 and $1.2 
billion in 1982.65
This early success was achieved mainly through a better public sector 
performance and restructuring, while the private sector initially adopted a wait and see
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attitude. Although the still prevailing high tariff protection and export compensation 
schemes raised questions about the real success o f the programme, the improved 
foreign debt situation and a superior export performance became leading indicators of 
progress as well as hopeful signs of what more could be accomplished by furthering 
liberalization efforts in Turkey. In recognition o f this fact, Turkey's performance was 
accepted by the IMF and the international lending community as meeting the 
requirements o f sound development.
The success o f  the Turkish experience was all the more remarkable as the world 
economy had been in prolonged recession, accompanied by rising protectionism and 
retrenchment in international financing as an increasing number o f developing and 
Eastern Block countries sought to reschedule their foreign debts. In 1982, while the 
OECD-area GNP stagnated and the balance o f payments o f many countries became 
major policy concerns, the GNP in Turkey increased about 4.5%.
Mr. Ozal's elevation to the premiership in November 1983 and his identification 
with the programme were taken as further reassuring signs by the business circles and 
international monetary organizations o f stability and continued adherence to the 
outward-oriented development policy. In fact, during the election campaign, Mr. Ozal 
called for further reduction o f constraints on the private sector and for creation o f 
incentives for private industry and trade. Among the major aims o f his party were 
efforts to strengthen the middle class, reduce unemployment, provide low-cost housing, 
promote more balanced regional development within Turkey, and reduce bureaucratic 
red tape.66 He interpreted his party's election victories in November 1983 and March 
1984 as signifying a strong mandate to carry out his broad programme o f liberalization 
and continued to implement radical policies vis-a-vis foreign trade and payments, 
liberalization, and export orientation o f the economy.
When he came to power in 1983 through general elections, Mr. Ozal was 
labelled a "technocrat" in western press and government circles, and had some highly 
able technocrats around him executing his policies. After becoming prime minister in
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1983, he immediately relaxed import controls, while keeping the export incentives, and 
virtually abolished restrictions on foreign currency transactions.
The initial results o f the new economic measures were again positive. As the 
government moved to devalue the currency to approach convertibility with daily 
adjustments o f the exchange rate, the value o f the dollar on the black market fell to  an 
insignificant premium over the bank rate. The provision to allow Turks to have foreign 
currency accounts for the first time in recent Turkish history reduced the need to go 
outside official channels. As a result o f the more realistic exchange rate and additional 
export incentives, export earnings rose sharply in the first months o f  1984, even though 
some o f  the claimed transactions may not, in fact, have taken place. The improvement 
in the balance o f payments received favourable comments from the international 
banking community.
Despite the signs of progress, however, the debate on economic policy in 
Turkey did not abate and the initial wave o f optimism on the potential success o f the 
programme faded, at least for some, towards the end o f 1980s because o f lingering 
trade and budget deficits and continuing problems o f high inflation and 
unem ploym ent.^ The strains accumulated en route to transition from inward to 
outward oriented economy were becoming all too evident towards the 1990s. 
Especially the gradual liberalization o f the political system following the military rule of 
early 1980s, which had led to a series o f important elections, caused growing pressures 
on fiscal balances because o f the mentality o f election economy. While the public-sector 
deficit had started to get out o f control, the inflation rate, too, reached its pre­
adjustment period levels. These developments, together with the growing burden o f  
external debt service, raised serious doubts about the sustainability o f the programme.
On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Turkey did manage to recover 
in the early 1980s in a difficult world environment, in which a world debt crisis and a 
recession in the industrialized countries made the outward-oriented strategy particularly 
risky. Nevertheless, her performances especially on the growth and export sides, have
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been impressive and change in mentality from import-substitution to  export-led open 
market economy marked a very important watershed in Turkish economic history.
The success o f  the programme in the 1980s was generally attributed to  its 
coherence, to  the general shift in policies, and to the continued political commitment o f 
the authorities despite adverse short-term effects on employment and real wages. 
M oreover, the adjustment process was greatly facilitated by huge capital inflows 
resulting from debt rescheduling, balance o f payments support from OECD countries 
(led by the US and Germany) and an increase in workers' remittances, which permitted 
the higher level o f imports that was necessary to sustain growth and alleviate supply 
bottle-neck.
Above all, the continuity o f political commitment among government circles, 
personal attachment to and the clear authority o f Mr. Ozal regarding the programme 
throughout its implementation were crucial factors for the success o f  the 
p ro g ra m m e .M r . Ozal's connection with the January 24 Programme was so intimate 
that the Turkish economic transformation after 1980 came to be associated with him, 
both inside and outside Turkey. He was author and initial conductor o f  the "24 January 
Rehabilitation Programme", which he, after the military coup d'etat, continued to 
oversee as a technocrat Deputy prime minister until his resignation from the 
government in 1982. After the November 1983 elections he was back again to the 
government with the same economic policies, but this time as prime minister. Thus, 
from the viewpoint o f continuity within economic policy, the decade o f  1980 could be 
treated as a whole since all the forms o f political regimes, the parliamentary, military, 
transitional and once again parliamentary, which followed each other during the 1980s, 
pronounced their adherence to the same economic programme which was controlled 
all the time, except for an interval o f sixteen months in 1982-83, by Mr. Turgut Ozal.
The importance o f a political commitment to the success o f  the programme 
becomes more apparent if we compare the post-1980 experiment with earlier Turkish 
attempts at stabilization. Both attempts in 1958 and the late-1970s were seen by the 
Turkish governments as merely short-term expedients to provide fresh facilities and get
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them out o f the immediate impasse. Once the impasse was over, the government would 
backtrack from the programmes and violate their stipulations. In contrast, the 1980 
programme was more rapidly welcomed and was implemented over a longer period of 
time with much greater firmness and determination.69
While the reforms were comprehensive, the rest o f this chapter focuses 
primarily on those aspects o f Turkey's post-1980 economic policy having to do, directly 
or indirectly, with foreign policy such as external debt, foreign trade, and relations with 
the international monetary organizations.
3. Instruments of The New Economic Programme and Foreign Policy
3.1. The Role of External Debt and International Organizations in Turkish 
Economic Recovery
One o f  the main tools o f the new economic strategy was dependency upon more 
international borrowing. Essentially, the preoccupation with trade liberalization, 
especially in the initial years o f the programme, and with short-term objectives like 
coping with inflation and balance o f payments difficulties, entailed, in addition to 
relying on demand restraint through tight monetary and fiscal policies, resorting to 
external borrowing.
Although Turkey could be categorized economically as a highly indebted
developing country, her experience during the 1980s, regarding foreign aid and external
debt issues, has been clearly different from other members o f developing world. The
reason for this is that the debt crisis caught up with Turkey in 1977-1978, well before
other leading debtor nations engulfed in a debt crisis from 1982 onwards.70 Jn
between, Turkey's performance on economic stabilization effort, as stated earlier, was
successful and by 1982 Turkey emerged again as credit-worthy country with a
71relatively high level o f economic growth based on an export boom. Being caught up 
with debt crisis much earlier than other debtor countries, thus before private creditors 
started to worry about returns on their lending, Turkey was able to undertake a series 
o f debt renegotiations with her debtors before 1982, which involved the largest sums
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ever to be rescheduled.77 Between 1978 and 1981, $9.8 billion of foreign debt was 
rescheduled, amounting to 70% o f Turkey's total debt at year-end 1981, o f these $5.5 
billion (56%) was debt owed to OECD governments and $2.8 billion (29%) to 
commercial banks.77 In turn, by 1982, while the private creditors were pulling out o f 
Latin America due to chronic debt crisis over there, Turkey was ready to re-enter 
private capital markets and thus benefit from favourable conditions. Since then both 
Turkey's credit-worthiness in international capital markets and debt service ratio have 
been clearly superior to that of other heavily indebted countries.7^ While Turkey, as 
one o f the first countries to arrange debt rescheduling, recovered from her serious 
liquidity crisis, most o f the other debtor nations have struggled unsuccessfully since 
1982. The relative success o f Turkish economic stabilization programme had threefold 
reason behind it.
While not denying that the market-oriented reforms undertaken after 1980 were
instrumental in achieving success on the external front, that the internal social and
political costs o f the transformation, especially the repression o f workers' rights and
declining real wages, should also be emphasized. Also and that the favourable
developments in Turkey's immediate neighbourhood, such as the Irah-Iraq war, greatly
helped the Turkish recovery by creating a thriving export market for Turkish goods, the
most important factor for the success o f the Turkish recovery programme, however,
was the exceptionally advantageous treatment that Turkey received from the
multilateral institutions (IMF and World Bank) and bilateral creditors, mainly OECD
governments, in terms of both debt relief and new capital inflows. To grasp the
importance o f international support in Turkish case, it is enough to compare Turkish
experience with those of other heavily indebted nations that tried to implement the 
75same policies.
Apart from the major debt operation, which included the above mentioned 
unprecedented size o f debt rescheduling and renegotiations, after 1979 Turkey was also 
beneficiary o f a coordinated effort on the part o f western governments to prop up her 
economy. Between 1979 and 1981, $1.5 billion was poured into the Turkish economy
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under OECD auspices as special assistance.^  In addition, during the same period, the
IMF and the World Bank lent $1.2 billion and $1.0 billion, respectively. Turkey also
became the first country to receive World Bank structural adjustment loan in addition
to obtaining major loans from Saudi Arabia and oil credits from other OPEC 
77countries. The financial boost created by these sums was not only sufficient to relieve 
Turkey's short term foreign exchange crisis and help to alleviate the impacts o f the 
second oil crisis shock but also enough to provide an important space in which the 
reforms o f the early 1980s could be carried out.^8 Rodrik's comparisons show that 
Turkey had been the recipient o f proportionately larger capital inflows in the aftermath
HQo f her debt crisis than any other country. This has reduced the squeeze on the current
account o f  the balance o f payments.
The OECD countries' commitment to the success o f Turkish economy derived
from different sources. In the first place, Turkey had became a test case o f monetarist
policies o f IMF, which had previously received unfavourable blows in Latin American
experiences. Initially, the January 24, 1980, stabilization programme was introduced
under the auspices o f the IMF and therefore received immediate recognition and
support from the other international organizations like the World Bank and the OECD.
The IMF's desire to play a significant and constructive role in Turkey's debt recovery
was reflected in its June 1980 stand-by agreement with Turkey, which amounted to
80$1,65 billion over a three year period , the largest ever IMF stand-by at the time. In 
turn Turkey's desire to satisfy the Fund's requirements was also evident during the 
drawing up process of the January 24 Decisions. When Mr. Ozal, as chief Turkish 
economic negotiator, approached the IMF at the end o f the 1979 with a new 
stabilization programme, his and the Turkish government's, main aim was to arrange an 
agreement so that the Fund would release more credits to Turkey in order to finance 
the imports required to maintain domestic and export production. Turkey's other 
creditors were also looking for a IMF green light to extend any further credits to 
Turkey.81 Therefore, especially in the early days o f the programme, the IMF’s 
performance criteria, embodied in a three-year stand-by agreement, was the overriding
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influence in the selection o f economic policies in a wide range o f spheres, particularly in 
the field o f  monetary, fiscal, trade, and industrialization policies.8^ The support o f 
international organizations such as like the World Bank and the IMF for the programme 
further increased especially after the 1983 elections and they, having played an 
important role in the shaping o f Turkish stabilization and liberalization efforts since 
1980 and having received favourable reviews about its early successes, started to 
identify themselves more closely with the experiment. Moreover, by the mid-1980s, 
Turkey was the only major example o f a country which had managed so far to recover 
from a debt crisis and achieve a respectable growth rates afterwards. This success was 
universally linked to the outward-oriented policies put in place since 1980 under the 
guidance o f the IMF and the World Bank. Therefore the implications o f the outcome 
extended far beyond Turkey. The uncertainty regarding Turkey's fate could have led to 
serious doubts as to whether such policies were either necessary or sufficient to grow 
out o f  a debt crisis. It was considered that had Turkey failed, then the so-called 
Chicago School Formula (Friedmanist Monetarism), backed by the IMF, regarding 
adjustment via liberalization, would have to be regarded as having failed as well. 
Accordingly, having put their name to the programme, the IMF and other international 
organizations felt obliged to see it through.
Political factors had also had their share in determining shape and volume o f 
OECD aid, and indeed other western help to Turkey. The initial rescue operation was 
clearly influenced by the events in neighbouring Iran. The fall o f the Shah in 1979 and 
following Iran-Iraq war highlighted Turkey's both strategic and shaky position in that 
particular hot spot o f the world for the western Alliance, and therefore triggered an 
avalanche o f aid from strategic-minded OECD governments.83 During 1980, for 
example, the OECD countries came through with a $1 billion special aid assistance 
package. This connection between the Iranian revolution and the increased interest o f 
the western governments in Turkey was clearly pronounced by the then prime minister 
Mr. Suleyman Demirel who, as mentioned earlier, reportedly said "it seems we must 
thank Iran for enabling people see us again".84 Although the civilian government was
replaced by a military regime in September 1980, the OECD packages continued both 
in 1981 and 1982 with $940 million and $960 million, respectively. ^
The continued backing o f the IMF and the World Bank, along with the OECD, 
was crucial for Turkey's balance o f payments support, especially in the initial years of 
the 1980 p ro g ram m e ,b e cau se , after the debt crisis o f late 1970s, Turkey was shut 
out o f  private capital markets and in fact was unable to raise any new loans from 
commercial banks until 1 9 8 3 .^  In order to determine the importance o f  official 
external backing for Turkish "success story", it is enough to look closer to the overall 
financing o f the current account after 1977, which shows that during the 1978-1981 
period, the major role in closing the gap in balance of payments was played by debt 
relief (29% of the total), official bilateral lending (26%), and flows from international 
organizations, mainly the World Bank and the IMF (2 2 % ).^  Altogether, official 
inflows to Turkey in 1980 reached an all time high $2.1 billion. She further received 
$1.5 billion in 1981 and $1.8 billion in 1982 from official sources.**9 Her outstanding 
credit from official sources totalled to some $4.2 billion in 1984. Moreover, proportion 
o f the long-term debts to total amount of the debt was over 26%, far greater than any 
other debtor nations at the time. This figure, compared with 4% for Argentina, 6% for 
Mexico, and 10% for Brazil, shows the peculiarity o f Turkish case among other debtor 
nations and proves the importance attached to Turkey by the western governments.90 
As these figures reveal, it is hard to downplay the role o f official and multilateral 
balance o f payments assistance during this period. While comparing Turkey to other 
highly indebted countries, it is of course worth remembering that during the 1978-79 
period, just before heavy OECD involvement and the reforms o f 1980, Turkish 
performance did not look much different from the typical pattern after 1982.
In the 1982-85 period, however, debt relief played a much reduced role (19%) 
and had no part at all by 1985. The same pattern is also evident for special OECD 
assistance. On the other hand, short-term private capital inflows, which amounted only 
to $50 million in the 1980-83 period, increased substantially after 1983 and between 
1983 and 1985, commercial banks undertook $1.9 billion o f new lending to Turkey.91
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Also in 1983, export credits, which had dried up for Turkey in 1979, became available 
once more. In this context, backing o f international organizations such as the IMF and 
the World Bank have been important, if not absolutely necessary, in encouraging the 
resurgence o f international bank lending to Turkey in the aftermath o f three debt 
reschedulings o f the late 1970s and 1980.92
Although the rising inflows o f private capital to Turkey was ample testimony to 
found confidence in her creditwothiness, this shift in borrowing pattern still did not 
diminish the potential constraints o f the need to borrow large sums for the country's 
foreign policy and independent stance in the world. There were precedents in the use o f 
economic pressures as instruments o f policy against Turkey in the aftermath o f  the 
Cyprus crisis in the 1970s. Indebtedness o f this size also had the potential to put in 
jeopardy the autonomy and negotiating power o f the governments with the creditor 
countries.
Complications arising from this factor were seen in the period o f 1980-83, 
during which the EC and West European states, despite strong responses from Turkey, 
attempted to use economic pressures on her as a political leverage to get a speedy 
return to democracy. West Germany, second biggest aid donor o f Turkey, though 
continuing to participate in the OECD Turkey Consortium, refused in January 1981 a 
Turkish request to coordinate another OECD loan package as it had done in both 1979 
and 1980. Moreover, under the mounting pressures from number o f politicians and 
organizations for general reductions in aid to Turkey because o f the NSC's reluctance 
to commit itself to a timetable for return to parliamentary democracy, the W. German 
government's final aid figure under the OECD auspices for 1981 ($200 million) was 
substantially lower than its previous offers. Even that figure didn’t seem secure at one 
point as it was reported in mid-November 1981 that W. Germany was considering 
whether withhold its participation in the OECD package 93 Furthermore, following the 
dissolution o f political parties by a decree on October 16, the Commission o f the EC
announced its intention to delay the implementation o f fourth protocol until Turkey's
i 94 political course became clearer.
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On the other hand, US readiness, in contrast to European's attitude, to support 
Turkey s borrowing needs after the military intervention and its substantial participation 
in international economic assistance efforts to rescue the Turkish economy from 
collapse in 1980, were recognized as a key to signing o f new Turkish-American 
Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement in 1980. O f course US readiness to 
back up Turkish needs generally derives from her strategic value as an American ally 
and therefore varies from time to time depending on US assessment o f it. For example, 
at the height o f the second cold war Turkey after 1980, despite the existence o f a 
military regime, became the third largest recipient o f economic and military aid from the 
US after Israel and Egypt, reaching $900 million in 1986. However, after the thaw in 
superpower relations, Turkey's share in US foreign aid started to diminish together with 
her strategic value. As a result US aid to Turkey for the fiscal year 1988 amounted to 
only $526 million.93
This dependence o f Turkey on one ally's willingness to support her economic 
development, o f course, created tension at times between the two countries, and 
solutions usually required Turkish perseverance in supporting US aims in the region, if 
not necessitated concessions from Turkey in return for America aid.90
Therefore, in order to diversify her aid donors, and to reduce her dependence 
on one ally, Turkey was reported to have requested aid from Saudi Arabia, capitalizing 
on the latter's preference for Muslim aid recipients. The total amount Evren was said to 
have requested in his trip to Saudi Arabia in 1984 was $6 billion. By the same token, 
Turkey further raised a total o f $125.5 million in syndicated loans supplied by Islamic 
governments and quasi-govemmental institutions in the first quarter o f 1984, including 
$35 million Islamic Development Bank loan. For the same reason, that is in order to 
reduce her dependence to her western allies, Turkey tried to emphasise the role o f  the 
Islamic Development Bank in enhancing economic cooperation between Islamic 
countries. Therefore, in contrast to her reserved attitude towards political cooperation 
among Islamic countries, Turkey has been more than willing to join into economic 
cooperation, as seen in her strong presence in Islamic Development Bank and her
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acceptance o f the leadership o f the Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial 
Cooperation o f the Organization o f Islamic Conference in Istanbul.
Also, it should not be forgotten that high state spending, especially when it has 
been financed in part by foreign borrowing has extremely inflationary effects on the 
economy, as seen in Turkey after 1983. Moreover, foreign debt o f this size generally 
has a tendency to grow in the middle-to-long term because o f its spin-over affect and 
put burdens over the country's future generations and development. Although debt 
reschedulings o f the 1978-1980 period relieved Turkey from the immediate danger o f a 
debt crisis, nevertheless the heavy repayments burden o f debt incurred in the 1970s is 
still being felt. After the rescheduling o f Turkey's foreign debt in 1979 and 1980, for 
example, her debt repayments amounted to $585 million in 1981 and $700 million in
1982. Moreover, in 1983, apart from compensating trade deficit o f the year, Turkey 
had to make debt interest payments o f $1.3 billion and foreign debt principal
Q7
repayments o f $1.05 billion. Although reliance on foreign aid had diminished after
1983, Turkey still needed some $1.5-2.0 billion foreign aid yearly in order to be able to 
meet her debt repayments as well as trade deficit and the needs o f the economy since 
her debt repayments jumped to $2.2 billion in 1985 and $2.6 billion in 1986. In the peak 
year o f debt servising, 1987, Turkey had to repay $5,600 million, o f which $2,000 
million was interest payments.98 To finance these repayments and current account gap, 
Turkey has increasingly resorted to short-term borrowing. Between 1983 and 1986, the 
share o f short-term debt in total went from 13% to 21%.99 However, Turkey's 
experiences in the late 1970s are important reminders o f the dangers o f a rapid build-up 
o f short-term debt which usually results in liquidity problems and foreign exchange 
bottle-neck. Further, burden o f debt repayments usually generates more needs for 
foreign borrowing and thus forms a vicious circle for the recipient country. As an 
example, Turkey's outstanding foreign debt increased from $16.3 billion in 1980 to 
$38.5 billion in 1988, with debt service obligations o f $7.2 billion o f which $3 billion 
represented interest and $4.2 billion principal.100
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The IM Fs and the World Bank's support for the Turkish economy was also
important beyond their major role in debt arrangements and rescheduling. M ost o f the
major reforms o f the Turkish economy and the redirectioning o f policy occurred in
conjunction with the World Bank and IMF programmes. The World Bank tended to
concentrate on institutional reform and structural problems emphasizing the
liberalization o f trade, encourage production for export, better resource allocation and
further mobilization o f domestic savings in order to reduce external debt, whereas the
IMF focused on monetary and fiscal stabilization, concentrating, in particular, upon the
flexible exchange rate policy, the restructuring o f the SEEs, monetary discipline and
market-determined interest rates. While the IMF tried to use stand-by agreements to
assert its influence over general economic policy in Turkey, ^  the World Bank's
efforts were institutionalised in series of Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) agreements 
109with Turkey. In other times, both the stand-by agreements and the SALs were 
backed up by continuous studies and reviews o f the programme by IMF and World 
Bank staff.
The finance provided by the Fund and by the World Bank was undoubtedly a 
vital injection into the cash-squeezed Turkish economy. The support o f  the IMF also 
lent credibility to the Turkish case and paved the way for debt renegotiations with 
private creditors. Whatever the longer term outcomes, o f the January 24 programme 
and the various criticism directed towards the short-sightedness o f the IMF policies, the 
reforms undertaken by Turgut Ozal from 1980 onwards, which received support from 
the IMF, have enabled the Turkish economy to proceed through the 1980s without the 
repeated debt problems which haunted so many other debtors. On the other hand, 
Turkey's case was probably peculiar in the history o f the debt crisis because o f the high 
degree o f official debt in its total debt portfolio. Its strategically important position, 
together with the timing o f its payment crisis, probably made its creditors more willing 
to contribute new money which was vital to recovery in the external sector. Turkey's 
experience, however, shows how a combination of policy re-orientation and substantial 
financial support can bring about a long-term recovery in external payments.
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3.2. Export Performance: Its Determinants And Effects On Foreign Policy
Although the availability o f foreign inflows and support received from international 
organizations, as discussed in the preceding section, were important factors in igniting 
the recovery o f the Turkish economy since 1980, they probably would not have been 
enough alone to sustain healthy growth o f the economy in the longer run if it was not 
for the country's rather miraculous export performance.10*1 According to the 
programme, rapid export growth was a crucial factor in improving the balance o f 
payments situation, in gaining international credit-worthiness, and indeed in securing 
the survival o f the entire economic programme by compensating for the depressed 
domestic demand because of the austerity measures.10^ Turkey's export boom in the 
1980s has shown rather interesting turns for a country which had been long stuck in 
"the traditions o f export pessimism". 106 Notwithstanding short lived experiments with 
free-market economy, throughout the entire republican period Turkey's economic 
policy had tended to favour import-substitution at the expense o f exports. Being made 
the official development strategy of the late 1960s and 1970s, the import-substitution 
policy gave little encouragement to production for exports and progressively tightened 
restrictions on imports, and had thus effectively gone a long way to cut Turkey from 
rest o f  the world market which undoubtedly had effects on the politically isolationist 
and pro non-aligned ideas , put forward in the 1970s regarding Turkey's international 
stand.
However, under the economic stabilization programme o f 1980 incentives were 
introduced to encourage exports.106 Direct policies to encourage exports were backed 
by equally important indirect policies, such as flexible exchange rate policy which 
ensured the competitiveness o f Turkish goods, and by change in attitudes and minds of 
government officials toward export and trade in general.
Official export statistics tell a spectacular story. From around $2.5 billion in
1071979, exports steadily increased to $8 billion in 1985 and $10.3 billion in 1987.AW
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Even if  one deducts 10% plus to allow for "fictitious exports", realistic figures for 1987 
would be $9 billion. Although this figures still gave away $5 billion deficit on visible 
trade account in 1987 (imports were a bit over $14 billion in 1987), the deficit, in 
proportional terms, was much less important than it had been at the beginning o f the 
1980s, when imports were more than double exports.
Two transformations came with this increase. First, the share o f manufactured 
exports grew faster, raising their share in total exports from 36% in 1980 to 75.3% in
1985, with a corresponding decline in the share o f agricultural products from 57.4% in 
1980 to 21.6% in 1985. Second, there was also a marked shift in geographical 
distribution and the country pattern o f exports. In an attempt to overcome the problem 
o f slow growth o f OECD markets, which was accompanied at times by barriers against 
imports, Turkey had to rapidly explore the market possibilities in the Middle Eastern 
and North African countries. As a result, although exports to all regions grew 
substantially, trade with the regional countries literally exploded in the early 1980s.
Before 1980, the Middle East and North Africa were underdeveloped as 
Turkish export markets. The rapid growth o f income and wealth amongst the oil- 
exporting Middle Eastern countries after 1979 as a result o f increases in the oil prices 
meant that they suddenly were able to embark upon major development and rapid 
growth programmes. As a regional supplier Turkey greatly benefited from this drive by 
providing transport equipment and machinery for the investment projects, and 
consumer goods and food stuff to the fast growing markets in the region. Prime 
Minister Ozal was particularly keen on promoting greater cooperation among the 
Islamic countries via Islamic Conference Organization. Consequently, the share ,o f 
Middle Eastern and North African markets in total exports o f Turkey increased from 
17.% ($400 m.) in 1979 to 44.3% ($2.5 b.) in 1982, eventually declining to 31% by
1986, while exports to OECD countries fell from 58% in 1980 to 45% in 1982.
Moreover, exports to these countries accounted for 72% of the increase o f total
1OQ
exports in 1981 and 63% in 1982.
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It is fair to say that this export boom has been the clearest success o f the 
adjustment programme o f the 1980s. The success on this front, apart from allowing the 
country to maintain its growth rate in healthy proportions, has also played a key role in 
attracting commercial bank lending since 1982.110
Success on the export front would become more apparent if one considers the 
fact that the rapid expansion occurred in an inhospitable and not particularly receptive 
world environment. The recession in the western world meant that overall trade was 
stagnant or growing only slowly in the early 1980s. Despite this adverse external 
environment, Turkey still managed to expand her export shares even in the hard- 
pressed markets o f the OECD countries, with an increase o f 35% in 1981, following a 
4% decline in 1979 and a 16% increase in 1980. The increase in 1981 seemed more 
impressive when it was set against the 5% decline in the total imports o f the OECD 
countries that occurred in the same year.  ^* *
What have been the determinants o f the boom? Several factors have been 
117frequently cited. From our foreign policy and international environment 
perspectives, the most important factor, and in a sense most fortunate for Turkey, 
determining the success of Turkish export boom was the Iran-Iraq war which created 
an important market for Turkish manufactured goods in the two belligerent countries 
and became the predominant source of expansion for exports to the Middle East. 
Within the above mentioned figures about the increases o f Turkish exports to the 
Middle East in general, Iran's and Iraq's combined share in total exports was 
particularly fast growing, with an increase from 5.5% in 1980 to 26% in 1985, though 
eventually declining to 15% in 1986 as a result o f the fall in oil prices. With these 
figures Iran, having overtaken W. Germany; became Turkey's largest export market in 
1982 and 1983.113 Moreover, the outbreak o f  war between Iran and Iraq put Turkish 
road transport in an attractive position as the only secure route for trade between 
Europe and the Middle East which allowed her to capture a major share o f the rapidly 
expanding transit market of the region.
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Furthermore, Turkey played a major role in construction works in the Middle 
East, where they have the advantage o f geographic proximity, familiarity with the 
terrain and business practices, a history o f good relations, reasonable labour costs, and 
a common religious identity, especially important in Saudi Arabia where major works 
were undertaken in the holy cities, not open to non-Muslims. ^  ^  In 1982, Turkish firms 
had 3.7% o f the Middle Eastern market and 2.2% o f the world market, major 
construction clients being Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Further, particularly up to 
1985, contracts obtained in the Middle East provided a new employment destination for 
Turks after the closure o f European labour markets and helped to keep workers' 
remittances, needed for balance o f payment reasons, high.
Another important factor for the export boom in this period was the active role 
the government played in arranging bilateral trade deals with, and organizing trade 
missions to, especially, regional countries. Moreover, for increasingly political rather 
than economic reasons Turkey's major oil suppliers (Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Saudi 
Arabia) became more willing to enter into barter deals, in which crude oil was 
exchanged for Turkish goods and construction works. ^  The same sort o f agreement 
was also eventually reached with the Soviet Union as well in 1985 in exchange for the 
latter's natural gas.
Although it is difficult to assess the precise effect each factor might have had on
Turkey's performance, Rodrik, after complicated economic calculations, asserts that
$1.9 billion worth (or 42% of total) exports between 1979 and 1984 was due to the
117Iran-Iraq war and other non-economic (political) changes after 1981.11 His 
calculations, rough as they are, highlight the critical roles played by three variables; 
together with the export subsidies and the active real exchange rate policy, the Iran- 
Iraq war and possibly the overall change in the domestic policy environment around 
1981 emerges as one of the more important inputs in export boom and consequently in
the Turkish economic recovery.
Once it is established that part o f the explanation for this favourable export 
performance lies in the fact that Turkey increasingly exploited the market possibilities in
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the Middle East and North Africa, it follows naturally that one o f the main aims o f 
Turkish foreign policy during this period should surely be directed to the preservation 
o f those markets. Turkey's "active neutrality", as described by prime minister Ozal, in 
the Iran-Iraq war derived, as much as security concerns, from the fact that both 
countries counted among Turkey's largest trade partners and she was reluctant to do 
anything which might have endangered this situation or curtailed favourable-priced 
crude oil supplies from either country. In this context, considering prime minister Ozal's 
preoccupation with the economic side of politics and his belief in economic 
development bring more political power and influence in the region, it is not surprising 
to see that prime minister Ozal was more interested at times with possible trade deals 
with, for example Iran, rather than Iranian efforts to export revolutionary religious 
ideas to Turkey or the defiant attitudes of Iranian officials regarding the secular 
character o f the Turkish state. Essentially all other issues had been played down while 
series o f trade agreements and joint economic schemes being signed.
The poor growth performance o f the OECD countries in the 1980s was
accompanied by increased protectionism, particularly severe in traditional (labour-
intensive) lines o f production. Given the concentration o f Turkish exports on these
lines, it was foregone conclusion that protectionist tendencies in industrial countries had
undoubtedly adverse impacts on Turkish export growth and caused at times frictions
between Turkey and other OECD countries. Although export growth to the OECD
countries averaged about 20% annually during the 1980s, calculations o f Anand, et.al.,
suggest that exports could have grown even more rapidly if the macroeconomics
118situation in Europe had been more favourable.
The extent o f protectionism against Turkish exports was the repeated complaint 
o f Turkish exporters. The problem related primarily to the US and the EC countries. 
Protectionism affected mainly Turkey's major export products, textile and agricultural 
goods. Especially textiles were felt to be highly competitive in the world market thus an 
important foreign currency earner for Turkey as well as employing a large proportion 
o f  the industrial workforce. Nevertheless, it was subject to quotas which were usually
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substantially lower than those imposed on the other developing countries o f the Far 
East. As a late entrant to the Multi-Fibre Agreement, Turkey has argued that its textile 
exports have been discriminated against by the US, in favour o f much larger export 
shares by countries in the Far East,119 and took her complaints in 1985 to the GATT, 
claiming that Turkish exports to the US were too small to justify American fears about 
the damage done to their domestic textile industry.129
In this context, it is significant that the Turkish government after 1983 came to 
ask consistently from the US for "more trade not aid".121 Although it was clear that 
US aid, particularly military aid, had been crucially important for Turkey, prime 
minister Ozal signalled time and again that, for the long-term economic sustainability, 
he would rather see expansion of Turkey's trade with the US, and particularly a 
dramatic increase in her exports, than continued reliance on US economic aids.122
The European Community also imposed quotas on Turkish textile products 
during this period, restricting the value o f Turkey's textile and apparel exports to the 
Community to some $1.2 billion in 1985. An earlier attempt by the Community to 
restrict the entry o f Turkish textile products had been met by a 15% Turkish counter 
levy on Community's steel. Nevertheless, an agreement was finally reached between the 
Community and the Turkish textile exporters on April 12, 1986 on import levels o f 12 
kinds o f textiles from 1986 to 1988 whereby Turkish exporters accepted a "voluntary" 
restrictions on their products, Turkish government acting only as go-between as it 
refused officially to accept one-sided imposition o f quotas on Turkish products. 
Consequently, Turkish textile exports to the Community was allowed to rise by 6% in 
1987 and in 1988, after the growth in the region of 25% in 1986.
The response of Turkish exporters to these problems, under the government's 
leadership, was to put pressure on the EC and the US for larger quotas on the one 
hand, and on the other, to try to develop new markets in the Far East since Turkey's 
trade balance with most Far Eastern countries, primarily Japan, has been in deficit. The 
authorities, as well as encouraging exports to these countries to improve the trade 
position, had in the past proposed offset financing, whereby foreign companies would
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agree to arrange offset deals for Turkish exports as part of their payment for a project 
to be carried out in Turkey. Such an arrangement was concluded with General 
Dynamics o f the US which, from 1988, started to assemble 106 F-16 fighters in a new 
factory in Ankara. Along similar lines, Turkey also secured a commitment from the 
Soviet Union to buy a certain amount o f Turkish exports as payment for 65-70% of 
Turkish consumption o f Soviet natural gas following the opening o f the gas pipeline in 
1987.
4. Economic Cooperation For Development: Regional Alternatives
During the 1980s, Turkey, as a newly developing country situated uniquely between 
East and West, attempted to profit from its foreign connections, developing a strong 
export base and deregulating the domestic economy to encourage greater economic 
efficiency. As a result she has been able to make good use o f her geographical positions 
despite the economic, political and social diversity o f her neighbours. While the foreign 
ministry had to steer a careful course in foreign relations, which have not always been 
trouble-free, Turkey had successfully sustained economic links with its neighbours. She 
also attempted to strengthen her links with the outside world, both institutionally, for 
example as seen in the membership application to the EC, in the re-activation o f  the 
RCD agreement, or in the establishment of Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Organization, and informally, for example in the active encouragement o f foreign direct 
investment and joint-venture participation in major Turkish projects. As a result she 
was a major supplier to both Iran and Iraq during their 8-year long war, became a 
consumer o f Soviet gas through a direct pipeline link and an important target for Soviet 
and Eastern European infrastructure investment; a potential European Community 
member and major trading partner of several EC states.
The current climate in Turkey contrasts sharply with that prevailing before 
1980, when an inward-oriented development strategy cut economic links with the 
outside world to  a minimum until substantial foreign borrowing became necessary in
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the aftei math of the first oil crisis. However, economic relations, even if separated from 
political developments whenever possible, were not always trouble free and smooth 
running. In the following part o f this chapter therefore, I will discuss Turkey's attempts 
to promote economic cooperation for development and the obstacles facing these 
attempts.
4.1. Turkey and the European Economic Community
In the context o f Turkey's modernization efforts since the 191^ 1 centaury, aspirations o f 
her political elite about the future o f the country, and her long-standing trading pattern, 
application for full EC membership in April 1987 could only be considered as a logical 
outcome for her.
However Turkey's economic relations with the European countries, especially 
with EC members, have not been exactly eye to eye ever since the late-1970s, when 
Turkey was forced by adverse economic conditions to halt temporarily her 
responsibilities to the EEC. Since then political differences, as well as economic 
difficulties, have prevented both sides from reaching a satisfactory' agreement, if  not 
deepened diversity even more. One o f the consequences o f this uneasy relation was a 
decline in trading links. In 1975, 44% of total Turkish exports and 49% of imports 
were with the EEC, but by 1982 these figures were down to 30.5% and 28.2% 
respectively. Though they have since picked up, Turkey's relations with the EEC are 
still in a dividend and tentative state, culminating in the lack o f  direction after the 
Community's refusal in 1989 even to consider Turkey's foil membership application for
an unspecified period.
In Turkey's relations with the EEC, political disagreements seem to  play as 
important a role as the economic factors, if not actually more. This was especially true 
for the first part o f 1980s, during which human rights and democratization issues had 
shadowed all other factors and had economic consequences, too, as seen in the 
Commission's decision after the dissolution o f all political parties in 1981 to  freeze an
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aid package, granted earlier to Turkey. However, since Turkey's relations with the EEC 
over human rights improved in connection with her democratization process, and also 
in keeping with this chapter's aims, I will concentrate here more on economic inputs o f 
Turkish-EEC relations, the most important o f which are related to the question of 
Turkish membership o f the Community.
Originally, in the 1970 protocol, it was envisaged that Turkey would become a 
full member o f the Community in 1995. European fears o f the consequences o f Turkish 
membership at that time related partly to the weakness o f its industry and the economic 
burden this would impose on other members, but also to the danger o f the market being 
flooded with cheap agricultural products. These problems are still relevant and are the 
source o f continuing conflict. The dispute over Turkish cotton exports to the 
Community has been resolved for the time being, although not to the satisfaction o f 
Turkish textile producers, but the other issues remain. When the additional protocol 
was signed there was an agreed timetable o f Turkish commitments towards the 
Community. Beginning in 1973 over of period o f 12-22 years Turkey was to abolish all 
tariff and other barriers with the EEC and harmonize its external tariffs. Because o f the 
threat that these obligations posed for Turkey's developing industries the original 
timetable could not be met and Turkey declined from fulfilling requirements o f the 
additional protocol. But there is another part o f the additional Protocol, referring to the 
right o f free movement o f labour in 1986, which was particularly worrying for EEC 
countries as the dateline approached given the enormous level o f unemployment in 
Europe. The heyday o f Turkish labour migrate to West Germany and other destinations 
had long been over. Workers were now returning, as former host countries found that 
they no longer had sufficient employment even for their indigenous workforce.
Nowhere was this conflict more apparent than in West Germany. While 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl's coalition government was arguing on the one hand for the 
necessity to follow a "humane" policy towards foreigners, they, nevertheless, 
introduced financial incentives for those who want to return home, including and mainly 
Turks.124 It appeared that the German government finally came to a conclusion that it
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was impossible to assimilate or even integrate the Turks.125 One answer would 
therefore be to abrogate the Treaty o f Association between Turkey and the EEC, and 
thus end the threat o f the free movement o f labour in 1986. This was a delicate issue 
since workers' remittances still played a vital role in closing the gap in the Turkish trade 
balance. However this was actually what the EEC, following German instigation, did in 
1986, which created big row between Turkey and the EEC, more so because the EC's 
action was seen in Turkey as illegal in terms o f Additional Protocol. Moreover, it was 
not just a matter o f  delaying the 1986 deadline by a year or two. The Community was 
adamant that no target was politically acceptable at the time. Hence the EEC ministers 
merely told Turkey that they simply refused to comply with this provision o f the 
additional protocol, and if one day the Community did need more migrant labour, then 
the Turks would be especially welcome. Most o f the indignation felt in Turkey after 
the row seemed to derive from the Turkish perception, real or imaginaiy, that western 
Europe valued "the military contribution of Turkey within the NATO alliance but was 
unwilling to take on the economic burden that Community membership would 
bring".127
The general consensus at the time in Turkey was that she had not greatly
198benefited from her association relations with the EEC, especially since mid-1970s. 
Clearly, the trade deficit with the EC was large in the period 1973-78, but even worse 
in the period 1980-1982. Turkey's exports to the EC had shown a moderate increase 
following 1982, but still the gap between exports to and imports from the EC was close 
to $400 million. Despite this favourable trend on the part o f Turkey's exports to the 
EC, she had not received adequate concessions for exports o f agricultural products -as
laid down in the additional protocol.
Moreover, despite various concessions the EC provided to Turkish industrial
goods since the signing o f the additional protocol, there was still, by the mid-1980s, a
serious dissatisfaction in Turkey that the current transitional agreements with the EC
129had not produced greater benefits for Turkey as a prospective full member. ^  First o f 
all, trade concessions provided to Turkey as an associate member had subsequently
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been given to other non-associate countries in the Mediterranean area, a move which
diminished Turkey's preferential status. Furthermore, promising Turkish exports
had concentrated in sectors such as cotton yam and textile, where Turkey enjoyed
considerable competitiveness, the effect o f which was greatly felt by EC countries. The
outcome was that exports to the European Community failed to record a satisfactory
growth due to barriers imposed on Turkish products by the EC. For instance, in view of
the fact that textile and clothing accounted for over 18% o f e x p o r t s , t h e  quota
imposed constituted a considerable restriction for Turkey as an associate member.
Moreover, recent studies show a sharp distinction in terms o f commodity diversity
between Turkish exports to EC, which consist primarily o f labour-intensive goods not
requiring a high level o f skills, and exports to the Middle East, which consist o f more
1 3?capital intensive categories with higher skill content. Therefore the desirability of 
sustaining such a trade pattern with the EEC for Turkish industry, without benefiting 
from the advantages o f full membership became questionable.
Further, it was often claimed that the additional protocol was not as balanced as 
both sides claimed at the time since Turkey agreed to abolish all o f its tariff barriers 
within a given period, while EC concessions were not tied to a time table and especially 
concessions on agricultural products were restricted by fears o f their impact on the 
Common Agricultural Policy. In fact, Turkey reduced its tariffs by 10% in 1973 for the 
manufactured goods which were included in the list for twelve years and it reduced its 
tariffs by another 10% in 1976. But the’ additional reduction o f tariffs was not 
implemented owing to severe economic problems which by then came into existence in 
Turkey. The postponement of further tariff cuts was also prompted by the fear ,in 
Turkey that exports o f agricultural products which constitute almost 58% o f total 
exports then would be set back because o f restrictions imposed on them by the EC. It 
was a widely held view that other fairly competitive manufactured products might also 
be subjected to the same restrictions as textiles.
While, on the one hand, the question of Turkish workers within the EEC did not 
reach a satisfactory conclusion for Turkey and did not result in complete free
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movement, as envisaged in the additional protocol, the "most favoured nation" status, 
given to the EEC by the protocol, on the other hand, restricted Turkey's economic 
relations with third countries as well.
Finally, it should be remembered while evaluating Turkish-EC relations, that 
Turkey has experienced structural changes in her economy since 1980. As a result o f 
these changes most o f Turkish tariff restrictions on imports were removed while others 
were greatly reduced, closing the gap between Turkish and EC tariffs. Moreover, most 
o f the structural changes after 1980 were introduced with EC membership in mind, thus 
uniformity with the EC regulations in many areas was reached.
Under these conditions, it was felt in Turkey that Associate membership was
not adequate any more in providing the expected economic benefits. Further, given the
outward orientation o f the economy since 1980 and the importance o f the EC as a
trading partner, full membership o f the EC would have provided Turkey a position
from which she could have a say in the decision-making o f the various Community
policies that had in the past profoundly influenced and affected her development route.
Thus Turkey, despite discouragement from the member countries, applied for full
membership in April 1987.133 The opinion o f the Commission, released on December
18, 1989, however, was a negative one even in terms of low level Turkish expectations.
Many political and economic obstacles infront o f the Turkish membership were listed
and no date was set for starting o f partnership negotiations.134 The major economic
problems o f Turkey's application, in the view o f the Community members, arose from
the gap in wealth between her and the rest o f  Community members. Her GNP per
capita was, only around $1200, well below even that o f Greece, Spain and Portugal..If
she became a member it would be a huge drain on the various Community funds, and
her large and backward agricultural sector would spell disaster for the Common
Agricultural Policy. Parts o f the Community market, particularly textiles and clothing
135would be swamped by low-cost Turkish manufacturers.
Although a "cooperation packet" was proposed by the Community in June 1990 
in an effort to prevent complete breakdown o f relations, it was quite clear by now that
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Turkey's full membership became a distant possibility. Furthermore, many important 
developments, most o f which could not be even imagined few years earlier, have taken 
place in both European and world political conjunctures since 1989. While German 
unification was further pushing away any considerations for accepting new members, 
the Austrian application for full membership definitely put her in front o f Turkey. Then 
came the break up o f Communist block which led to positive reviews about the 
possibilities o f eastern European membership to the Community before the end o f the 
century. While the offers o f a special association agreement in December 1991 to 
Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia before separation were causing anxiety in 
Turkey, the application of Cyprus for full membership in 1992 further blurred the 
Turkish membership question by restressing her political problems with Greece.
Another recent development, which could affect Turkey's position vis-a-vis EC 
was the creation o f the European Economic Space between the EC and EFTA which 
would probably lead to reorientation o f European trade and eventual Community 
membership o f most o f the EFTA countries. Although the full economic implications of 
this for Turkey are still speculative, it is significant that the EFTA countries have 
agreed to contribute to a compensation fund for the Mediterranean members. Non­
member states, including Turkey, were excluded from this programme. In the 
meantime, Turkey concluded an agreement o f her own with the EFTA on December 
10, 1991, which included provisions concerning creation o f a free-trade area and 
increase in economic cooperation between Turkey and the EFTA countries. The 
agreement paralleled Turkey's association agreement and the additional protocol with 
the EEC and stipulated that reductions on tariffs and other development in Turkish-EC 
relations will be reflected in the Turkish-EFTA connection as well.1JO
On the other hand, after the Maastricht agreement which stressed greater 
political and social integration in Europe as well as monetary and economic union, the 
very nature o f the Community has been changing. While there has been major economic 
reorganization among member states, discussions on remodelling EC institutions to 
meet the new demands for membership and the changing international environment
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were already taking place. As a result, both the nature and the rules o f the membership 
are changing from the one that Turkey had applied to join.
The net result o f all these changes was to push the question o f Turkish 
membership, if there was left any chance for it, into yet even more distant future.13^ 
Realisation o f this has led Turkey to reassess her position vis-a-vis European 
Community and to consider other regional alternatives if possible in order prevent 
Turkey from the prospect o f being left alone against increasing number o f economic 
blocks. At the same time, however, Turkey, determined not to be discouraged by these 
developments, committed herself to completing a custom union with the EEC by 1996, 
thereby fulfilling one o f the requirements o f full economic integration which was 
initiated by the 1963 Ankara agreement. Complications which would arise from 
completing a custom union without having full access to the Community funds and 
markets are not yet known, even though a new protocol is already in preparation to
T O O
replace the existing one to foresee the process of union. But it is significant that 
none o f the existing member countries had undertaken such an obligation before 
reaching full member status. Moreover, in the cases o f last three members, i.e. Greece, 
Spain and Portugal, requirement o f full custom union, because o f its heavy economic 
burdens, was deferred further even after those countries became full members o f the 
Community. This goes a long way to show the political determination, which is quite 
distinctive from the economic capability, o f Ankara governments not to be parted from 
Europe.
4.2. Regional Alternatives to the EEC
%
4.2.1. Islamic Cooperation Efforts Under The Auspices of The Islamic Conference
Although the Turkish governments, after 1980, increasingly emphasized their desire for 
greater links with the Europe, primarily through membership o f the EEC, they also 
found it expedient to concentrate increasingly on Middle Eastern markets for various 
reasons. Initial, also perhaps the most important, reason for this was the inability of
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Turkey to engage the Europeans fully in the effort to overcome her economic problems 
in the early 1980s after the military intervention and emergence o f consequent problems 
between Turkey and the European states. The inability or unwillingness o f  the 
European countries to help Turkey's economic needs, in turn, created resentment and 
disenchantment within Turkey from Europe, thus a vicious circle was set in motion. 
Moreover, although Turkey had earlier become an associate member o f the European 
Community, the successive Turkish governments found it increasingly difficult to gain 
the tariff privileges they believed they required for successful trade with Europe. So 
long as the question o f full membership in the European Communities remained in 
contention, Turkey found it expedient to look more seriously to the Middle East for 
economic relations than it had in the past.
Furthermore, there were other sound economic reasons for Turkey to increase 
her links with the Middle East. Much o f Turkish industry was still weak, uncompetitive 
and unable to make major inroads into depressed Western markets. The oil-producing 
countries o f the Middle East, on the other hand, had money for capital investment and 
Turkish imports. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, most o f Turkish exports to the 
Middle East concentrated on capital intensive goods, such as machinery, cars, buses 
and other durable goods, which would push Turkish industry to grow further in the 
technology intensive lines.
In this climate, the share of Middle Eastern countries in Turkish exports rose 
spectacularly in the early 1980s. For the first time in 1981 the Middle East and North 
Africa became the single most important market for Turkey's exports. Turkish building 
contractors and Turkish banks have been particularly successful in the Middle East. 
Moreover, in the late 1970s and early 1980s many Turkish workers found employment 
in the Middle East and Gulf states as Turkish contractors have increasingly won large 
amount o f business particularly in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Libya.
While these developments were taking place on the bilateral leve, Turkey also 
started to look for multilateral cooperation opportunities which might have provided 
her with both further economic gains and also increasing influence in the region. There
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could not be a better venue for Turkey to concentrate her economic cooperation efforts 
than the Organization o f the Islamic Conference (OIC), since promoting economic 
cooperation among its members has been one o f the major aims o f the organization 
since its establishment, though it has been overshadowed by political matters, especially 
by the Palestinian question which the Arab members o f the organization seemed to be 
preoccupied with.
Turkey's original aim in participating in the Conference, on the other hand, was
to secure the political and economic support o f the Arab countries. Since then,
however, Turkey's interest in the economic side o f the Organization grew faster,
together with her recognition o f Middle Eastern countries as a worthwhile economic
asset, and after 1980, concomitantly with her export drive to the Middle East, her
efforts to use Islamic organizations as a medium for economic gains gathered particular
momentum. So much so that President Kenan Evren, during a summit meeting held in
January 1984 in Casablanca, accepted his nomination as chairman for the newly
established Islamic Conference Standing Committee for Economic and Commercial
Cooperation (COMCEC), which later held its first meeting in Istanbul in November
1984 with the participation of 35 Islamic States and some international organizations. It
was decided during this meeting that the permanent headquarters o f COMCEC should
be established in Istanbul. The Istanbul meeting further adopted detailed resolutions for
establishing a trade information network; strengthening and streamlining o f trade
promotion activities among the member ‘ states; providing financial measures for
promotion o f intra-trade; harmonizing standards; promoting preferential measures for
regional trade; technical cooperation in trade; and supporting the marketing -of
139Palestinian and Lebanese products. J
In connection with the Islamic Conference, Turkey had also joined the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB), though her initial intention was more political than 
economic. It was reported at one time that a Turkish finance minister said that "what 
we expect from the Bank is not financial aid, but we believe that we have a role in the 
Bank".140 This attitude, however, has changed and Turkey has been a major
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beneficiary o f  IDB short and medium term trade financing loans.141 By 1985, Turkey 
wanted more active involvement into the Bank's management, thus requested to 
increase her share from 63 up to 166.4 million Islamic Dinar, thereby enabling herself to 
be represented permanently on the Board o f Executive Directors.142
Furthermore, on Turkey's initiative two other organizations to further economic 
cooperation among Islamic countries were established; the Islamic Centre for Statistic, 
Economic and Social Research and Training in Ankara, and Islamic Chambers o f Trade 
and Commerce in Karachi. Two other OIC institutions have also been based in Turkey; 
Islamic Heritage Organization and the Agro-hydrological Research and Education 
Centre. Moreover, Turkey was able to persuade the third general meeting o f the Islamic 
Chambers o f Commerce in February 1982 to adopt a resolution accepting the principle 
that construction firms from Islamic countries would be given preferential treatment in 
the region against other firms from third countries. And again under a Turkish initiative, 
the Islamic Cement Union and the Islamic Agricultural Organization were thereby 
established.143 It is, needless to say, in both organization that Turkey, as a result o f her 
position as biggest constructing and agricultural exporting country in the Middle East, 
stands to be the biggest beneficiary from the funds allocated to them.
These efforts initially paid back Turkey handsomely as she, with her bilateral 
and organizational relations, became one o f the few countries in the region which 
realised an outstanding trade success in their commercial dealings with other Islamic 
countries. However, this favourable situation have undergone major changes since 
1985, when the recession hit the Middle Eastern countries. Further declines in oil 
revenues after 1985 have meant a slow-down in new construction projects in the region 
which put an end to further jobs for Turkish labourers, and a decline o f Turkish exports 
to the region by over 20% in 1986 alone. Since then Iran, Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia 
became the most important markets to have suffered from the contraction due to falling 
oil prices.144 Earlier concentration o f Turkish exports to these countries meant that 
Turkey, as a major supplier, has suffered the consequences o f cutbacks in regional 
imports more severely than most other exporters. Also, the expense o f Iran-Iraq war
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eventually drained both countries o f resources, so that even imports o f essential foods 
were being reduced. Iraq, for example, accumulated huge payments arrears with 
Turkish suppliers, totalling some $1.2 billion in 1986. Arrears were also built up from 
Iran's side, and imports were cut back severely. Anxious to maintain trading links with 
both countries, and aware o f the huge potential for reconstruction work and 
rehabilitation o f consumption once the war is over, the Turkish authorities had agreed 
to maintain export financing and credits for Iraq , and the Turkish Central Bank 
established a $1 billion credit line for trade with Iraq. The outbreak o f the Gulf war in 
the aftermath o f  the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war, however, prevented Turkey from 
gaining advantageous contracts, and the declaration o f UN embargo on Iraq further 
prolonged the reversal o f this trend.
One o f the biggest supporters of intra-Islamic trade in Turkey was the late 
president Turgut Ozal. After the second COMCEC meeting in Istanbul he announced 
that "our objective is to follow this up by serious negotiations leading to the abolition 
o f tariff and non-tariff barriers affecting our mutual trade, which we hope will 
eventually lead to the establishment o f an Islamic free-trade zone". 146 However, this 
doesn't seem possible, at least at the moment. Although there is no doubt that there is 
still a big potentiality in Islamic countries to increase the volume o f trade and economic 
cooperation among themselves,146 and that Turkey's active participation in Islamic 
Organizations has contributed substantially to her relations with Islamic countries both 
in the political and economic spheres, cooperation and trade potentiality o f the region, 
as shown by the sharp decline o f trade volume after 1985, are still largely volatile, and 
it is very unlikely that the organizational cooperation efforts with the Islamic countries 
would substitute the EC's place in the Turkish economy and trade in the foreseeable 
future. Moreover, Yalcintas draws attention to the "managed trade" character o f the 
majority o f Turkey's economic relations with other Islamic countries.142 In this 
context, it is appropriate to point out that Turkey's main aim in her organizational 
cooperation attempts among the Islamic countries seemed, as put by a former foreign 
minister, to provide "a constructive platform for our bilateral economic relations" with
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other Islamic countries, rather than to create a multilateral arrangement whereby an 
Islamic Common Market, as opposed to European Common Market, would be 
established.14**
4.2.2. Revival of The RCD as The ECO and Its Prospects
The RCD (Regional Cooperation for Development) was established in 1964 between 
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey to promote trade between member states and to encourage 
cultural and economic cooperation. The members initially agreed to establish, other 
than the usual organs, a tripartite Shipping Conference, common post, telegraph and 
telecommunication offices at different places in the region, to reduce air surcharges on 
letters and other mail to the domestic levels, and to set up industrial joint ventures. 
Later on April 21-22, 1976, the meeting o f the heads o f state o f Pakistan, Turkey and 
Iran, observing that the RCD was successful in the cultural fields but not in economic 
sphere, drawn up a treaty to provide for; 1-) appropriate measures leading to the 
establishment o f an free-trade area through gradual elimination o f tariffs and a protocol 
on trade within ten years; and 2-) setting up o f an RCD investment bank, initiating, 
promoting and financing projects o f a regional character with participation by the 
private sector. Though the Treaty o f Izmir, as it later came to known, thus drew up a 
blueprint for cooperation and development in the three member countries, political 
developments in the region prevented further development and the organization came 
to a standstill in 1979 after the Iranian revolution and Turkish withdrawal from it.
At the time o f disengagement, the main organs in operation was the Ministerial 
Council, Council o f Deputies, Regional Planning Council, the Secretariat, the RGD 
Chamber o f Commerce and Industry, the RCD Cultural Institute, the RCD Insurance 
Centre, RCD Shipping Services, and 7 RCD committees dealing with industry and 
petroleum, trade, transport and communications, technical cooperation and public 
administration, cultural affairs, tourism and information, and agriculture.149
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After nearly six years at a standstill, at a meeting in Tehran on January 27-29, 
1985, the representatives o f the governments o f Pakistan, Turkey and Iran decided to 
replace the RCD with the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization). They reaffirmed 
their desire to work together to promote cooperation in various fields like the 
economy, industry, agriculture, science, education and culture for the well-being and 
prosperity o f their peoples.
For the time being, the ECO's status seems even lower than that o f its 
predecessor and its scope is limited as its technical committees have been reduced from 
seven to four. These committees are responsible for technical and industrial 
cooperation, economic cooperation and infrastructure, agricultural cooperation, and 
cooperation in education and scientific research. Moreover, the High Council, which 
previously met at ministerial level, would now be composed o f deputy foreign ministers 
or representatives o f equivalent rank from the three countries, and this would be the 
highest policy making body o f the ECO.
Significantly however, the participants declared their adherence to the treaty of 
Izmir, which had originally envisaged the establishment o f a free-trade area between 
member countries. This points to the preference o f a political will in the region to 
restore at least the earlier cooperation, though the three countries seemed more 
cautious about each other's intentions.
Although the possibilities o f economic cooperation among members are diverse 
and promise advantageous results, its success in operation will inevitably depend on the 
continuation o f the political will for cooperation, which has seemed lacking in recent 
years. Further, the scaling down o f the organization's status compared to RCD is likely 
to affect the capability o f  the organization to function at a level necessary for increased 
cooperation between the three countries. Moreover, in the past the RCD could not 
achieve priority status in the eyes of either Iranian or Turkish officials as far as 
economic interests and cooperation were concerned. Because o f its oil-based 
bargaining power, Iran in the past had its own agreements o f economic cooperation 
both with the EEC, the US and other developed countries. Significantly enough, Iran's
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fifth development plan, 1973-78, had made no mention o f the RCD .151 Turkey, on the 
other hand, had her other commitments mainly to the EEC. Her interest in the RCD 
was mainly derived from her wish to create a complementary economic organization to 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which also came to halt after 1979.
Furthermore, the initial desire and enthusiasm o f Iran to persuade Turkey and 
Pakistan to revive RCD seemed to derive from wrong reasons, that is other than 
economic ones. It was Iran's intention to reduce its isolation in the Islamic world, 
resulting from its war with Iraq, that prompted its efforts. However, neither Turkey nor 
Pakistan seemed to share same enthusiasm, mainly because o f their desire not to 
endanger their valuable trading relations with the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, which 
were looking at Iranian efforts at least with apprehension. This was reflected in a 
meeting held in mid-1983 in Tehran where the possibility o f reviving RCD was 
discussed for the first time. In the meeting Iran was represented by a deputy minister 
while Turkey and Pakistan only sent ambassadors.
Although the disintegration o f the Soviet Union and subsequent admittence of 
five Central Asian Republics into the ECO on February 16, 1992 did incite fresh hopes 
for the EC O ,1^  the Turkish-Iranian rivalry, which had emerged in the region as the 
both countries attempted to fill the vacuum created by the collapse o f the Soviet Union, 
signalled future difficulties in trying to establish workable relations within the ECO. 
Moreover, Iran, with an obvious effort to exclude Turkey, created the Caspian Council 
- between Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Russia - whose aims and 
areas o f  interest overlap with those o f ECO, a fact that promted President Ozal, while 
playing down the rivalry, to call the Caspian Council "one organization too many".*?4 
At the same time, Turkey's attempts to establish a Turkic Common Market, if 
succesfiil, would be as damaging to the ECO.
Also, the tariff and non-tariff barriers continue to impede regional trade despite 
the announcement o f will for creation o f a free-trade area. If  this aim can be realized in 
the future, and if especially Turkey and Iran can work out a way to cooperate instead of 
compete in the region for influence, then this would accelerate the socio-economic
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cooperation in the region, however, it is obvious at the moment that this cooperation, 
especially for Turkey, could not replace but only complement her relations with the 
EEC.
4.2.3. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region
The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region (BSECR), formed in 1992, was one o f 
Turkey's responses to the momentous changes that had taken place around her, and 
also to the EC's "rejection" o f her application for full membership. After the rejection, 
Turkey seemed to be left out from all the major economic groupings o f the world, and 
from certainly the one that she inspired to join. Moreover, the Middle Eastern markets, 
which flourished suddenly in the early 1980s, were already diminished as a result of 
declining oil revenues and increasing competition in the region after the end o f Iran-Iraq 
war.
Under the circumstances, and also given the fact that the Soviets were willing to 
cooperate more than ever, it seemed natural option for Turkish businessmen to look for 
new markets throughout eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Economic relations 
between Turkey and the Soviet Union had already developed on considerable grounds, 
especially after the signing o f an economic cooperation agreement on December 27, 
1984.155
Although economic considerations played an important part, and were 
frequently cited by the governments, the main incentive behind the initiative to set up a 
economic cooperation scheme in the region seems to derive from Turkish fears about 
being left behind or out in the process o f widespread regionalization o f the wofld 
economy;
...the region rather than the nation state has gradually become focal point o f 
international attention. Indeed a wide range o f integrated regional groupings 
have been established all over the world. ...Many countries are also considering 
strengthening some o f the existing arrangements or forming new integration 
groupings. ...The functioning o f regional and sub-regional integration 
arrangements will certainly contribute to the economic welfare o f the member 
countries...(However) these groupings may substitute trade o f goods and
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services among partners for trade with non-participating states, even if a third 
country is the more efficient producer.
Fear o f being overwhelmed by the changes taking place around her was also 
evident. Thus, it was accordingly proclaimed that the "recent great changes throughout 
the world, globalization of economy and polarization in parallel with these 
developments are the basic reasons for forming a Black Sea Economic Cooperation 
Region". ^
Also, the political necessity of doing something to alleviate EC's rejection
played a part. Moreover, Turkey, it seemed, was trying to get back into a some sort o f
European cooperation in a very indirect way. This was evident, for example, in the first
preparatory meeting held in Ankara in December 1990, during which the Turkish
delegation stressed their wishes to see the cooperation scheme as an integral part o f the
1 S8process o f a European Economic Space, covering the whole continent. Also it was
expressed elsewhere that Turkey, among others, was guided in her attempt to launch
the scheme by the "wish to form an integral part o f the future European
a rc h ite c tu re " .^  Moreover, the disintegration o f the Soviet Union has created an
economic and military vacuum in the Black Sea and Central Asia regions, which cannot
be filled by Russia alone. A number o f countries, including Iran, Saudi Arabia and
China, have been trying to establish their influence among the newly independent states.
Turkey has been, from the beginning, at the forefront o f these efforts to create
networks o f friendly relationships in these regions and especially has been trying to
establish herself as role-model as well as economic partner in relation to the Turkic
republics. Black Sea Economic Cooperation was seen as an appropriate medium to
connect all these networks, as well as being suitable forum for Turkey to assert her
influence, both economic and political, in these regions.
Economic considerations, such as "the importance o f securing the further
development and diversification o f our economic relations by making efficient use o f
the advantages arising from geographical proximity and the complementary nature o f
1
our economies", were o f course also instrumental in bringing the scheme about.
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A retired Turkish ambassador was the first to suggest the idea o f a "Black Sea 
Cooperation and Prosperity Region".161 The Turkish press immediately welcomed the 
idea and the government also seemed receptive towards such a move. But it was 
president Turgut Ozal who gave unequivocal political backing to the idea and 
enthusiastically supported it. The initial responses o f other would-be member were also 
positive and the first preparatory meeting took place towards the end o f same year in 
Ankara with participation o f representatives from Turkey, Soviet Union, Bulgaria and 
Romania. 16^
After the meeting, common will for the establishment o f a Black Sea Economic
Cooperation Region was announced, and it was agreed that a step by step approach
should be adopted and membership should be open to the participation o f all states
which commit themselves to observing the founding principles and which are
1unanimously considered eligible. Moreover, it was also noted during the meeting 
that the scheme was another example of regional cooperation envisaged in the context 
o f  CSCE and that the new organization would establish the guide-lines in the light of 
Paris Charter to provide and facilitate cooperation and joint ventures among private and 
public sector organizations. And after the meeting president Ozal, noting that the effort 
to establish BSECR was taking place at a time when international structures were being 
changed, stressed that the project, through promoting economic cooperation among the 
parties, would serve to regional peace as well.164 Although a desire for an eventual 
liberalization o f the free movement o f labour, goods, services and capital was also 
expressed by the four states, it seemed that they were not willing to establish a 
supranational body to oversee such cooperation. The meeting further entrusted to  
Turkey preparation o f draft documents to be signed for both main scheme and for the 
proposed Black Sea Foreign Trade and Investment Bank, an action which gave her a 
chance to emphasise her priorities and objectives in the draft agreements. At this time, 
the anxiety o f being a ringleader and inspiration o f a multilateral organization for the 
first time was overwhelmingly present both in the government circles and in the Turkish 
press which generally described it as a "historic move".165
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After various contacts, mainly carried out by Turkey, and further preparatory 
meetings held in Bucharest, Sofia, Moscow and Istanbul, it became clear that the idea 
was gathering momentum and interest was expressed by even some countries which did 
not border the Black Sea. There were suggestions to integrate other sub-regional 
groupings, such as projected Danube River and Caspian Sea schemes, into the
1 f \ f \
BSECR. However political and often armed conflict between would-be members 
was a major concern. A civil war was going on in Georgia, there was an armed conflict 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia, both of which showed interest and were accepted by 
the original participants. Elsewhere in Eastern and Central Europe ethnic and cultural 
divisions were leading to increased tension and instability within the region. The war 
among the former Yugoslavian republics has been o f particular interest to the 
participants not only because it was initially accepted that Yugoslavia, alongside 
Greece, was to be invited as founding state, but also because a number o f members 
have an interest in the conflict.
By this time nine countries (Turkey, Bulgaria, Moldova, Rumania, Ukraine, 
Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) were actively participating in the process of 
consultations and interest was expressed by the governments o f Hungary, Albania and,
i cn
to  a lesser extent, the Czech and Slovak Republics. °  Further, Greece, although its
press initially ridiculed the idea as "the Turk's hallucination o f a Black Sea community
1 ^8a la EC", also responded positively to the invitation.100
Despite the evident willingness on the part o f the participant countries, the idea 
still seemed, to say the least, a little bit too ambitious to be realized. Apart from the 
obvious difficulties to getting warring states together to talk economic cooperation and 
hope that political animosity would not destroy it, the fact that all the participants were 
in the process o f development further complicated the evolution o f the project. What all 
the states needed at the time was a helping hand in terms o f the economy and foreign 
aid which none o f them was able to offer to the others. Nevertheless the interested 
parties went ahead with their plan and signed the agreement to establish a Black Sea 
Economic cooperation Organization on June 25, 1992 in Istanbul.
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Since the initiative was proposed by Turkey, she also offered to provide the 
funds for the establishment of a coordinating unit in Istanbul as well as 40% o f its 
annual operating costs. Although the idea o f having a permanent central unit in 
Istanbul, which would reassert Turkey's influence in the organization, was opposed 
initially by Greece, the problem was solved after changing the name o f  the unit from 
"General Secretariat" to "General Coordination Centre". During the process, other 
participants also seemed to prefer a less powerful body that a general secretariat. This 
o f course further proves their preference for a international organization based on 
voluntary participation rather than a supranational one with an imposing body.
After the establishment, further preliminary plans were prepared by Turkey for
concrete projects, which were based on the private sector and the state contributions
limited to legal adjustments to assist business. Decisions had been taken to establish a
joint Black Sea Foreign Trade and Investment Bank, and a data bank to coordinate the
1 6Qactivities o f the statistics agencies o f the countries involved. Also, further meetings 
between mayors o f the Black Sea capitals were organized by the mayor o f  Ankara to 
discuss municipal problems.
Although Turkey, above all, sought to achieve concrete cooperation, most of 
the initial declarations o f the BSECR were decidedly vague and referred to general 
partnership as a contribution to the Helsinki process and to broad conditions to ensure 
capital flow, investment and industrial ventures. This largely non-committal attitude by 
the participatory states derived mainly from the uncertainties in the region and from the 
indecisiveness o f the individual states about the way they wish to shape their future 
development and about the prospective role the BSECR could play in that future. It 
should not be forgotten that most of the members o f the organization emerged as 
independent states after the disintegration o f the Soviet Union, and they are still 
reluctant to enter any sort of organization or cooperation which even remotely implies a 
transfer o f their sovereign rights o f decision making for their countries' future.
Turkey, on the other hand, tried to use the BSECR declarations to put her ties 
with the former Soviet republics on a multilateral basis. The willingness to tackle some
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o f the political problems of the region, created in the aftermath o f Soviet and Yugoslav 
disintegrations, through cooperation was also apparent in the Turkish stand. Although 
during the process she was accused, mainly by the Greek press, o f trying to establish a 
politically pan-Turkic organization, the overwhelming presence o f non-Turkic republics 
among the signatories supports Turkish assurances that her ties to the Caucasus and 
Central Asian Republics are neither discriminatory nor pan-Turkic.
The countries o f the Black Sea region, enjoying a geographical proximity, have 
a large potential to enhance mutually advantageous economic cooperation. Economic 
progress is the main concern for all the Black Sea countries at the moment. They share 
convergent interests, based on their complementary economies and extended bilateral 
relations. The implementation of intended multilateral projects in the region is likely to 
advance individual states to meet the common need for development by multiplying a 
general potential and by more rational utilization o f resources available to all.
The BSECR scheme also has its political dimensions. The strengthening o f 
economic cooperation in the region may also generate a political will among its 
members to stabilize the region politically and militarily. This o f course, in turn stands 
as a direct contribution to the peace and development o f the whole European continent.
Although the idea o f BSECR seemed to attract enough interest from many 
states, and its subsequent establishment within such a short time showed willingness of 
the participants to cooperate on a regional basis, its future depends first and foremost 
on finding workable solutions to the region's political differences and armed conflicts, 
and then on the economic ability of its members to realize their aims. Whatever the 
outcome o f this attempt would be in the longer term, it is quite certain the BSECR 
would, or indeed could, not be either a rival or a substitute to the EEC in the 
foreseeable future. Its members attitude so far tend to confirm this observation. On the 
other hand, given that the prospects for Turkey's entry into the European Union in the 
near future are slim, a major shift to the east could be expected to compensate for 
sentimental dissapointments in the West. However, it is unlikely that Turkey's "eastern 
relations" would provide her as much economic, political and military benefits as her
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European connection provides. Thus realization o f this fact has been reflected in 
Turkish rejections o f the idea that the formation o f the BSECR was designed to be qa 
Turkish-led alternative to the EC. Rather, it was potrayed, as mentioned earlier, as a 
sub-system o f a wider global system: a Europe-wide union.  ^^
5. Concluding Remarks: The Political Economy of Turkish Foreign Policy And 
The Internationalization of The National Economy
As mentioned earlier, Turkey was frequently cited during the 1980s among the 
international economic community as an example o f structural adjustment through 
economic liberalization. Undeniably, the economic policies applied in Turkey during 
this period were more liberal than any since the establishment o f the Republic. And this 
was often mentioned as sine quo non for Turkish success whatever it was. But from 
our perspective, Turkey's success in coping with the debt crisis and increasing her 
exports to unprecedented levels must be considered with reference to factors relating to 
the international political environment rather than the economy alone. Since some of 
our findings throughout this chapter have already pointed to the existence o f such 
factors, all that is necessary now is to put . them into the wider context o f Turkey's 
foreign policy and show the relationship between the domestic development o f the 
economy and the country's external relations and changes in its international 
surroundings.
The importance of the Iran-Iraq war in the initial surge o f Turkish exports and
the favourable attitudes of OECD countries regarding Turkish debt problem behind her
economic come-back have been mentioned several times in this chapter. It is now time
to attempt to paint a broader picture o f interdependence o f economic and political
171factors in shaping Turkey's external relations.
It is generally acknowledged that autonomous factors, i.e. those factors 
independent o f economic performance, have been instrumental in Turkish economic 
development in general. It is common knowledge, for example, that the inclusion of
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Turkey in the Marshall Aid programme was a political choice by the USA. The same is 
also true for massive, economic, military or technological aid, that the US provided 
Turkey during the 1950s. Further, politico-strategic considerations were also 
instrumental in allowing Turkey to became a member or associate member o f such 
western organizations as the EECD, OECD or the EEC.
Turkey also benefited from the growing labour demands o f the European 
economies in the late 1960s and early 1970s by providing foreign labour. This 
increasing number o f Turkish" guest workers" in Europe, mainly in W. Germany, 
helped the Turkish economy in terms o f both reducing unemployment in the country 
and alleviating balance of payments deficits through huge inflows o f workers' 
remittances. However, when the successive oil price shocks forced the industrialized 
world into stagnation and then recession, the number o f unemployed started to rise fast 
in European countries thereby reducing the need for foreign labour. The closure o f the 
European door for migrant workers meant, on the one hand, that Turkey would not be 
able to defuse her rising unemployment number simply by damping her excess labour to 
Europe, and, on the other hand, signalled coming problems on the balance o f payments 
front by ending substantial foreign currency inflows via Turkish workers abroad, which 
forced the successive governments to look increasingly for short-term debt that ended 
up in subsequent debt crisis.
Moreover, the impact o f the Cyprus crisis and subsequent problems in the 
Aegean with Greece were heavily felt by the Turkish economy. Military involvement in 
Cyprus after 1974 not only deprived Turkey of much needed American military aid, but 
also created an unreceptive, if not hostile, international, especially European, 
environment for Turkish problems, including economic ones. Gradual re-acceptance of 
a democratic Greece into the European system, which culminated in its integration into 
the EC, meant increasing pressures on Turkey as a result o f Greece's insistence on 
internationalization o f bilateral problems between two countries and the responsiveness 
o f  international community towards that kind o f manipulation in the face o f what were 
perceived as aggressive moves by Turkey in the Aegean. Further, the increasing tension
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in the Aegean created an armaments race between two NATO members during the 
1970s in an, to say the least, economically undesirable period. As a result, Turkey's 
defence spending was increased while foreign military aid was diminishing due to US 
arms embargo. Thus, the strains of armament had to be faced increasingly by the 
national economy.
Still in the 1970s the detente process, while forcing states in both camps to 
reconsider their situation vis-a-vis the international environment, reduced the 
importance o f hitherto strategically located countries like Turkey in connection with the 
thaw in superpower rivalry. The direct result o f this diminishing role for Turkey in the 
strategic thinking of the superpowers was amply illustrated in decreases in American 
aid to Turkey in the 1970s. Further, detente also allowed the emergence o f hitherto 
suppressed regional problems into the limelight. Accordingly Turkish-Greek tension, 
suppressed during the 1950s and 1960s under the pressure o f Block politics, emerged 
strongly in the 1970s and heightened the possibility o f armed conflict between two 
NATO allies, thus further aggravated international pressure on Turkey. During this 
period Turkey's allies, mainly the US, tried to use economic tools, such as reducing aid 
or increasing its political conditionality, in order to achieve political settlements either 
in Cyprus or in the Aegean.
As a result o f the above mentioned factors, during the 1970s, while the Turkish
economy was deteriorating, foreign inflows into the country, either as official aid or
commercial debt, progressively dried up. As Aricanli puts it, "official sources o f long
term debt could not have been tapped within the context o f multilateral international
sanctions".172 Therefore Turkey, without its earlier strategic advantage and thus ability
to seek bilateral favours for its economic development, had to resort short-term
commercial debts. This process which led Turkey into the debt crisis o f the late 1970s
171indeed "seems much different within this broader political context".
The deterioration o f Turkey's domestic politics throughout the 1970s was also 
instrumental, particularly in the reluctance o f both direct foreign investments and 
commercial bank lending to the country, because o f the fact that political stability
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heavily weighs in the minds o f potential investors, and can also affect the country's 
credit-worthiness.
Starting from the second half o f 19.79 however, the international environment 
radically changed. The first piece in the domino to fall was the Iranian revolution, which 
kicked off many following developments in the region that eventually redefined 
Turkey's strategic importance to the West. Many developments between 1979 and 
1981, such as the Iranian revolution, the beginning o f the Iran-Iraq war, the invasion of 
Afghanistan by Soviet forces which started the second cold war, the election o f  a 
socialist government in Greece in 1981, and presidency o f Ronald Reagan helped 
greatly to enhance Turkey's place within the western alliance system, thus resulting in 
increases in economic aid following the resumption o f American military aid at a 
heightened level.
During the 1973-80 period domestic political formation and considerations, in 
addition to external developments, had consequences on economic development. This 
period was dominated by ineffective and unstable coalition governments which were 
committed to high rates o f growth and employment under political considerations. The 
political situation o f the country in the late 1970s was described earlier. It is sufficient 
to  say here that any government that attempted to apply an austerity programme during 
that period would have been digging its own grave. As a result, all the coalition 
governments during this period, numbering thirteen, despite their ideological 
differences, had favoured the same economic policies for the same political reasons. 
Whatever they put in their economic agenda, all the coalition governments o f the period 
ended up doing the same thing; favouring maintenance o f high economic growth 
through big public expenditure in order to maintain their political bases by creating 
economic favours and employment for their sympathizers. Consequently, patronage and 
political favour replaced economic rationality that ended the last hopes for economic 
recovery.
The period 1973-80 was also witness to an intense political and ideological 
struggle between different political factions to capture the imagination o f newly
371
urbanized, but not necessarily modernized, masses, which at the end led to political 
violence and the spread o f armed struggles out on the streets. Whatever the casual 
relationship, "there was a close correlation between the intensity o f unrest and 
worsening economic conditions".17-*
In turn, Turkey's decision to move toward liberalization in the early 1980 was, 
as shown earlier, motivated by political considerations as much as economic factors. 
W hatever was the economic necessity to embark on such a course, it also signalled the 
government's determination to be part o f political Europe and its willingness to 
accommodate political consequences o f such a programme both in Turkey and Europe. 
As stated earlier, one o f the factors behind deterioration o f Turkish economy during the 
late 1970s was the unwillingness o f the governments to face the political consequences 
o f comprehensive austerity measures. Thus, they opted for ad hoc measures instead of 
structural adjustment. The Demirel government o f 1980, on the other hand, was forced 
by a combination o f economic and political factors, originating both inside and outside 
Turkey, one o f the most important o f which was the pressure from the international 
organizations like the IMF and the Bank and from her allies in Europe and America, to 
embark on a hitherto avoided structural adjustment programme with a strong austerity
1 l f \package and to face up to its political consequences. As it happened, it was not the 
same government which initiated the programme, but the military government which 
enforced its entirely and saw it through. This in turn prevented most o f the predicted 
social and political consequences o f the programme which would have inflicted 
destruction on both the programme and the political system.
It is clear that what made it possible for Turkey to get out o f her debt crisis w,as 
the huge capital inflows o f the early 1980s, which were more or less free from 
economic performance, at least in the initial phase. This fact led Kiray to assert that the 
flow o f  loans into Turkey in the early 1980s'"seem to do both with US foreign policy in 
the region and the need to find an examplary debtor".177 Further, the importance o f 
US political readiness to rescue Turkey from economic chaos was also captured by 
Taylor who argues that "commercial bank capital is not going to flow into Turkey
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unless there is a signal from Bretton Woods. The Fund and Bank in turn, will favour or 
disfavour Turkey in light o f political situation since the US State and Treasury 
Departments ultimately call the shots".178
Moreover, the reinforced strategic importance o f Turkey was the main reason 
behind the US readiness to help Turkey even after the military coup d 'etat in 1980, 
which eventually led to an increased level of intimacy in Turkish-American political 
relations that could be compared only with those o f the 1950s. Turkish-European 
relations, however, deteriorated during the early 1980s not only because o f  the political 
unacceptability o f the military regime to the western Europeans, though this played a 
major role, too, but also growing economic difficulties between Turkey and the EC 
countries. On the other hand political, more than economic, factors heavily affected the 
EC's decision in the late 1980s to halt the Turkish quest for membership for an 
indefinite period. Further political considerations, in addition to economic conditions, in 
the early 1980s caused restrictions for Turkish goods in markets, which initially forced 
Turkey to look for other market possibilities. Moreover, increased openness in trade 
and investment has exposed her to greater tensions in external economic relations, for 
the period corresponded with depressed world markets and restrictive measures in 
developed countries.
In this connection, the beginning o f the Iran-Iraq war was a mixed blessing for 
Turkey since it , despite security concerns, allowed Turkey to establish a growing 
market in the region and was the main incentive for a Turkish exporting drive that was 
repeatedly pronounced as the strong force behind the Turkish economic recovery.
However, the political volatility o f the region was also reflected in its economic 
fluctuations. First the decline and then the crash o f oil prices from 1985 onwards, 
directly affected Turkey's export markets on the one hand, while helping her balance o f 
payments by reducing oil bill on the other. Although it was hoped that the end o f  Iran- 
Iraq war would generate huge construction business in the region for Turkish firms, the 
crash in oil prices first and subsequently the crisis and later war between Iraq and the 
Allies, which included Turkey from the beginning, did not allow this to take place. In
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between Iraqi attacks on Kurds soon after its cease-fire agreement with Iran caused
widespread refugee movements into Turkey which put strains on the economy and fed
to a dilemma in Turkey between the moral and economic sides o f the situation..
The same strains were also evident in the handling o f Turkish refugees from
Bulgaria. To open the border in Summer 1989 for refugees who were fleeing from
persecution in Bulgaria was a political decision. However, the economic realisation that
Turkey could not cope with such an immediate surge o f refugees heavily prompted the
decision to close the border after three months, and prime minister Ozal had to turn
back from his vow that Turkey's doors would always be open to accept all o f them if
necessary. However some 300.000 seemed just about enough in mid-August 1989 as
finding homes and jobs for the refugees had proved very difficult at a time when the
1 70Turkish economy was heading again towards trouble.
Again in the second half o f the 1980s, the combined result o f normalization o f
US-USSR relations, following the end of the cold war and the Iran-Iraq war was the
diminishing importance o f Turkey as strategic ally, which once again was reflected in
the advantageous foreign aid that Turkey was receiving as a result o f  this
developments. Consequently, official flows to Turkey from 1985 onwards stopped with
the exception o f much reduced levels o f bilateral aid. Moreover, the end o f the Iran-
Iraq war also created much more competition in exports to the Middle East and as a
result o f Turkey's declining share in the Middle Eastern market Turkey, aided by the
normalization o f her political relations with the EEC countries, had to revert back to
her traditional export markets in Europe, and also had to look increasingly to other
180market possibilities, namely eastern Europe and the USSR.
The end o f cold war and the following break up o f the Soviet Union, while
diminishing Turkey's global strategic importance, opened new economic opportunities
to Turkey in both the former Soviet republics and Russia itself because o f economic
reforms in the latter. Further, the cultural affinity o f the Central Asian republics towards
Turkey is also a factor worth considering for future Turkish economic attempts in the 
181region.
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Moreover, if it was the end of the cold war which signalled the end o f Turkey's 
strategic importance, it was again the end o f the cold war which sowed further seeds 
for subsequent crises virtually all around Turkey, and thus heightened Turkey's position 
and role in international politics once again. Although it is still too early to 
comment on possible economic outcomes for Turkey o f the current crises in the Balkan 
and in the Caucasus, it is clear by now that, despite her increased international role as a 
potential regional power, adverse developments in these regions could have important 
economic and political repercussions for the country. An important example, which has 
had adverse effects on the Turkish economy, was the Gulf War and the subsequent UN 
embargo on Iraq. Primarily as a result o f the Gulf crisis the growth rate sharply declined 
to 0.3% in 1991; exports to Iraq, Turkey's second largest market, were disrupted; the 
bill for higher oil prices exceeded $900 million; more than a billion dollars was lost 
from oil pipeline revenue; Iraq ceased to service substantial credits that had been 
advanced by Turkey; and tourism, which had generated $3.3 billion in 1990, was 
severely disrupted.
Although the impact o f the January 24 programme on Turkish foreign policy is 
less well documented and agreed than its economic results, nevertheless, it seems that 
external shocks and some political considerations have guided, if not determined, the 
Turkish economy in its general course to development since at least 1950. This was 
especially evident in the "rescue operation" set into motion by the West in the 1980s. 
The initial reason for Western commitment to Turkish economic recovery was the 
common belief in the necessity o f saving Turkey’s political regime from following in 
Iran's footsteps. Since the Western, and especially the US, interpretation o f Turkey's 
importance after the Iranian "loss" was illuminated earlier in chapter III, I will be 
content here with two quotations from US government representatives linking 
economic aid to Turkey to the developments in the region:
What is needed now if Turkey is to remain a viable ally o f the Western world is 
an international rescue operation whose scope has not been equalled since 1945. 
How much would it take? By all accounts, perhaps $10 billion to $15 billion 
over a five-year period, mostly in loans and credits...And what is to be gained?
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Well, our overall losses in the Iranian debacle are sure to run many times the 
amount Turkey now needs...We cannot effort to temporize until Turkey, like so
many o f our erstwhile allies, lies prostrate and dism em bered.^^
US Assistant Secretary of State Warren Christopher further elaborated the 
necessity of "saving" Turkey in the Congress by linking it with dire consequences which 
went beyond the Iranian "loss".
This turbulence - in Iran, Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere - affects 
fundamental US economic and security interests... the importance o f  a stable,
democratic and pro-Western Turkey has never been clearer.
The enthusiasm in the West to save the Turkish regime was so evident that it 
led Aricanli to comment in retrospect that the late 1970s and early 1980 was "the best 
time" for Turkey "to have a major economic crisis without a practical solution", 
since the West was going to have to back up her, under the strategic considerations, 
whatever the economic costs or the arguable benefits o f such a move. The natural 
outcome o f this enthusiasm was reflected, as shown earlier, in the official capital 
inflows into the country. Out of $11 billion long term capital inflows to Turkey 
between 1980 and 1985, $9 billion was coming from official sources. This shows us the 
dependency o f Turkish success in the early 1980s on her strategic connections in the 
Middle East and the security interests o f her NATO allies. Although this interest 
internationalized Turkey's economic problems, concomitantly with its political 
developments, it also greatly facilitated her to put herself on a stable economic track 
which in turn helped Turkey to establish herself as an important part o f Middle Eastern 
politics and subsequently to play a much more vital role in the developments taking 
place in her close environment.
If  one looks at the long-term, Turkey's economic strengths seem heavily to 
outweigh its weaknesses. The most basic but least tangible reason for confidence is that 
the mentality of the government and the business community is completely different 
from what it was ten years ago. The economic and psychological barriers that used to 
exist between Turkey and the rest o f the world have been broken. This, on the other 
hand, increased the economic vulnerability o f Turkish society to international shocks, as
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the mostly rural community has been transferred hastily into the money economy and 
the national market became increasingly interactive with world markets. While the new 
spirit o f enterprise and the outward-looking export-oriented economy have improved 
the balance o f payments, during the process, however, Turkey's national economy 
became heavily connected with, and at times depended on, international economic 
developments and on other states' willingness to buy Turkish products, to lend money 
to Turkey or to invest in Turkey. This in turn allowed international economic opinion 
and foreign governments to become an important part in developments, economic or 
otherwise, within Turkey. As a result, Turkey and its foreign policy became more 
vulnerable towards the country's economic necessities while the foreign ministry came 
to  be more prone to the opinions and requests o f both international organizations, like 
the IMF or the Bank, and individual states. Further, the level o f economic relations with 
these organizations and states came to, at times, determine the quality o f political 
relations.
As a result o f the seemingly broad agreement within the country on the 
economic strategy that Turkey should follow, the future o f her economic development 
seems now to be dependent more on global events, above all on the European economy 
on which there is so much dependence. The effects o f this will undoubtedly reflect and 
be seen in the future on the country's foreign policy and external relations.
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TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE GULF CRISIS OF 1990-1991
We should not be cowardly; we should not shy away from war i f  necessary. I f  we want to 
create a better world, War is nothing to be afraid of.1
The developments and the point we have reached today reveal to both friend and foe that the 
policy Turkey followed [during the Gulf Crisis] was far-sighted, realistic and correctf
1. Introduction
As has been demonstrated throughout the course o f this dissertation, the decade o f the 
1980s brought profound changes to Turkey. Politically, economically, culturally and 
socially the country witnessed sharper changes than perhaps at any other time since the 
1920s. During this multi-faceted evolution, the foreign policy could hardly have been 
standing still. Accordingly, previous chapters have looked at the changing environment 
o f Turkish foreign policy-making and the evolving reasoning, that is domestic political, 
economic and social as well as external inputs, behind the general policies. Thus it 
seems a good idea now to incorporate all these in a case-study to see the workings o f 
Turkish foreign policy on a daily basis and to make a point o f the stage that it came to 
at the end o f the decade. Since we have already looked into the foundations and the 
state o f Turkish foreign policy at the beginning, and through the years, o f the 1980s, 
finding out where it came to rest at the end of the decade would give us a proper sense 
o f the distance that had been covered and the changes that had been experienced. It 
would also provide us with a platform from which we might try to predict the future 
direction o f Turkish foreign policy.
The reasons for the choice o f the Gulf Crisis o f 1990-1991 stand obvious from 
many aspects. First o f all, the Gulf Crisis and the accompanying end o f the Cold War 
marked the most important international development since the Second World War,
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that was so close to Turkey and so profoundly affected her. This was the occasion 
where she came closest to entering an international war - The Cyprus intervention o f 
1974 was a limited affair, and the only other military conflict she was involved in was 
fought over the far away lands of Korea. The Gulf War, on the other hand, was 
painfully close to home and carried with it the dangers o f engulfing the whole country 
into a war that she was neither ready nor enthusiastic for. Yet the Crisis was the one 
which presented, in the mid-to-long term, the most acute repercussions on Turkey's 
own national security. Moreover, the Crisis demonstrated very effectively the changes 
that took place in Turkey and in her ideological underpinnings vis-a-vis her immediate 
surroundings.
Since the end o f the Second World War, for almost forty years, Turkish foreign 
policy had followed the Western lead. Throughout the Cold War she was a distant 
outpost on the European periphery, a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, 
and a contributor to the security o f Europe. Her geostrategic "value" was largely 
limited to her role within the Atlantic Alliance and, more narrowly, her place within 
NATO's southern flank. During this period, Turkey had, to a surprising extent, ignored 
the volatile politics o f the Middle East and in turn was ignored mostly by her southern 
neighbours.
However, her traditional foreign policy o f non-intervention and non­
involvement in Middle Eastern politics had been challenged during the second half of 
1980s by two equally important developments; the end o f the Cold War and the 
frustration o f Turkey's hopes to join the EC.3 While the end o f the Cold War had 
reduced Turkey's importance to the West on the southern flank o f NATO, and thus 
signalled an end to the military and economic benefits derived from it, the events in 
Eastern Europe further undermined Turkey's chances o f joining Europe as the EC 
would give priority to accommodating the newly democratic East European countries 
before considering Turkey. Thus, after the rejection o f  Turkey's application for full 
membership in 1989 by the EC, and the sudden changes in the Eastern Europe and the
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Soviet Union, Turkey seemed, by 1990, to be left alone with fundamental political, 
orientational and defence dilemmas.
Given the fact that orientation toward Europe and eventual integration in it 
were the underpinnings o f Turkey's Kemalist foreign policy, the recent changes in 
international politics inevitably came to test their continued validity It is recognition o f 
these facts that led Turkish officials to look for new principles to guide country's 
foreign policy, and that shaped many o f Turkey's recent foreign policy moves, 
including her growing activist policy toward the Middle East, highlighted by the high 
profile during the Gulf Crisis.4
Further, Turkey’s foreign policy during the Crisis was a perfect example o f  
"one-man rule a' la Ozal". There is no doubt whatsoever that Ozal dominated Turkish 
policy making during the Gulf Crisis and thus himself alone deserved any credit or 
criticism derived from it. While the domestic discussion over the constitutional 
boundaries o f president's rights and responsibilities was heightened by Ozal's 
controversial standing, the prime minister and foreign ministry officials were both 
forced, to the embarrassment o f the latter, to the background by his highly visible 
public stance and successfully publicized foreign contacts, including almost daily phone 
calls to  and from President Bush o f the United States.6
Although this controversial meddling with the government's business cost him 
the highly visible and critical resignations o f three top officials, the foreign and defense 
ministers, and the Chief o f Staff, who left with protests over his conduct and style o f 
policy making, it was President Ozal again who remained in his place and was able, 
despite the widespread domestic misgivings, to claim at the end o f the Crisis that 
Turkey had passed this important test "with flying colours".6
Furthermore, the crisis took place at a time when the fundamental paradigms o f 
the bipolar system were dramatically altered and the so-called "new world order" was 
emerging. Thus Turkey's stand in the Gulf War was also poised to  demonstrate, or 
give us clues about, the response o f Turkey to the newly emerging world system that
395
effectively made it impossible for Turkey to follow her traditionalist foreign policy 
based on relative safety and stability o f the Cold-War politics.
Finally, from a more modest and rather selfish perspective, too, the Gulf War 
seemed an appropriate choice for the case study, as it coincided chronologically with 
the end o f the period with which this study is concerned.
2. The Prelude
Before proceeding to a day-to-day analysis o f the Gulf crisis and the war itself, it would 
be useful to observe some of the important developments taking place around Turkey 
that had important effects on her reaction to the crisis.
Although geographically Turkey is an integral part o f the Middle East and 
shares the dominant religion o f the region, i.e. Islam, culturally and politically her 
professed allegiance has been directed towards Europe - and the West in general - ever 
since the collapse o f the Ottoman Empire. While the Kemalist tradition urged the Turks 
"to move consistently towards the West" for "in order to be a civilised nation, there is 
no alternative"^, the perceived threat from the Soviet Union forcefully oriented Turkish 
security and foreign policies to focus on the search for creditable allies. As a result, 
Turkish foreign policy was set in concrete by membership of NATO, Council o f Europe 
and, later, associate membership of the European Community, representing Turkey's 
aspirations to be part of the wider Western state system politically, culturally, 
economically and militarily.8 Consequently, during most o f her republican history, 
Turkey's relations with the Middle Eastern Islamic states were normally o f secondary 
importance to the Turkish foreign policy-makers. Moreover, the obvious insecurity X)f 
Middle Eastern politics had discouraged Turkey's few half-hearted efforts at 
rapprochement with the regional states. Nor were the Middle Easterners very eager to 
embrace Turkey because of her imperial background in those areas. Thus, Turkeys 
approach to the Middle East was mainly dictated by the realities o f Cold War politics 
and her desire to remain out o f the unstable and conflicting dynamics o f regional
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politics. The Principles o f non-interference and non-involvement in the domestic 
politics and the interstate conflicts o f all countries in the region became the watch­
words o f Turkey's Middle Eastern policy.^ Turkey's brief attempts during the latter half 
o f  1950s to lead regional alliances, such as Baghdad Pact and the Central Treaty 
Organization, were actually repercussions o f the Cold War policies rather than results 
o f  Turkey's sincere wish to return to the region.111 Nor did her overtures towards the 
Muslim world in general during the 1960s and 1970s, as a result o f the Cyprus problem 
which forced Turkey to realize her loneliness in the international arena and alienation in 
the Muslim world, lead to a significant change in Turkey's approach to regional 
conflicts. Hence, for example, Turkey chose to stay clear o f the perennial Arab-Israeli 
conflict and as late as the 1980s maintained strict neutrality in the eight-year Iran-Iraq 
war.
On the other hand, Turkey's economic ties with her Middle Eastern neighbours 
had grown closer during the past three decades, and, as was shown in chapter six, came 
to challenge the principal position o f Europe in Turkey's trade balance, although this 
too, towards the end o f 1980s, proved to be a passing phase.
However, these established patterns in Turkey's relations with the West and the 
Middle East were profoundly affected by the end o f the Cold War. The collapse of 
communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union left Turkey without a powerful 
Communist adversary along her borders for the first time since the end o f World War 
II. The decline of the perceived Soviet threat dramatically altered the security 
environment in Europe and it raised fundamental questions about the future o f NATO 
and Turkey's role in European security and defence policies.11 As the function and 
relevance o f NATO in the post-Cold War world order was opened up for discussion, 
Turkey suddenly found itself in a "security limbo" and realized that the end o f the 
"threat discourse" was fundamentally damaging to its Western security connection, and 
to the military and the economic benefits derived from it. While the emergence o f 
liberal democracies in Eastern Europe created a buffer zone between Western Europe 
and Russia, Turkey still felt threatened by the lingering uncertainties regarding its
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iiiiiiiodiatc; neighbourhood and faced, at the same time, the possibility o f being 
abandoned by its Western allies. Many Turkish observers argued that the West might 
no longer need strategic outposts such as Turkey in the post-Gold War era.12 Western 
press reports and analysis similarly echoed the view that Eastern Europe's shifting 
political map might come at the expense of Turkey and that the country could face 
growing isolation from the W est.1J This shook the very foundation of Turkish security 
thinking and policy, and the need to reassess its post-cold war situation vis-a-vis 
potential threats was alarmingly expressed at the highest levels.1"1
At this juncture, highly publicized discussions in Western capitals about
NATO's lessening influence and its possible replacement with alternative European
security arrangements, preferably based on the EC, created considerable anxiety among
Turkish policy makers. After the "exclusion" o f Turkey from the economic and political
integration o f Europe by the rejection o f her membership application, her
"marginalization" in the European security arrangements, too, seemed imminent.1 ^
Moreover, there has always been a feeling o f uncertainty in Turkey about the extent to
which NATO would be prepared to defend Eastern and Southern Turkey which has
always been a grey area from the Alliance's perspective.1^ Thus, immediately after the
end o f the Cold War, when the world's attention turned to the massive weapons arsenal
amassed by the Middle Eastern states with their regional hegemonic aspirations, the
possibility o f Turkey being drawn into the regional conflicts dawned on her more than
ever. The fact that the military balance between Turkey and its two southern
neighbours - Iraq, where Saddam Hussein seemed increasingly willing to use his power
in combination with bullying tactics; and Syria, known for its protection o f the Kurdish
separatist organization PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) which had engaged in terror in
Turkey since 1984 - had changed to Turkey's disadvantage during the 1980s, made
Turkey feel extremely vulnerable and together with her "exclusion" from European
security arrangements, forced her to strengthen bilateral ties with the US and to look
17for new strategies in order to balance her deteriorating relations with Europe.1 
However, by the time the crisis suddenly erupted, Turkey's search for a new strategy,
with president Ozal taking the lead, was very much in flux. Thus, Turkey's response to 
the crisis was extremely important for the future development o f her security 
arrangements.
Apart from the end of the Cold War and Turkey's changing security 
environment, two important developments closer to home had important effects in the 
calculations o f the Turkish policy-makers during the Gulf war.
The first o f these was the existence of a Kurdish uprising in Southeastern 
Turkey since 1984 with secessionist aims.18 Before the crisis, Turkey and Iraq had 
established a security cooperation scheme concerning the Kurds, which enabled both 
sides to deal with its own Kurdish community through a series o f quiet mutual 
understandings.1^ An open anti-Iraqi stance in the crisis would certainly have ended 
this cooperation, which was based on the assumption that both governments had a joint 
interest in opposing Kurdish nationalism. Once the trust between two states was 
broken, the Iraqi regime could easily have backed Kurdish separatist guerrillas 
operating in Turkey. Since, until very recently, the Turkish policy had been to deny the 
acceptance o f Turkish Kurds as a separate cultural entity, considerations relating to this 
issue undoubtedly held an important place in the calculations o f  Turkish decision­
makers.
Another important development in the region was the dispute over the waters o f
the Euphrates, which represented a potent source o f friction between Turkey, Syria and
Iraq. The fact that a possible crisis over water was dubbed, especially by Western
sources, as a more imminent cause for the next war in the Middle East, made the issue 
20all the more important.
The tension has been the result o f the downstream countries* (Iraq and Syria) 
fear that Turkey's South Anatolia Project (GAP), which includes construction o f 15 
dams on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and aims to regulate and develop the Turkish 
part o f the Mesopotamia basin, would, when completed, deprive them o f the water. 
The matters came to a head shortly before the Gulf Crisis when, on January 13, 1990, 
Turkey unilaterally diverted up to 75% o f the waters o f the Euphrates river for thirty
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days in order to fill the giant Ataturk Dam, the biggest single piece o f the GAP 
22
project. This considerable reduced the flow o f the water into Syria and consequently 
to Iraq and provoked sharp protests from both countries and much outcry from the 
whole Arab world, which upheld generally the view that Turkey's cut-off was to show 
that she could use the waters as a weapon and charged her with breaching international 
law. The crisis was heightened when in late June Turkey once again refused to sign a 
tripartite agreement to regulate the usage o f the rivers and increase the average flow 
into downstream countries.2^
Although both countries, in the end, had to accept the Turkish fait accompli, 
two important developments were not missed by Turkish leaders. Firstly, for the first 
time in years Iraq and Syria, normally hostile regimes to each other, were brought 
together by the crisis to form a common front against Turkey. In April 1990 both 
countries signed a protocol to regulate their share o f the water and started to urge
oc
other Arab countries to put pressure on Turkey. Though they confined themselves 
this time to condemn Turkish action, the possibility o f a military alliance between Iraq 
and Syria against Turkey, however remote it was, made her extremely uneasy.
Another important development was the success o f both states in creating a
9 f \common front in the Arab world against Turkey over the water issue.zo Although the 
Turkish delegation, which toured the region to explain the Turkish side o f the issue, 
helped to dispel some o f the Arab fears and suspicions, this concerted effort was 
carefully noted by the Turkish authorities who saw in this the possibility o f closing 
ranks among Arabs against Turkey if the tension between Turkey and an Arab country 
was to escalate into an actual military conflict.27 Moreover, the more outspoken role 
played by Iraq, which was in reality affected less by the cuts than Syria, in creating a 
common Arab reaction toward Turkey's efforts to curb the flow o f the Euphrates, 
which was referred to by Saddam Hussein as "Arab water", was not missed in 
Turkey.28 He also accused Turkey of "not acting in accordance with international law" 
since Turkey's stance took no account o f Iraq's "acquired rights" o f the water
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requirements already under way.2^ Accordingly, when Turkish prime minister visited 
Iraq on May 30, he found a cool reception and much aggravation there.
Although, during the crisis, Turkey argued that the cut-off was for purely 
technical reasons, the fact that Turkish government had put Syria and Iraq under heavy 
pressure in previous few months to curb the infiltration from their borders o f  Kurdish 
separatist guerrillas o f the PKK, was not missed on international observers.^
The water issue was important because it affected the balance o f power in the 
region, and the January 1990 cut-off highlighted both the relative strengths and dangers 
o f Turkey's position in the region. Although various state officials in Ankara issued 
repeated messages that there was no political side to the decision, it was also no secret 
that cutting the water - even for a short period - highlighted Turkey's exclusive position 
in the region. Even though this was not the main aim, the whole affair showed that 
control over water did provide Turkey with significant leverage. In an interview with 
the daily Cumhuriyet, State Minister Kamran Inan, in charge o f GAP project, was to 
stress this position by comparing Turkey's military situation with that o f her neighbours. 
Putting bluntly, he said "we have the water and they have the missiles". However, the 
conflict was also a good reminder o f the dangers o f alienating both her Arab neighbours 
at the same time.
The Water issue, in regard to the Gulf Crisis, was also important for the war
effort, since it was estimated that Iraq would not be able to keep its troops in action for
33more than three months if Turkey suspended its water flo w JJ Such vulnerability of 
course explains the tense relationship shared by Turkey and her southern neighbours, 
even in the most peaceful of times. Thus the water issue, and the related security threat 
posed by Syria and especially Iraq, was undoubtedly in the minds o f Turkish decision­
makers when they were scaling the options for Turkish response to the crisis, for Ozal 
once said "...there is also water issue. Does nobody think that this kind o f expansionist
state would turn to us one d ay?"^
Before proceeding further, the somewhat unusual character o f the Turkish
government at the time o f the Gulf Crisis should also be noted since most o f the
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domestic controversies over Turkey's Gulf strategy stemmed from, or were at least 
exacerbated by, the existing political situation in Turkey. It has already been mentioned 
that Turgut Ozal had succeeded Kenan Evren as President o f the Republic in November 
1989. Although his election was perfectly constitutional, it was contested by the 
opposition on moral grounds that he did not command the backing o f  the majority in 
the country (see chapter 5). His election also differed from the Turkish political 
tradition in that he was an important politician in his own right rather than a politically 
insignificant candidate, preferably a retired military commander, chosen in compromise 
between political parties. Moreover, in the.Turkish political tradition presidents had 
normally played a mainly symbolic role, leaving the main executive power to the prime 
minister and the Cabinet. Although the constitution required the president to sever all 
official links, if there were any, with the political parties on assuming the presidency, 
Ozal made it known from the beginning that he would not even pretend to be impartial 
between political parties, and, in fact, would continue to exercise a predominant power 
over the government from behind the scenes. Accordingly, the new prime minister, 
Yildirim Akbulut, was, at most, a stand-in for the president and did not oppose his 
meddling with government affairs. However, the situation was unacceptable to  the 
opposition which kept a watchful eye on his actions, and created tensions between the 
president and not only the opposition but also the government backbenchers and the 
Cabinet, all o f which came to the fore during the Gulf Crisis.
3. The Crisis
The Iraqi invasion o f Kuwait on August 2. 1990, "an event which Turkey could not
35afford to ignore", presented her with difficult policy choices and limited options. In 
other words, Turkey's age-long policy o f non-involvement in the intra-regional and 
intra-Arab conflicts was not applicable to the situation caused by the Iraqi invasion o f 
Kuwait because o f various reasons.
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First o f all, from the first day of the crisis it became clear that the af fair was 
hardly going to remain or be contained as a regional matter. The existence o f vast 
quantities o f oil on Kuwaiti soil saw to it that the crisis became an international affair in 
which the US, Turkey's main ally, took the lead in opposing Iraq, one o f Turkey's main 
trading partners and close neighbour. The involvement o f  the UN right from the 
beginning and the collaboration between Russia and the US in the Security Council, 
further made it almost impossible for any state, led alone a regional one with a strategic 
location, to ignore the situation. Turkey's strategic location, reinforced by her 
neighbouring position to Iraq and the existence o f both Iraqi oil pipelines and the 
NATO military installations in her territory, meant that she could not have avoided 
being dragged into the conflict in one way or another.
Moreover, Turkey's position as being the principal land road to and from Iraq - 
as its political problems with Iran and Syria had blocked other routes - meant that she 
would came under immediate pressure to join the international embargo against Iraq 
once it was agreed on. In addition, Turkey was a major trading partner with Iraq and an 
important market for Iraqi oil. O f course this, apart from being an additional reason for 
international pressure, was also a major source of concern for Turkey, since any
Turkish action against Iraq would have signalled the end o f a lucrative market for
Turkish goods and contractors, and cheap oil that Turkey received from Iraq.
Finally, as mentioned above, Turkey's security cooperation scheme with Iraq 
concerning the Kurds was a satisfactory arrangement to Turkey which had allowed 
Turkish military three times in the past to enter northern Iraq in pursuit o f Kurdish
secessionist guerrillas. An action against Iraq would have certainly ended this
collaboration and would even have prompted retaliation from Iraq in terms o f a helping
hand to Kurdish guerrillas.
On the other hand, from the early days on, it was obvious that Turkey's 
response to the crisis, whichever way it eventually tilted, would certainly have long­
term implications on both Turkey's future regional and global role, and on relations 
with her Western allies as well as Middle Eastern countries. As far as Turkey's
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involvement in Middle Eastern affairs was concerned, in the context o f post-cold war 
paradigm and Turkey's response to it, there was a danger o f creating a suspicion among 
especially Arabs o f the region that Turkey might have wished to revive the pan- 
Ottomanism once the crisis was over. After all, there were the bitter examples o f the 
over-enthusiastic Turkish involvement in the Western-sponsored regional security 
initiatives o f the late 1950s, which essentially created deep suspicions and distrust 
between Turkey and the other regional states and opened way to the charges o f Turkey 
being the arm o f western imperialism in the region. Thus the experiences o f the 
Baghdad Pact and the Central Treaty Organization were mistakes that Turkey would 
not want to repeat in the region. On the other hand, lack o f interest on Turkey's part in 
such a major regional crisis, which was affecting the region fundamentally, would again 
resulted in her marginalization after the crisis and also would have prevented Turkey 
from having a say in the post-crisis security arrangements o f the region, which were 
obviously going to affect Turkey's regional interests fundamentally.
From the perspective o f Turkey's relations with her Western allies, too, her 
position vis-a-vis crisis was important. Although inaction on the Turkish side probably 
would not immediately have caused her relations with the West to deteriorate to the 
point o f unrecoverable break, it would, however, not certainly help them either. Her 
position next to her Allies, on the other hand, was likely to present new opportunities, 
both economically and politically.
Also, Turkey had to consider the regional balance o f power while formulating 
her response and calculating its pros and cons. During the 1980s, she had to watch the 
build-up o f the Iraqi military arsenal, including strategic weapon systems and chemical 
and nuclear capabilities, with growing concern. It was the Turkish military's conclusion 
that during the 1980s Turkey was overpowered by quantitatively and qualitatively 
superior armaments o f aspiring regional hegemons, Iraq and S y r ia .F u r th e rm o re , 
Turkey's recent dispute with Iraq and Syria over the water issue carried within it the 
dangers o f military involvement from both sides. Thus, by the time the crisis erupted, 
there was a growing perception in Turkey that she faced a potentially serious threat
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from the South. Iraq's invasion o f Kuwait only helped to heighten this perception by 
highlighting Iraq's willingness to use military means in order to establish an Iraqi 
hegemony in the region. 3^ On the other hand, though the Iraqi armament and 
aggressive policies had posed a great threat to the regional balance, from the Turkish 
perspective, the prospect o f total break-up o f Iraq, which would increase the influence 
o f Iran and Syria as well as Israel, was not a suitable projection either. Therefore, 
Turkey, as a regional power which attributed critical importance to regional balance of 
power, had to find ways to prevent both eventualities; that is while weakening Iraq's 
power, the existing equilibrium in the region should not be altered dramatically.
Thus it seemed that any action or inaction by Turkey was likely to affect both 
her Middle East and Western relationships, as well as having important repercussions 
both in domestic politics and for the regional balance o f power. In addition, it was 
likely to affect Turkey's long term standing both in the region and in the world while 
defining Turkey's security environment and involvements after the crisis.
Consequently, the very first reaction o f the Turkish government was extremely 
cautious, showing signs o f reluctance to become part o f this intra-Arab dispute and also 
reflecting hope that the crisis would soon die out or would be settled by diplomacy, 
long before Turkey was forced by circumstances to take stand, endangering her links 
either with Iraq or any other Arab states as well as with her Western Allies. O f course, 
there was no question over which side would Turkey take when it came to diplomatic 
response to Iraqi action o f August 2. In other words, "it was never likely that Turkey 
would issue anything other than a condemnation of occupation o f territory by force". 
39 Accordingly, on the day o f the invasion, the Minister o f Trade and Industry was 
quoted saying that Turkey "regretted Iraq's occupation o f Kuwait" which represented 
"a threat to the maintenance o f friendship in the region"40 The first statements o f 
prime minister Akbulut and foreign minister Bozer were also cautious and devoid of 
any strong references to the Iraqi action. There was no indication that Turkey was 
working on a possible retaliatory move against Iraq, merely a reference to the fact that
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Iraq had violated the sovereignty o f Kuwait and the wish to see that the situation be 
solved by peaceful means.4 ^
A meeting o f the NSC, held on August 3, produced the same sort o f reaction, 
and the statement issued following the Cabinet meeting that evening, though it spoke o f 
"unjust occupation", still promised no action except to follow developments and 
"implement the necessary action in time according the changing conditions".4^ Thus, 
when the Turkish press was reporting, the day after the NSC meeting, that Turkey 
would not close the Kerkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline or take other steps against Iraq,4^ it 
became obvious that Turkey was tilting towards, at least for the time being, its 
traditional neutral attitude in what was seen as a purely inter-Arab dispute.
Meanwhile, the UN acted swiftly to condemn the invasion and to demand an 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal.44 Although Turkey's initial reaction seemed 
mild in comparison to the strong UN condemnation, it was in accordance with many 
other states' first reactions against this largely unexpected move by Iraq.46 Moreover, 
Turkey was hardly in a position to criticise Iraq strongly while she herself was keeping 
troops in Cyprus against UN resolutions, though the conditions and reasons were 
different. However, the next resolution adopted by the UN Security Council on August 
6, which called on all members to "prevent the import into their territories o f all 
commodities and products originating in Iraq or Kuwait...", put Turkey in the spotlight 
because o f Iraqi oil pipelines passing through her territory, and immediately created 
pressures from the international community on Turkey to take a tougher line.46
The issue o f the pipeline closure posed some tricky questions for Turkey 
regarding its political and economic constraints, as well as its relations with the Middle 
Eastern Arab countries in the region. First o f all, Turkey, as a main transit route for 
Iraq's trade, had much to lose from enforcing the UN embargo and joining the alliance. 
The pipelines were source o f about $300 million per annum income in the form of 
transit fees, and another $50 million for port handling charges. Moreover, the bilateral 
trade in 1989 totalled $2.1 billion o f which Turkish imports amounted to $1.7 billion. 
There were signs that trade could have been higher in 1990 if it were not for the Gulf
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Crisis. Turkey estimated the loss in trade with Iraq and Kuwait would amount to $600 
million for Turkish exports in 1990; the loss in receivables was put at $750 million; the 
lost contracting services at $500 million; the increase in its oil bill at $800 million; 
probable lost tourism revenues at $300 million; and additional losses were due to the 
appreciation o f  the Deutschmark and the Dollar, which are the two main currencies 
involved in Turkish foreign trade. Thus Turkey stood to lose perhaps $3 billion by the 
end o f 1991 in remittances, oil transit dues and building contracts, let alone remittances 
from 300.000 Turks no longer employed in Iraq. Further Iraq was also withholding $2 
billion dollars o f debt repayments to Turkey.4^
Furthermore, though enforcing an economic embargo on Iraq was requested by 
the UN Security Council, cutting the flow o f the oil would in the longer term bring to 
mind the possibility o f Turkey’s cutting the flow o f waters o f the Euphrates river or o f 
the so-called "peace pipeline" that Turkey was proposing to be build in the region to 
distribute Turkish waters to the Arab countries. The main obstacle for such a project, 
apart from its huge cost, seemed to be the unwillingness o f the Arab countries to put 
themselves at the mercy and goodwill o f Turkey regarding the continued flow o f water, 
and the fear that Turkey might in one day find it too tempting a political weapon to 
ignore. Therefore Turkey would not wish to create the wrong implications for the 
future while trying to do the right thing at the moment. Moreover, once it was 
established that Turkey was willing to use pipelines, oil or otherwise, passing through 
its territory as a weapon - special circumstances do not matter much as they would be 
forgotten in the longer term - this would cause future aspirants to think twice before 
committing themselves to lay down pipelines through Turkey.
Moreover, there was the possibility of Iraqi retaliation as, in the words o f Iraqi 
deputy prime minister Taha Yasin Ramadan, "the closure o f the oil pipeline may create 
an atmosphere o f mistrust between the two countries"48 The protection o f Turkey's 
cities and installations, not least the dams in.fhe southeast that were at the centre o f the 
ongoing debate with Iraq, appeared to be unguarded against the threat o f an Iraqi 
missile attack, which was, to say the least, unnerving for Turkish leadership.
407
There was also the danger o f oil shortage, for, before the crisis, some 60% o f 
Turkeys oil imports had come from Iraq, which roughly corresponded to about 9.5 
billion tonnes o f crude oil for the period o f January-July 1990 49
Given the magnitude o f the above objections, the first Turkish official reaction 
to  SCR-661 was predictably negative. Immediately after the SCR-661 was made public, 
Minister o f State in charge o f energy policy, Mr. Mehmet Kececiler, announced that 
Turkey would not close its two pipelines so long as the one through Saudi Arabia 
continued to operate. He further asserted that Turkey had to give priority to its own 
needs and interests.69 The message was clear enough; Turkey would consider such an 
action only if there was a prospect o f a fully effective international embargo against 
Iraq.
Given the prevailing conditions, the cautious Turkish approach to the pipeline 
issue seemed "sensible". When faced with international pressure, it was pointed out that 
a unilateral closure by-Turkey would not be effective so long as the Saudi line was kept 
open. Even though the argument that Turkish closure would encourage the Saudis to 
follow suit was put to Turkey, it seemed that prevailing feeling and attitude in Turkey 
generally, and among the foreign ministry officials particularly, was that if a directly 
threatened Arab country would not resolve itself to close its pipeline, why then should 
Turkey, whose national interests were not in immediate danger, block her's, hence with 
all probability inciting a retaliation from Iraq. Moreover, should the crisis be solved by 
political means in the mean time between the Turkish unilateral move and Saudi's 
similar action, or inaction, then Turkey would have found itself alone in a security 
limbo in the region faced with charges o f being the "servitude and the long arm" o f the 
US.
Under these circumstances, the response o f the foreign ministry, if left alone, 
would have been to drag its feet on implementing the UN embargo long enough to see 
the cooperative action o f the world and the regional states. They, most probably, would 
have adopted a wait and see attitude and after having long considerations and 
discussions, and seeing the general response o f the world to the UN call, would
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eventually move to comply with the resolution, provided that most o f the Arab world 
also approved, at least condoned, this attitude and the Western powers were generally 
observing it. Even then the Turkish response would have been very low key without 
much publicizing.^ According to this line o f thinking, Turkey, if it dragged its feet 
long enough, might even have been saved from formally taking sides and closing the 
pipeline as a result o f either a blockage by the US navy in the Mediterranean or the 
refusal o f  the Western tankers to transport the Iraqi oil, thus effectively shutting down 
the oil flow from Iraq once the terminals in the Turkish port o f Iskenderun at the 
receiving end o f the pipelines were fu ll .^
Interestingly enough, as if proving this point, Iraq shut down one o f the 
pipelines on August 6, while reducing the pumping o f oil by 70% to the second one 
"due to  marketing problem s".^ On the same day, Turkey took a step further and 
banned the loading o f Iraqi oil from its Mediterranean port at the end o f the pipelines, 
thus bringing itself closer to actual shut down.*^ This o f course effectively meant the 
closure o f the pipelines without officially shutting them down, because storage facilities 
on Turkish side would have been full, as estimated by the state minister Kececiler, after 
six days and this would have forced Iraq to shut the pipelines completely by itself. ^
This approach seemed to conform *with the principles o f traditional Turkish 
foreign policy: that is complying with the international regulations and requirements 
without actually boasting about it. O f course, there was the danger with this policy that 
at the end o f the day Turkey would have ended up with pleasing no one. First o f all, so 
long as Turkey refused to buy herself or load Iraqi oil from her ports, the fine nuance 
between the actual shutting of pipelines and forcing Iraq to stop pumping because the 
storage facilities were full, which was incidentally aimed to obtain the same result, 
would have hardly impressed the Iraqi regime anyway. What's more, this half-hearted 
measure and softly-softly approach would not have pleased Turkey s Western allies 
either, and thus would lead to the charges o f non-cooperation and tension had the US 
decided to blockade the Turkish ports itself in order to prevent any embargo-busting 
attempt. Therefore, given this situation and. possibilities, the Turkish foreign ministery
409
at the end, in all probability, would have decided to close down the pipelines itself, but 
this would have not created same affect on the international arena as Turkey's 
immediate voluntary cooperation and closure would.
However, despite these dangers and considerations, it appeared that the foreign 
ministry was leaning towards this policy o f "wait and see", when President Ozal came 
out on August 7 and announced the formal closure o f the pipelines, suspension o f all 
commercial links with Iraq and Kuwait, and freezing o f all their assets in Turkey.56 The 
announcement came at a very awkward point for the foreign minister, Prof. Ali Bozer, 
because it coincided with a press conference during which he was briefing journalists 
about the reasons for Turkey's cautious approach and about what Turkey proposed to
cn
do regarding the UN embargo. It was obvious that the foreign ministry officials, like 
the rest o f the country, were caught unaware o f the decision which seemed to be taken 
by President himself unilaterally without prior consultation with the foreign ministery or 
the General Staff.5 ^
Further, despite the decision to impose economic sanctions upon Iraq, the 
Government still appeared to be trying to avoid direct confrontation with Iraq by 
stressing that "the resolution o f the UN, which Turkey is a founding member, is 
binding. Furthermore, Switzerland, which is not a member o f the UN, has announced 
that she will act in line with the resolution".59 Although it was doubtful how much ice 
this apologetic and almost pathetic statement cut with the Iraqi leadership, it was pretty 
clear that the Turkish leadership was quite anxious about the consequences o f "its" 
decision.
This incident not only confirmed Ozal's single-handed control o f national affairs, 
but also highlighted the lack of coordination among the top executives, and gave early 
indications o f what was coming within the course o f a year, that is the serious division 
within the government, various state organs and the public opinion in general over the 
strategy to be followed by Turkey during the Gulf crisis.
Although the crisis among the "top brass" erupted and was conducted over 
Turkey's Gulf War policy, the underlying differences and problems ran much deeper. At
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the heart of the matter lay the problem of the perennial confrontation between so-called 
traditionalists and "revisionists". On the one side o f the argument, the 
traditionalists", combining, at this particular time, much o f the foreign ministery 
bureaucrats, military establishment, and opposition parties together with most o f the 
media and the public opinion, argued for the preservation o f Turkey’s long-standing and 
much-tested foreign policy posture in the Middle East, that is primarily cautious 
approach and neutrality .^  These people, who were actually not longstanding allies and 
some o f whom had been political opponents, were brought together casually in this 
heterogeneous coalition o f forces by their common wish to keep Turkey clear from the 
Gulf Crisis as long and as much as possible.^ *
On the other side of the argument were the "revisionists", led by President Ozal 
and supported by some of his close associates and advisers, who argued basically that 
the traditionally cautious Turkish foreign policy belonged to the past and Turkey, in 
keeping with its contemporary composure and the fast-evolving world, should adopt a 
more flexible, initiative-taking, and indeed more "active" foreign policy line. In 
contrast, traditionalists argued that "the foreign policy is not supposed to be either 
passive or courageous, it should be dignified, self-possessed, efficient, sagacious, and 
p ru d en t" .^
As far as the Gulf crisis was concerned, the "traditionalists" were o f the view 
that Turkey should preserve her now traditional neutrality in Middle Eastern conflicts 
and most importantly, should not, as long as Turkey's national interests were not 
threatened, risk direct involvement in the present conflict for the sake o f obscure 
eventual benefits. One o f the most effective arguments they put forward against 
Turkey’s further involvement was that Turkey would have to co-habit with Iraq and 
more generally with the Arab world within the same geographic conditionality long 
after the crisis was over and international forces had returned home. They feared that 
after the crisis was over, the reasons for Turkey s actions would be forgotten quickly 
while her involvement in the crisis would be remembered throughout the Arab world as 
a Turkish attempt to resuscitate pax-Ottomana in the region. Ozal, on the other
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hand, seemed only too eager to take risks in the Gulf for the sake o f the enlarged role 
which he envisaged that Turkey was going-to play in the region after the crisis was 
over. He argued vigorously that in the emerging post-cold war system Turkey could no 
longer "act like ostrich", ignoring the realities o f the "new world order" and pretending 
the Gulf Crisis would go away without fundamentally affecting T u rkey .^
Thus it seemed after the closure o f the pipelines that Turkey was poised for a 
bitter war, not external but internal between the non-conformist President Ozal and, 
seemingly, the "rest o f the country". In the mean time, the abating o f the international 
interest in Turkey after the pipeline closure and the period o f stalemate, during which 
international actors were trying to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis before it 
reached the otherwise inevitable military confrontation, provided Turkey with an ample 
opportunity to stop and reflect about what had happened within past week or so and 
calculate what the long term consequences would be. The period between the invasion 
o f Kuwait and the closure o f the pipelines was marked with an intense sense o f shock at 
first and then chaos o f thoughts about what to do, exacerbated by the lack of 
understanding about the reasons for the conflict and by the international spotlight and 
pressure on Turkey. It was obvious that during this time Turkey as a whole and its 
decision-makers particularly stumbled along with the international public opinion while 
trying to make sense o f what was going on and formulate appropriate policies for 
Turkey to follow if the conflict was prolonged. Even the Parliament, which held the 
right to declare war if need arose, was not convened until September 12 when the most 
important decisions were already taken and Turkey's position had become more or less 
apparent. In the process, the foreign ministry bureaucrats at first almost instinctively 
turned to Turkey's traditional policy o f caution and neutrality to find a way out or at 
least to  spare Turkey for the moment from being forced to take sides before proper 
evaluations were made. After all, this policy had served Turkey well for almost seventy 
years, thus it could have done so for another week or two. The then Chief o f Staff^ 
General Torumtay, was right when he observed in retrospect that "the wheel o f the 
Turkish state machine", which based its working principles on national policies and
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long term decisions, turns s l o w l y " . T h e r e  lay the crux o f the disagreement. The 
president believed that Turkey could not go on practicing old formulas in her foreign 
policy in the post-cold war era. She had to change and adapt herself to the realities of 
the era. She had to react quickly and act decisively. Actually, there seemed to be no 
difference between the President and the foreign ministry in that Turkey needed to 
reevaluate her new geopolitics and surroundings in the new era. However, they 
disagreed on the timing and the style o f that reevaluation. With the visible stillness of 
the Turkish bureaucracy, the foreign ministry opposed the idea o f sudden changes, they 
wanted to conduct inquiries, research, have meetings, reflect on the ideas put forward, 
and then produce proper policy option for the decision-makers, that is the Cabinet, not 
the president. In contrast, the president believed that Turkey had to make her move 
then and there. He also wanted to personalize and dominate national policy-making, 
which was quite unacceptable to the civil-military bureaucracy. During the crisis, Ozal's 
many conversations with President Bush o f US and other foreign leaders, television 
stations and newspapers made him Turkey's representative to the world, which caused
f\HTPP leader Demirel to remonstrate that "Turkey is not Ozal-land". They vehemently 
opposed a one-man decision-making process which was justified by the president with 
the necessity o f practicality and speed, the qualities which, he argued, the Turkish 
foreign policy was in dire need and what the international system towards the 21st
zro
century required from a strategically situated modem state like Turkey.00
The way the entire debate was conducted during this period suggests that the 
main disagreement and the basic interest of the participants were concentrated on how 
the country was - or should be - governed. The confrontation over this issue had been 
brewing ever since Turgut Ozal became president in late 1989, and it seemed that the 
nature o f the Turkish policy over the Gulf crisis provided an ample battle ground for 
this more general conflict. In other words, what was at stake during the controversies 
between the president and his opponents throughout this period was not only the way 
Turkey's Gulf policy and more generally her foreign policy should develop and be 
conducted, but also, maybe more importantly, the way that the country should be
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governed in the future. President Ozal, who had to all intents and purposes temporarily 
transformed the government into a presidential style system, was also openly drawing 
up proposals for the amendment o f the constitution.^ Thus, the confrontation between 
so-called Kemalist" and "liberal revisionists" was essentially a struggle for political 
power, that is who would govern the country and how?7^
This grandiose political struggle within the country inevitably clouded the 
external developments during this "period o f introspection".7 ^  As if reflecting the 
suspense in the Gulf, Turkey's elites, including politicians, journalists, the army and the 
constitutional bodies, were locked in a passionate discussion while the ordinary people 
seemed to worry more about the possibilities o f a forthcoming war spreading into 
Turkey as manifested in steady migration of citizens from the border areas. 7^
After the closure of the pipelines and declaration o f the economic embargo, 
Turkey seemed to face more important questions regarding the wider Turkish role in 
the possible military engagement in the Gulf. The questions raised included the 
possibility o f contributing Turkish troops to coalition forces, allowing allied forces to 
use NATO bases on Turkish soil for their out-of-area operations, and finally opening a 
second land front against Iraq if the conditions deemed it necessary. '
Before these questions were answered, however, Turkey in the first instance 
had to  make defensive preparations. Although it could be argued from the outset that at 
least on this point everybody would have agreed easily, a closer look reveals that even 
this evidently straightforward task embodied the seeds o f future confrontations. 
Especially, the dispute between the Chief of Staff, General Torumtay, and President 
Ozal could be traced back to this basic point and the early days o f the Crisis. In his 
memoirs, General Torumtay frequently complained about the lack o f political directives 
on the measures to be taken against Iraq.74 Moreover, he also complained that many 
speculative actions were entertained by president Ozal at one time or another, including 
manoeuvres on Iraqi border and possible invasion of part o f Iraqi territory, without 
actually giving directives to General Staff for preparations for such actions.75 It seems 
that as the result o f a lack of coherent directives from above, the Turkish Armed Forces
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preparations wei e limited only to such defensive measures as putting all forces on alert, 
cancelling all leave for key personnel, and moving troops to the Iraqi border, which 
were at any rate contemplated at the General Staff s discretion rather than as a part of a 
more general plan drawn up by the joint action of the civilian and military authorities.7^ 
At the end, Turkish forces on the Iraqi border, which reached about 120.000 men just 
before the beginning of the war, however, played an important role, pinning down 
about eight Iraqi divisions in the north which could otherwise have been used elsewhere 
against the coalition forces.
While propping up Turkish defences along the Iraqi border, there appeared the 
question o f whether Iraq would attack Turkey and if that happened whether Turkey 
would be able to defend itself. With this concerns, the fact that the Turkish borders 
were guaranteed by the NATO treaty inevitably came to minds. However, since the 
Middle East was traditionally regarded as out-of-area for the NATO operations it 
seemed, for a brief period, a question mark appeared in Turkey about the NATO’s 
possible response for such an attack. Although a NATO summit, held in Brussels on 
August 11, had confirmed its pledge to defend Turkish borders against any aggression, 
the Turkish government asked for the defensive deployment o f NATO air forces on 
November 30, not only because there was a genuine fear that Turkish air and anti­
aircraft defences were inadequate against possible Iraqi attack, but also to test the 
sincerity o f the NATO countries' pledge to defend Turkey against aggression from out 
o f  NATO's main defence area in the post-cold war era. Though on January 2, 1991, it 
was announced that Germany, Italy and Belgium would be sending 42 aircraft as a part 
o f an allied mobile force, the unwillingness and opposition to such a move especially 
within Germany proved, for most part, Turkey's fears that Turkish security needs, 
especially regarding her Middle Eastern borders, after the end o f the Cold War would 
be ignored. Thus the opposition and discussions within Germany provoked sharp 
attacks from President Ozal who dubbed the Germans unreliable allies 77
Although it was somewhat disappointing to see mostly obsolescent aircraft 
when finally Allied forces began to arrive in Turkey on January 6, the Turkish
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government did not make any more fuss over the quality o f the forces, since their 
symbolic value was much more important than their actual fire power and strength.78 
In addition to these forces, there were much larger and modem American and British 
squadrons, based at Incirlik air base, which could also be brought into action if  Turkey 
was attacked. When finally the Patriot missiles against possible Iraqi Scud attacks 
arrived from the US on January 15, Turkish defensive preparations seemed ready, 
though there were still the huge shortage o f gas masks, shelters against chemical and 
nuclear attacks, and reliable communications systems.7^
Ironically, inviting foreign troops onto Turkish soil provoked much more bitter 
attacks in Turkey than in Germany. This issue had been traditionally problematic in
o n
Turkey for historic reasons. One important aspect o f the whole affair was that 
Turkey's request for NATO force to be stationed on her territory was kept secret from
01
the public for about three weeks. This again inevitably raised the issue o f whether
there was a question o f a "second front"/being opened against Iraq over Turkish
territory in the event o f a war. This was denied by foreign minister, K. Alptemucin, who
emphasised strongly that Turkey did not wish to see any war on any fronts, but argued
that it was the government's task to ensure the security o f the country as best as
82possible and take all measures for defence.
However, sending troops to the Gulf, or allowing the US or other allied air 
forces to use Incirlik air base for non-NATO operations, that is to attack Iraq in this 
case, was far more problematic for the government since this required specific 
authorization from the parliament and could not be done with executive request as was
0*5
the case in inviting NATO troops to help protect the country's borders OJ
As in the case o f the foreign forces to be invited, President Ozal seemed to  be 
the most enthusiastic person in the country in favour of sending at least a Turkish 
contingent to join the coalition forces in the Gulf. In a television interview in January 
1991, he admitted that he wanted to send a Turkish contingent to join the coalition 
forces in the Gulf.84 However, the opposition seemed determined to prevent this. Both 
opposition parties, TPP o f S. Demirel and SDPP o f E. Inonu, vigorously attacked
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Ozal s adventurism as they termed it. More importantly, however, it became clear, 
when a government proposal was brought before the parliament to obtain authorization 
for sending troops, that a considerable group o f M ot.P backbenchers, led by former 
foreign minister, Mesut Yilmaz, who resigned in February 1990, were also opposed to 
such an authorization. It appeared that the proposed bill was seen by many as a request
oc
to wage war.
During the debates o f the extraordinary session o f the TGNA on August 12,
when the authorization bill was first discussed, opposition speakers expressed their
reservations about the confrontational policy towards Baghdad.8^ More vigorously,
though, they used the occasion to attack President Ozal with charges o f  exceeding his
87constitutional boundaries. "If the president, who is non-responsible according to 
Constitution, is de facto conducting foreign policy, how can the parliament supervise 
this policy?", asked the leader o f SDPP, Erdal Inonu, and added that "...the necessity 
for practicality and speed, or knowing world leaders cannot be justifications for using 
powers that were not mentioned in the constitution by a non-responsible post, 
especially given the damage inflicted on both our domestic and foreign policies by 
esteemed Ozal's hasty decisions".88 After bitter exchanges between the opposition and 
the M ot.P MPs, the final outcome was a compromise that fell short o f the government's 
- that is president's - expectations.89 Without the power to send Turkish troops abroad 
or to permit foreign troops to be stationed in Turkey before she was attacked, the 
adopted bill actually gave the government no additional authority than it would have 
had already during the recess of the parliament.90 The result indicated, if not proved, 
that even the Mot.P MPs had doubts about the direction o f the government's policy and 
more importantly suspicions about the "undeclared intentions" (hidden agenda) o f the 
president. Their suspicions had been exacerbated by the visit o f US Secretary o f State,
91
James Baker, just three days before the Bill was discussed in the parliament. While it 
was known that Baker came to give guarantees against an Iraqi attack and ask for 
Turkey's further cooperation, the result o f his discussions in Turkey was unclear and, as 
far as the official statements were concerned, conflicting. While the Turkish authorities,
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including Ozal, were insisting that the US had not even asked for the usage o f Incirlik, 
or any other, air base, the US officials made clear that they believed no problems would 
be raised about their use in the event o f war.9^ The lack o f a coherent statement from 
the foreign ministry about the issue further fanned the uneasiness among the 
parliamentarians about Ozal's single-handed operation style. As a result, the parliament 
seemed decisive in tying the president's hands, at least temporarily, regarding Turkish 
troops to be send to the Gulf as a part o f the Coalition build-up.
Although obviously disappointed, President Ozal was not to be disheartened by 
the outcome. Thus, when he got the chance to speak out, he criticised the MPs and 
"those who think that Turkey's foreign policy could still be conducted with hesitant 
indecisiveness" for not seeing what was really happening in the region.9  ^ He then, 
stressing the supreme importance o f "national Unity", called for a consensus on 
Turkey's policy in connection with the Gulf Crisis - the policies o f other countries in 
this respect were the product o f a national consensus, he said, and it was important that 
Turkey was not seen to be divided. He went on to state that Turkey's policy throughout 
had been in line with international law and her own national interests and make clear 
that Turkey's aim was the withdrawal o f Iraq and the restoration o f the Kuwaiti regime.
Finally, he explained that with international developments moving as fast as they 
were doing, traditional diplomacy could be too slow, and the ability to manoeuvre in 
order to take quick decisions when necessary was essential. Both during the crisis and 
after it, he said, Turkey's policy would have to be dynamic. Hesitation and 
indecisiveness would mean losing the advantages that arisen from her own strengths 
and her important position between West and East. It seemed that most o f his agitation 
was the result o f his anticipation that Turkey would not enjoy the full benefits o f her 
stance against Iraq unless she joined the coalition build-up in the Gulf.94 Thus in 
conclusion, Ozal "advised" parliament to transfer to the government those powers 
mentioned in article 92 o f the constitution with the exception o f the power to declare a 
state o f war, adding that of all the democratic governments concerned, only the 
Japanese and the West German lacked the powers in question.
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It was not long before the matter again returned to the limelight when, on
September 5, a new bill was put to vote in the Parliament. This time, thanks to
reconciliation o f Mot.P rebels, the bill which allowed the government to send troops
abroad, and receive foreign troops on Turkish soil, even if she was not attacked, was
p assed .^  Although the parliament still retained its powers to declare war, this seemed
a trivial point since the government, in theory, could have participated in an armed
conflict without actually declaring war and also it is a fact that "most modem wars have
been fought undeclared".^
Thus, although the government gained its "war powers", bitter parliamentary
debates and criticisms in the press showed large scale opposition to direct involvement
in the Gulf. Moreover, there were popular demonstrations against such an 
0 7
involvement. It seemed that the stories o f "Turkish blood that was shed in those 
deserts for four hundred years", a folk memory that plunged republican Turkey into 
decades o f distant neutrality to Arab events, were still strongly present in the collective
Q O
mind o f Turkish public. As a result, by the time the actual war started, it seemed that 
the president had dropped the idea o f sending Turkish troops to the G u lf .^  Apart from 
the fact that there was popular disapproval o f such a move, it seemed that the 
opposition from the Army and from within the Mot.P had played important roles in this 
turn o f  events.
In the mean time, President Ozal, taking time from the domestic bickering, 
started a 10-day tour o f the US on September 24. His warm reception from President 
Bush showed the extent to which Turkey had won back favour with the US due to her 
firm stand against Iraq. Although Ozal had said Turkey's response to the UN call on 
economic embargo against Iraq was determined by Turkey's respect for "universal 
principles" rather than cheap calculations, and taken "without hesitation", 100 the 
breakdown o f the estimated costs o f the embargo to Turkey had been nevertheless 
made public and expectations for compensations were expressed. Therefore, Turkey's 
price for keeping up with the "universal principals" was undoubtedly discussed during 
Ozal's visit. On his return, he argued that the visit was "very beneficial and extremely
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favourable and that he was given assurances that Turkey's annual cost o f sanctions,
which was officially estimated at the time at about $5 billion, would be somehow be
m et.101 During his visit, he especially impressed both the US officials and the public by
his calls for "more trade, not aid". Moreover, just before the President's visit, Turkey
renewed the expiring DECA agreement on September 18, without the usual huffy 
• • 102negotiations. In return, none of the US bases in Turkey were on the latest list o f 
facilities to be closed by the budget cuts in the Pentagon.10  ^ Moreover he also 
triumphantly claimed that President Bush "agreed to everything we asked for".10zl 
However, what exactly President Bush agreed was not known because they discussed 
this question, in President Ozal's words, "in principle only with the understanding that 
details will be taken up in the future". And referring to "details", Ozal said that the US 
had so far only joined the modernization programme for M-48 tanks, and added, 
"perhaps our demand will exceed" the proposed American Eximbank credit o f $1.4 
billion to Turkey if the US won the bidding for construction o f military helicopters for 
Turkey's defence industry. 1
The first sign o f cracks among the top decision-makers came, just two weeks 
after Ozal's return from the US and partly as a result o f it, with the resignation of 
foreign minister, Prof Ali Bozer, on October 11. His resignation once again highlighted 
the issue o f the president's personal involvement in the country's policy-making. The 
fact that the resignation came after the reports that Bozer as foreign minister was 
excluded from Ozal's meeting with President Bush at the White House during the 
above-mentioned visit, while the US Secretary o f State, James Baker, was also present, 
triggered further speculations about the extent to which he had taken over the policy 
making from the foreign ministery.106 It was also argued that Ozal had promised, on 
behalf o f Turkey, far more help to the US with regard to the military situation in the 
gulf than had been publicly announced.107 These accusations were strengthened by the 
fact that, during his meeting with President Bush, Ozal was only accompanied by his 
personal adviser, Mr. Nabi Sensoy, thus everything discussed in the Oval Office 
remained between four persons, none of them a member o f the Turkish government
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who could answer to parliament. ^  It was also argued that, prior to his departure, 
Bozer was opposing Ozal's determination to take the parliament's powers over troop 
deployments into his own hands and had been increasingly left out o f the decision 
making process.
The new appointment to Prof. Bozer's former post came as a surprise as the 
new foreign minister, A. K. Alptemucin, had never held responsibilities related to 
external relations. His selection was interpreted as that his job would be to ensure that 
the ministry o f foreign affairs would limit itself to diplomacy and leave policy-making to 
the politicians. And as if proving this point, when questioned on Gulf policy, he told 
journalists to direct their questions to the president; he did not seem to have an answer 
o f his own.** * This, more than anything else, proved that he would be only a symbolic 
minister and would be totaly dependent on Ozal's orders.
Following the departure o f Bozer, Ozal made Turkish diplomatic history by 
visiting five Gulf states between 13 and 16 October with no accompanying ministers at 
all. On his return, his declaration that Turkey's esteem in the region had been 
heightened following her firm stand against Iraq was spoiled by the resignation o f the 
Defence Minister Safa Giray on the same day, just before a scheduled meeting with the 
visiting NATO Secretary-General, Manfred Woemer. Although Giray's resignation was 
attributed to internal squabbling within the Motherland Party, the timing and style of 
the resignation also suggested that he, too, was not happy with Ozal's one-man 
tendencies.1 ^  His letter o f resignation, written to prime minister, merely stated that "I 
have reached the firm conclusion that the relationship o f trust which exists between us 
has been damaged". It was a statement open to interpretations.113
A much bigger shock, and consequently a major political storm, came with the 
resignation o f the Chief o f General Staff, General N. Torumtay, on December 3 .114 
This was an almost unprecedented event in Turkey. His resignation letter, which read "I 
am resigning o f my own free will, because with my principles and my understanding of 
what the state should be, I cannot continue to serve", further highlighted misgivings 
among the top officials about Ozal's intentions and governing style. Although General
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Torumtay did not reveal at the time any specific reasons for his sudden departure, his 
thinly veiled attack on the president showed most dramatically that not only the 
opposition leaders believed that the president was not acting in Turkey's best interest. 
M oreover, the lack o f reference to the prime minister in the resignation letter and the 
prime minister's statement that they had "no difference o f opinion, no disagreements, or 
no conflict in any subject what so ever" within the year that they had worked together, 
were taken as further evidence that the real target o f the resignation was the 
president.113
At the time, it was widely suspected that General Torumtay resigned because o f
the disagreement with the president over his aggressive Gulf policy and in particular
over whether Turkey should allow the US to use Incirlik air base for attacks into
Iraq .11^ However, in his memoirs General Torumtay denies this reasoning. Although
he admits that he did not share the views o f the president about the policies that Turkey
should follow, he nevertheless argues that he would have been content with them and
continued to serve provided that those policies were put to him as official directives by
117the "proper channels", by which he means the government. It appears that he was 
much more troubled by the autocratic style o f the president and his right to conduct 
policies than the substance of his ideas, though some o f his "mind-exercises" were
1 1 O
obviously "adventurist" and "out o f tune with the military realities".110
He was most annoyed by the lack o f direction emanating from the government 
and by the non-professional and unprotocol-like attitudes o f the executives. He was 
shocked, for example, when he received written directives from the prime ministry 
without necessary signatures.119 In fact, this incident could only be explained either by 
negligence and sloppiness o f prime minister, or by his doubts and hesitation to commit 
Turkey into a course o f policies which he did not agree but was forced to endorse by 
the president. In latter case, the implications of the situation, o f course, become much 
more serious as the question o f responsibility for the government's actions arises, since 
the president, according to constitution, could not be held responsible for his actions. 
Responsibility for the policies lies with the government and the projection that a non-
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responsible individual could take and force the implication o f decisions that would have
fundamental effects on the country's future is indeed a daunting prospect.
Moreover, to the resentment o f the Chief o f Staff it seemed, at one point, that
the president designated him as a "liaison officer" to the Americans without actually
informing him. He was most indignant about this because the "Turkish Chief o f Staff is
not liaison officer, but the highest commanding post, who, as a representative o f a
dignified state, can not accept any correspondence other than another Chief o f Staff o f
a friendly state". 1211
Furthermore, he also seemed resentful o f the fact that President Ozal by-passed
him when taking decisions and he was not invited to a meeting on December 1, 1990 at
the Presidential Palace where the particulars o f Turkey's Gulf policy were decided.121
Moreover, it seemed that Ozal frequently ignored the advice o f the General Staff in
"matters o f  military strategy" in favour o f his "non-professional" advisers and his "un-
•  • 122coordinated personal interpretations and opinions".
In short, it seemed that Torumtay resigned in reaction not to what was being 
done but to the way certain things were being done. His was not a protest against this 
or that policy - though he would consider himself entitled to make such a protest - but a 
refusal to work within a management framework he could not reconcile himself 
w ith.122
On the other hand, President Ozal's own explanation about the real reason for
the resignation was that "some Generals are not keeping in step and are acting to
preserve the status quo. While we are taking brave steps forward, they are trying to put
brakes on".124 He also presented the resignation as proof o f Turkey's democratic
maturity in an apparent allusion to earlier preferences o f Chiefs o f Staff to issue
"warnings" instead o f resigning.125 It seemed that the clashes between "tradition" and
"practicality" on the one hand, and between the strict code o f practice o f General
Torumtay and "relaxed and often unruly" practices o f Ozal on the other were
126responsible for the resignation of the Chief o f General Staff.
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After Torumtay's resignation, and as the UN dateline for the withdrawal o f Iraqi
troops from Kuwait approached, the question o f whether Turkey would allow the use
o f  Incirlik base in the event o f a war was still undecided and matters came to head when
the US Secretary o f State Baker, on his way to tour the Middle East, stopped over in
Turkey in the first week o f November, apparently to request the full Turkish 
127cooperation. In this, again, the government seemed less enthusiastic than the 
1 9 0
president. As late as January 15, when the UN-imposed deadline was expiring, the 
prime minister Akbulut still insisted that no decision had been taken on the use of
1 on
Turkish bases. However, it was a foregone conclusion that they would be used by
the US planes when two days later the parliament voted to renew the government's war
powers, making clear that this time it would include allowing the use o f Incirlik and
130other bases against Iraq.
Faced with the fact that the most extensive war powers were conveyed to the 
government, the opposition, which cast 148 votes against the bill, was not impressed by 
the assurances o f the foreign minister, A. K. Alptemucin, that "Turkey does not
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want...to become a party to the war...to open up a second front". 1 Thus they 
attacked during the debate on January 17, to the government and Ozal on the account
1
o f war-mongering and accused Ozal o f turning Turkey into the "USS Saratoga". ^
Erdal Inonu, the leader o f the SDPP, claimed that while the government said it would
not strike at Iraq unless attacked, by allowing foreign forces to launch attacks from
133Turkish air bases it had invited Iraq's wrath and would draw Turkey into the war.
In the meantime Ozal seemed to have his own agenda. He had been urging the 
US to fight it out with Iraq, arguing on American TV that they exaggerated Saddam's 
powers too much; "It (Iraq) is basically a Third World country. It's not like Russia; it's 
not like Germany. After all, what did they do in eight years o f war with Iran?"134 He 
further argued that "Saddam can not survive any more, unless the US says, well, the 
war is enough. Then you might be in trouble".135 His language became, by this time, 
most harsh against Saddam Hussein, whose back, he said, "must be broken", and he 
seemed, in the words o f a Turkish journalist, to have "burnt all his bridges with
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Saddam . In a television interview, when questioned about the wisdom o f his
"hawkish" stand against Iraq, he bluntly stated that "the only way to live with a hawk
like Saddam Hussein is to be o n e" .* ^  It appeared that he based all his calculations on
the assumption that the US would, in all eventuality, fight against Iraq, at the end of
which Saddam Hussein would be removed from his post. Moreover, he seemed to be
convinced that the US and its allies were set to re-draw the map o f the Middle East
after the defeat o f president Saddam Hussein and thus was anxious not to be left out
when that happened around the negotiating table. "After the crisis, the map o f the
Middle East will change completely. If  there is a better place for us in the world, we
must take it", Ozal told journalists.*^  Thu^ in this frame o f mind, he did not see any
reason for not committing Turkey fully to the declared war aim o f the US-led coalition
forces, that is the full and unconditional withdrawal o f Iraq from Kuwait, and to the
unspoken US wish to remove Saddam Hussein and disarm his war power. *^ **
In view o f all the uncertainty surrounding whether Turkey would be party to a
war if it started, there were, as the January 15 dateline was approaching, signs o f
limited panic among the Turks. While the official line had been fixed that Turkey would
only get involved in a Gulf War if it was the object o f a direct assault by Iraq, for the
142ordinary people in the streets, the threat o f imminent war was seen as very real.
4. The War
As mentioned above, once the war had begun, the parliament endorsed the extra 
powers that the government, that is President Ozal, had been long seeking. This gave 
the president a freer hand in policy-making and, once the TGNA had endorsed the 
government’s proposals, he immediately indicated that the US could use the air bases 
whenever it wanted, a move which was widely interpreted at the time as turning Turkey 
into a second front and putting all Turkey's eggs into one basket. * ^
Hence, on January 18, with the opening o f the air war, the first allied raids from 
Incirlik were duly launched. The government, however, wary of the effect o f the air
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raids on public opinion, originally played down the importance o f Turkish bases and 
claimed that the waves o f American planes, daily flying out o f the Incirlik base only to 
return with their bomb pads empty, were merely on "training exercise".^44 Moreover, a 
censorship was put into action on the Turkish television, which cut the news that 
revealed Turkey's involvement while beaming the CNN reports, such as the repeated 
US strikes from bases in Turkey, the exodus from strategic southeastern towns and the 
almost total lack o f gas masks in Turkey.*4^ The government was obviously trying to 
prevent people from learning the truth about an issue which would faithfully affect their 
future.
In a television interview on January 18, however, President Ozal appeared to be 
uninterested in whether the planes had bombed Iraqi targets; "the F-15s, F-16s and F- 
111s might have gone to Iraq after their training" he said. It seemed even "training" was 
a relative concept for Ozal when he suggested that had Turkey sent troops to the Gulf 
earlier, they would have gained some "useful experience".*4^
After the President's admittance that planes from Incirlik "might have gone to 
Iraq", the government at once dropped its pretence that the aircraft were flying on 
training mission everyday and accepted that the "second front" was now a reality, at 
least with regard to the air w ar.147 Regular sorties from Incirlik by coalition planes 
continued up to the time o f the cease-fire in the Gulf. In the mean time, while the 
government was still insisting that allowing Turkish bases "a more comprehensive role" 
was a far cry from committing Turkish troops on the ground, there was, naturally, a 
growing anxiety among the Turks that Iraq might counter-attack, and that the second 
front would also become a land w ar.148 Fears became more intense when the contejct 
o f a letter sent by the Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz to his Turkish counterpart were 
revealed, in which he pointed out that Turkey had taken a hostile position against Iraq 
and must be ready to face the consequences. Though he did not clarify what he meant




However, General Torumtay emphasizes in his memoirs that during the Gulf 
crisis Iraq was never up to a position o f attacking Turkey. According to him, at worst 
Iraq would have fired some missiles or would have tried air bombing missions in the 
event that an attack from Turkish soil took place. "In other words", he continues, "a 
war with Iraq could have only started with Turkey's own will". Then he goes on to 
reason that since the government did not have any intention to start an offensive war on 
its own initiative against Iraq, "everything was left to the conduct and decision o f the 
president" who, leaving the government in the background, had started to direct foreign 
policy personally. ^
In the mean time, the Turkish government, in an attempt to deter any Iraqi 
counter attack, for this was certainly a possibility, issued threats o f retaliating by air 
power and opening outright second land front with Iraq. Though the weight o f such a 
threat on the Iraqi leadership was seen at best as dubious, given the fact that Iraq was 
already experiencing "most harsh" onslaught from the Coalition forces, Baghdad, 
nevertheless, refrained from attacking Turkey and thus effectively opening the second 
land front. In retrospect, a question comes to mind as to whether Turkey would have 
escalated the situation had Iraq struck only the Incirlik air base, from which there were 
certainly offensive attacks against Iraq? At the time, two different arguments were 
entertained in the media, one o f which argued that Turkey would put up with Iraqi 
attacks without retaliation so long as there were no, or "acceptable" amount of, 
casualties, and in the case o f massive attacks from Iraq, then Turkey would have to 
retaliate by striking back with air power and then opening the second land front. 
Some others, on the other hand, argued that-President Ozal, who had already admitted 
that he wanted to send Turkish troops to the Gulf but was prevented by the 
circumstances, would immediately take up Iraqi challenge by committing Turkish 
troops into war, with a possible undeclared aim of occupying some part o f the Iraqi 
territory in the north. ^  It is not possible to come down in favour o f either 
interpretation, for there is no way o f knowing now what might have been in the mind o f 
the late-President Ozal at the time. It is true that he had advocated a more active role in
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the war and entertained the possibility o f occupation for some parts o f Iraq at one 
point. However, by the time the war had started, he seemed to drop both notions, 
probably because o f (1) the popular disapproval; (2) the explanation by the General 
Staff and the foreign ministry about the possible outcomes and pitfalls o f such a 
m ove;15^ and (3) maybe because he realised that Turkey's existing contribution to the 
Gulf war effort and extensive cooperation with especially the US were after all enough 
to  obtain his objectives, that is to further Turkey's existing cooperation with the US and 
to find a place for Turkey in the post-crisis settlement process and security 
arrangements in the region, thus there was nothing more to gain by simply opening a 
costly land front with Iraq. In addition, the roles o f the suspicions and anticipated 
oppositions o f Turkey's two regional rivals, Iran and Syria, for any such action, and the 
possible US reluctance to see part o f Iraqi territory being occupied, even by an ally, 
should not be disregarded.
Though the possibility of war with Iraq was thus averted, the existence of
prospective conflicts in the region was very much alive since, once the outcome o f the
war became pretty certain, the future o f the Iraqi state and its territory opened up into
regional calculations. While there was much reference in the foreign press about the
Turkish intentions over Mosul and Kirkuk regions where some Turcomans were living
and over which Turkey only reluctantly had to disclaim her rights in 1926,155 Turkey,
too, certainly had her suspicions about the intentions of both Iran and Syria if things
came to a point where Iraqi territory might be divided. Therefore, while Turkey found
it imperative to deny that she had any territorial claims over Iraqi territory,156 the
government also did not neglect to issue warnings to both Syria and Iran against
possible ambitions in Iraq. Thus, while the fighting got under way between Iraqi forces
and the domestic opposition immediately after the cease fire in Gulf, it was made clear
to both Syria and Iran that military intervention in northern Iraq by either side, would
157not be tolerated by Turkey.
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5. The Aftermath
When Iraq finally resigned itself to unconditionally accepting all the UN resolutions on 
February 28, 1991, Turkey had reasons for celebration. The war clearly demonstrated 
Turkey's strategic importance even if the Cold War was over, and firmly put her back 
to the Western security calculations in the "new world order". Turkey's cooperation 
during the crisis once again proved her status as a reliable ally to the West. In return 
she was offered compensations for her losses and sufferings because o f the crisis and 
her collaboration with the Coalition forces.
Also, there was a hope in Turkey that her trusted services during the crisis 
would provide a suitable platform from which she could jump on the European train. 
Privately it was expressed that Turkey expected to see European appreciation o f her 
cooperation in the forms o f more collaboration and encouraging attitude towards the 
question o f her EC membership. The US too, was expected to put pressure on Europe 
on behalf o f Turkey. Moreover, hopes were also expressed that Turkey could play an
1 C O
important role in building more stable and democratic post-cnsis Middle East. 
Expectations were put forward o f a role for Turkey in the post-crisis Middle Eastern 
security arrangem ents.*^ Further calls for the creation o f a Middle East Economic 
Zone and/or an Economic Development Fund to accompany these security measures,
■I zrr\
were also made by the Turkish prime minister.
During the following months, however, these almost euphoric expectations 
were shattered by the wave of largely unforeseen consequences o f the conflict. Of 
these, the Iraqi Kurdish refugee crisis was the most immediate and probably the most 
important for Turkey as it also exposed her internal weaknesses to the world. The 
problem started as a humanitarian disaster as a direct result o f half-finished Gulf War 
and half-hearted US encouragement o f Iraqi Kurds to rebel against the regime of 
Saddam Hussein. However, when the first wave o f Kurdish refugees were sighted on 
Turkish border on March 31, 1991, it presented Turkey with both a refugee problem of 
unprecedented dimensions and a political problem, since the sensibility o f her own
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Kurdish question for Turkey made it o f far-reaching importance, thus left Turkey with 
an immediate dilemma.161
After the collapse o f the Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi regime, the vast 
exodus o f refugees, terrified by the expectation o f retribution, began towards the 
Turkish and Iranian borders during the first two weeks o f April 1991. By the middle o f 
the month, some 700.000 refugees, estimated by Turkish authorities, moved to the 
Iraqi-Turkish border. 16^ Their situation on the border area was desperate. The 
mountainous terrain and the severe climatic conditions made the transport and 
distribution o f supplies almost an impossible task. Although at first the local villagers 
and the Turkish Red Crescent, and later on the international aid agencies, tried to help 
them, it soon became clear that unless they were brought down to more accessible sites 
from the mountain-tops, there was no way of coping with the situation. This presented 
Turkish government with difficult policy choices.
On the one hand, the plight o f the refugees and the magnitude o f the 
humanitarian catastrophe made it impossible to turn a blind eye to the situation. 16-* 
Moreover, international public opinion was soon involved, thus external pressures for 
solution became considerable. Furthermore, there was a danger that Turkey's own 
Kurdish population might have got restless if the government remained inactive. On the 
other hand, Turkish government was most reluctant to allow the refugees to move to 
more accessible sites within Turkey as demanded by aid organizations. She had ample 
reasons for the reluctance.
First o f all, there were concerns over the long-term responsibility for the 
refugees. The recent experiences had tought Turkey enough to conclude that she would 
be left alone with the nearly impossible task o f caring and accommodating those 
refugees long after the international attention moved on to other problems in other 
parts o f  the world.164 In March 1988, following the Halabje massacre, 51.512 Iraqi 
Kurds, according to official figures, had taken shelter in Turkey, and after two and a 
half years later, more than half o f them were still living in Turkey as refugees with next 
to no international assistance.165 Moreover, nearly two million Iranians had passed
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through Turkey during the Iran-Iraq war, many o f whom stayed. Then there were the 
300.000 Turks who arrived from Bulgaria. In addition, there were also some Afghan 
refugees brought by president Evren few years earlier from Pakistan. These were 
followed by another wave o f refugees after Iraqi forces entered Kuwait on August 2. 
This time about 60.000 people o f various nationalities who had been working in Iraq
1 f \ f \
fled to Turkey. Thus, another mass exodus o f refugees, who had no intention of
leaving soon, would have put pressures on the already-stretched Turkish economy.
The much broader question for Turkey, however, was that during the previous
few years, as a result o f above-mentioned exoduses, she had arrived at a situation
where she had to work out a policy concerning refugees without delay. Turkey was fast
becoming the largest recipient o f refugees coming from the west as well as the east.
The realization was growing in Turkey that things could not be left to chance any more,
and that in view o f the volatile nature of the environment in which Turkey found herself
geographically, a broad policy governing refugees was called for. Thus it was also
feared that if it got around that Turkey was offering asylum, the number o f refugees
i fn *asking for it would inevitably multiply. "We do not want another Palestinian camp
on our border", was Ozal's reaction to those who criticized Turkey for not allowing
1
refugees to move further inside Turkey.
There were political complications, too. The main reason for Turkey's initial 
reluctance to permit large number o f Iraqi Kurds to enter the country was the fragile 
situation on the Turkish side of the border. It was feared that influx o f Iraqi Kurdish 
refugees who might remain in Turkey for an undetermined time period, might have a 
radicalizing effect on Turkish Kurds too. Moreover, security problems were presented 
by the possibility o f infiltration by the PKK guerrillas into Turkey with the refuges, by 
the difficulty o f guarding and appeasing the highly-agitated refugees, and also by the 
possible resistance to the disarming o f the Iraqi Kurdish peshmergas before entering 
Turkey.
Therefore, Turkey initially seemed determined not to allow the Kurdish refugees 
to  cross the border. In her opposition, Turkey, internationally, played down the role o f
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political considerations, but raised the logistic and economic objections.1^  However, 
heart-rending plight o f the refugees, brought home every evening on the world's 
televisions, soon created an emotional response in the Western public opinion, which 
was reflected on to Turkey by means o f immense international and moral pressure to 
open her border and admit at least some o f the refugees. Although under pressure 
Turkey allowed some 20.000 refugees, mainly elderly, pregnant woman and children, to 
be moved gradually down to a tent-city at Silopi, she was still adamant not to allow 
others to move into further inside Turkey to the plains.17^ Turkey wanted them to 
move back to Iraq as soon as possible. However, they seemed most reluctant to do so 
because o f the fear from further Iraqi reappraisals. 171
At this juncture, President Ozal's call on the UN, on April 7, to establish "safe 
havens" in northern Iraq, to which the refuges could return, was a novel idea.17^ 
However, it also marked the beginning o f policy change in Turkey towards Iraqi Kurds 
and Kurdish question in general. As Turkey's hitherto firm commitment to preserve the 
status quo o f the region by opposing any sort o f partition o f the Iraqi territory seemed 
loosening, possible long-term political consequences o f this move began to be 
considered in Turkey in earnest. 175 Though the emergence o f some sort o f Kurdish 
enclave in Iraq seemed a little less dangerous than the arrival o f millions o f  Iraqi Kurds 
inside Turkey, her consent to the establishment o f "safe heavens" by the UN for the 
Kurds, that is no-go areas for the Iraqi security forces, on the other hand, implied the 
acceptance by Turkey o f the idea o f Kurdish autonomous region in northern Iraq, 
which, under the protection o f the UN, would have every opportunity to grow into a 
semi-independent Kurdish state. Therefore Turkey's initiative in the UN on behalf o f  
Kurdish refugees was met with cautious criticism in Turkish press.174 Although 
Turkey, realizing that, in the long-term, the idea o f "safe heavens" could eventually be 
turned in to a seminal internationally protected Kurdistan, tried to back down from the 
original idea in favour o f "temporary settlement areas",175 by then the idea was taken 
up first by British prime minister John Major, then the EC, and eventually by the US, 
which warned Iraq on April 10 not to operate any aircraft or helicopters, or engage in
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any military action on land, north o f the 36°* parallel.1^0 On the same day Turkey 
announced that her soldiers had crossed into Iraq to help control the refugees.1^  
Finally, towards the end o f April, about 17.000 coalition troops, with a mandate to 
establish a security zone in Iraq north o f the 3601 parallel, kicked off the "Operation 
Provide Comfort", and by the middle o f June all the refugees had returned to Iraq.1^8 
Thus from the Turkish perspective the humanitarian aspect o f the refugee crisis was 
successfully brought to a conclusion in a relatively short time.
As far as the short-term refugee problem was concerned, the Turkish policy
proved to be the right one. Despite the international pressures, Turkey, by refusing
entry to the refugees, was able to limit the immediate problems created by the mass
exodus to the border area. At the same time this brought media attention and
consequently Western intervention. Had the refugees moved into organized camps in
Turkey, then the international interest in them would have died out sooner and Turkey
would have had to suffer the long-term consequences o f a semi-permanent refugee
problem. To judge the success o f Turkish policy, it was enough to look at Iran, which
was still struggling to cope with about half a million refugees long after Turkey had
179diverted the problem away.
Turkey's handling of the refugee crisis also scored sa a personal success for 
President Ozal, whose imaginative and flexible approach to the issue at hand opened 
the way for a short-term solution .
The only drawback experienced by Turkey during the crisis was the 
indiscriminate criticism by the Western media o f Turkey's handling o f the refugees. 
While Turkey was stretched to the limits by the enormity o f the task at hand, the 
images o f Turkish officials and soldiers in the region as brutal and corrupt were 
circulated in the Western press.180 These, on the one hand, had a negative impact on 
Turkey's image in the world, and on the other, created a simultaneous outcry in Turkey 
to the effect that the West, especially the Europeans, while doing nothing to help, was 
picking on Turkey.181 Even the idea that the Europeans were especially blackening
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Turkeys image in order to make point for their refusal o f Turkish entry to the EC was 
aired in the national press.182
Another problem area was the eagerness o f Turkish officials to uphold the 
niceties o f Turkish sovereignty against the multinational force temporarily stationed in 
Turkey to help to the Operation Provide Comfort. Most o f the problems were caused 
by the !oopho!es in hastily drawn operation agreements between Turkey and various 
countries involved.
One particular incident that left a bitter after-taste in Turkey was the case o f a
Turkish provincial district sub-governor who was man-handled by the British troops
while he was investigating ail earlier accusation o f corruption among Turkish troops.
The opposition used the occasion to unleash a wave o f protest in the country and
criticised heavily both the "unruly attitudes" o f foreign troops in Turkey and the
1 83government's handling o f the matter. J "An autonomous region under the mandate of
the USA has come into being within our bordersV was the reaction o f TPP's vice-
184chairman, Mr. H. Cindoruk. Although the government tried to play down the 
incident, and the British marine unit that was involved was immediately ordered out of 
the country, the furore generated by the incident in the press and indeed among the 
public showed the need for delicacy while accepting foreign troops in Turkey.
However, the long-term political consequences o f the crisis were much more far 
reaching. In July 1991, "Operation Provide Comfort" was succeeded by "Operation 
Poised Hammer". Accordingly, coalition forces gradually withdrew from Iraq and 
replaced by a task force o f around 2.500,’ stationed at the Turkish border town of 
Silopi.185 Further, extra air power was added to already existing coalition forces at the 
Incirlik air base. The purpose o f this force was to inhibit Saddam Hussein from
launching further campaigns against the Kurds.
The establishment o f this force was received with suspicion in Turkey amid 
fears that it might compromise Turkish sovereignty or would lead to an independent 
Kurdistan.186 The idea o f new Western forces being based in Turkey was opposed by 
the opposition parties on the grounds that "while a Western reaction force might be the
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hammer, Turkey would end up being hit as the anvil".187 They also questioned 
whether these forces would drag Turkey into undesired cross-border military 
adventures, and accused the government o f disregarding Turkey's national interests for 
ambiguous aims.188 In addition, there were the anxieties felt by the Soviet Union to be 
considered. They were voiced by its Ambassador to Ankara in an interview with the 
daily Cumhuriyet July 18. Moscow was clearly worried about a force that had, in effect, 
been established in a somewhat arbitrary manner and outside control o f the UN. Given 
the volatile nature o f the Caucasus and the Baltics, Soviet policy-makers were clearly 
worried that this force may constitute an example that could be activated in the future 
against the Soviet Union. Moreover, Turkey had for years opposed a NATO, mainly 
US, idea o f setting up a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) in southeastern Turkey with 
out-of-area operations in mind. The new proposal thus appeared to set up exactly that 
force under different pretensions.
Although President Ozal, anxious to support the Western alliance, and to 
prevent any recurrence o f the huge flow o f refugees towards Turkey, had initially given 
a speedy green light to the force, the change o f government in July 1991 brought new 
attitude to foreign affairs, and indeed to the hegemonic relationship between the 
president and the prime minister. The new prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz, seemed 
prepared to use his powers against the president's attempts to dominate the country's 
policy-making and was also anxious not to give any opportunity to the opposition to 
charge him with being weak on national security.
Turkey was undoubtedly worried about a repetition o f the refugee crisis as the 
negotiations between Kurdish leaders and Saddam Hussein were going nowhere. In this 
sense, Turkey had an interest in seeing that the refugee crisis or a similar crisis did not 
reemerge. Thus, the logic o f a deterrent force against Saddam Hussein could be 
understood in Ankara, but there was also a separate logic dictated by the sensitivities of 
Turkish public opinion. These stemmed from the not-so pleasant experience the last 
time round when allied troops came in to help the Kurdish refugees. The fact that, as 
mentioned earlier, the hastily-worked arrangements had subsequently caused problems
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o f sovereignty, resulted in the General Staffs insistence that this time the military 
aspects o f  the operation should be worked out very precisely beforehand.180 This 
meant restricting the number o f troops to arrive in Turkey, determining how long they 
would stay and under whose command they would come.
Thus, after stalling some time on the grounds that the new government needed 
to  obtain a vote o f confidence before taking any decision, on July 5, a Turkish foreign 
ministry statement indicated that Turkey would give the green light soon. However, it 
also emphasized that Turkish troops would be joining the force and they would not 
engage in any operations beyond Turkish borders. Moreover, there were disagreements 
about the size o f the force, and claims in the press that the government was trying to 
put the final decision off long enough to avoid possible US pressure on Cyprus which 
might be raised during the forthcoming visit from President Bush on July 20-21.100
Nevertheless, while the last Western troops were withdrawn from Northern Iraq
on July 15, prime minister Yilmaz agreed in principle to the force on July 18. But,
under the mounting criticism from the opposition parties for "compromising the
country's sovereignty", he felt necessary to stress that the force would be under Turkish
control, that cross-border operations must receive the government's permission, and
that it would only be allowed to stay until the end o f September.191 On the same day
an official note was also delivered to the countries participating in Operation Poised
Hammer, stressing again that the open approval of the Turkish government would have
to be sought if force was to be used against Iraq from Turkish territory, and that
without such approval, the force would "under no circumstances" be able to use
192Turkish soil, air space or territorial waters for belligerence against Iraq. ^ Moreover, 
Turkey was to contribute to the force by sending an undisclosed number o f troops 
under the control o f a Turkish commander whose status would be equal to that o f the 
coalition forces' commander and would be in constant consultation and cooperation
with him.
Hence, towards the end o f July 1991, the above-mentioned task force was 
established according to Turkish conditions. Though the ground troops stationed at
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Silopi were gradually withdrawn during the Autumn o f 1991,193 the special air 
detachment at Incirlik was retained, and its mandate was renewed by the Turkish 
parliament in six-monthly instalments up to now (June 1994). However, every time the 
renewal was due, another round o f controversy took place in Turkey about the "real 
purpose" o f this force. Accusations were brought against the force to the effect that it 
was providing logistic and armed support to the Kurds in Iraq and that some o f this aid 
had ended up in the hands o f the PKK guerrillas who used them in terrorist activities 
against Turkey.19^ Moreover, as the semi-autonomous Kurdish regime in northern Iraq 
moved towards semi-independence, the purpose o f this force and the still existing UN 
security zone were questioned from the point of view of whether these were helping to 
create an independent Kurdish state in the region, which might eventually contest 
Turkey's borders, too, thus present the further security threats to her.193
However, it should not be forgotten that thanks to the existence o f the security
thzone in the north o f 36l parallel, Turkey's security forces were able to enter Iraqi 
territory and conduct operations against her own secessionist Kurdish guerrillas, 
without being actually contested by Iraq. O f course, it must also be noted that in the 
absence o f law and order, this area provides a suitable nesting ground for PKK 
guerillas, who operate cross-border raids info Turkey before withdrawing back to Iraq. 
Moreover, there is a strong suspicion in Turkey that the Iraqi regime, since the end of 
the crisis, has been actively arming and encouraging PKK guerrillas.196
In the mean time, Turkish policies towards the Kurdish question, including both 
the relations with the Iraqi Kurds and the discontent among her own Kurdish minority, 
were affected by these developments in the region and by the continuing campaign o f
attacks by the PKK guerrillas.
As mentioned above, the PKK inevitably exploited the collapse o f Iraqi power 
in northern Iraq to consolidate itself there. Moreover, as a result o f rapprochement in 
Turkish-Syrian relations, and that country's wish to be dropped from the terrorist- 
backing countries list, the PKK was forced to move most o f its forces into Iraq where it 
found support from Saddam's regime and more importantly a secure place to operate
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from. This prompted several Turkish air-raids, and ground-troops incursions into Iraq, 
which attracted international condemnation and created uneasiness among other 
regional powers about Turkish intentions in the region.197 Both Iran and Syria were 
suspicious o f Turkey's intentions about the local hegemony by playing trustee to the 
Iraqi Kurds. In order to soothe their fears and dispel their suspicions, Turkish envoys 
were dispatched to both Iran and Syria to explain the situation. Later on representatives 
o f  the three countries met in Ankara on November 14, 1992, to confirm their desire to 
keep Iraqi territory intact.198
At the same time Turkey's policies towards Iraqi Kurds were shaped by both
international interest in their fate and by Turkey's own Kurdish problem. In the
aftermath o f the Gulf Crisis, Turkish leaders gradually realized the importance of
differentiating Kurdish discontent in Turkey from that o f the Iraqi Kurds, whose
aspirations had already acquired international backing, thus could not be prevented.
Moreover, the isolation o f the PKK from the Iraqi Kurdish organizations was also
important in order to deny them the logistic back-up and secure retreat in northern Iraq.
As a result a dialogue was established with the Iraqi Kurdish groups. In this turn of
events, president Ozal's personal involvement was an important, if hot crucial, factor.
When he announced on his way to a state visit to Moscow on March 11, 1991 that
Turkish officials had already held a meeting with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders at his own
discretion, he created a considerable uproar in the country.199 To the astonishment o f
journalists, who asked the reasons for such a dramatic move, he said he wanted their
friendship.200 This contact, expectedly, provoked a howl o f outrage from the
mainstream opposition parties. Both Demirel and Inonu accused Ozal o f breaking faith
with the country's Kemalist tradition by interfering in the internal affairs o f another
country.201 However the close involvement o f both the foreign ministry and the
National Intelligence in the process showed that this time the bastions o f Kemalism
were also thinking along the same lines as the president. Moreover, Ozal reportedly
countered the interference accusations by arguing that in effect everybody was
202interfering in the internal affairs of Iraq at the moment.
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The fact that president Ozal had initiated contact with the Iraqi Kurds by 
exchanging messages with PUK leader Jalal Talabani back in late February, when the 
outcome o f the war in the Gulf became clear and the calculations for the post-war Iraq 
had started, suggests that his main aim was to have a say in the forthcoming 
developments in northern Iraq by befriending the Iraqi Kurds.20**
It appeared that the president, rightly calculating that some sort o f Kurdish 
entity was going to be established in the northern Iraq as a result o f Gulf War and 
following western interest in the fate o f the Kurds, preferred this to happen under 
Turkish influence. Further, it seemed, he expected to prevent any further inter-action 
between PKK guerrillas and Iraqi peshmergas, and to affect developments in the region 
by playing the role o f protector to the Iraqi Kurds. Moreover, in this way Turkey might 
have been better placed to dissuade the Iraqi Kurds from moving towards establishing 
an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.20^ And if that turned out not to be 
possible, and that Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq became a fait accompli, then it 
was much better to be "a guest at the celebrations than a sour onlooker".20  ^ Further, it 
was argued that by strengthening her position with the Iraqi Kurds, Turkey was also 
strengthening her ability, if a need or opportunity arose, to occupy the oil fields of 
Kirkuk and Mousul. As put by Olson, "in short, it could very well be Turkey's position
OC\f%that if it's going to have a Kurdish problem, it may as well have it with oil". ° 
Whether this was in Ozal's mind is an arguable point, but one thing was clear that about 
60% o f Turkey's oil imports were from northern Iraq before the war, and thus Ozal 
wanted to position Turkey to be able to exercise a greater influence and achieve greater 
access to the oil fields in northern Iraq. Moreover, if Turkey could forge a fruitful 
relationship with Iraq's Kurds, in the longer term, it would counterbalance the influence 
Iran was trying to  exert through the Shi'ites in the South. Hence, Turkey joined the 
regional power politics over Kurds. It appeared that Turkey's "active" Gulf Crisis policy 
had developed into one o f not being a by-stander regarding the future o f Iraq. The 
contact also indicated that Ozal's earlier alleviation o f the language ban on Kurdish was
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indeed a gesture toward international opinion and Kurdish opinion beyond Turkey's 
borders rather than towards Turkey's own Kurdish minority.
In fact, this modest beginning marked an uneasy, but at the same time 
compelling, partnership between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds, in which Turkey supplied 
humanitarian aid to the Iraqi Kurds and presumably supported the idea o f enhanced 
Kurdish autonomy within Iraq, and the Iraqi Kurds in return refrained from helping the 
PKK, if not collaborating openly with the Turkish security forces.202 Although this 
was not an ideal solution for Turkey, it was the next best thing through which the two 
Kurdish peoples and issues (Iraqi and Turkish) were successfully separated from each 
other without further interaction. As a result of this mutually benefiting situation, this 
partnership, despite the widespread misgivings and suspicions in Turkey and faltering of 
especially Barzanian forces from time to time in their helpful attitude towards Turkey, 
appears to have been able to survive up till now (June 94).20**
Finally, in addition to the growing militancy o f the PKK, the continued 
international interest and spotlight over the whole Kurdish issue, provoked by the Iraqi 
Kurdish refugee problem which was a by-product o f the Gulf War, also forced Turkey's 
hands to make some dramatic moves towards her own Kurdish minority. In these, the 
imagination and personal involvement o f President Ozal were again the driving forces. 
Realizing that Turkey's Kurdish problem had grown to a point where it demanded 
immediate resolution and had become impossible to isolate from external interests and 
influences, and believing that Turkey had to solve its own Kurdish problem, which was 
becoming an obstacle for Turkish-European rapprochement, in order to take up its 
place within the new world order, President Ozal took the initiative with a succession 
o f gestures towards the Kurds. Thus the ban on speaking Kurdish was repealed on 
January 25. Moreover, he opened up discussion about giving more cultural rights to 
Kurds, allowing Kurdish TV, etc., and finally declared that "I am definitely going to 
solve the Kurdish problem. This will be the last service I perform for my nation"209
The timing o f the reforms implied that the Gulf War, or rather the peace talks 
after it, were the main motive for the the president's move. He seemed keenly aware o f
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the possibility that the Kurdish question would come up at any comprehensive peace 
conference. And preventing the formation o f an independent Kurdish state in post-war 
Iraq, which would clearly threaten Turkey's security, seemed the priority. It was noted 
that if Turkey had not moved to reform its bad Kurdish record, she would hardly have 
been given a chance to speak about the Kurds' future at the peace ta lk s210 Thus, the 
reform was the least Turkey had to do if it was to present itself as a credible guarantor 
for a prospective settlement in northern Iraq.
In the mean time, though there was ho constitutional change in his position, the 
Motherland Party's defeat in the October 1991 general elections cost President Ozal the 
parliamentary support, and thus his ability to affect daily governmental policies, as he 
had been doing effectively since his elevation to the presidency, was sharply reduced.
Nevertheless, the new coalition government, formed by TPP and SDPP, 
brought new hopes to the fore.211 Though it was emphasized that Turkish would 
remain the sole official language and Turkey would be preserved as a unitary state, new 
cultural rights for the Kurdish minority, including freedom to issue books and 
newspapers in Kurdish and the promise to establish a Kurdish cultural institute, were 
granted.212 As prime minister Demirel put it, Turkey "now speaks o f the Kurdish 
identity", and since it was impossible to oppose this, Turkey must "recognize the 
Kurdish reality".212
Furthermore, during his visit to southeastern Turkey, where the PKK has been 
most active, Prime Minister Demirel gave indications that Turkey's policies towards the 
whole Kurdish issue were changing as her view on her own Kurdish minority was 
evolving. While talking to journalists, he stated that
...the people in the south-east are our brothers, the people in northern Iraq are 
their brothers and ought to be our brothers too. ...Turkey was just a bystander 
in the past when faced with events in northern Iraq. For instance, there was the 
Halabja incident. We said "that's outside our frontiers, it's nothing to do with 
us". This policy ought to change. Turkey's new policy should be as follows: if 
Baghdad commits another barbarity in northern Iraq, it will find us opposing
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Although he did not mention any specific way o f "opposing" Baghdad, his remarks 
were indicative o f some changes in official thinking vis-a-vis the Kurdish problem and 
non-involvement in regional intra-state conflicts. In the past Turkey used to regard this 
kind o f "incident", as the prime minister called it, as an internal matter o f the country 
concerned. Now he was saying that Turkey was going to make them her interest too. In 
his press conference on December 11, 1991, Demirel further warned Iraqi president 
Saddam Hussein that any attempt to attack Kurds o f Iraq would be countered by 
Turkey: "That would irritate us a lot, I don't think that it can be called a domestic 
affair...Definitely we'll not sit and watch".212 Although too much significance should 
not be attached to the prime minister's words, for these seemed to be directed more to 
the domestic audience, it was interesting to see that, after all the opposition he put 
against so-called "Ozal's vision", finally even Demirel himself found it necessary to talk 
about the need to change Turkish Foreign Policy. This more "pragmatic" approach 
towards the Kurdish issue in particular and towards the Middle Eastern affairs in 
general seemed to stem from the realization o f the fact that Turkey could not pretend 
any more as if these problems were non-existent or would go away without affecting 
Turkey if she waited long enough, while they usually don't go away and fundamentally 
affect Turkey's interests in the region.
M ost importantly, as far as the post-crisis Middle East was concerned, Turkey 
had to come to terms with the fact that Saddam Hussein, as predicted and feared by the 
"traditionalists" all along, was left in power in Baghdad, and Turkey, after the 
withdrawal o f Coalition forces, had to, like it or not, live with him.216 Moreover, the 
Iraqi Kurdistan was still very much in a political limbo and presented a security threat 
to  Turkey. As the feasibility of an agreement between the Iraqi regime in Baghdad and 
Iraqi Kurdish leadership was disappearing quickly, Turkey again, like it or not, had to 
accept the fact that she had to contend with a semi-independent Kurdish entity in
northern Iraq, at least in the medium-term.
According to Turkey's calculations about the post-crisis Middle East, this was, 
without a doubt, not an ideal option. In a perfect world, Turkey, after she had behaved
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as she did during the crisis, would have liked to see the overthrow o f Saddam's regime 
in favour o f a broadly representative democratic one in which the Iraqi Kurds - and 
Turcomans - would enjoy full participation and a degree o f cultural autonomy, without 
o f course a territorial autonomy or p a r t i t i o n . T h u s  Turkey was extremely uneasy to 
see the emergence o f a de-facto Kurdish government in northern Iraq in the Spring o f 
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However, as the existing world is not a "perfect" one, Turkey, given the 
circumstances, appeared to accept the reality o f a de-facto Kurdish state in northern 
Iraq, at least for the time being, and seemed willing to maintain a working relationship 
with its leaders. However, Turkey's condition for the durability o f this relationship was 
continued cooperation o f the Iraqi Kurdish leadership with Turkey on her struggle 
against the PKK terrorism. The Kurdish leaders, on the other hand, appeared to realize 
that their position in northern Iraq was heavily dependent on Turkish goodwill, not 
least because all the supplies to the area had to come via Turkey. In addition, Turkey 
was the dominant power in the region, one which had interests in developments taking 
place in northern Iraq, and whose willingness and ability to pursue her interests in the 
Iraqi Kurdistan had been demonstrated by frequent incursions o f her armed forces. 
Moreover, they also appeared to realize the fact that the only reason keeping Saddam 
Hussein from launching another onslaught tpwards Kurds was the enforcement o f UN 
security zone in the north of 3 6 ^  parallel by the coalition task force, stationed at the 
Incirlik air base, whose existence was entirely depenent on Turkey's goodwill and 
cooperation.
Hence, in return for the continuance of Turkey's existing policy, Iraqi Kurds
generally denied support to the PKK and did not forward any claim on "greater
Kurdistan". However, neither Turkey's recognition o f the "Kurdish reality", without
actually offering anything substantial, nor the collaboration o f the Iraqi Kurds with her
were likely to brake down the PKK campaign, which, together with Turkish counter-
219measures, claimed the lives of more than 11.000 people in the ten years after 1984.
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6. Reappraisal
Turkish foreign policy during the Gulf Crisis reflected the existence, or at least 
emergence, o f a new thinking shaping its fundamentals. Although the Crisis had 
presented Turkey with difficult policy choices and at the end raised more questions than 
it answered, it, admittedly, had brought about potentially important changes into 
Turkey's role in the Middle East and forced Turkish leaders to admit the necessity of 
broader changes in Turkish foreign policy.
Furthermore, the Gulf War proved that it was almost impossible for Turkey to 
isolate itself from the influences o f outside changes and developments, especially from 
those taking place in the immediate vicinity o f Turkey. In this context, the crisis forced 
Turkish leaders to open their eyes to the reality that Turkey, like it or not, was an 
important actor in the Middle Eastern politics, and she could not go on pretending 
otherwise. In fact, the increasing interaction between some o f Turkey's internal 
problems and her external relations in the. Middle East - i.e. the Kurdish question, 
Islamic fundamentalism, and so on - and her growing economic interest in the region 
during the 1980s had already forced Turkey to break the shell, o f her traditional 
isolation in the region and to seek more active involvement in Middle Eastern affairs. 
The Gulf War, in this context, only highlighted this reality and helped to broaden the 
base o f change in Turkish foreign policy. Also, by crystalising the need to adopt a more 
active and flexible policy towards the Middle East - and indeed towards the whole of 
international affairs in general - the crisis enlarged the number o f  people arguing for a 
change.
In addition, the Gulf Crisis further enabled Turkey to re-emphasize her strategic 
position vis-a-vis Western interests in the region. As mentioned earlier, just before the 
crisis, in security terms, Turkey was feeling very vulnerable because o f perceived 
indifference o f the Western powers towards her security needs, mainly in the Middle 
East and the Caucasus. The Gulf Crisis reminded the West that, even though the Cold 
War was over, Turkey was still located in one of the most strategic locations in the
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World. As demonstrated by the Crisis, her cooperation was essential for the protection 
o f  Western interests in the Middle East. The Crisis and following developments in the 
region proved that even without a Soviet threat, Turkey, with her influence over 
regional balances, continued to hold an important place in the Alliance against the 
threat from the Southeast. Realization o f this fact put Turkey on a new and more 
secure footing with the West, especially with the US.
However, the crisis also reminded Turkey that she was in the middle o f major 
changes that were taking place all around her; in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the 
Middle East. These were the major centres o f change and insecurity in the emerging 
"new world order" and Turkey was right in the middle o f this volatile and unstable 
region. In this context, the Gulf War left the region as dangerous for Turkish interests 
as it had been before the Crisis, if not more. This fact again crystalized the need for 
Turkey o f to formulate a fairly complex, flexible and imaginative approach to foreign 
policy.
Moreover, the response o f NATO members to Turkey's request for deployment 
o f Alliance forces in Turkish territory against possible Iraqi attack was not entirely 
reassuring for the future dependability of NATO regarding possible subsequent out of 
area crisis. The extent of the debate within each country about the necessity and the 
wisdom of getting involved in protecting Turkey even by a symbolic force was quite 
significant. Further, when the force was eventually deployed, its mandate required a 
strictly limited response if it was attacked. Had Turkey been attacked, it was necessary 
to obtain another decision o f NATO's central committee to respond. This reluctance 
and bickering to commit forces, of course, raised suspicions in Turkey about what 
NATO's European allies would do in the future if Turkey was subjected to a threat 
from the South.
Furthermore, Turkey's strategic importance to the West was highlighted during 
the Crisis from the perspective o f her proximity to developments in the Middle East, an 
out o f area for NATO purposes, not in European theatre as it had been so far. This, 
together with the developments in the Caucasus, has brought into mind the possibility
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that Turkeys posture within the Atlantic Alliance might be linked in the future 
increasingly with her out o f area role. This was clearly in the mind o f Richard Burt, 
American Assistant Secretary o f State for European Affairs, when he remarked that 
...the Turks...can be very useful, particularly as NATO as an alliance has to look 
beyond its existing boundaries and worry about the extent to which Western interests 
are at stake in so-called third areas, like the Middle East...like the Persian G ulf'.22- It 
was obvious that in the absence o f permanent Western military bases in the Gulf, 
Western powers have to continue to rely on Turkey's strategic proximity to the region 
for access to the Gulf and beyond.222 This geo-strategic location, o f course, meant 
that Turkey had to be put at the forefront o f any Western plans for conventional 
military engagements in the region.
However, it was almost certain that Turkey would not be entirely happy with 
either being asked to play a new role as a buffer against the "third areas" or change her 
posture within NATO to be more concerned with the Middle East than previously. This 
was something that Turkey had been trying to avoid for a long time, as had been 
demonstrated by her continual negative response to the stationing o f NATO's Rapid 
Deployment Force in her territory with out o f area mandate. There was no reason now 
to assume that Turkey would be willing to accept that role, especially when she had 
doubts about European intentions regarding her Europeanness.
During the hectic days of the crisis, which pressed Turkey for practical thinking 
and urgent responses, some o f the most basic principles o f traditional Turkish foreign 
policy had been challenged and decisions were taken mainly by President Ozal without 
any regard for them.223 His confident, risk-taking and high-profile style had replaced 
the cautiousness o f traditional approach o f foreign ministry bureaucrats. His handling of 
the Gulf Crisis was so fundamentally different from the usual Turkish style that this 
immediately brought speculations about the possibility o f broader changes in Turkish 
foreign policy. In this context, President Ozal's television address to the nation, 
delivered on March 2, 1991 just after the cease-fire in the Gulf, contained important 
hints about what was expected in the foreign policy by the revisionists:
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As I always reiterated, my conviction is that Turkey should leave its former 
passive and hesitant policies and engage in an active foreign policy. The reason 
I made this call is because we are a powerful country in the region. Let me also 
point out that there are conservatives who prefer that no change should be 
made to these passive policies. The reason these circles accuse me o f dragging 
the country into an adventure is because I  generally prefer to pursue a more
dynamic policy for our country.
Although the speech was interesting in terms o f showing the distance that Turkish 
foreign policy travelled during the Gulf Crisis, it, nevertheless, did not mention any 
specific action to be taken to implement this "active and dynamic" foreign policy stand.
It was also argued that the dynamism showed by Turkish foreign policy during 
the Gulf Crisis owed more, on the one hand, to the style and personality o f Turgut 
Ozal, and, on the other, to the special circumstances o f the Crisis than to a more 
general change in attitudes towards external relations o f the country. Thus it was 
argued that the country and her foreign policy would revert back to the old style and 
principles once President Ozal moved out o f the way and the circumstances turned to 
normal.
However, the following developments in Turkey proved otherwise: Turkey had
moved beyond a point o f no-retum in her foreign and domestic policies as far as
fundamental changes were concerned. It should also be noted here that, as asserted in
Chapter 5/7, since most o f the criticism directed against president Ozal stemmed largely
from the general distrust o f his personalized and single-handed style in conducting
governmental affairs rather than his "vision", the October 1991 election, which ended
the hegemony o f Ozal over Turkey's policy making, considerably lessened the
00 s
resistance to his ideas and change in Turkish foreign policy. This was also true for 
Turkey's Gulf crisis policy. Again, as argued in chapter 5/7 it was quite improbable that 
Turkey would follow any other course apart from giving unequivocal support to the 
coalition forces. Thus, once the dominant role that Ozal had played in domestic and 
foreign policies was brought to end by the October 1991 elections, it became much 
more easy for most people to consider his ideas and vision in a new light. This helped 
to consolidate the "revisionists" arguments regarding foreign policy. Although, after the
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formation o f a new government under the premiership o f veteran Suleyman Demirel, 
the more cautious, responsible" and probably more "dignified" style o f traditional 
Turkish foreign policy returned to the fore, it was, nevertheless, obvious that the 
substance o f the changes started during the War were irreversible. However, whether 
these changes would lead Turkey to a place where President Ozal would have wanted 
to  lead the country is another matter, and much depends on the fulfilment o f Turkish 
expectations in the mid to long term from her highly visible stand during the Gulf Crisis.
The Gulf Crisis also had an effect on the development o f Turkey's nascent 
democracy. During the Crisis, President Ozal, as demonstrated through this chapter, 
transformed the government, for all purposes, from a parliamentary to a presidential- 
style system. Although his somewhat enthusiastic grasp o f the role o f a war-time 
Commander in Chief and his, at best, indifferent attitude towards constitutional bodies 
created widespread criticism in the country, he was protected by presidential immunity 
on the one hand and the acquiescence o f the government and the Mot.P on the other.
From the beginning of the Crisis, he emerged as one o f the key players both 
internationally and domestically. From the international perspective, all attention was 
focused on him when dealing with Turkish position in the Crisis. He was the only 
person addressed by foreign leaders and questioned by the Western media. However, in 
the process the prime minister and the foreign minister, who were, according to the 
constitution, responsible for Turkey's actions, were reduced to playing supporting roles. 
This only added to the already existing criticism in opposition circles and the press. 
However, it was obvious that Ozal liked the attention he was getting from international 
circles, which he successfully diverted to accelerate his effective takeover o f the powers 
that are normally attached to the presidency in a fully-fledged presidential systems.
The role o f the Turkish parliament in the whole affair was also strongly debated. 
The president did not seem to have considered consulting the only representatives of 
the nation while adopting a crucial role on their behalf. Instead, the opposition parties 
had to gather signatures in order to bring parliament out o f recess - and despite the fact 
that there was an imminent crisis at hand, it was not until August 12 that the meeting
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took place. It was evident that with the daily changes in the Gulf, anything could have 
happened by. This alone showed how much influence the Turkish parliament had on 
national policy-making.
Leaving parliament aside, there was the question o f whether Ozal had even 
consulted with the Cabinet before taking major decisions, such as the closing o f the 
pipeline or the imposition of trade sanctions. Moreover, there were further speculations 
whether Ozal even bothered to consult with the Crisis Management Committee that he 
himself had established as they, too, appeared unaware o f the decision to shut down the 
pipelines.
Thus, Ozal's de facto presidential system seemed to develop to the point at 
which decisions on major national issues, which could bear dramatic consequences for 
the whole country, were taken apparently without consultation and certainly not 
through normal channels. The most important aspect o f all this was the hurried manner 
and enthusiasm with which the government on orders from the president allowed the 
country to drift to a position where she was simply placed face to face with the 
prospect o f war at a time when she was neither ready for it nor desired it.
Ozal's hard-line position against Iraq during the Crisis was, as mentioned earlier, 
primarily designed to highlight Turkey's importance to Western strategic interest and 
security concerns in the Middle East. More narrowly, Ozal was aiming to reaffirm 
Turkey's commitment to US-Turkish bilateral relations in order to get more support 
from the US on wide-ranging issues.226 Specifically, he expected greater access to US 
markets for Turkish exports, an increase in military assistance, help for the 
modernization o f the Turkish armed forces, the expansion o f the strategic relationship 
between the two countries, and US support for Turkish expectations in Europe. In 
addition, putting Turkey back on the world strategic map, he expected to relieve 
growing pressure on Turkey from Greece in the Aegean and Cyprus and to raise 
Turkey's profile in the US to defeat the perennial pro-Armenian bills in Congress and to 
break the 7/10 ratio in American aid to Greece and Turkey. Moreover, he expected 
that, as mentioned above, Turkey's Western European NATO allies would be
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appreciative enough o f the Turkish contribution to reconsider her application for 
admission to the EC.
Initially, Ozal's uncompromising stance against Iraq during the Crisis enhanced 
Turkeys and his stature in Western capitals. As he stressed in a live television news 
conference, to get the same fillip for Turkey's international image through the 
advertising agencies she had employed would have cost the country millions. Thus "if 
the Gulf Crisis had not happened, Turkey might have wanted to invent i t " .^ ^
In this context, especially, Turkish-US relations reached a new level of 
understanding after the crisis. Appreciating the role Turkey played during the Crisis, the
US doubled Turkey's textile quota and provided to her with a $282 million additional
99J?assistance for 1991. Though this was a far cry from writing-off her total debt to the
US, as it was the case with Egypt's $7 billion loan, an action which left the Turks bitter,
the initial American help in various other areas was, nevertheless, satisfactory. Apart
from being instrumental in securing the purchase o f 40 Turkish-manufactured F-16 by
Egypt, the American government also took a leading role in arranging the Gulf Crisis
Financial Coordinating Group's $4 billion aid pledge to Turkey as well as persuading
799the Gulf states to contribute $2.5 billion to the Turkish Defense Fund. Moreover, 
the US was also effective in release o f delayed World Bank credits that totalled $1.4 
billion.230
However, Ozal's expectations regarding his other objectives in the Gulf Crisis 
were not fulfilled. As mentioned earlier, Turkey expected a warmer response from the 
EC to her request for closer association and eventual membership. By joining the 
Americans under the UN flag in Korea, Turkey had earlier worked her way into 
NATO. It was hoped that something similar might have happened again, regarding the 
EC. However, the European attitude toward Turkey's EC - and WEU - membership did 
not change after the war. Although the Western Europeans expressed their appreciation 
for Turkey's Gulf policy, there was no sign o f willingness in Europe towards 
accommodating Turkey on the issue of closer economic and political ties. If  anything, 
the European doors were even more firmly closed to Turkey after the Crisis than they
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had ever been before. The main obstacle that emerged from the Crisis and Turkey's role
in the Allied coalition was the belief that Turkey was an important and dependable
Middle Eastern ally. It may seem ironic and probably ungrateful in the face o f Turkey's
sacrifices in holding the coalition intact, but- it pretty certainly emerged that, as the EC
moved to develop a common security policy, the European countries seemed
increasingly unwilling to accept the additional burden o f an exposure in the Middle 
231East. This unwillingness to be embroiled in a Middle Eastern conflict was amply
demonstrated by the reluctance showed by NATO's European partners to participate in
a symbolic NATO force that Turkey requested against a possible attack from Iraq
during the Gulf Crisis. It appeared, in the words o f former premier Bulent Ecevit, that
"Turkey's Western allies want Turkey to be a pro-Western and modernized Middle
Eastern power rather than a European power situated in the Middle East".232
Furthermore, Turkey's expectations of becoming part o f a wider Middle Eastern
security arrangement were not realized either, mainly because o f Arab suspicions.
Although the desirability o f Turkey's participation in a "security role" in the region was
arguable,233 President Ozal, nonetheless, was keen to obtain a wider role for Turkey in
the Gulf when he declared in March 1991 that "nothing will happen in the region
without us being involved". Despite the fact that Turkish policy traditionally and
instinctively sought to avoid any perception o f playing the role o f US vigilante in the
region, Ozal also added that the US should also be present, or else this force would not
234be able to keep the peace".
Although it was suggested that Turkey could play an important role as a model 
for other countries in the region, with her democratic and secular traditions as well,as 
her liberal economy, Ozal's anticipation that for the "first time in 200 years Turkey had 
managed to be on the winning side o f a war" and therefore could reap some benefits 
from it was not to be realized.235 As an early indication o f what was coming, Turkey 
was not included in the post-war Damascus meeting where the six Arab Gulf states, 
Syria, and Egypt set forth new future peace-keeping forces in the region in the 
"Damascus Declaration" 236 Further, when the time came to hold a more
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comprehensive peace conference, she was not invited, even as an observer, to the 
Madrid peace talks between Israel and the PLO either, let alone host them as she had
997
volunteered. Moreover, Turkey had to cancel a planned meeting on November 
1991 to discuss the water issue in the region and her "peace-pipeline" initiative, a 
subject which was referred to by Ozal as a "supplementary element o f peace", because 
o f unwillingness o f the Arab countries to attend.238
During this period, Turkey's suggestion that some sort o f a process comparable
to the CSCE could be established in the Middle East to oversee the establishment of
general security and stability in the region was also received with suspicion by the Arab 
239countries. The traditional suspicions of the Arab world towards Turkish intentions 
in the region were heightened by the way which the government over-enthusiastically 
responded to US request to open up her air-fields for the use o f the Coalition forces 
against Iraq, an Arab country for all its transgression.. Thus by allowing Iraq to be hit 
from her soil, Turkey perhaps inevitably lost any potential chance o f playing the role o f 
mediator, as Iran was able to do, and also invited Arab suspicions to be developed in 
the long-term. Whatever the reasons and the prevailing conditions behind her action 
were - and also despite the truth that Saudi Arabia, too, opened up its soil to Coalition 
forces - the simple fact that Turkey allowed her territory to be used in a Middle Eastern 
context could well be interpreted by the Arab world as setting a precedent, once the 
immediate circumstances, which placed Turkey on the same side as most Arab states, 
had been forgotten.
More significantly perhaps, the post-war developments in Iraq deviated sharply 
from President Ozal's best-case scenario. The failure o f the allied coalition to remoye 
Saddam Hussein from power and dismantle his regime was particularly worrisome to 
Ankara. N ot only did the Iraqi leader and his regime remain intact, but the Gulf War 
also vastly complicated Turkey's Kurdish problem. First, the Turks had to deal with the 
massive influx o f Kurdish refugees following the collapse o f the Kurdish revolt in 
northern Iraq. Then, in an attempt to prevent the flow o f refugees into Turkey, Ankara 
supported the creation o f a de facto Kurdish controlled zone near the Turkish-Iraqi
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border under the supervision of the allied forces. It is one o f the ironies that sprung out 
o f  this Crisis that whilst one o f the rewards Turkey claimed from the West for her 
support o f the Coalition forces was a promise that no Kurdish state would be 
established in her southern border, she ended up with supporting the creation o f an 
Kurdish entity in northern Iraq which developed into a de facto state. Lastly, the 
Turkish government faced a growing problem in its attempts to control the PKK's 
violent campaign in southeastern Turkey, which received arms and supply from the 
Iraqi regime as a retaliation for the support Turkey had given to the Coalition forces 
during the Crisis. Moreover, the refugee crisis which broke soon after the defeat o f the 
Iraqi army took away in one stroke what credibility Turkey may have gained as a result 
o f  the Gulf Crisis because o f the massive negative publicity that she got on this score in 
the Western media. Not to mention much talk o f an independent Kurdistan, the 
geographical outline o f which was shown on Western media in detail, with borders 
which took in a large chunk of Eastern Turkey.
Finally, the internationalization of the Kurdish issue encouraged the Turkish 
Kurds into further political activism and accelerated PKK violence. Further the Allied 
humanitarian efforts to help the Kurdish refugees in the aftermath o f the crisis set a 
precedent for challenging the principle o f international law concerning state 
sovereignty. While the coalition forces were intervening on humanitarian grounds to 
protect a minority population from its state, the grounds were being laid for similar 
future cases. Given the challenging position o f Kurdish resurgence in Turkey, this 
precedent was certainly a worrying development for Turkey.
Despite these imperfect aspects, as far as the regional power game and 
hegemony are concerned, the Gulf War, at the same time, created an opportunity for 
Turkey to establish an influence in northern Iraq that she had not usually enjoyed. Quite 
significantly her entry into regional power politics was not opposed, if not supported, 
by Western powers, especially the US, which considered Turkey as a pro-Western and 
loyal local ally with a strong interest in regional stability, a suitable counter-balance to 
possible hegemonic aspirants in the region. Moreover, as explained above, the Iraqi
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Kurds, too, had to accept Turkey's dominance in the region as she controlled vital 
lifelines and in the process "became more dependent on Turkey than Iraq as the latter 
moved to impose an economic embargo" against them .^^T his, in turn, increased 
Turkey's leverage against Iraq and thus her weight in regional affairs.
The extent o f Turkey's influence in the region, o f course, had its limitations. 
First o f all, being directly involved in the affairs o f some three million Kurds in northern 
Iraq in addition to some twelve million of her own, was a mixed-blessing. It carried 
within it the seeds o f instability for the region, and Turkey, in this context, had to 
contain and control the Kurdish nationalist movements both in Iraq and in Turkey, as 
the two became increasingly inter-active and a Kurdish;, state or even a fully
autonomous region in northern Iraq had an irresistible appeal to the Kurds in
941Turkey. Moreover, although it was argued that Turkey's biggest gain from the
949Crisis was the destruction o f Iraqi power for the time being, this, as far as regional 
balance o f power was concerned, could hardly be considered as serving Turkish 
interests exclusively as Iran and Syria, too, benefited from Iraq's weakness, which 
opened the way for their hegemonic drives in the region.
Furthermore, the Gulf Crisis also clearly demonstrated the importance o f water 
in the regional balance o f power. The discussion over the possible cut-off o f the Iraqi 
water supply by Turkey, as mentioned earlier, showed the almost "exclusive privilege" 
that Turkey possessed in the region. However, the Crisis also showed that this was a 
privilege which Turkey was extremely reluctant to use. While she quite easily resolved 
herself, despite the economic disadvantages,* to shut down two Iraqi oil pipelines, when 
it came to impeding the flow of the Euphrates river into Iraq, she resisted various 
innuendos - and open calls - in the western media. Besides the physical and political 
difficulties in contemplating such an act and the fact that the river passes through Syria 
first, which would be affected from any cut more than Iraq, the clarification o f Mr. 
Kamran Inan, State Minister responsible for GAP project, strikingly revealed the 
difference between oil and  water; "when we stop the oil, we stop the engines , he said,
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"but when we stop the water, we stop life"243 This power, too, o f  course, increased 
Turkey's influence in the region.
On the economic side, also, Turkey's expectations were not realized. Although,
there was much talk o f Turkish participation in the reconstruction o f war-torn
K u w a i t , ^ 4  most o f the projects were already promised to Americans and British even
before the end o f the war, and to the great disappointment o f Turkish diplomats, when
the newly re-installed Kuwaiti government gave full-page length advertisements in
Western press, thanking all the states participating in the campaign against Iraq by
name, they simply "forgot" to mention Turkey among them. Moreover, the promises
made by the Gulf states to make good Turkey's financial losses due to the Crisis and the
embargo on Iraq were, despite various diplomatic initiatives, slow to be delivered and
in any case not wholly fulfilled. Moreover, the much expected construction market of
Iraq, too, could not be tapped by Turkish construction companies because o f
continuing UN embargo, which, it seems, caused "more damage to Turkey than any
945other country, except Iraq". According to President Demirel, the war and embargo 
against Iraq cost Turkey $ 15-20 billion, of which she had been compensated "three or 
four billion" by "our friends in the Gulf'. Turkey was still owed by Iraq about $ 2 
billion, he added, and was losing about $ 600-700 million a year that she had collected
9 A f\for the use o f the pipeline
M ore importantly, the effect o f the UN embargo on Iraq was heavily felt,
especially in southeastern Turkey, where the economy had depended on trade with Iraq
and where Turkey's Kurds had been active, which made the embargo all the more
important to Turkey. Thus, not surprisingly, president Demirel spoke o f what he called
the political and social problems caused by the UN embargo in southern Turkey.
Therefore, Turkey wanted the embargo lifted. However, as o f June 1994, the embargo
was still in place, mainly because o f the US resistance in the UN Security Council - but
247at the cost o f more Turkish resentment o f the West.
Finally, almost three years after the Crisis, it seemed that the much-praised 
Turkish-US understanding was also changing. The US military aid to Turkey had
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already been cut because o f US's overall budget cuts, and Turkish-American relations 
are strained over what appeared as successful attempt in the Congress, led by Greek 
lobby, in inserting a clause to the 1995-US aid bill to Turkey, conditioning 10% of the 
military aid to the improvements in Cyprus and Kurdish questions.
Hence, as a result, it could be argued that although Ozal's foreign policy during 
the Gulf War was successful in challenging the fundamentals o f Turkey's traditional 
foreign policy, it failed to foresee the long-term effects o f the crisis, and thus, while 
bringing about potentially important changes in Turkey's role in the Middle East, it had, 
at the same time, raised long-term questions.
The ingenuity o f his policy during the Crisis was that it made a virtue o f the 
support that Turkey was, in any way, bound to give to the international effort to isolate 
Saddam Hussein. The weaknesses were that it exposed Turkey to the Iraqi military 
threat during the Crisis and its retaliation afterwards, and committed her for the first 
time since the dissolution o f the Ottoman Empire to becoming involved in Middle 
Eastern uncertainties. This fact represented arguably by far the most important 
development ensuing from the Gulf Crisis with respect to vital Turkish interests. It also 
stood out as the most important challenge for both domestic and foreign policies to 
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In recent years, the international community has witnessed dramatic changes. None, 
perhaps, was so greatly welcomed as the end of the Cold War. As the Berlin Wall 
crumbled, the Eastern Europeans took their future into their own hands and the Soviet 
Union disintegrated, the Cold War was declared over and the World anticipated the 
dawn o f an unprecedented era o f peace, stability and democracy. Today, unfortunately, 
the wisdom o f these anticipations is questioned. The initial optimism and euphoria have 
been silenced by extremely grave problems which have subsequently developed. The 
community o f nations was either ill-prepared to recognize such problems or simply too 
slow in preventing them. However, if one thing is certain today, it is the "change" that 
the international system has experienced and continues to be influenced by.
Amidst the dust created by these momentous systemic changes in international 
politics, Turkey, once a distant outpost o f NATO on the European periphery, has 
emerged as an important actor, poised to play a leading role across a vast region 
extending "from eastern Europe to western China". This change in Turkey's status, 
however, was not accidental, but was due to wider changes experienced within and 
around Turkey during the 1980s. Without denying the importance o f the impetus and 
options that were provided by the end o f the Cold War, this study aimed to explore the 
transformation that Turkey had experienced in every aspect o f human relations during 
the period under consideration; this is what provided the powerful impetus to grasp the 
opportunities sprung from the end o f the Cold War.
Today, Turkey is a country on the move. The roots and dynamics o f this lie in 
the changes that affected her throughout the 1980s, changes without which she could 
not have expected to benefit from her new role as it emerged in the international arena
after the end o f the Cold War.
The introduction o f this study identified variables that may effect and bring 
changes to a country's foreign policy. They were changes in the nature of the political
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regime including the balance of power within, and composition of, the policy-making 
system, in the socio-economic dynamics; and in the external environmental 
circumstances. Throughout the text they provided a helpful guide for interpreting 
changes in Turkey's foreign policy.
T he N atu re  of the Regime and External Reactions
During the 1980s, Turkey passed through different regimes: The decade started with a 
period o f multi-party democracy, which was entrapped by mounting terrorism and 
rampant economic disasters, and which was abruptly interrupted by the September 12 
coup d'etat. What followed was three years o f outright military dictatorship and a 
transitional period which finally gave way once again to a multi-party parliament, if not 
full democracy. Thus, from the outset, it might seem that Turkish politics ended the 
decade where they had originally started. However, appearances are mostly deceptive 
in the social sciences. Thus, the Turkey of December 3, 1990, when the Chief o f Staff, 
General Torumtay, resigned because the governing framework at the top clashed with 
his "principles and understanding of what the state should be",* was fundamentally 
different from that o f September 12, 1980, when the then Chief o f Staff, General Evren, 
led a junta to dislodge the elected government because "the state had been rendered 
unable to function...and the political parties have failed to bring about unity and
9
togetherness".
The difference between these two actions is important because, as Chapter 
Three demonstrated, the September 12 Coup and the developments following it were 
hugely important for Turkey's external relations, especially with European democracies. 
In general terms, it was shown that the nature of the political regime o f a country 
affects its foreign policy and relations. Furthermore, the various aspects o f this 
connection were identified. It was shown that the nature o f the political regime o f a 
country and its composition affects its foreign policy for mainly two reasons. Firstly, 
the political regime has the power to define the broader framework o f the country's
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overall political philosophy, which, in the final analysis, constrains, if not conditions, its 
choices in the international arena, since it determines how the regime sees itself vis-a- 
vis other regimes or state groupings. Secondly, the nature o f political regime in a 
country also creates images outside the country and any change in the "established" 
political regime o f a country tends to attract reactions from other countries, which, 
again in the final analysis, might result in pressures for change.^ Accordingly, it is one 
o f  the conclusions o f this study that during the 1980s, being governed by a military 
dictatorship or a transitional democracy at best, circumscribed Turkey's options in the 
foreign policy arena and put constraints on her already existing relationships. 
Specifically, this effect manifested itself in Turkey's relations with western European 
countries, mainly because of the nature of her existing linkage patterns with them. 
Especially the western Europeans, who were non-committal in their early reactions 
towards the coup, in time became hostile towards it because o f what they perceived as 
the impossibility o f condoning a military dictatorship, with its deteriorating human 
rights record and torture allegations, and especially o f accepting it within the European 
"democratic club". On the other hand, due to the presence o f a linkage area between 
Turkey and Europe, the European countries chose to pressurize Turkey instead o f 
pushing her out o f the European system, and thereby their influence area. However, the 
"ever-lasting" foreign (read: European) pressure created a counter-reactive attitude in 
Turkey, forcing her to look for alternative options to Europe. In this context, president 
Evren's reminder that Turkey was "a Middle Eastern country as well as a European 
one" was indicative of where Turkey's search for new partners would lead her.
Another important aspect of the connection between Turkey's domestic political 
situation and external perceptions and also reflections o f it, was that the effects o f the 
democratic nature o f the Turkish politics on'her foreign policy gain meaning primarily 
in the context o f Turkey's Western vocation, and external pressures are only effective 
so long as the subject state is receptive to them. It has been confirmed by this study that 
the internationalization o f Turkey’s domestic politics has created a constant restraint on 
governments, and as such had effects both on the country's domestic political
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evaluation and on her foreign relations as well. The crucial factor in this connection has 
been Turkeys receptivity towards external, that is European, pressures due to the 
existence o f political, economic, military and ideological linkages between her and 
Europe. While these linkages enabled Europeans to pressurize Turkey on certain 
aspects o f her internal politics, especially over her human rights record and the 
democratization process, Turkey's own identification with Europe at the same time 
made her susceptible and responsive to such pressures.
Approached from this angle, it becomes easier to understand why successive 
Turkish governments have reacted harshly when faced with European criticism, and 
why they attributed such importance to the opinions of an otherwise marginal European 
organization, i.e. the Council of Europe. Turkey's membership o f the Council was an 
institutionalized proof of her Europeanness for the Turkish westernizing elite, and their 
ideological and indentificational linkages demanded being part o f that community of 
nations, namely Europeans.
The strength and importance o f Turkey's linkages with western Europe was 
amply demonstrated by the fact that even during the worst period o f European 
criticisms, the Turkish leadership chose to stay and faced the criticisms instead of 
taking the country out o f the European realm. Thus, during the period under 
consideration, European attempts to influence were strongly felt in Turkey and, 
whatever the political rhetoric to the contrary, were responded to. Although this 
response usually manifested itself in publicly defiant attitudes, most o f the time the 
governments were quietly engaged in diplomatic and propaganda campaigns in western 
states both to "explain" Turkey's policies and to curtail further public criticisms.
In the process, however, Turkish foreign policy, especially vis-a-vis western 
Europe, became dependent both on domestic political developments and on European 
reactions to them. The latter, in turn, were an important input in determining domestic 
political developments, as well. Although it is difficult to ascertain the exact proportion 
o f the effectiveness o f European pressures on Turkey' democratization process, it is 
pretty clear that Turkey's "western vocation" and her long history o f westernisation
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affected this transition to a considerable extent.^ On the other hand, during the process, 
Turkey and the European countries grew apart, both because o f the Turkish people's 
disappointment with the Europeans who "let them down in their hour o f need" and also 
because o f considerable coolness o f European public opinion towards Turkey, created 
by what appeared as yet another demonstration of the Turk's inability to sustain a 
workable democracy and by a constant barrage of criticism directed toward her which 
highlighted her deficiencies vis-a-vis Europe and as such built up the "otherness" o f 
Turkey.
It was asserted in the introduction that a critical international environment may 
create pressures on a country for reappraisal o f its hitherto followed policies. In other 
words, it was claimed that international responses to domestic policies o f a country may 
force it to reconsider and if necessary change its foreign policy stand. It is now one o f 
the conclusions o f this dissertation that the external, that is mostly European, criticisms 
and hostile international, i.e. European, environment faced by Turkey after 1980 forced 
the hands o f her leaders to look for new foreign policy patterns and were also 
instrumental in Turkey's openings towards the Middle East and former Eastern Block 
countries. All this, o f course, denies neither the role of domestic actors and internal 
factors, nor the effects of systemic changes in general in reformulation o f Turkish 
foreign policy. But the emphasis here, in contrast to the official Turkish view, is on the 
existence o f a linkage pattern between international pressures and Turkey's domestic 
political developments, a connection which ultimately affects her foreign policy as well.
The Composition of, and Balance o f Power in the Decision-Making System 
The nature o f the political system also affects the combination and/or structure of 
policy-making bodies. It was mentioned earlier that the 1982 Constitution, prepared by 
the military regime, gave priority to a strong state and a strong executive within that 
state, and moreover favoured the president against the Cabinet, as reflected in the 
strong positions taken both by president Evren and later by president Ozal in their 
relations with the different governments. This eventually had a spill-over effect on
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foreign policy, as well as domestic policies, an area which hitherto governments had 
tended to leave to experts and foreign ministry bureaucrats.
However, equipped with strong powers and charismatic leadership, president 
Ozal, for example, was able not only to canalize Turkey's external relations towards 
realization o f his "vision", but was also able to conduct daily foreign policy as well as 
determining long-term guide-lines for, and thus mapping out future options for, Turkish 
foreign policy. Although president Ozal's successor, Mr S. Demirel, has so far used his 
powers with more restraint than his predecessor, the powers and the institutional 
structure for forceful presidential domination over Turkish politics, both domestic and 
external, are there for future aspirants. Therefore this aspect o f Turkish politics should 
be kept in mind when considering Turkey's future foreign policy moves. These powers 
would enable presidents with a political background and strong convictions about the 
country's place in the world to impose their "vision" on the foreign ministry, possibly 
against what the latter considered as the "national interests" o f the country. Since 
obtaining a consensus on what constitutes the "national interest" o f a country is a 
difficult, if not impossible, task, this aspect o f Turkish politics, with its foreign policy 
overtures, could create extreme tensions within the decision-making bodies o f the 
country and among public opinion in general, as exemplified in Turkey during the Gulf 
Crisis o f 1990-1991.
In a country like Turkey where the military normally plays larger role in 
determining what is in the "national interest" o f the country than in the liberal western 
democracies, a clash between the opinions of the executive and the General Staff 
always carries dangers o f another possible attempt to dislodge those who opposed tfce 
military's vision. Although it has been argued above that the Turkey o f the 1990s is 
much different from earlier periods, and in this context another military intervention in 
Turkish politics is highly improbable, it can not be entirely disregarded that the 
possibility is still there and one can conceive various possible future scenarios where the 
military might find it extremely difficult to resist intervention. For example, in a 
hypothetical effort for the sake of an argument, a situation can be imagined where a
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break-up o f the unitary Turkish state might seem imminent because o f a Kurdish 
uprising in the southeastern comer of the country, or in an Algerian-type situation 
where the secular outlook of the country was threatened because o f a takeover, 
democratic or otherwise, o f power by Islamic forces, that the military might consider it 
as its duty again to "save the nation". O f course, answers to such questions as to 
which direction Turkish foreign policy might be forced to take if that were to occur, 
and what would be the external reactions to such an event, which would eventually 
have an important effect on Turkish foreign policy as we have seen throughout this 
study, could only be speculative. However, if the past is in any way indicative o f the 
future, it could be argued that yet another military intervention in Turkey, even if it was 
to keep unitary, secular and pro-westem Turkey intact within the western political 
system, could have devastating affects on Turkey's European relations and its leaders 
might, ironically, end up severing Turkey's western connections (if she had not already 
been forced out) because of the impossibility o f sustaining them in the face o f mounting 
criticisms and extreme pressures from Europe.
It was also argued in the introduction that changes in balance o f power within 
the policy-making body can affect a country's foreign policy. In connection with this we 
saw in Chapter Three how the dominance o f the military within the system affected 
both the foreign policy thinking and actions of Turkey. Later, Chapter Five showed that 
the inclusion o f hitherto obstructed Islamic forces into the realm o f decision-making 
bodies smoothed, if not directly called for, Turkey's openings towards the Middle 
Eastern Islamic countries. It was also documented that the dominance o f economically 
minded administrators, led by the then premier Ozal, within the government led to the 
"economy first" principle in foreign relations, and that various political and ideological 
differences were disregarded for expected economic benefits. O f course, the most 
telling change in the balance of power within the policy-making system during the 
period was the gradual concentration of powers in the hands o f late president Turgut 
Ozal. M ost openly the case study demonstrated that president Ozal, in time, became the
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sole policy-maker in foreign policy and in that capacity imposed his style and way o f 
governing on foreign affairs as well.
The Socio-Economic Dynamics
The political system o f a country is not, o f course, strictly limited to "politics" per se. It 
also includes the country's economic policies, its cultural affinities, ideological 
inclinations, and its arrangements for social order. In this context, it has been shown 
that Turkey's international affinities, in the first place, affected her economic policies. It 
was demonstrated that Turkey's opting for the liberal economy at the beginning o f the 
decade had much to do with her linkages with, and aspirations to be part of, the 
western political system. Turkey's partnership in the western political system and her 
essential role within it for western security interests, on the other hand, provided her 
with much more foreign aid and help during her economic transition than any other 
country that tried to do the same thing. Therefore there came into existence yet another 
linkage between Turkey and its western vocation thorough her transition to a liberal 
economy.
Furthermore, once Turkey had made her switch, her new liberal economic 
system demanded a certain set of political actions and international connections. The 
programme that introduced the liberal economy to Turkey on January 24, 1980, for the 
recovery o f the Turkish economy, necessitated huge amounts o f net foreign currency 
inflows into the country. The ways to generate the necessary amount included heavy 
borrowing from abroad, persuading foreigners to invest in Turkey, and increasing and 
diversifying Turkey's export potentials. However, the crucial point to all the economic 
measures aimed at obtaining the above mentioned results was that they all, in one way 
or another, depended on the willingness of other countries to respond in a way that 
would favour Turkey. Since it was clear that the success o f the programme depended 
largely on the availability of foreign assistance, it can easily be imagined how Turkish 
foreign diplomacy had to exert itself to maintain contact with the various assisting
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governments and organizations, as well as with their delegations in Ankara. Therefore, 
during the 1980s, as the Turkish economy progressively integrated with the world 
economy, the foreign ministry became increasingly concerned with obtaining necessary 
foreign loans, opening up necessary markets for Turkish goods, and striking necessary 
deals with foreign governments and sometimes even with companies in order to bring 
more investments into the country. Thus, as the foreign policy o f the country needed to 
be in tune with its economic programmes, economic necessities also became an 
important variable o f Turkish foreign policy making. As a result, for example, as 
Turkey's need for fresh markets was growing, so her political efforts to find openings in 
the Middle East and Eastern Block also increased. However, at the same time, 
realization o f the fact that the huge sums needed by the Turkish economy could come 
only from western sources, demanded a continuation in Turkey's linkages with the 
West. Any severing in political relations would have dealt a blow to her economic 
transformation as well.
On the social side, too, Turkey had experienced important changes during the 
1980s. The repression o f the liberal and left-wing intelligentsia by the military regime, 
and also their efforts to promote orthodox Islam as an antidote to extremism in society, 
have led to perhaps not totally unexpected, but unforeseen, result o f growing visibility 
o f Islam in Turkish society, which was also effected by the world-wide Islamic revival.
Although many high level and influential Mot. P members were branded as 
"Islamist", at least partial to Islam, by the secular Turkish intelligentsia, this study did 
not find particular instances during the period under consideration where the used their 
influence to get, and obtained, policy changes in foreign relations. Giving allowance Jo 
the problems, mentioned in the introduction regarding the difficulties o f separating the 
possible influence o f Islam from other motivating values, and also in distinguishing 
between Islam's motivating and/or justifying roles, a possible explanation emerges from 
the chapter three in connection with this subdued role o f the "Islamists" within the 
Motherland Party: the "Islamic faction" o f the party was pre-occupied most o f the time 
with a power struggle against the "idealist" and "liberal factions, and, at the same time,
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the leader o f the party, Mr. Turgut Ozal, who, as shown in chapter five, controlled the 
party completely, had strong foreign policy ideas o f his own and thus, thanks to his 
delicate balancing between various factions o f the party, did not allow any one faction 
to dictate his policy-making. Moreover, most o f the time, the presence o f ever-watchfiil 
President Evren against "Islamic" manifestations within Turkish politics, was also a 
restraining factor for Islamic influences on foreign policy.
As a result, especially up to 1989, the Islamic revival within the country had not 
particularly affected Turkey's foreign policy-making - provided that there was a desire 
and pressure for change from the "Islamists" since this is, save sporadic demands for 
closer relations with the Islamic countries, also difficult to pin down. Therefore, one of 
the actions that the Islamists were supposed to oppose strongly, that is Turkish 
application to the EC membership, went smoothly without significant opposition.
However, since 1989, the effects o f  the Islamic affinities, in connection with the 
ethnic and historic sentiments, seemed on the rise. Yet again, it was still very difficult to 
ascertain whether the Turkish public's outcries regarding the Karabakh and Bosnian 
conflicts were the results o f Islamic connections, or rather originated from what was 
perceived, by public at large, as attempts to wipe out Turkish ethnic'brethen in the East 
and Ottoman legacy in the West. The support displayed by the Turkish public in general 
to the Coalition war effort during the Gulf War indicates the dominance o f the latter - 
although it could be argued that the Turkish public's support could be seen within the 
context that the Islamic countries themselves were divided about the issue, it may be 
sufficient to point out that even within those Islamic countries sided with the West 
there were strong anti-Western sentiments in contrast to Turkey where most of the 
opposition came from the outlawed left-wing Revolutionary Youth, and callings from 
the Islamic extremists failed to mobilise Turkish public in general.
In conclusion, therefore, it could be argued that the role o f Islam in Turkish 
foreign policy during the period under consideration was mostly confined to the 
justification o f the policies for which the government opted for other reasons, and 
Turkey's reorientation towards the Middle East during the 1980s was the result o f a
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combination o f factors, among which the Islamic revival in Turkey occupied a small 
part - as indicated by the fact that Turkey turned towards the Western Europe and the 
Soviet Union (later on former Soviet Republics) when the political and economic 
incentives for closer cooperation declined after 1985.
This discussion, then, brings us to the question o f the Turkish public's role in the 
changing patterns o f Turkish foreign policy during the 1980s. As elaborated in Chapter 
four, all the channels o f public expression were ruthlessly suppressed under the military 
regime (1980-83) to the point that the public opinion's role in foreign policy-making 
was minimal. It's affects, if there was any, during this period was only indirect in that 
the military regime was anxious to keep the public on its side. Thus the military leaders 
might have taken decisions which, they thought, would go well with the public, 
although, due to nature of the regime, there was no apparent domestic pressure on the 
military government.
Even after the return o f the civilian government, the recovery o f public opinion's 
freedom for expression was slow as a result o f various restrictions formulated by the 
new Constitution and other related laws. As stated earlier, under the new laws, the 
activities o f the various groupings, through which public opinion could be related to the 
government, were restricted to non-political areas, which by definition also excluded 
the foreign policy-making. Thus, most o f the period under consideration the 
governments got a "easy-ride" in foreign policy-making as far as the public pressures 
concerned.
However, as Turkish public opinion became an progressively important factor in 
the policy-making process, parallelling the increasing democratization o f society 
especially after 1989, the Turkish government had to resist particularly strong pressures 
over its policies towards the Karabakh and Bosnian conflicts.
From the government's point o f view, both o f these conflicts represented no-win 
situations. As far as the Karabakh conflict concerned, Turkish public opinion sided 
heavily with Azerbaijan, and the government was under pressure not to sit on the 
sidelines so long as the fighting continued. Non-intervention by Turkey only stirred up
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public opinion and also gave Iran an opportunity to steal the lead from Turkey and play 
protector to Azerbaijan. Intervention, on the other hand, would have been extremely 
costly for Turkey in her future relations in the Caucasus, and in her relations with 
Russia, NATO, and the United States. Hence, in her official approach to the conflict in 
Nagoma-Karabakh, the Turkish government faced difficult policy choices between 
domestic pressures, stemming from the sympathy o f the Turkish public for the Azeris, 
who they regarded as victims o f Armenian aggression, and its desire to remain neutral 
and play a moderating role. Moreover, the complacency with which Armenian military 
advances had been received in the West did not help the severely embarrassed 
government, which was not only pro-Western but did its best to remain on good terms 
with Armenia as well as Azerbaijan. Thus, it seems that this conflict firmly underscored 
the dilemma that would face Turkey in its future efforts to maintain strict neutrality 
regarding ethnic conflicts in the former Soviet republics.
Moving along from the former Soviet Central Asia and Caucasus to the 
Balkans, we come across yet another manifestation o f growing nationalism in world 
politics after the end o f the Cold War, which aroused great interest in Turkish public, 
that is the bloody struggle between Serb, Croat and Moslem forces over Bosnian 
territories. Though Bosnia is several hundred miles from Turkey's borders and the 
Bosnian Moslems are not ethnic Turks, it seems that Turkish public opinion has 
developed a feeling o f kinship and responsibility for the Muslims left behind by the 
retreating Ottoman empire from the Balkans after around five hundred years of 
domination.5 Moreover, the existence o f substantial numbers o f "Boshnaks", Turkish 
citizens o f  Bosnian origin, about four to five million, in Turkey further increased the 
identification o f Turkish people with the Bosnian Moslems.
What is important for future Turkish involvement in the region is that the 
importance o f religious and historical links, alongside ethnic bonds, seems to be on the 
increase in Turkey,6 and the Turkish government, as in the conflict between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, seems to be caught in between domestic pressure and what are 
considered by decision-makers as sensible and responsible policies. Thus, while the
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Turkish government in its official response to the crisis has been trying to be extremely 
restrained and has followed a policy aimed at creating coordinated policies with other 
states through international organizations, such as the UN, NATO, the CSCE and the 
ICO, in order to avoid charges that Turkey pursues pan-Ottomanist policies in the 
region, Turkish public opinion, increasingly frustrated by the inactivity o f the West, 
became very critical o f what they perceived as the passivity o f their government.
Although the Turkish government has so far resisted public pressure and 
avoided direct military involvement in either o f the conflicts, the increased importance 
o f religious and historical bonds may yet result in increased public pressure on the 
government to act - especially if conflict spreads out, in the Bosnian context, into other 
areas o f the region where Turkish minorities live, or, in the Karabakh context, to the 
Nachivan Autonomous Region - and thus Turkey may still get involved in situations 
where neither her security nor her national interests are directly threatened. There are 
already certain groups in Turkey calling for such an involvement in the Bosnian conflict 
in the name o f Islam or neo-Ottomanism. However, such Turkish actions would be 
bound to attract strong reactions from a wide number o f states and would be disastrous 
for Turkey in the long-term.
Moreover, there are much wider and maybe in the longer term more important 
aspects o f these conflicts for Turkish foreign policy. Most notably, a reassessment 
among the vast majority o f Turkish people about the "real face" o f the "western values" 
and the place o f Turkey vis-a-vis the West seems to be taking place. Especially in 
connection with the Bosnian conflict, whiie the Western inactivity towards Serbian 
aggression is increasingly interpreted as "Western complacency" towards Serbian 
atrocities, questions are raised about whether the West would have allowed the Serbs 
to conduct their so-called "ethnic cleansing" if the victims were Slovenians or 
Croatians, that is Christians instead o f Moslems. Thus speculations that Serbian attacks 
were in fact part o f a new "crusade" aimed at expelling the last remnants o f the 
Ottomans from Europe were also aired.
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Furthermore, there is also talk o f "double standards" as the West continues to 
keep its hold over Iraq even three years after the end o f the Gulf War, and criticisms 
over alleged Turkish human rights violations are ever-present, yet, at the same time, 
does "nothing" to prevent Serbs attempts to create "ethnically clean" greater Serbia.
These events in the Balkans, when viewed together with the Karabakh issue, 
where as mentioned earlier Turkish public .opinion again sees a Christian solidarity 
against Moslem Azerbaijanis, resulted in the questioning o f both Turkey's Western 
orientation and the desirability o f her further integration into Europe. In the meantime, 
pan-Turkist and neo-Ottomanist ideas made way among at least right-leaning 
intellectuals. Although it is not clear yet where these discussions will eventually lead 
Turkey, it would seem that, coupled with the frustration felt as a result o f "European 
rejection" o f Turkey, the above mentioned developments in the Balkans and the 
Caucasus are putting Turkey, under the public pressure, into a process o f yet another 
reassessment o f her self-identity in the early 1990s.
The External Environment: Systemic Changes (1989-1991)
The importance o f the external environment, especially regarding Western European 
reactions to the military coup and the subsequent evolution o f Turkish democracy, has 
already been elaborated above. Towards the end o f the period under consideration yet 
another impetus for change, originating in the external environment, came to dominate 
Turkish foreign policy-making and forced her to reconsider her place and standing in 
the world. This was the transformation o f Eastern Europe and the dismemberment o f 
the Soviet Union, which had enormous impacts both on Turkish foreign and security 
policies and on the Turkish world view in general.
It has been argued that "perhaps no other country outside the former Soviet 
block has seen its strategic position more radically transformed by the end o f the Cold 
War than Turkey".8 Throughout the Cold War, as mentioned earlier, Turkey was a 
distant outpost on the European periphery, a barrier to Soviet ambitions in the Middle
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East, and a contributor to the security o f Europe. Turkey's geostrategic "value" was 
largely limited to its role within the Atlantic Alliance and, more narrowly, its place 
within NATO's southern flank.
By the end o f the Cold War, however, all these were altered by the appearance 
o f new zones o f conflict on three sides o f Turkey which arguably enlarged Turkey's role 
in the world. Further, the emergence o f six independent Muslim states to the northeast 
opened Turkey's eyes to a vast territory inhabited by some 150 million fellow Muslim 
Turkic-speakers. The years o f claustrophobia suddenly ended, and under the prevailing 
atmosphere o f subsequent euphoria, Turkey's common cultural, linguistic, and religious 
bonds with the newly independent Central Asian and Caucasian republics were 
frequently mentioned, both within and without Turkey, and she was seen as an 
economic and political model for these new states.^ Even limited pan-Turkist ideas 
were circulated freely. In return, the Turks and Muslims o f the former Soviet Union 
turned to Turkey to help them achieve momentum, consolidate their independence, and 
gain status and respect in the world.
It was not long, however, before this euphoria become tempered by reality, and 
it soon became clear that Turkey's financial and technological means were too limited 
to meet the immense socio-economic needs o f the underdeveloped former Soviet 
republics as Turkey also gradually discovered that the links between the Central Asian 
republics and Russia, in some cases forged over centuries and reinforced by need and 
dependency, were far more solid than originally suspected. While optimism gradually 
replaced by disillusionment, there is even now a suspicion that earlier enthusiasm was 
merely an empty pretence, "that in reality Turkey is too weak to have more than* a 
marginal impact on these republics".^
The truth o f the matter is that Turkey today is facing tremendous opportunities 
and potential new risks in Central Asia and the Caucasus, all o f which collectively pose 
extraordinary and complex challenges. Having based her whole post-war foreign and 
security policies on the strategic importance for the West o f her location vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union, Turkey, initially hardly welcomed the end o f the Cold War. As the
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relevance o f NATO in the "new world order" was opened up to discussion, especially 
by the western Europeans who were moving towards a new defence arrangement 
without Turkey, she suddenly found herself in a situation where she felt threatened both 
by the lingering uncertainties regarding her immediate neighbourhood and by the fact 
that her western security connection, the anchor o f her European vocation, was 
fundamentally damaged by the end o f the Cold War, which hitherto provided her with a 
relative safety and stability in the region. The realization that she may find herself facing 
military threats virtually all around her and it may not be possible to evoke the western 
security umbrella for protection, shook the very foundations o f Turkish security 
thinking and policy, and the need to reassess its post-Cold War situation vis-a-vis 
potential threats was alarmingly expressed at the highest levels.
Thus, by 1990, the external stimuli for change in her traditional foreign policy
was its utmost. On the other hand, while the disintegration o f the Soviet Union came to
the fore, Turkey, too, as discussed above, was going through a process o f reassessing
her foreign policy orientation and some of its essential ideological underpinnings. At
this juncture the emergence of the Turkic states beyond her northeastern border was a
welcome break, as put by the daily Milliyet, "it has been a great , thrill for Turks to
11realize that they are no longer alone in the w.orld".
Today there is a growing awareness and a new sense o f ethnicity in Turkey, "in
19a society not very used to talking about such things", and the talk o f a "Turkish 
speaking community o f states stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall o f China" 
became increasingly common. In the process, however, the lines between "Turkish" and 
"Turkic" became increasingly blurred.13 In this context, it is not totally unexpected that 
as the "Turkic power" grows in the world, it will be likely to exert an ever greater 
impact on nationalism in Turkey itself, spark a more activist Turkish foreign policy, and 
perhaps a new quest for influence.
In the mean time, a greater Turkish role has also been favoured by the West as a 
counter-weight against the ambitions of Iran to influence the region. The fear that the 
vacuum left by the collapse o f Soviet Communism could lead to an emergence of
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Islamic fundamentalism among the Moslem republics of Central Asia led to the West's 
promotion o f  Turkey as a Moslem, yet a secular and democratic model. In President 
Demirel's words, Turkey had proved that "Islam, democracy, human rights and market 
economy could go together hand in hand".14 Although cultural, linguistic, and religious 
affinities were the stimulating factors for the forging o f closer ties, the Turks expect to 
gain major economic benefits from the development o f closer ties with the Central 
Asian Turkic republics, which are seen as promising for a growing Turkish industry. 
However, in the more immediate future, the region presents important challenges for 
Turkey.
A Sum m ary of T urkey’s Foreign Relations and T heir D eterm inants in the 1980s
With these general observations in mind we can now draw up some concrete summaries 
from this study both about the factors that affected Turkish foreign policy and also 
about her external relations during the 1980s with specific states or state groups.
1980-1983: The Military Regime
The September 12, 1980 military coup d'etat had a deteriorating effect on Turkish- 
European relations. Although the military regime from the beginning declared its 
distinctly pro-western attitude, the incompatibility o f military dictatorship with the 
liberal democratic tradition o f the West, coupled with the slight willingness on the 
European side to show an understanding o f Turkey's political problems, resulted in 
widespread European criticism and strained relations. Consequently, Turkey's relations 
especially with the European representative institutions, such as the Council o f Europe 
and the European Parliament, suffered considerably. Moreover, European 
organizations, and also governments as well, attempted to use their political and 
economic leverage on Turkey during the period to obtain an early return to democracy 
and improvements in human rights conditions in Turkey. Although these attempts were 
partly successful because of Turkey's receptiveness towards such pressures as a result
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o f her European vocation, they also created counter-reactions among the Turks as they 
resented being subjected to foreign pressures.
During the same period (1980-1983), Turkish- American relations, however, 
expanded as the latter, in contrast to the Europeans, showed an understanding towards 
Turkish problems mainly because o f reigning strategic considerations. Thus, in the 
atmosphere o f renewed Cold War, American military and economic aid to Turkey 
increased and a relatively unproblematic period o f Turkish-American relations 
developed. Strategic considerations and further rapprochement in Turkish-American 
relations were also instrumental in Turkey's conciliatory attitude in the Aegean where 
Turkish interests clashed with those o f Greece. As a result, the normal flight conditions 
were allowed to resume in the Aegean air space and, after a personal "promise" from 
NATO Secretary-General General Rogers to General Evren, Turkey dropped her 
objections to Greece's reintegration into NATO structures. However, this initial 
conciliatory attitude by Turkey did not result in further normalization o f Turkish-Greek 
relations as the Pan Hellenic Socialist Party o f A. Papandreou came to power in Greece 
in 1981 with an anti-Turkish rhetoric and propaganda.
During the same period Turkey's political contacts with Islamic and Communist 
countries also increased as the former needed new outlets and political allies in the face 
o f mounting criticism and increasing alienation from Europe. The latters' largely 
uncritical attitude towards the military regime greatly facilitated these contacts. 
Moreover, adoption o f a liberal economic strategy based on export-led growth 
demanded new markets and large foreign inflows. Given the fact that the political 
standstill in Turkish-European relations further hindered Turkey's efforts to rally any 
concerted European effort to save her, she had to turn increasingly to US-dominated 
international monetary organizations for necessary foreign aid, and to the Middle East 
and former Eastern Block for new export markets. Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq war, 
towards which Turkey took a neutral stand, was largely instrumental in new economic 
surge towards the Middle East as both countries were forced by the war to rely
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increasingly on Turkey for their necessary supplies and for their connections with the 
West via Turkish territory.
The most important determinants o f Turkish foreign policy during the military 
regime were, thus, the heightened strategic considerations as a result o f the renewal of 
Cold War; the necessities and demands generated by the revitalization o f the national 
economy; and the nature o f the political system in Turkey which largely conditioned 
Turkey's European connections.
Return to Democracy: 1983-1991
Although the gradual return to Turkish parliamentary politics from 1983 onwards 
should have ideally provided a base for normalization of Turkish-European relations, 
the reality differed as European criticism continued to focus on the deficiencies o f the 
Turkish political system and persisting practices o f torture and other human rights 
abuses. Consequently Turkish-European political relations were slow to recover, 
despite the willingness and various attempts o f consecutive Ozal governments. 
Towards the end o f the decade, parallelling her democratization process, Turkey had 
gained most o f the lost ground in her relations with the European states and 
institutions. Yet further progress beyond that point proved impossible, and the Turkish 
application for full EC membership was clearly refused in 1989 not only in 
consideration o f Turkey's economic deficiencies, but also its political short-comings and 
alleged "cultural differences". This in turn created a new wave o f resentment within 
Turkey and brought about questions over the sustainability, and indeed the desirability, 
o f  existing patterns o f relations between Turkey and Europe.
Turkish-European economic relations, on the other hand, recovered from their 
lowest point during the military regime, despite the inability o f Turkey to obtain further 
concessions from the Community for her exports, especially for textile products, and 
release o f the fourth financial protocol of the EC mainly because o f Greek objections. 
In this recovery, the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the decreased purchasing power of 
Middle Eastern countries as the oil prices declined after 1985 played an important part
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since the decline in the Middle Eastern market forced Turkey to turn to her traditional 
European markets. O f course, gradual relaxation o f political tension also played an 
important role.
Turkish-Greek relations continued to be strained during the period, despite 
various overtures from both sides for normalization of relations, and in March 1987 
reached a point o f almost open military conflict over the Aegean Continental shelf. This 
resulted in consecutive meetings o f prime ministers and foreign ministers o f the two 
countries and since then relations remained strained but contained. The declaration of 
independence by TRNC in December 1983 was particularly instrumental in earlier 
worsening o f relations. Moreover, constant Greek attempts, after its membership to the 
EC, to make the Community a party to Turkish-Greek disputes and its continuing 
blocking o f the normalization o f  Turkish-Community relations also created tensions 
between the two countries. Thus both the Cyprus question and the problems between 
Turkey and Greece in the Aegean remain today as unsolvable as they have ever been.
Turkish-Middle Eastern relations, on the other hand, continued to develop 
during the Ozal governments despite the fact that part o f the economic incentive for 
closer relations disappeared gradually after 1985. In continuation o f improved relations, 
important roles played by the growing ideological and cultural affinities o f the ruling 
political elite with these countries and by the insistence o f Mr. Ozal to open up Turkish 
foreign policy towards new centres. Moreover, especially in Turkish-Iraqi relations, the 
perceived common security threat from Kurdish separatists was a source for closer 
relations. However, specially towards the end o f the decade, and certainly after the end 
o f the Iran-Iraq war, relations with Iraq, and also with Syria, were strained because.of 
the water issue, which became so explosive in the region that it was referred as a 
possible source o f the next Middle Eastern war.
However, "the next war" in the Middle East erupted between Iraq and the US- 
led coalition forces over Kuwait. Turkey's policies during the Crisis, as documented in 
the case study, both showed deviations from her established Middle Eastern foreign 
policy patterns and presented important clues about her post-cold war foreign policy
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stand. Again as maintained in the case study, Turkey's Gulf policy, which was marked 
by active involvement in contrast to the earlier Turkish stand o f not getting drawn into 
Middle Eastern affairs, was heavily determined by president Ozal, and as such 
represented part o f his "vision" for Turkey's future role in regional and international 
politics. In the process, however, he precipitated a vigorous debate within Turkey over 
his role as president and the extent o f his authority.
Turkish-American relations continued to enjoy cooperation during the decade, 
again heavily influenced after 1983 by Turgut Ozal, who concluded that the US was 
undisputed leader o f the world and that Turkey should closely associate herself with it 
in international politics in order to attain her deserved place in the world, if not to 
prevent US influence over world politics from harming various Turkish interests. It was 
also true that there was a genuine appreciation, and admiration, o f "American ways" in 
general by Turgut Ozal, which was formed during his stay in and various visits to the 
US. Moreover, friendship between two presidents, Ozal and Bush, further introduced a 
personal touch into Turkish-American relations, and strategic cooperation that reached 
its peak during the Gulf Crisis when Turkey unequivocally supported the American 
stand against Iraq. However, afterwards cooperation, though continued, somewhat 
cooled down as the change o f governments in both countries brought into power 
people with more restrained foreign policy priorities. Also the logic o f strategic 
cooperation somewhat changed its character, if not actually declined, with the end of 
the Cold and Gulf wars and the emergence o f new conflict centres in the world. 
Concomitantly, American aid to Turkey declined, creating a Turkey somewhat more 
reluctant to commit itself to US priorities in international politics. Moreover, the 
preference o f coalition government in Turkey after 1991 to improve her relations with 
Europe instead o f more dependency to the US, in contrast to president Ozal's earlier 
preference, appears as an important factor that needs emphasis.
Turkish-Soviet (and later Russian) relations, also, continued to improve during 
the second half o f 1980s and important cooperation especially in the economic realm 
came into existence. In this context, Turkey's innovative attempt to bring together
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those countries bordering directly the Black Sea or neighbouring them is an interesting 
attempt and, though still in its infancy period, may yet develop into an important 
organization in the region, enabling its members to cooperate on political as well as 
economic areas in the future.
In conclusion, it is the assessment o f this study that, during the 1980s, despite 
widening and expanding her connections with new centres, Turkey kept her traditional 
pro-Western orientation intact. Thus through her explorations, guided by the leadership 
o f Mr. Ozal, Turkey o f 1980s, while trying to keep her Western pillar untouched, 
despite a series o f odds, has added new components - the Middle East, the Caucasus 
and the Balkans - to the substance o f her foreign policy. As the balance o f relations was 
being re-ordered to make room for new actors, Turkey's multi-dimensional setting was 
emphasised once more and her role in bridging different cultures and geographical 
settings was underlined, without, however, loosing sight o f her Western vocation.
Finally, it should be mentioned that, in the absence o f a driving force like Ozal, 
exercising a decisive influence in foreign policy, it is likely that the main directives and 
areas o f emphasis in Turkish foreign policy as manifested during the 1980s should be 
expected continue to exist both in the external and domestic environments during the 
1990s and beyond, unless dramatic international changes necessitate widespread 
reconsideration o f its pillars. As far as domestic influences are concerned, the Kurdish 
separatist movement, possible serious economic difficulties, and the rising power of 
Islamic forces should be watched as likely factors inhibiting the smooth functioning of 
Turkish foreign policy in the near future.
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